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Abstract 
This thesis explores the evolution of the European Union’s (EU) Latin America policy 
through an analysis of factors internal to the EU’s foreign policy decision-making system. 
Its policy towards the region has changed in important ways over time and appears to 
have come to be more and more incoherent. Adapting existing Foreign Policy Analysis 
frameworks to the specific context of the EU’s foreign policy, this thesis seeks to 
understand how factors of bureaucratic politics shape the EU’s foreign policy towards 
third actors. It is hypothesized that where an analytical perspective which evaluates the 
EU’s increased policy incoherence towards Latin America as the result of rational 
decision-making is not satisfactory, bureaucratic politics need to be considered instead. 
Under this perspective, the EU’s policy incoherence is influenced by policy inertia arising 
out of previous commitments, the divergence of views between different internal EU 
actors, the autonomy of these to take decisions without prior consultation or coordination 
with others, and lastly the complexity and duration of EU foreign policy decision-making 
processes themselves. This research framework is then applied empirically by analysing 
the EU’s negotiations for international agreements with partners in the Latin American 
region, and particularly those with regional organizations since the 1990s. This thesis finds 
that despite attempts to strengthen foreign policy coordination and coherence in the EU 
over time, the coherence of its Latin America policy has indeed been affected by 
bureaucratic politics arising out of factors such as changes to the internal organization of 
the European Commission or the disruption of established coordination mechanisms 
through the Treaty of Lisbon. The findings contribute to our understanding of the 
evolution of EU-Latin American relations, on-going debates on the study of 
interregionalism, as well as more generally to the literature on EU foreign policy-making. 
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CHAPTER 1:  
Introduction 
1.1 EU foreign policy coherence towards Latin American: Why bother? 
The initial motivation for this thesis was based on the fact that the EU’s policy towards 
Latin America, originally founded on the pursuit of interregional ties and the conclusion 
of international agreements that would link all of the EU’s policy areas relevant for the 
region in a comprehensive framework, appeared to gradually become more incoherent 
over time and across policy areas. This was despite various reforms to the EU’s foreign 
policy system aiming at increasing the coherence of its foreign policy outputs. The 
contrast between the pursuit of coherence through systemic changes and the observation 
of foreign policy incoherence towards Latin America thus provides for this thesis’ main 
puzzle. In turn, the main research question is to understand what has driven the 
formulation of incoherent policy outputs despite the EU’s institutional reforms. 
Since the 1990s, the European Union’s (EU’s) Latin America (LA) policy has 
generated a number of innovations and superlatives for its foreign policy. The 1997 
Global Agreement with Mexico was at the time “one of the most ambitious pacts ever 
negotiated by the EU with a state that has absolutely no possibility of joining the EU.” 
(Szymanski and Smith 2005, 172) Signed in 2002, the Association Agreement with Chile 
was in turn “the most comprehensive agreement ever signed with a third party”, serving 
as “a model for current EU negotiations and a statement of future intentions.” (García 
2011, 501–2) The 2010 Association Agreement (AA) with Central America then 
represented “the first ever region-to-region agreement of the EU covering at the same 
time political dialogue, cooperation and trade” (Van Rompuy 2010). These innovations 
occurred despite the fact that the region is geographically distant from the European 
Union, is not amongst its major trade partners, and does not enjoy an eventual 
membership perspective.  
When taking a long-term look at the evolution of the EU’s relations with the 
Latin American region since the 1990s, it is possible to identify two over-arching 
dynamics: the EU’s pursuit of supporting regional integration mechanisms through the 
development of region-to-region ties, on the one hand, and to institutionalise and deepen 
its existing relations by means of the negotiation of Association Agreements (Dominguez 
2015, 172). The latter represent an important innovation in the EU’s foreign policy as 
they attempt to link different policy areas of the EU’s relations with third actors under a 
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single institutional framework that is codified in international law: once ratified they 
become international treaties between the EU and its member states on the one hand, 
and the third actors in question, on the other. This comprehensive approach is best 
explained in a memo from the European Commission on the 2010 Association 
Agreement with Central America: 
The Association Agreement consists of three pillars: political dialogue, 
cooperation and trade. The Agreement is a comprehensive tool that provides 
with [sic] all the means needed for an integrated relation, going from political 
dialogue to cooperation and trade. The different parts of the Association 
Agreement complement each other. That is the most important added value 
of this instrument. It is not only a trade agreement and it goes far beyond 
traditional agreements as it creates interdependence between the various parts 
of the Agreement. (European Commission 2012) 
While both the pursuit of interregionalism, defined as the development of ties 
between different regional integration mechanisms, and that of Association Agreements 
have been important dynamics in the EU’s Latin America policy in their own right, and 
each provide distinct ideal-types for how the relations could to be structured, the two 
have often been closely intertwined. For instance, in the case of its ties with Mercosur, 
the Andean Community (CAN) and Central America (CA),  
the EU has promoted integration in these three groups through covert and 
overt means, not least by making economic negotiations contingent on 
further integration. (García 2015, 622) 
All three subregional groupings mentioned above are similar to the EU in their 
economic and political ambitions, but less integrated and institutionalised as yet. Despite 
these attempts to foster Latin American regional integration through the development of 
interregional ties in what has been described as a “one-size fits all approach” (Börzel and 
Risse 2009, 10) since the mid-1990s—that would have seen the EU negotiate Association 
Agreements with all relevant regional groupings—the state of EU-Latin American 
relations today demonstrates that this has not been realized in most instances, and the 
reality of EU-Latin American relations is much more complex. 
For the purposes of this thesis, Latin America is defined as all hispanophone 
and lusophone countries in the Americas excluding those whose relations with the 
European Union are shaped by the CARIFORUM Economic Partnership Agreement 
(EPA).  Already before the EPA relations with these countries were governed by the 
specific framework of the EU’s ties with the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group 
of states, and have been dealt with in such a separate manner for a long period of time. 
The above definition thus excludes most Caribbean countries and dependent territories 
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of EU member states located geographically in South America and the Caribbean basin, 
such as French Guyana or the Falklands Islands. 
In turn, when referring to European Union foreign policy a similar definition to 
the one developed by Federica Bicchi is taken, which defines 
European foreign policy (EFP) as that body of declarations, decisions, and 
actions, that are made by the use of all the instruments that the EC/EU has 
at its disposal, that are decided at the EC/EU level, and conducted in its name 
toward a country or an area outside its borders. (Bicchi 2007, 2) 
Under her definition European foreign policy encompasses the activities of the 
EU towards specific third actors, be these activities either directly targeted at them or 
having indirect effects on them. This is in line with research outlining the existence of a 
‘European foreign policy system’ (K. E. Smith 2003; M. E. Smith 2008; White 1999a), 
which posits that the EU’s foreign policy is much broader than its activity in the realm of 
the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). For the purposes of this thesis, this 
will be referred to as European Union Foreign Policy (EUFP) so as to limit the scope to 
the activities of the European Union and not that of other international organizations in 
the region.  
 
Table 1: EU agreement negotiations in Latin America 
 
Target 
 
Start 
  
End 
 
Trade 
 
Cooperation 
 
Political 
Mexico 1996  1997/1999 X X X 
Mercosur 2000      
  Brazil 2007   X 
Chile 2000  2002 X X X 
Andean 
Community 
2007      
  Colombia 2010 X   
  Peru 2010 X   
  Ecuador 2014 X   
Central 
America 
2007  2010 X X X 
Cuba 
 
2014  2016  X X 
Horizontal dividers denote grouped negotiations. Source: Own compilation.  
 
Taking stock of the EU’s relations with Latin America reveals the extent to 
which these diverge from the two goals of interregionalism and Association Agreements 
outlined above. Relations with the entirety of the Latin American and Caribbean region 
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are limited to the political realm and defined by a regular dialogue mechanism that has 
been set up in the guise of biannual EU-Latin America and the Caribbean summits since 
1999. Nowadays these bring together the EU, and its member states, on the one hand 
and all member states of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States 
(CELAC) on the other.1 The evolution of the EU’s ties to subregional organizations and 
individual countries also differs from the two perspectives set out above. Table 1 provides 
an overview over the EU’s negotiations for international agreements in the region and 
the ultimate negotiation outcome. 
With the exception of the agreements with Mexico and Cuba aside, all 
negotiations listed above began within an interregional setting, and were grouped as 
parallel processes in different waves of negotiations (as marked by the horizontal dividing 
lines). While the former is one of the most important Latin American economies, it 
nonetheless differs from the remainder of the region in that it is integrated with North 
America through the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and has until 
recently not been a member of any of Latin America’s substantive subregional integration 
mechanisms. In contrast, Cuba’s distinct political history as a communist country meant 
that the country has not joined either of the above regional integration mechanisms either. 
When negotiations began for an Association Agreement with Mercosur and 
Chile, it was hoped that the country would eventually join Mercosur, thus simultaneously 
supporting the enlargement of an existing regional integration mechanism (García 2011, 
151). The next grouped set of negotiations was that for Association Agreements with the 
Andean Community and Central America, which passed through the EU’s foreign policy 
decision-making system in parallel up to their eventual ratification by the European 
Parliament (EP). All of the interregional negotiations were flanked by other policies aimed 
at ensuring their success, such as through earmarking large parts of the EU’s development 
cooperation funding towards the region for the specific goal of regional integration, 
including the direct support of the regional integration organizations themselves 
(European Commission 2007c). 
While the initial goal of all negotiations was to reach comprehensive Association 
Agreements, covering all three ‘pillars’ (policy areas) included in the EU Central America 
Association Agreement detailed above, the ultimate outcome of the negotiations has only 
been compatible with this in three cases: the Global Agreement with Mexico, and the 
Association Agreements with Chile and Central America. Furthermore, in the case of 
                                                
1 This organization regroups all 33 sovereign Latin American and Caribbean states. 
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negotiations with Mercosur, the interregional approach was replaced with one that 
prioritised Brazil over the others and included only a political component under a 
‘strategic partnership’ (which is not based on a binding international agreement, but rather 
defined by ad-hoc declarations and fora for cooperation). In the context of negotiations 
with the Andean Community, the EU’s approach shifted towards bilateral trade 
negotiations with some of the countries in question only, and abandoned the two other 
pillars of the proposed Association Agreement entirely. Additionally, only the agreements 
with Mexico and Chile have been fully implemented so far, with only the trade provisions 
of the accords for which negotiations concluded in 2010 being in force today. 
When comparing the initial format and goals of the negotiations to their eventual 
outcome, a considerable discrepancy can thus be observed. If the EU’s policy goals in the 
region were indeed to support regional integration mechanisms and to link the most 
relevant elements of its policies targeted at it through comprehensive and binding 
international agreements, as suggested by the initial format of negotiations, then the 
outcomes indeed do not cohere with the initial overarching aims. After all, if such 
negotiations were meant to be used as a means to foster regional integration, as was 
suggested by María García (2015, 622), then the abandonment of an interregional 
approach in the case of Mercosur and the Andean Community is incompatible with this. 
 
Table 2: EU trade with Latin American partners (2015 data) 
  
With EU 
 
EU total 
 
EU Rank 
Andean Community 15.3 0.8 3 
Central America* 13.3 0.3 2 
Chile 14.4 0.5 3 
Cuba 22.8 0.1 2 
Mercosur 19.1 2.6 1 
Mexico 
 
7.1 1.5 3 
Partners’ trade with EU and EU trade with partner as % of total, EU rank as partners’ 
trade partner. Source: Own compilation based on DG Trade data. * 2012 data. 
 
The lack of attempts to include all three pillars of the Association Agreements 
in the ensuing bilateral negotiations with Brazil, Colombia, Peru and Ecuador provides 
further evidence for a departure from the original negotiation position. This is particularly 
relevant as the EU disposes of important advantages in the negotiations, namely the 
benefits that come with granting access to its single market, and the EU’s development 
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cooperation funding towards them, which should mean that the EU can wield 
considerable influence in the region (García 2015). Table 2 shows that for some of Latin 
America’s regional organizations and countries the EU is the most important or second 
most important trade partner. This is not the case from the perspective of the EU as most 
Latin American trade partners only account for a small percentage of total EU trade. 
It appears thus that the EU’s policy towards the region is incoherent over time 
when looking at the changing negotiation framework outlined above, and despite the fact 
that the EU should have an advantage in any of the above negotiations. This pattern can 
be detailed further when considering some of the specifics surrounding the negotiations. 
In the case of the talks with the Andean Community, for instance, the EU’s rhetoric of 
regionalism support has continued even after interregional negotiations were abandoned 
and replaced entirely by bilateral ones. For instance, a European Union strategy paper on 
Latin America from 2009 stated that 
Encouraging regional integration remains a key policy priority in EU relations 
with Latin America and the Caribbean, as shown mainly in the negotiations 
on sub-regional Association Agreements. (European Commission 2009, 4) 
This was despite the fact that at the time the CAN negotiations had already been 
abandoned and replaced through bilateral Free Trade Agreement (FTA) negotiations with 
Colombia and Peru only. This approach is conceptually incompatible with the support of 
CAN itself, as it weakened political and economic cohesion within CAN, with one of 
CAN’s members, Bolivia even threatening to take the other members to the Andean 
Court of Justice over the bilateral nature of negotiations (ICTSD 2008). Yet even the 
eventual FTA reached with both regions makes specific reference to CAN integration in 
its article 10, which is devoted entirely to regional integration: 
The Parties recognize and reaffirm the importance of the respective regional 
integration processes between the Member States of the European Union and 
between the Andean Community Member Countries as a mechanism to 
achieve greater trade opportunities and foster their effective integration into 
the global economy. (Official Journal of the European Union 2012, Article 
10.2) 
Furthermore, despite the fact that by 2010 these negotiations had been reduced 
to the bilateral trade realm only, the rhetoric of the EU’s support for regional integration 
and ties that go beyond a mere trade component was even upheld at the 2010 EU-Latin 
America and the Caribbean Madrid summit, the final declaration of which stated: 
We hereby commit to further strengthening this partnership, with the goals 
of deepening political dialogue and regional integration (Council of the 
European Union 2010b, 6). 
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Nonetheless, even alternative possibilities to uphold the aim of reaching a 
stronger format for political dialogue and cooperation with CAN in absence of an 
Association Agreement were de facto abandoned on the EU’s side. While the Andean 
countries completed the process to ratify a previous Political Dialogue and Cooperation 
Agreement (PDCA) signed in 2003 by 2012 (Comunidad Andina 2012), Germany and 
Greece and thus consequently the EU itself have not yet done so in 2016 (Council of the 
European Union 2016). This is despite the fact that the European Commission’s 2009 
Latin America strategy specifically mentioned that the PDCA should be ratified and 
enhanced in order for the EU’s interregional approach to remain intact even in absence 
of an Association Agreement with CAN itself (European Commission 2009, 4). Instead 
of attempting to ratify the PDCA, which would have provided for a format to interact 
with the entirety of CAN, further bilateral political dialogue mechanisms with Colombia 
and Peru were set up to complement those included in the FTA.2  
Incoherence between the EU’s abandonment of interregional negotiations with 
CAN and development cooperation funding towards the region can also be observed. 
When its multiannual programmes targeted at the organization and its member states were 
up for review in 2010—a point in time when the interregional perspective in negotiations 
had already been abandoned and Ecuador had left the remaining bilateral negotiations 
with Colombia and Peru—the mid-term review of the funding allocated to the latter 
country nonetheless suggested to 
increase NIP II [National Indicative Programme 2011-2013] funds by an 
additional €4 million to support the eventual implementation of the EU-CAN 
multiparty trade agreement currently under negotiation. (European 
Commission 2010, 17) 
The fact that the country did not partake in the initial negotiations was only 
mentioned in the development cooperation programming for the 2014-2017 period. 
While the support of the country’s regional integration was still included as a major goal 
of the EU’s development cooperation for the period in question, it nonetheless 
acknowledges a possible risk to the effectiveness of such programmes given that its 
ultimate participation in the EU’s Free Trade Agreement with Colombia and Peru 
remained uncertain (EEAS 2014). 
The example of the EU’s negotiations with CAN, and the accompanying 
rhetoric and policies thus allows for the identification of further incoherence in the EU’s 
policy towards the region in addition to the one observed above. On the one hand the 
                                                
2 Internal CFSP document dated October 2010. 
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EU’s rhetoric of regionalism support and the aim of developing ties with the region 
beyond the realm of its trade policy has been upheld despite the fact that both the 
interregional and comprehensive aspects of Association Agreements were abandoned. On 
the other, the EU does not appear to have adjusted its development programmes towards 
the Andean region, still providing regional integration support despite having abandoned 
it in the negotiations. 
Similar observations could be made for any of the other negotiations outlined 
above, with the case of policy incoherence detailed here in the Andean case serving as a 
mere illustration of a broader trend in EU-Latin American relations. This observation of 
policy incoherence over time and between different foreign policy areas, such as trade 
negotiations and the EU’s development policy can be made despite the fact that these 
developments occurred over a period of time in the evolution of the EU which focused 
increasingly on mechanisms to ensure that the EU’s foreign policy become more 
integrated and coherent. This began with the Treaty of Maastricht of 1992, which created 
the over-arching structure of the EU itself, and posited that 
The Union shall in particular ensure the consistency of its external activities 
as a whole in the context of its external relations, security, economic and 
development policies. (Official Journal of the European Communities 1992, 
Article C) 
 Most recently, the Treaty of Lisbon has created with the High Representative 
of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HRVP) and the supporting 
European External Action Service (EEAS), a post and an institution whose primary role 
is to ensure the coherence of the EU’s external policies. 
Given that an important factor of the institutional changes to the European 
Union since the early 1990s has been to increase the coherence of its foreign policy, the 
main puzzle in this thesis is thus why, despite such attempts, there appears to have been 
an increasing incoherence in the EU’s foreign policy towards Latin America induced by 
foreign policy changes over time, as well as between the different policy areas that make 
up the EU’s foreign policy overall. In short, what explains the incoherence of the EU’s 
foreign policy towards the region despite the creation and continuous reform of 
internal EU mechanisms to ensure its foreign policy coherence? 
Analytical perspectives based on the rational decision-making behaviour of 
individual actors in the international realm would caution researchers to seek an answer 
to the apparent incoherence of the EU’s foreign policy towards the region in a change of 
important factors that led the EU to adopt its Latin America strategy in the first place. 
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The apparent incoherence of the EU’s position that was observed would thus amount to 
a rational restructuring of its position in line with a change of such broad factors that 
warrant an alteration of the position of the EU along the lines observed. However, given 
the economic imbalances observed above, and little change to these conditions over time, 
the EU should have enjoyed significant clout in any of the above negotiations, making it 
difficult to imagine reasons that would have led to the abandonment of broader political 
and developmental concerns in negotiations with Peru and Colombia, for instance. 
Furthermore, the incoherence of the EU’s foreign policy observed here is not 
an isolated phenomenon, but has been observed even in recent years towards other third 
actors and across other policy areas (see for instance Furness and Gänzle 2016; Portela 
and Orbie 2014; Verdonck 2015). While this thesis is primarily concerned with exploring 
the underlying causes for a change from coherence to incoherence in the EU’s policies 
towards Latin America, it also seeks to contribute to broader enquiries into the 
incoherence of the EU’s foreign policy towards third actors and across policy areas. 
Given the apparent limitations of assumptions of rational decision-making in 
EU foreign policy processes, a key factor that has to be considered in this regard is the 
necessity for a decision-making system to produce parallel policy outputs that are 
consistent with one another in a number of ways. In absence of an only theoretically 
conceivable decision-making system with a perfect hierarchy where every policy output 
would ultimately stem from a single decision by a single empowered decision-maker, the 
main issue becomes that of being able to coordinate different policy outputs of a political 
system with one another. 
This “administrative Holy Grail of co-ordination and ‘horizontality’”, ie. the 
ability to link different policy outputs, “is a perennial quest for the practitioners of 
government” (Peters 1998, 295), and this has been no different in the case of the 
European Union’s external relations. Nonetheless, when considering reforms to the EU’s 
foreign policy decision-making over time it is striking that instead of increasing the EU’s 
ability to coordinate its external relations “each progress towards enhanced coherence 
was paradoxically increasing internal complexity” (Telò 2013, 27). 
The typical response to a lack of external policy coherence due to failures in 
policy coordination mechanisms has been to reorganize the functioning of the EU’s 
foreign policy bureaucracy in an attempt to foster coordination. This was achieved 
through treaty changes, portfolio and organizational reforms, or through the invention of 
new roles such as that of the EU’s High Representative for its Common Foreign and 
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Security Policy. The evidence on the increasing incoherence of the EU’s ties to Latin 
America outlined above, combined with the fact that EU has sought to increase the 
coordination capacity of its foreign policy decision-making system, will make it necessary 
to consider which broad factors internal to the set-up of the EU’s foreign policy 
bureaucracy affect its capacity to produce coherent foreign policy outputs. 
It is here that a consideration of analytical tools developed for the study of the 
foreign policy of states, namely Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) can help inform the study 
of the external relations of the EU which increasingly resemble those of states in nature, 
scope and ambition. Consequently, this thesis seeks to adapt and apply this framework to 
the study of the EU’s foreign policy with all its peculiarities. While the empirical side of 
the analysis will be concerned with factors contributing to the incoherence of the EU’s 
policy towards Latin America, this analysis allows to gain wider insights on the utility of 
using Foreign Policy Analysis to study the EU’s foreign policy.  
 
1.2 A brief outlook on the contributions and findings of this thesis 
By contrasting a rationalist perspective on the evolution of the EU’s relations with Latin 
America with one that explores it through the lens of Foreign Policy Analysis, the 
contributions of this thesis are two-fold: On the one hand it demonstrates the usefulness 
of adapting and applying FPA to external relations decision-making processes of the 
European Union, while on the other expanding our empirical knowledge of EU-Latin 
American relations and what this means for the EU’s pursuit of interregionalism. 
Each empirical chapter of the thesis explores whether the changes to the EU’s 
Latin America policy over time can be explored through a rational alteration of the EU’s 
foreign policy in line with wider changes to the reasons that led the EU to adopt its Latin 
America strategy based on regionalism promotion in the first place, or whether 
administrative factors as elaborated on in FPA literature offer a better understanding of 
the evolution of the EU’s policy towards the region. While the exploration of the 
rationalist perspective always seeks to unearth decision-making pathways that support 
that deliberate decision-making has contributed to the evolution of the EU’s Latin 
America policy, the hypotheses based on FPA evaluate the influence of different yet 
interrelated administrative factors, named various aspects of bureaucratic politics 
contribute to the generation of an incoherent foreign policy towards the region over time. 
In consequence, the thesis evaluates whether factors such as existing commitments and 
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administrative procedures, the diverging interests of different branches of the EU’s 
bureaucracy, the absence of clear decision-making hierarchies, as well as the involvement 
of many actors in long decision-processes negatively influence the EU’s capacity to 
formulate a coherent Latin America policy. 
Empirically-speaking, this thesis finds that the incoherence of the EU’s Latin 
America policy over time, which was outlined above, is even more complex when 
considering its details, and indeed increases over time even after the ratification of the 
Treaty of Lisbon. 
While at times, and particularly in the incipient stages of the formulation of the 
EU’s original Latin America strategy there is some evidence for the validity of 
perspectives that would emphasize the EU’s rational decision-making, most empirical 
chapters provide strong evidence for the influence of factors outlined in FPA literature. 
The thesis then provides clear evidence for the varying importance of all factors of 
bureaucratic politics considered having contributed to the increasing incoherence of the 
EU’s Latin America policy. Moreover the negative influence of aspects such as the role 
of diverging interests has increased over time. The complexity and long duration of EU 
foreign policy processes related to negotiations with third actors has also been a factor 
that contributed to the EU’s increasing foreign policy incoherence in its own right. 
Through the empirical insights outlined above this thesis provides some relevant 
insights for where researchers should focus their attention when trying to grasp the origin 
of incoherence in the EU’s foreign policy. Firstly, while the diverging positions of 
member states on various aspects of the EU’s foreign policy are an important source for 
the EU’s foreign policy incoherence, this thesis shows that the relations between different 
institutions at the EU level, and even various Directorates’ General inside the European 
Commission (and the EEAS since the Treaty of Lisbon), need to be considered for a 
better understanding of the multiple origins of EU foreign policy (in)coherence. Secondly, 
the duration of decision-making processes from a first consideration of signing an 
agreement with a third party to its ultimate ratification, needs to be considered as a source 
for foreign policy incoherence in its own right. Lastly, even though the Treaty of Lisbon 
radically reorganized the EU’s foreign policy bureaucracy, these changes have made the 
coordination of the EU’s external relations more difficult in practice. 
Going beyond elaborating on the utility of applying FPA to the study of the 
EU’s foreign policy and generating new insights on EU-Latin American relations, this 
thesis also contributes some insights to other literatures. Concerning research on the EU’s 
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interregionalism policies, this thesis confirms that these have weakened in recent times 
and that there is a strong divergence between its initial ambitions and their realization in 
practice. Furthermore, while the European Union emphasizes that it wants to link trade, 
political and development considerations, as is the case in its Association Agreements, 
trade concerns often prime over the others. 
 
1.3 The structure of the remainder of the thesis 
The following chapter outlines this thesis’ analytical framework in detail and situates it 
with the existing literature. Chapter 3 provides some background information on the 
evolution of the EU’s foreign policy decision-making framework focusing, in particular, 
on changes to the EU’s treaties that were meant to increase its external relations policy 
coherence, and different rounds of bureaucratic restructuring within the European 
Commission; all of which are likely to have had an impact on the EU’s Latin America 
policy. The first empirical chapter related to the examination of the EU’s policy towards 
the region (Chapter 4) then outlines the origin of its ‘one-size fits all’ policy during the 
1990s and how this initiated the negotiation of the EU-Mexico Global Agreement of 
1997/1999. The following chapter (Chapter 5) then discusses the evolution of the EU’s 
ties with Mercosur and Chile in detail, ending with the failure of negotiations for the 
Association Agreement with the former organization in the mid-2000s. Subsequently the 
evolution of the EU’s ties with the Andean Community of Nations and Central America 
are discussed (Chapter 6), focusing on the decision-making processes surrounding the 
Association Agreement negotiations and their successful conclusion in one case and their 
failure in the other. The final empirical chapter (Chapter 7) then outlines the growing 
incoherence in the EU’s Latin America policy after the end of negotiations outlined in 
the previous chapter, focusing on the EU’s negotiations with Cuba and Ecuador, as well 
as the upgrade of the EU’s initial Association Agreements with Mexico and Chile. The 
last chapter then draws conclusions from the empirical analysis in the chapters and 
evaluates the validity of the different hypotheses before discussing the contribution of 
this thesis in the context of the wider literature. 
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CHAPTER 2:  
The Analytical Framework: Studying EU foreign policy 
(in)coherence 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter outlines the analytical framework adopted in the thesis, details the research 
methodology used, and discusses the thesis in the context of the existing literature on 
EU-Latin American relations and that on European Union policy coherence. The main 
part of this chapter is thus concerned with discussing the analytical framework adopted 
and which hypotheses derive from this. In doing so it discusses why Foreign Policy 
Analysis literature was used and adapted to the context of the EU’s foreign policy rather 
than utilizing other theories such as new institutionalism to inform the analytical 
framework. Ultimately this chapter details that despite some differences with the foreign 
policy decision-making systems of sovereign states for which FPA was originally 
developed, it is nonetheless ideal to capture the complexity of the EU’s foreign policy 
system in the analysis undertaken in this thesis. 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: The following section 
develops a formal definition of EU foreign policy coherence which is required for a 
structured discussion as to its origins in the EU’s decision-making. This is followed by 
the outline of the analytical framework based on FPA and why it was chosen over other 
theoretical perspectives. The next section then outlines this thesis’ methods and 
methodology and describes the empirical sources that have been consulted in the writing 
process. Lastly, the thesis is situated in the wider literature on EU-Latin American 
relations and that on EU policy coherence. 
 
2.2 Defining EU foreign policy coherence 
EU policy coherence, at its most basic level, can be described as “the absence of 
contradiction between policies” (Portela and Raube 2012, 4). However, such a definition 
is the most minimal one imaginable and does not allow for a differentiation between 
different kinds of policy (in)coherence. Moving away from it, Leonard den Hertog and 
Simon Stroß (2013) have suggested instead that a mere absence of contradiction between 
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policies could rather be described by the term of consistency, which in itself would form 
a subset of policy coherence. In their view, policy coherence is instead as a more active 
process which “refers to the synergic and systematic support towards the achievement of common 
objectives within and across individual policies.” (italics in original, Hertog and Stroß 2013, 377). 
However, rather than describing different kinds of policy coherence, such a 
definition offers clues as to the conditions under which it may originate. This will later on 
form the basis for the generation of hypotheses as to why the EU’s foreign policy towards 
Latin America is incoherent. The definition developed here instead focuses on factors 
outlining how the EU’s foreign policy is incoherent. The evaluation of policy coherence in 
the context of this thesis is thus based on “systemic outputs, i.e. the way in which the 
substance of different policies generated by the EU forms part of a coherent whole.” 
(Christiansen 2001, 747) Policy outputs are defined here as the activities of the EU 
targeted at a third actor, be it through the disbursement of funds, negotiations for 
international agreements, or simple declarations targeted at said actor. 
When taking such a perspective it is then possible to define different kinds of 
coherence that need to be fulfilled for the EU’s policy outputs to be coherent overall. In 
this context most authors (Gebhard 2011; Hertog and Stroß 2013; Mayer 2013; Portela 
and Raube 2012) discuss at least two distinct kinds of policy coherence that need to be 
fulfilled for the EU’s foreign policy to be coherent overall, namely vertical and horizontal 
policy coherence. While the definitions differ to a certain degree, horizontal policy coherence 
is mainly described as the necessity for policy outputs to be consistent across various 
policy areas and different modes of decision-making at the EU level. While Carmen 
Gebhard (2011, 108) adds an additional factor, namely internal policy coherence, 
described as the absence of contradiction between policies falling under the remit of 
different former pillars of the EU’s structure, this is included in the definition of 
horizontal policy coherence provided here. An example for the lack of such horizontal 
policy coherence would be if different EU policies simultaneously aim to promote trade 
with a third country through FTA negotiations all while imposing economic sanctions on 
it in another. In contrast, vertical policy coherence focuses on the necessity for outputs at the 
EU level to match those of its member states. An example for this would be if the EU 
decided to halt its development cooperation funding towards a third country over human 
rights concerns, while some EU member states still continue to provide their own 
development funding to the third country unfazed by such considerations. 
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A third kind of coherence can be found in the EU’s interaction with third actors, 
namely external policy coherence, which considers the need for consistency between the EU’s 
outputs in international fora, be it of different internal EU actors towards the same third 
actor, or in different institutions, such as NATO and the OSCE (Gebhard 2011, 108–9). 
In consequence, “external coherence is primarily concerned with functionality and 
credibility rather than with specific foreign policy contents.” (Gebhard 2011, 109) 
Although delineating different elements of foreign policy coherence somewhat 
differently, two useful additions can be made to the above three types of coherence when 
looking at Hartmut Mayer’s (2013, 107) conceptualisation, as he adds a requirement for 
narrative and strategic coherence. Narrative policy coherence describes the necessity for the 
EU’s foreign policy outputs having to match the rhetoric which legitimizes them. While 
closely related to both vertical and horizontal policy coherence, given that the EU’s 
rhetoric may originate in a number of places, the justification for the EU’s policy outputs 
should nonetheless be considered independently from the outputs themselves, as was 
already done when outlining the research puzzle above. The last type of coherence to be 
considered is that of strategic policy coherence which is concerned with the EU’s policies 
following a broader goal. Mayer sees this as fulfilled when “[s]imilar or overlapping 
policies would follow the same principles, values and aims” (Mayer 2013, 107). Diverging 
somewhat from this definition, it will be used in this thesis to describe the necessity for 
policy outputs to be the same in similar situations, and that these should continue to be 
the same over time in absence of fundamental changes to the underlying situation that 
prompted such policy outputs in the first place. To return to the examples outlined above, 
in absence of a radical change in some underlying condition, the EU’s policy towards the 
Andean Community should have remained the same over time for this kind of coherence 
to be fulfilled. 
Taken together these five elements (summarized in Table 3) form a list of 
components of policy coherence necessary for the EU’s foreign policy towards a third 
actor to be coherent overall. Crucially, in line with others’ considerations the components 
of foreign policy coherence detailed here differ from the concept of policy effectiveness 
(Thomas 2012, 460–61), which is instead based on the effect of policy outputs. 
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Table 3: Components of EU foreign policy coherence 
  
Horizontal Consistency across EU-level policy outputs 
Vertical Consistency between EU-level and member state level policy outputs 
External Consistency of EU policy outputs in international fora 
Narrative Consistency between policy outputs and the surrounding rhetoric 
Strategic Consistency of policy outputs over time and across similar situations 
  
 
While the overall puzzle of this thesis is larger, and these definitions can be used 
for other aspects of EUFP outputs, taking the example of the EU’s relations with CAN 
from the introductory chapter help illustrate the value of separating different kinds of 
policy coherence. For the case at hand, at least three different kinds of policy incoherence 
can be observed: a lack of horizontal policy coherence between the EU’s trade and 
development policy, a lack of narrative coherence given the disjunction between the EU’s 
discourse on regionalism support and the abandonment of it in practice, and lastly a lack 
of strategic coherence given the change of the negotiation format over time. 
 
2.3 EU Foreign policy through the lens of Foreign Policy Analysis 
Given this thesis’ focus on determinants of EU foreign policy coherence towards Latin 
America, an analytical focus on the EU’s policy-making processes that generate 
incoherent outputs is necessary. This is in line with alternative and more process- rather 
than output- focused definitions of policy coherence. Thomas Christiansen argues that 
on the one hand 
we can conceive of ‘coherence’ in terms of the systemic outputs, i.e. the way 
in which the substance of different policies generated by the EU forms part 
of a coherent whole. Alternatively, we can regard ‘coherence’ in terms of the 
institutional process by which policies are made, i.e. in terms of the degree to 
which institution(s) operate a coherent and well-coordinated process of 
deliberation and decision-making […] which in the following is termed 
‘institutional coherence’. (Christiansen 2001, 747) 
Similarly, Michael E. Smith has argued that research into European Foreign 
Policy should use “actor-centred analyses where variations among, and linkages between, 
those actors are explicitly problematised rather than neglected or ‘assumed’ away.” (M. E. 
Smith 2008, 181) This view is shared by Simon Duke, a scholar of administrative 
processes in the EU, who cautioned that 
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For those with an interest in public administration and organizational science, 
coherence is assessed from the perspective of the administrative and 
bureaucratic bases of the organization, its routines, functioning, and 
resources. International relations scholars tend to concentrate on the 
coherence of the ‘end product’, assessing the outcome of policies or the 
uniform treatment of third parties by the EU. (Duke 2012, 45–46) 
In this view, the determinants of incoherent foreign policy outputs can thus be 
found in internal EU decision-making processes themselves, such as the interaction 
between the EU’s institutions, its member states, and the activity of different 
administrative units within the institutions themselves (Christiansen 2001, 748). This 
resonates with a specific field of enquiry in International Relations research, namely that 
of Foreign Policy Analysis. As Valerie M. Hudson argues, 
One hallmark of FPA scholarship is that the subfield views the explanation 
of foreign policy decisionmaking as of necessity being multifactorial and 
multilevel. Explanatory variables from all levels of analysis, from the most 
micro to the most macro, are of interest to the analyst to the extent that they 
affect decisionmaking. (Hudson 2015, 1) 
For FPA researchers, there is thus not a single model to explain foreign policy 
outcomes and its underlying decision-making processes. Rather, it encourages conceptual 
pluralism in an attempt to offer multi-faceted determinants of foreign policy outcomes. 
While developed and popularized in the specific context of explaining decisions of both 
superpowers during the Cuban Missile Crisis (Essence of Decision by Graham T. Allison, 
first published in 1971, then updated with Philip Zelikow in 1999), it has gained academic 
attention to explain all kinds of foreign policy choices, such as radical reorientations of 
states’ foreign policy in the aftermath of the Cold War (Carlsnaes 1993; Hermann 1990) 
or determinants of small states’ foreign policy choices in the context of NATO (Doeser 
2011). 
Initially FPA was developed to explore national foreign policy decisions in the 
realm of so called ‘high politics’, having to do with questions directly impacting on 
national sovereignty, such as defence or the membership of one of the Cold War’s two 
rivalling blocs. This would have made it difficult to apply FPA insights to the context of 
the EU, given that it is neither a state nor does it deal with most aspects of what has 
traditionally been considered ‘high politics’. Luckily, FPA has been adapted to contexts 
of ‘low politics’, such as the ones in which the EU plays an important role in and of itself. 
For instance, John Odell (1979) has studied the United States’ historic decision 
to move from a system of fixed exchange rates to a flexible one by applying insights from 
FPA literature. The EU has come to be involved in this realm through its Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU) and the associated common currency. Given the importance of 
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trade relations in EU-Latin American ties David A. Welch’s (2005) book Painful Choices: 
A Theory of Foreign Policy Change, which uses Canada-United States free trade negotiations 
as one of his case studies to illustrate his take on FPA, is even more important for this 
thesis. In the European context, Jakob Gustavsson (1998) has developed a theory of 
foreign policy change to explain the re-orientation of Sweden’s position towards 
membership in the European Union through economic factors. More importantly still, 
the very creators of FPA have argued in a footnote to a seminal article on bureaucratic 
determinants of foreign policy that while their arguments were limited to the realm of 
national security so as to provide for analytical clarity, “[e]xtension of the argument to 
other issue areas, e.g., foreign trade, is straightforward.” (G. T. Allison and Halperin 1972, 
47)  
While the problem remains that FPA has been developed to study the foreign 
policy of states, I will argue that it nonetheless can and should readily be applied to the 
context of European Union Foreign Policy. This is due to the fact that the EU by most 
standards can be considered as an entity which disposes of a foreign policy in its own 
right, if lacking some of the tools at the disposal of most sovereign states. While 
Christopher Hill has provided a useful general definition of foreign policy in a 
contribution that sees it as the “sum of external relations conducted by an independent actor 
(usually a state) in international relations” (Hill 2003, 3; emphasis mine), his focus on the 
activity of an independent actor is particularly relevant, as the EU is solely responsible for 
some parts of the traditional foreign policy of its member states, and it shares powers 
with them in others. This is particularly the case for its foreign economic policy, as 
exemplified through its activity in the realm of trade. Here, Michael Smith has argued that 
while the “aims and means” of the policy may be principally economic, its underlying 
reasoning could still be “implicitly political or concerned with security” (M. Smith 1994, 
287), thus rendering the EU’s external relations politically relevant. 
Furthermore, other authors have already used FPA to study foreign policy in the 
context of the EU, such as Henrik Larsen (2009) who has argued that an analysis of the 
foreign policy of EU member states necessitates an adaptation of FPA literature to take 
into account the existence of the EU. Conversely, Brian White (1999b) has argued that 
the existence of the EU offers new possibilities for the study of FPA itself. The most 
systematic attempt to utilize FPA to study the EU is an edited volume on Contemporary 
European Foreign Policy (Carlsnaes, Sjursen, and White 2004), which has argued that the 
existence of the EU requires a reconsideration of most FPA insights in the European 
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context. Some authors have also used FPA to study specific institutional dynamics of the 
EU’s foreign policy decision-making process (Dijkstra 2009). Lastly, some of the insights 
from FPA research promote a focus on the bureaucratic and institutional determinants 
of foreign policy which may actually be deployed for an even greater analytical gain in the 
context of the EU. While most states (despite important differences between them) 
dispose of some kind of ultimately hierarchical and unitary foreign policy decision-making 
system that is influenced by institutional and bureaucratic dynamics, bureaucratic factors 
may actually be even more relevant in the context of the EU:  
In contrast to states, which rely on one single bureaucracy for foreign policy 
and mostly a unitary source of foreign policy authority – the executive –, EU 
foreign policy has struggled with differences between the EU level and the 
member states as well as between the Community and the intergovernmental 
level. (Portela and Raube 2012, 4) 
Studying determinants of (in)coherence in the EU’s foreign policy thus requires 
a focus on internal EU decision-making processes and the actors involved in them. When 
taking such a perspective the use of Foreign Policy Analysis literature appears logical given 
that it cautions that foreign policy decisions should be analysed as more than rational 
decisions by unitary actors in the international system. While some differences exist 
between the EU and the foreign policy apparatuses of sovereign states, for which FPA 
was initially developed, this thesis argues that it can still be usefully deployed to study the 
EU’s foreign policy. 
 
2.3.1 EU-level decision making as the primary level of analysis 
While International Relations research has historically placed the level of analysis at the 
systemic level, ie. where different independent actors interact with one another, FPA 
literature has cautioned from the very beginning that such a perspective should be 
supplemented by others which focus on the foreign policy bureaucracies of states 
themselves (G. T. Allison and Zelikow 1999). This raises the question as to where the 
equivalent lies when studying the EU’s foreign policy given the parallel existence of 
member state foreign policies and ministries in addition to that of the EU itself. 
Michael E. Smith (2008) has pointed to these challenges for conducting research 
into what he calls European Foreign Policy. For him, this term encompasses the co-
ordination of European states’ foreign policy, either at the national level, or by making 
use of the EU’s institutions and policies, or as a mix of both. While his definition 
encompasses the object of interest for this project, the view taken in his work is a member 
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state-centric one, which sees the EU’s institutions primarily as facilitators for collective 
action as is the case in classic principal-agent approaches. 
Extending on the earlier definition, European Union Foreign Policy is the set of 
“systematic EU intervention” (H. Smith 1998, 168) towards third actors or regions that 
goes beyond policy boundaries and modes of decision-making in the EU’s bureaucracy 
(H. Smith 2002, 9–10). The primary level of analysis is thus the EU’s collective foreign 
policy output in the name of the EU and at the level of the EU’s institutions. The analysis 
in this thesis therefore spans across the EU’s former pillars of decision-making, an 
approach also favoured by other FPA scholars who have studied the EU (White 2004, 
15–17). This is also particularly relevant for researchers interested in the EU’s relations 
with Latin America, as “going beyond CFSP is crucial to include the key themes of EU-
LAC [Latin America and the Caribbean] […] relations” (Ruano 2013b, 16). 
This leaves the question of the continued existence of the foreign policies and 
related ministries and decision-making processes of the EU’s member states and how to 
integrate these into the perspective taken in this thesis. This problem of a ‘Multilevel 
Foreign Policy’ (Foradori, Rosa, and Scartezzini 2007), where decisions taken at the 
national and EU-levels—sometimes even by the very same actors—influence the 
coherence of the foreign policy of the EU itself has been recognized by others as well.  A 
conceptual solution to this problem lies in an adaptation of Robert Putnam’s two-level 
games approach (Putnam 1988) to the specific context of the EU. Here, Sarah Collinson 
(1999, 217–20) has suggested that decision-making in the EU’s commercial policy should 
be conceptualized as a three-level game instead, which simultaneously considers the 
bargaining of the EU’s negotiators with third actors at the international level, the 
bargaining taking place at the EU level, as well as that at the national level. This has been 
applied and refined in an article on the EU’s negotiations for the EU’s 1999 Trade, 
Development and Cooperation Agreement with South Africa. The author cautions that, 
“[t]he main argument of the article is that the three-level game model needs 
to place its domestic focus at the level of the Commission, rather than, as is 
done in most traditional three-level game models, at the level of the Member 
States” (Frennhoff Larsén 2007, 858). 
Conceptualizing the main level of analysis as that of the EU’s institutions (but 
not limited to the Commission), and treating these as the main foreign policy 
bureaucracies that are the subject of most FPA literature thus allows for overcoming the 
problem of the continued existence of member state foreign policy decision-making 
processes. Instead, member state activity will be considered mainly in the context of their 
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actions in the Council of the EU, with each member state seen as a part of the internal 
Council decision-making processes. 
 
2.3.2 The hypotheses: Different yet related ‘lenses’ on EU foreign policy 
(in)coherence 
In line with existing FPA scholarship, foreign policy decisions can best be understood 
when analysed through different analytical ‘lenses’. In consequence, the analysis of the 
emergence of the EU’s foreign policy incoherence towards Latin America will be studied 
from two broadly different perspectives and their ultimate explanatory value thus 
explored. 
A first analytical lens that can be taken is to consider whether the observed 
incoherence of the EU’s foreign policy output is actually the result of rational decision-
making within the EU’s foreign policy bureaucracy, that is, decisions were taken because 
decision-makers considered that the EU needed to change its policy towards the region 
in such a way. This corresponds roughly to the first analytical perspective explored in 
Graham T. Allison’s and Morton Halperin’s work on the Cuban Missile Crisis, which 
describes it as follows: 
This approach depends primarily on the assumption that events in 
international politics consist of the more or less purposive acts of unified 
national governments and that governmental behavior can be understood by 
analogy with the intelligent, coordinated acts of individual human beings. 
Following this approach, analysts focus on the interests and goals of a nation, 
the alternative courses of actions available, and the costs and benefits of each 
alternative. (G. T. Allison and Halperin 1972, 41) 
In this view foreign policy decisions are based on rational decision-making. In 
the case in question the result of this process would be the change of foreign policy 
outlined above. Given this assumption of rationality, a previous foreign policy towards a 
third actor would only change when a cost-benefit analysis of various underlying factors 
warrants it. A specific part of the FPA literature that is concerned with foreign policy 
change allows for the identification of different such factors, or ‘drivers’ for change in the 
foreign policy of individual states. Charles Hermann (1990, 10–13) has identified four 
such factors: 1. Leader-driven change 2. Bureaucratic advocacy 3. Domestic restructuring 
4. External shocks. The first describes the initiation of the process for foreign policy 
change based on authoritative top-down decisions by political leaders, due to a change of 
opinion at that echelon. The second encompasses instances in which groups of officials 
lobby for a reorientation of foreign policy in absence of political leadership. The third 
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then describes changes as induced by altered majorities after elections which may bring a 
party to power that has a different vision as to how foreign policy should be conducted. 
Lastly, and perhaps most relevantly, external shocks describe the initiation of foreign 
policy change as warranted by changes to the external environment of a state which is 
perceived by actors in a state’s foreign policy decision-making system. 
While leader-driven change in the context of the EU appears unlikely given the 
absence of a single foreign policy decision-making hierarchy, any of the other factors 
relevant for foreign policy change to occur could be of importance in the context of the 
change in the EU’s Latin America policy. Nonetheless, the existing literature has 
privileged the consideration of external factors, and particularly the effect of the United 
States’ policy towards Latin America (García 2008, 234, 2015; Grabendorff 2005; Gratius 
and Legler 2009; Roy 2010; Santander 2005). María García suggests in particular that 
developments in the realm of international trade have altered the EU’s rationale for the 
negotiation of Association Agreements over time: 
The AAs emphasize continued commitment to, and hopes for, regional 
integration. However, given changes in other economic powers’ trade 
strategies and setbacks at the WTO, since 2006 the EU has been willing to 
forgo some of its interregional objectives in favour of perceived 
improvements in competitiveness. (García 2015, 636) 
A similar explanation for the EU’s partial abandonment of interregional relations 
can be found in the literature that explores its emergent complex interregionalism:  
This situation is a first indication of the diplomatic implications of complex 
interregionalism: the EU has tried to privilege the interregional level of 
relations above all others, but because of slow progress has now been forced 
to return to the bilateral level of relations with key partners. […] 
Although the EU has tried to operate all of its relations in Latin America at 
the interregional level, predominantly economic balancing and bandwagoning 
reasons have forced it to sign important bilateral agreements. […] It appears 
that if the interregional approach is not proving fruitful, then the EU will 
consider a bilateral approach, although the EU will only consider the bilateral 
option when there are pressing relative economic concerns, such as the 
countries in question signing agreements with the EU's competitors. 
(Hardacre and Smith 2009, 182) 
In consequence, the EU’s shift to bilateral agreements can thus be explained by 
changes to external (economic) factors that shaped the EU’s initial policy towards the 
region which was based in interregionalism. To this another dimension based on the 
weakness of regional integration schemes in Latin America can be added. As Roberto 
Dominguez (2015) has argued, the EU’s shift towards bilateral agreements in the region 
can also be explained by Latin America’s inability or unwillingness to deepen their regional 
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organizations which would be a prerequisite for the signature of interregional agreements 
with the EU. 
Nonetheless, the presence of external factors for foreign policy change towards 
Latin America is only a first step in concluding that it was indeed based on rational 
decision-making in the EU’s foreign policy bureaucracy. After all, drivers for foreign 
policy change are little more than “[e]xternal stimuli […] that potentially form feedback 
to the policymakers” (Hermann 1990, 16). These still need to form the basis for the 
rational cost-benefit analysis taking place in a foreign policy bureaucracy that ultimately 
shape the change of foreign policy. This is particularly important, as in the case under 
consideration there would need to be additional evidence suggesting that the reasons 
leading to the EU’s increased shift towards bilateralism have also informed the decisions 
that have led to a continuation of the previous rhetoric of regionalism support and 
development cooperation projects based on such an over-arching goal. A reason for this 
could be concern for a loss of reputation: 
Diplomatic negotiations take time and sudden changes may be a sign of 
unreliability. Other countries may perceive change as inconsistency that 
undermines credibility. (Kleistra and Mayer 2001, 383) 
While a foreign policy change based on external economic conditions may have 
become necessary, the continuation of the previous rhetoric could have been based on a 
calculation that the EU’s foreign policy activity needed to continue to appear consistent 
despite an actual underlying foreign policy change. In that sense, the observed 
incoherence of the EU’s foreign policy outputs could still be based on coherent and 
rational internal decision-making. This proposition can be summarized as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Rational incoherence — The observed incoherence in the EU’s foreign policy 
towards Latin America is in reality the result of rational decisions based on cost-benefit analyses that 
have occurred within the EU’s foreign policy bureaucracy. 
 
This contrasts with a second perspective which sees bureaucratic processes 
themselves as determining factors for foreign policy decision-making, which has come to 
be known as the  bureaucratic politics paradigm (G. T. Allison and Halperin 1972). Jerel 
A. Rosati (1981, 236–38) provides a concise overview of it, summarized in four 
propositions: Firstly, the bureaucratic politics paradigm assumes that multiple entities and 
individuals make up the executive branch of any government, that these differ in their 
assessment of specific issues and that their individual preference structure differs. 
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Secondly, there is no dominant institution or individual in any state’s foreign policy 
decision-making system, although presidents/heads of government hold a particular and 
privileged position. Thirdly, foreign policy decisions are the outcome of bargaining 
between the different actors involved in foreign policy decision-making. Lastly, there are 
gaps between decisions taken and how these are being implemented. 
This perspective resonates with the above elaboration on internal determinants 
of EU foreign policy coherence, and provides an analytical lens that contrasts with the 
one seeing the EU’s policies towards Latin America as the result of rational decision-
making. Where the bureaucratic politics paradigm comments on the activity of the 
executive branch of national governments, this thesis instead considers the entities 
involved in the EU’s foreign policy decision-making towards Latin America at the EU 
level, similarly stipulating that no single actor is in a dominant position to define the EU’s 
foreign policy towards the region. In consequence, this thesis’ second hypothesis which 
contrasts with the first analytical lens can be summarized as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 2: Bureaucratic Politics — The incoherence in the EU’s foreign policy towards 
Latin America is the result of bureaucratic processes and institutional factors that shape the EU’s 
decision-making. 
 
In and of itself this hypothesis cannot be operationalised, and needs to be further 
detailed in individual sub-hypotheses, so as to be able to study how the various elements 
that are parts of bureaucratic politics may have shaped the EU’s policies towards the 
region. While each provides a distinct perspective on internal EU foreign policy decision-
making, these sub-hypotheses by definition interact and overlap. For instance, the degree 
to which one of the factors underlying one of the sub-hypotheses influences EU foreign 
policy decision-making may be aggravated or moderated by another. 
An initial element to consider here is that foreign policy change, and even more 
so change that is coherent in its outputs is a difficult process that is hampered by existing 
bureaucratic processes and commitments. Even when decision-makers agree on a foreign 
policy change, it will take time to permeate existing bureaucratic structures, as these 
operate according to specific organizational cultures which develop over time (Beach 
2012, 142). To simplify the functioning of complex bureaucracies, often ‘standard 
operating procedures’ (G. T. Allison and Zelikow 1999, 169–70) are developed to deal 
with specific situations. A decision on foreign policy change will often require changing 
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such procedures and altering the existing administrative culture before the policy change 
can be implemented. This is particularly important in contexts where an institution is 
short-staffed and struggles to keep up with the demands placed on it. Notoriously low 
staffing levels have been a major problem for the EU’s development policy bureaucracy 
in the past (Orbie and Versluys 2008, 69), and the same can currently be said of the EU’s 
trade policy (see chapter 7). 
There are also material factors limiting the EU’s capacity for foreign policy 
change, related to the long timeframes of certain EU programmes and the way in which 
funding decisions are taken internally. Certain parts of the EU’s policy towards a given 
third actor may be predetermined due to long-term funding commitments and planning 
periods. This means that certain EU policies can only be altered with great difficulty in 
the short-term, such as its development cooperation funding which is based on six-year 
planning periods, in line with the EU’s budget. 
The capacity of the EU to change its foreign policy coherently may also be based 
on the fact that many actors in the EU’s foreign policy system are influenced by existing 
principles, values and norms that have previously served as its basis for foreign policy 
action. It is generally assumed that most actors in a foreign policy system share certain 
underlying values and beliefs: 
Beneath the differences that fuel bureaucratic politics is a foundation of 
shared assumptions about basic values and facts. These underlying 
assumptions are reflected in various attitudes and images which are taken for 
granted by most players. (G. T. Allison and Halperin 1972, 56) 
When it comes to the specific example of the EU, Daniel C. Thomas has pointed 
out that 
the policy-making behaviour of member states is shaped significantly by 
shared perceptions regarding which policy options are consistent or 
inconsistent with pre-existing EU norms and commitments. […] As a result, 
once member states have committed themselves to a particular set of norms 
and/or policy course, they are likely to find themselves entrapped, 
constrained to take further actions that do not reflect their original intentions 
and/or current preferences […]. If this is correct, one would expect EU 
common and community policies to be consistent with pre-existing EU 
norms and policy commitments. (Thomas 2011, 15–16).  
While his argument is limited to the behaviour of member states, it can easily be 
extended to other institutional actors involved in the EU’s foreign policy, such as the 
European Commission and its various administrative sub-entities. Even where a change 
of policy may have been the outcome of a rational decision, the presence of such 
entrapment may lock in specific policy outputs by individual institutional actors, thus 
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increasing the risk of horizontal and rhetorical policy incoherence. This problem can also 
be fuelled by the power of precedent, as long-standing (public) commitments and 
resources dedicated to a previous policy goal will make it more unlikely for actors to want 
to initiate a change of policy (Thomas 2011, 17), and even less so when the suggested 
policy change is incompatible with other EU policy goals (Thomas 2012). The public 
dimension of this has been described as rhetorical entrapment (Schimmelfennig 2009; 
Splidsboel Hansen 2006), where an alteration of the EU’s policy will lead it or its 
institutional actors to incur a loss of reputation given previous public commitment to a 
specific policy goal. 
The first sub-hypothesis to be considered is thus based on the fact that it is 
difficult to translate foreign policy decisions coherently into foreign policy outputs given 
the existence of previous commitments, the prevalence of established views on an issue, 
as well as established bureaucratic procedures. Translated into the format of a hypothesis, 
this proposition reads as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 2a: Policy inertia — Even where a rational cost-benefit analysis may mean that the 
EU should change its Latin America policy in a coherent way, existing procedures, assumptions and 
commitments will render a coherent change of policy less likely.  
 
Aside from the mainly material factors, such as the long timeframes of existing 
EU programmes, underlying the sub-hypothesis outlined above, bureaucratic actors may 
also be naturally inclined to hold diverging views on particular policy issues. While, in line 
with the sub-hypothesis outlined above such differing views may simply be based on the 
fact that certain bureaucratic actors are bound more strongly by previous commitments 
given their role in past decision-making processes, the factors that can lead to diverging 
views between various bureaucracies are much larger. 
The positions of specific actors within the EU’s foreign policy apparatus may 
also diverge in line with their (perceived) role, their current position in the decision-
making process, and the likely effect of any decision on the former two. When considering 
national foreign policy bureaucracies this has been summarized as follows:  
Organizational interests are often dominated by the desire to maintain the 
autonomy of the organization in pursuing what its members view as the 
essence of the organization’s activity (G. T. Allison and Halperin 1972, 49) 
Relatedly,  
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The drawing of organizational boundaries between as well as within ministries 
tends to bias the allocation of attention and the formation of preferences and 
identities (Egeberg 1999, 163) 
These insights can easily be translated to the specific context of the European 
Union, and existing research points to the fact that disagreements between different EU 
institutions in the foreign policy process are common (Orbie 2008, 39), that different 
institutional actors such as the Commission and the Council Secretariat compete for 
influence in the EU’s foreign policy (Christiansen 2001; Dijkstra 2009), that an actor’s 
position in the policy process will have an important impact on its view of any given issue 
(Stetter 2007, 139), and that EU policy output is always shaped by the competition of 
different interests internal to the EU (Carbone 2008, 330). 
While differing views of individual institutional actors are likely to have a 
negative impact, particularly on the EU’s horizontal and vertical policy coherence, the 
likelihood of this happening depends on how much individual actors care about the issue 
at hand. The more an actor is invested in a given policy, the less likely it is to want to 
change the status quo (Kleistra and Mayer 2001, 392), which is in line with the 
assumptions of the sub-hypothesis outlined above. This will also be determined by the 
general salience of an issue, with policy questions that will likely have important effects 
or be heavily scrutinized in public leading to individual actors’ wanting to defend their 
positions more vehemently than otherwise: 
EU foreign policy is the more powerful the less it is in the headlines. Where 
the policy content is routine and does not provoke rivalry and controversy 
among member states, it [the EU] is at its most powerful. (Matlary 2013, 138) 
Once more, this member state-centric perspective can easily be extended to 
other institutional actors such as the European Commission or the European Parliament. 
Lastly, taking the specific example of Latin America, it is important to note that policy 
questions relating to the region will differ greatly in salience between different institutional 
and intra-institutional actors, for instance with most Eastern European member states 
typically remaining passive in discussions due to their limited historical or economic ties 
to the region (Ruano 2013a, 4). 
Overall, diverging interests of the different institutions involved in the EU’s 
foreign policy decision-making towards Latin America are thus likely to negatively impact 
the EU’s foreign policy towards the region as actors will be determined to defend their 
view on specific issues, and in particular if these are politically salient. This can be 
summarized as follows:  
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Hypothesis 2b: Diverging interests —A coherent foreign policy change towards Latin America 
that may be in the rational interest of the EU itself is less likely where the interests of key actors in the 
EU’s foreign policy decision-making system diverge. 
 
While the above is seen as an important element driving foreign policy 
(in)coherence in the literature, it is nonetheless key not to overestimate its importance on 
its own, as 
easy harmony of preferences is rare and this hypothesis leads one to expect 
failure of agreement except for those few issues where the member states’ 
preferences are identical or where the stakes are so small that nobody cares 
about the outcome. Moreover, we know this to be false: member states’ 
representatives often argue intensively about issues that nobody considers 
inconsequential before they reach agreement on a common policy. Nor can 
we simply dismiss these debates as meaningless rhetorical exercises. The 
reason that such debates are so intense, it is reasonable to assume, is that even 
where some preference convergence has occurred, the quest for agreement 
on an EU policy involves the compromise of policy preferences and 
adjustment of policy behaviour by member states that otherwise would prefer 
to avoid such concessions. (Thomas 2011, 12) 
Additionally, Morten Egeberg has cautioned that 
those who focus on bureaucratic structure do not necessarily figure out in 
what ways varying administrative arrangements might intervene in policy 
processes and ultimately shape policy outputs. (Egeberg 1999, 155) 
It is thus important to also focus on the policy-making process itself, and 
particularly how much individual actors in the EU’s foreign policy system are bound by 
collective decisions or those taken by individual actors elsewhere. Only when there are no 
mechanisms in place that ensure an ultimate agreement between different institutional 
and bureaucratic actors despite their diverging views on particular issues can the above 
sub-hypothesis influence EU foreign policy decision-making in an important manner. The 
consideration of individual actor’s ability to defend their individual position and act 
independently of other actors on it is thus the essence of the ensuing sub-hypothesis. 
It has already been pointed out that despite the various reforms of the EU’s 
treaties there is no specific single foreign policy decision-making hierarchy in the EU 
(Portela and Raube 2012, 4), and even the Treaty of Lisbon’s language was sufficiently 
vague to leave the implementation of its provisions to those very actors meant to abide 
by them (Missiroli 2010, 429), a process which has not been without difficulty in certain 
policy areas (Tannous 2013). 
Yet it is the presence of coordination requirements and mechanisms and their 
functioning that can determine the coherence of the EU’s foreign policy output even 
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when diverging interests are present. Taking insights from administration research, policy 
coordination that can help coherent policy outputs is less likely the more individual actors 
are self-contained in their activity and capable to act on their own and achieve their goals 
without the involvement of others, and it will not occur automatically unless actors’ share 
the same views on any given issue (Peters 1998, 301, 304). The latter consideration would 
obviously represent the lack of diverging views between institutional actors, and thus the 
absence of factors considered under the sub-hypothesis based on diverging interests. 
The typical response to a lack of coordination mechanisms or their 
malfunctioning has been to reorganize the functioning of the EU’s foreign policy 
bureaucracy in an attempt to foster coordination. Yet, it is these very changes that can 
increase the autonomy of an actor in the EU’s foreign policy process and change its 
position on a given issue, as this can involve the breaking up of functioning established 
coordination mechanisms, be they formal or informal. This is problematic as  
The changing nature of politics and policy problems raises another issue 
about co-ordination, having to do with the extent to which co-ordination is a 
one-off event or a part of an ongoing series of interactions. Everything else 
being equal I would expect co-ordination processes to be more effective when 
each event represents one in a continuing series of interactions. (Peters 1998, 
305) 
In consequence, scholars who have studied the reorganization of bureaucracies 
have cautioned that “most major reorganization efforts have been described by outsiders, 
and frequently by participants, as substantial failures.” (March and Olson 1983, 288) In 
the context of the EU, researchers have observed that 
In parallel with efforts to ensure coherence between external relations and 
the CFSP, the ‘Brusselisation’ of foreign policy has provoked both rivalries 
between EU institutions and national foreign ministries and intensified intra-
bureaucratic struggles. […]Likewise, the reorganised Commission external 
relations empire has suffered from prolonged internal bickering over turf and 
resources (Peterson and Sjursen 1998, 179) 
This situation is also rendered worse by the continuing growth of the EU’s 
institutions and their tasks (Christiansen 2001), thus increasing the autonomy of individual 
actors until new coordination mechanisms have been established. Overall, in addition to 
a focus on the divergence of opinions between individual institutional actors, it is also 
important to consider their capacity to act on their own and how this is curtailed by 
established coordination mechanisms. In consequence: 
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Hypothesis 2c: Actor autonomy — The weaker the requirements for policy coordination are 
between the different actors involved in the EU’s foreign policy decision-making process, the less likely it 
is for the EU to coherently change its foreign policy towards Latin America. 
 
It is important to note here, that the EU’s foreign policy decision-making 
process in itself is highly volatile and follows different logics depending on if it is an 
exclusive or shared competence of the EU, or whether it is intergovernmental in nature. 
In this context Michael Smith has described the EU’s foreign policy decision-making 
system as a hybrid with “a political, institutional and legal structure derived from 
heterogeneous sources, or composed of elements of different or incongruous kinds.” (M. 
Smith 2012, 700) This has arisen “from the operation of a ‘mixed actor system’ and [is] 
reflecting heterogeneity of political influences” (M. Smith 2012, 700) on the EU’s foreign 
policy system. These different institutional structures have then evolved in parallel, 
perpetuating this heterogeneity over time (Elgström and Pilegaard 2008). 
Even where requirements and mechanisms for policy coordination are in place, 
reducing actor autonomy overall, the complexity of decision-making mechanisms, the 
duration of decision-making processes and the number of actors involved in different 
capacities can help individual bureaucratic actors to increase their overall decision-making 
autonomy through an exploitation of these complexities to escape control and 
coordination mechanisms. Particularly when placed at key positions within the EU’s 
foreign policy decision-making hierarchy, such as DG Trade for the EU’s Common 
Commercial Policy, this and other institutional actors have utilized information 
asymmetries arising in this setup to increase their decision-making autonomy over other 
institutions meant to control them (Gastinger 2015). While in the EU’s trade negotiations 
the member states were meant to control DG Trade’s negotiation efforts, in the past no 
mechanisms were put in place to do so in pre-negotiation phases, which is one of many 
steps necessary for the EU to conclude trade agreements. This allowed DG Trade to 
sometimes bargain strategically with third actors to overrule certain member state 
concerns. 
If the complexity of decision-making within one policy area such as trade already 
allows individual actors to gain more decision-making autonomy than foreseen given 
established coordination mechanisms, then this is likely to increase when considering 
coordination across different policy areas. This is facilitated by the fact that depending on 
the policy area under consideration the same actors at the EU level may take up different 
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roles and decision-making may require differing majorities or even unanimity voting. 
These difficulties extend beyond a consideration of CFSP and policies that used to be 
part of the EU’s first pillar, as different provisions may guide decision-making in different 
areas even within the former pillars (Portela and Orbie 2014). 
Rather than reducing the number of actors involved in EU-level decision-
making over time, the creation of the HRVP and the EEAS with the Treaty of Lisbon 
has only increased the overall number of actors, increasing the complexity of the system 
overall, and further increasing the risk associated with each one defending its own 
interests due its unique position in EU decision-making (Lequesne 2013, 81–83) rather 
than the interests of the Union as a whole. Furthermore, established institutions are likely 
going to want to defend their established position within the system in line with the sub-
hypothesis based on diverging interests, and will dispose of more knowledge of the 
process to do act independently than newly created institutional actors, or those which 
have been reshaped in important ways. 
The complexity of the EU’s foreign policy decision-making system poses two 
additional risks to the coherence of its foreign policy towards Latin America, one related 
to the sheer number of actors involved and the different roles that these fulfil, the other 
to the duration of the decision-making process from the very beginning to the generation 
of foreign policy outputs. Foreign policy decision-making has, for a long time, been 
conceptualised as a process, rather than individual decisions taken at specific points in 
time. This duration in turn introduces risks related to different discount rates between the 
various actors involved (G. T. Allison and Halperin 1972, 50, 53). 
In essence, the longer the time period that it takes for foreign policy decisions 
to be taken and implemented, the more likely it will become that the positions of 
individual actors involved in the process will start to diverge, possibly contributing to the 
incoherence of the ensuing foreign policy outputs. This risk is further aggravated by the 
number of actors involved in the process and the requirements for individual decisions 
taken by these at different points in time. 
In sum, the elements considered under this sub-hypothesis can be summarized 
as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 2d: Decision-making complexity — The more complex the EU’s foreign policy 
decision-making is at any given point in time, the less likely it will be for it to change its foreign policy 
towards Latin America coherently. 
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The two major hypotheses above thus form two analytical lenses to respond to 
the research question, with Hypothesis 2 considering different yet related aspects of 
bureaucratic politics as potential parallel explanatory factors for the EU’s foreign policy 
(in)coherence towards Latin America. 
 
2.3.3 Alternative analytical perspectives 
While this thesis uses insights from Foreign Policy Analysis to analyse factors internal to 
the EU that contribute to the incoherence of its policy outputs towards Latin America, 
some alternative analytical perspectives such as new institutionalism(s) or principal-agent 
theory could also have been used to structure the analysis undertaken here. All these 
theories 
have in common that they do not consider the EU as a unitary actor in 
international politics, but rather as a complex political system that consists of 
more than merely member states and in which Brussels-based actors matter. 
(Delreux 2015, 152) 
This section outlines why despite certain advantages of such analytical 
frameworks FPA was ultimately chosen over these all, while outlining that some of their 
assumptions are shared with the analytical framework outlined above. 
Starting with new institutionalism, theories falling under this heading examine 
the role of institutional actors in foreign policy decision-making processes and consider 
under what conditions and for what purposes they are created, and how they subsequently 
shape decision-making processes. A large body of the literature on new institutionalism 
revolves around rational choice institutionalism. Principal-agent theory (PA) itself can be 
considered as a subset of this variety of new institutionalism (Delreux 2015, 159). 
Rational choice institutionalism assumes that actors in the international realm, 
or member states in the context of the EU, attempt to maximise their interests based on 
cost-benefit analyses. Under this perspective the creation of institutions, defined as rules 
constraining the behaviour of individual actors, can help overcome collective action 
problems and thereby reduce transaction costs hampering cooperation. 
Principal-agent theory then expands these basic insights to discuss the dynamics 
that can unfold once an institution—or an agent in the language of principal-agent 
theory—has been created by so called principals. When applied to the context of the EU 
the latter are most often its member states. PA then assumes that despite the intentions 
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of the principals the newly created agent will develop its own interests and given its 
privileged access to resources such as information will, under certain conditions, be able 
to take decisions against the preferences of its principals. The latter in turn are then 
incentivised to set up certain control mechanisms, such as ‘police-patrol’, meaning an 
active and regular oversight of the actions of the principal, or less resource-incentive ‘fire-
alarm’ oversight, where principals will set up mechanisms to control only important and 
large deviations by an agent from its assigned role (Pollack 1997, 111). 
A seminal article by Mark A. Pollack (1997) has outlined the advantages of using 
principal-agency theory to conceptualise the independent role of the EU’s supranational 
institutions on its decision-making processes, and particularly that of the European 
Commission and the European Court of Justice. This was followed by a book that 
expanded on his argument (Pollack 2003). However, his work was primarily concerned 
with the EU’s single market, leaving aside a possible application of PA to the EU’s foreign 
policy. 
Considering PA’s application to the EU’s foreign policy, most of the literature 
uses it to analyse the dynamics of decision-making in specific policy areas, such as the 
EU’s trade policy or its behaviour in international organisations (Delreux 2015, 160). A 
special issue of the Journal of European Public Policy considers the value of principal-agent 
analysis for the study of the EU’s foreign economic policies in particular (see the 
introduction by Dür and Elsig 2011), and thereby offers a good overview of the utility of 
PA for such policy-specific analyses where the positions of principals and a single agent 
are clearly delineated. 
However, applying PA to the EU’s external relations more broadly is more 
challenging as the set-up of principals and agents varies between different policy areas 
and does not help to conceptualize how agents may interact in more complex decision-
making settings. If one considers decision-making in two distinct policy areas relevant for 
this thesis, trade and the CFSP, for instance, it is possible to note that principals, agents 
and control mechanisms differ between both policy areas. While theoretically the member 
states mandate the EU’s supranational institutions to perform certain tasks, the member 
states themselves should not be considered as unitary actors. When it comes to the 
delegation and control of powers for trade negotiations to the European Commission, or 
more specifically DG Trade, different national ministers and officials are involved than 
when delegating powers to the EU’s External Action Service to negotiate external 
agreements under the EU’s CFSP. 
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Not only are there thus two different delegation chains for distinct foreign policy 
areas, but there are implicitly separate sets of principals and explicitly distinct agents in 
both cases. Given my interest in the emergence of (in)coherence in the EU’s foreign 
policy between different policy areas, the interaction between these distinct principals and 
agents needs to be considered alongside the dynamics of delegation processes themselves. 
As outlined above FPA can help structure such analyses that take into account the 
existence of parallel decision-making hierarchies and bodies whose competencies are 
sometimes distinct and may overlap, which is one of the reasons why an analytical 
framework based on FPA was chosen over principal-agent theory. 
Another variety of new institutionalism, namely sociological institutionalism, 
also considers the socializing effect of institutions on the actors that created them in the 
first place, and thus allows to take into account that EU member state officials will 
develop an ‘esprit de corps’, or coordination and cooperation reflex, once socialized into 
the institutions within which they operate on a regular basis (Delreux 2015, 157).  
While it can explain why representatives of the EU’s member states may 
sometimes act against the preferences of the member states themselves as determined by 
rationalist approaches, this perspective does not allow to take into account all the 
dynamics that may arise between different institutional actors at the EU level. 
Nonetheless it cautions to think about the social identity of officials involved in decision-
making processes and how this may transcend the formal roles assigned to them, 
something which also forms part of FPA literature when considering the role of 
individuals in policy processes. 
Historical institutionalism is another variety of new institutionalism that needs 
to be considered. This theory emphasizes the importance of past decisions on future 
policy choices, emphasizing that past events restrict the number of future policy options 
available in a process called path dependency. Under historical institutionalism it is 
hypothesized that past decisions make it more and more costly to deviate from the 
direction of past decisions taken, thereby contributing to unforeseen effects of the 
creation of institutions and past choices. While this theory offers a relevant additional 
perspective on the dynamics of decision-making processes, it is nonetheless important to 
note that “a pure HI account is rarely sufficient to explain institutional change and design 
and that it needs to be complemented” (Delreux 2015, 159). 
Nonetheless, historical institutionalism has been used to study the EU’s foreign 
policy and has generated some important insights. For instance, it has also been pointed 
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out that the distinct evolution and history of EU foreign policy decision-making processes 
by policy area make it difficult for the EU to reach coherence in external negotiations 
such as those for Economic Partnership Agreements (Elgström and Pilegaard 2008). 
Furthermore, Maria García (2008) has used historical institutionalism to study the 
dynamics leading to the conclusion of the EU-Chile Association Agreement. 
While not explicitly using historical institutionalism in this thesis, some of the 
hypotheses outlined above share common assumptions with this theoretical perspective. 
For instance, the hypothesis entitled ‘policy inertia’ (Hypothesis 2a) considers that the 
existence of administrative cultures that have developed over time, and the long duration 
of certain EU external commitments and programmes would make it difficult and costly 
to alter these in the short term. Furthermore, the hypothesis based on the complexity of 
the EU’s decision-making (Hypothesis 2d) considers the parallel yet distinct evolution of 
policy-making frameworks for different EU foreign policy areas as a source for its foreign 
policy incoherence. 
While new institutionalism and principal-agent theory would have offered 
alternative bases for the analytical framework of this thesis, ultimately FPA literature was 
chosen over these given that it allows to consider more complex and different dynamics 
in decision-making processes that could not be sufficiently captured by either of the other 
approaches. 
 
2.4 Methods and methodology 
Given that the hypotheses based on assumptions from the realm of bureaucratic politics 
depend on analysing how processes internal to the EU’s foreign policy decision-making 
system shape its foreign policy outputs, the perspective taken in this thesis is ultimately 
one that emphasizes causal pathways in decision-making processes. A research method 
suited to unearth causality in political processes is process tracing, which can be defined as 
“the systematic examination of diagnostic evidence selected and analyzed in light of 
research questions and hypotheses posed by the investigator” (Collier 2011, 823). Process 
tracing is specifically used to draw causal inferences from empirical data, “often times 
understood as part of a temporal sequence of events or phenomena” (Collier 2011, 824). 
In order to be able to draw causal conclusion from process tracing in one’s 
research, David Collier (2011) emphasizes that the researcher must be familiar with the 
case at hand, and be able to offer sufficient descriptions of phenomena, before being able 
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to analyse them. When using process tracing as a tool to draw causal inferences from 
empirical data in particular, it is crucial to be able to place empirical evidence in a 
chronological chain of events. 
Process tracing is thus particularly apt as a research method for cases in which a 
plethora of empirical data is available, so as to be able to provide detailed or ‘thick’ 
descriptions of phenomena and ultimately identify causal pathways through a temporal 
analysis and how these have been shaped by other variables, such as those outlined under 
Hypothesis 2. While research into policy-making for recent periods is always limited by 
problems of access to internal documents given moratoria on archival access and the 
secrecy surrounding decisions in the realm of foreign policy, the data gathered for this 
thesis is nonetheless sufficiently detailed to enable process tracing for the cases under 
consideration here (see below). 
Nonetheless, the plethora of the EU’s foreign policy outputs towards Latin 
America over the time period under consideration here have made it necessary to focus 
the analysis around the EU’s negotiations for international agreements in the region. 
While this limits the empirical scope of the thesis somewhat, in reality the negotiations 
for Association Agreements have, through their focus on trade, development and political 
ties, covered most of the relevant aspects of the EU’s Latin America policy, and are 
necessarily influenced by other developments in EU-Latin American relations and in 
return provide the context within which these occur. After all, the eventual conclusion of 
an agreement will often alter the EU’s ties to the partner in important ways and over a 
long timeframe. While other developments such as the EU-Latin America and the 
Caribbean summit format and the associated dialogues are important developments that 
are technically separate from the negotiations for Association Agreements (see 
Dominguez 2015), the tone of discussions has nonetheless always been shaped by the 
state of the EU’s negotiations in the region, and presented opportunities for rhetorical 
commitment towards negotiations or substantial progress in the EU’s negotiations 
themselves. Similarly, the EU’s two strategic partnerships in the region with Brazil and 
Mexico have evolved as by-products of a failed and a successful negotiation for 
international agreements in the region. 
Furthermore, the pursuit of negotiations requires specific decisions to be taken 
within the EU’s foreign policy bureaucracy, such as the granting of negotiation mandates 
to the European Commission, and therefore offers starting points to unearth causal 
pathways leading to the EU’s foreign policy outputs towards Latin America. The analysis 
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in this thesis is thus structured chronologically, and focuses on different rounds in the 
EU’s negotiations for Association Agreements (see Table 1). Each chapter discusses 
specific grouped negotiations that occurred at that point in time, further breaking down 
the process into the separate steps necessary before negotiations could begin, the 
negotiations themselves, and the ratification process where these succeeded. The overall 
chronological approach of the thesis also allows a study of exactly when and how the 
EU’s foreign policy towards the region started to be incoherent. Consequently, this 
permits an exploration of whether the functioning of foreign policy coordination 
mechanisms, or the complexity of decision-making processes in themselves have played 
a role in the process. While the initial analysis was shaped primarily by following the steps 
of formal decision-making procedures as much as possible (see chapter 3) to gain an 
overview over internal EU developments and decision-making timeframes, this was 
gradually supplemented by additional data that allowed for insights into decision-making 
dynamics not accurately captured by an analysis merely based on formality. 
On this basis the different hypotheses can then be tested in each chapter, always 
looking for evidence that the emergence of the EU’s policy incoherence towards the 
region represents either a rational decision or is the result of bureaucratic politics. To this 
end, the empirical data gathered is checked for the presence of indicators (see Table 4) 
that provide evidence as to their validity. When it comes to Hypothesis 1 this is the 
presence of mainly external factors that could change the cost-benefit analysis and parallel 
evidence that this view has shaped the EU’s policy towards the region as a whole. The 
hypotheses based on assumptions from bureaucratic politics, consider factors such as pre-
existing and long-standing policy commitments (Hypothesis 2a), the salience of an issue 
for individual actors (Hypothesis 2b), the weakness of coordination mechanisms 
(Hypothesis 2c), or the presence of different modes of decision-making (Hypothesis 2d). 
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Table 4: A summary of the hypotheses and indicators 
 
Hypotheses 
 
   Indicators 
H1: Rational incoherence - Clear temporal link between policy change 
and driver for change 
o Political change in LA 
o US trade policy 
o Development at the WTO 
o Change of majorities 
- AND evidence of internal debate and 
diffusion across policy areas 
H2: Bureaucratic Politics  
   H2a: Policy inertia - Long-standing public commitments 
- Established policy principles 
- Long timeframes of existing policies 
- Sunk costs 
o Previous development funding 
o Human resources 
   H2b: Diverging interests - Competence overlap 
- Salience of an issue 
- Policy-centred organisation of the 
European Commission 
- Established policy-based communities of 
interest 
   H2c: Actor autonomy - Weakness of decision-making hierarchies 
and horizontal coordination mechanisms 
- Geography-centred organisation of the 
European Commission 
- Continued validity of previous 
principles/mandates for activity 
- Disruption of established coordination 
mechanisms 
   H2d: Decision-making complexity 
 
- Number of actors involved in decisions 
- Varying modes of decision-making 
- Duration of administrative processes 
 
 
When considering the broader insights that this thesis can contribute to the 
literature discussing the EU’s interregionalism policies and its foreign policy coherence, 
research on the evolution of the EU’s ties with Latin America represents what has come 
to be known, methodologically speaking, as a single case study focussing on a crucial case 
(Gerring 2008, 659–63), one in which EU foreign policy coherence is the most likely and 
the pursuit of interregionalism to be the most successful. On the one hand this is based 
on the fact that the positions of Latin America and the EU are relatively similar: 
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Despite nuances and differences, the gaps between the European and Latin 
American worldviews are considerably smaller in comparison to the 
diplomatic clashes between the European Union and other regions or 
countries. (Dominguez 2015, 2)  
Furthermore, the EU’s policies that focus on the region emanate from the field 
of ‘low politics’, exclude important security considerations, and are relatively unimportant 
for most member states. Unlike in cases where security interests are prime concerns and 
purely intergovernmental CFSP decision-making applies (Malici 2008), the focus on Latin 
America means that actors’ interests should be relatively similar, and the likelihood of the 
respect of formal decision-making mechanisms larger. Additionally, the focus on 
interregionalism as shaped by negotiations represents an important and relatively recent 
foreign policy tool of the EU in the realm of ‘low politics’ (Santander 2005, 286), and 
should thus allow for important insights into the area where the EU’s international role 
is most pronounced (Matlary 2013, 138–39). 
 
2.4.1 Sources 
Given the difficulty of gaining insights into internal EU decision-making processes 
through any one particular source, the research for this thesis is based on a variety of data. 
These are notably semi-structured interviews, internal documents made available to me, 
publicly available documents, leaked diplomatic cables, secondary sources and media 
coverage. 
Any one kind of source utilized to gather data comes with problems. While for 
interviews, for instance, the researcher needs to be able to separate an interviewee’s 
opinion from underlying facts (Rathburn 2008, 686–90), public documents may represent 
a mere narrative separate from an underlying rationale. Official minutes of internal 
discussions on the other hand may omit important elements, and their content is shaped 
by the officials producing such documents.3  Whenever possible, the analysis for this 
thesis is thus based on the triangulation of information gathered from different sources, 
so as to corroborate information contained in others. 
 
                                                
3 A former EU official cautioned that researchers should always attempt to identify the note-
taker for official summaries of meetings held in the Council of the EU before analysing the 
content of said document (Brussels, 19.6.2015, interview 17). 
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2.4.1.1. Interviews 
Given that concerns related to the practice of the formulation of the EU’s foreign policy 
are at the core of this thesis, interviews with persons involved in the formulation of EU-
Latin American relations are a logical choice to generate empirical data. As Brian 
Rathburn (2008, 689–95) cautions, interviews can be particularly useful in revealing 
information on motivations, preferences and personal thoughts of interviewees when they 
are conducted carefully and thoroughly fact-checked. Thus, gathering data in this way has 
only been undertaken as one of the last steps in the data collection process, as this allowed 
me to ask questions related to specific pieces of information contained in other primary 
sources.  
In total 37 individuals were interviewed in 31 separate interviews throughout 
2015 in Brussels, London and Hamburg. While most of these were with a single person, 
some involved groups of interviewees. Where necessary some interviewees have also been 
contacted again to conduct follow-up interviews. Interviews were conducted with EU 
officials working in the Council, the European Commission and the EEAS, member state 
officials, members of the European Parliament, as well as Latin American diplomats. 
Interviewees were selected based on their previous or current role related to EU-Latin 
American relations, while some individuals previously active in the field were 
recommended to me during prior interviews. Interviews were conducted in English, 
French, German, or Spanish depending on the context and the interviewee. Caution was 
taken to preserve interviewees’ anonymity. This meant that interviews were not audio 
recorded and only detailed hand-written notes were taken. When referencing interviews 
in the body of this thesis, these are only listed with a unique identifying number. This 
corresponds to a list in Annex 1 of all interviews conducted. Consequently, this list does 
not contain interviewees names and only provides some information on them, such as a 
broad description of their role, the date of an interview, and its location. 
Each interview began with a set of open-ended questions depending on the 
position and background of the individual concerned. These were then followed by 
further questions depending on the initial answers given. This made it possible to react 
flexibly to the viewpoint or expertise of individual interviewees. Over the course of 
conducting different interviews, the focus changed more and more from general 
questions to those attempting to situate particular pieces of information or corroborate 
elements learned in a different context beforehand. The core problem revealed itself to 
be the high turnover of staff in the institutions targeted, making it difficult to gain insights 
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into developments dating back more than a few years. While this could be compensated 
for partially by asking interviewees for contact details of previous personnel holding their 
posts, often these individuals were not available to be interviewed or did not remember 
details from their previous postings. Consequently, empirical insights gained from the 
interviews have proven to be the most valuable for general conceptual insights, as well as 
the chapters on the EU’s negotiations with the Andean Community (chapter 6) and EU-
Latin American relations after the Lisbon Treaty (chapter 7). 
 
2.4.1.2. Documents 
Significant empirical insights for this project also emanated from a large range of official 
documents generated by the EU institutions, its member states and Latin American 
countries. Many relevant documents can be accessed through the EEAS website or the 
Council of the European Union’s online database. While the most recent documents are 
typically classified, some formerly secret documents from the relevant time period for this 
have been declassified fully or in parts. The online Archive of European Integration hosted at 
the University of Pittsburgh similarly contains many significant documents, including 
some that are not listed in the Council’s database. The online repository Foreign Trade 
Information System hosted by the Organisation of American States (OAS) has been particularly 
helpful in tracking developments for individual trade negotiations rounds between the 
EU and its Latin American partners. Lastly, specific keyword Google searches limited to 
the backend of the EU’s official websites have also revealed some relevant documents 
that are not linked in a publicly accessible manner. These are regularly referred to in the 
bibliography by providing the full hyperlink to access the document in question. 
While I could have supplemented my research with freedom of information 
requests to the EU’s institutions, this was hindered by the fact that many documents that 
may be in existence are not listed in public registers, rendering precise enquiries 
impossible. 
At times, classified documents have been made available to me by interviewees 
and others. I was only able to consult some of these documents under the condition that 
I do not publicly refer to them. Others are referenced with some identifying information 
in footnotes, though not fully identified and referenced as this could contribute to the 
identification of the sources who have made them available to me.  
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2.4.1.3. Diplomatic cables 
EU diplomatic correspondence, that of its member states and of its Latin American 
partner organisations for the time period relevant for this thesis remains inaccessible at 
present due to archival embargo periods typically spanning thirty years. Nonetheless, 
certain types of diplomatic communication are used extensively in this thesis. 
The so called ‘Cablegate’ leak of the United States’ diplomatic cables by the 
organisation Wikileaks has created an important and easily accessible database of 
diplomatic communication significantly ahead of the lapse of embargo periods. In total, 
the database contains 251,287 diplomatic cables, from the period between 2003 and 2010. 
While not emanating from a state actor directly involved in EU-Latin American relations, 
these cables have nonetheless proven to be a useful contribution to this thesis for a 
number of reasons. On the one hand, the United States’ extensive diplomatic network 
and its significant interests in the Latin American region mean that American diplomats 
have followed developments in the EU’s relations with the region closely, and hence 
reported on it. On the other hand, American diplomats appear to regularly consult with 
EU and member state officials on Latin American issues, offering some insights into the 
positions and opinions of key EU officials on certain issues. Lastly, some EU member 
state foreign offices have regularly shared internal EU documents and position papers 
with their American counterparts, hence making either their text or detailed summaries 
publicly available. An example of this is the provision of a summary of an internal 
discussion on the EU’s Cuba policy provided by the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(US Embassy Czech Republic Prague 2005). 
While researchers should be cautious as to the authenticity of the documents 
given their non-official source and publication, there remains little doubt at present as to 
the database’s accuracy. Not only have official US sources acknowledged the authenticity 
of these documents and issued restrictions for US employees on using them, but 
numerous newspapers have also researched the context of some of the cables and 
published stories based on key insights from the archive. 
Consequently, I have performed keyword searches pertaining to EU-Latin 
American relations, as well as searches based on the origin and destination of cables on 
the database that is available and indexed on the Wikileaks website. I then discovered 
further cables by following cross-references contained in those provided as a result from 
the keyword searches. In total, I have identified around 150 diplomatic cables of relevance 
for this thesis, with references to individual cables provided when these have been used 
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in the text. Lastly, I have equally used a number of other diplomatic cables emanating 
from smaller leaks, such as cables exchanged between the Ecuadorean embassy in 
Brussels and the country’s foreign ministry on EU-Ecuador Free Trade negotiations.  
 
2.4.1.4. Secondary sources and media coverage 
Where empirical work of an academic nature on specific elements of the EU’s relations 
with Latin America is in existence, this has also been used in this thesis. This has proven 
to be particularly valuable for the chapters concerned with the pre-Lisbon situation where 
interview data could not easily be gathered or would have duplicated previous empirical 
research. 
Equally, I have consulted media reports of developments in EU-Latin American 
relations from a large range of different sources available to online database services such 
as Factiva. Regular news bulletins produced by the news agency Agence Europe, which is 
focused on reporting on EU politics, have proven the most helpful. Given that many 
developments in EU-Latin American relations are relatively more important for the Latin 
American partners concerned, I have consulted reporting by national media outlets in 
most of the countries concerned to track smaller developments that may go unnoticed in 
reporting in Europe. The website Bilaterals.org, which follows developments in trade policy 
from a critical perspective by providing links to reporting on the matters has also proven 
to be particularly helpful in this regard. Whenever possible, I have triangulated the 
information contained in secondary sources with other kinds of data. 
 
2.5 A brief literature review: The thesis in context 
The existing literature that considers the EU’s relations with Latin America is relatively 
limited, both in its empirical detail and the analytical perspectives taken. The bulk of the 
research that has been done on the EU’s ties with the region is not concerned with EU-
Latin American relations for its own sake, but in the context of the discussion of 
interregionalism as an emerging phenomenon in International Relations. This section 
outlines the state of the literature on the EU’s ties with the region before arguing that one 
needs to look at a different kind of literature that uses the EU’s policies targeted at third 
actors to analyse EU foreign policy decision-making in itself, as is the focus of this thesis.  
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While comparatively little has been written on EU-Latin American relations in 
English (Dominguez 2015, 3–4), there is nonetheless an established body of literature that 
considers the ties between the two regions from different perspectives. The first detailed 
and structured elaboration on the relationship is Hazel Smith’s (1995) book on European 
Union Foreign Policy and Central America. In this seminal contribution the author outlines 
how different aspects of the EU’s foreign policy have interacted to support the Central 
American peace process up to the early 1990s. Her theoretical argument focuses on the 
fact that the EU was able to play a central role in the region due to the activity of the 
European Commission, and the relative absence of the member states from the overall 
policy process. Nonetheless, aside from the core empirical contribution on EU-Latin 
American relations up to the early 1990s, the book’s focus lies in the discussion of how 
the European Union fits into existing debates in International Relations. The author then 
expanded her empirical contribution somewhat in a book chapter (H. Smith 1998), which 
extended the analysis through most of the 1990s and considered the evolution of the EU’s 
ties with Latin America as a whole. Trying to conceptualise the role of the EU, she argued 
that the EU’s policy towards Latin America had formed something akin to a state’s foreign 
policy, aiming to 
project a European political identity based on the political norms it chooses 
to propagate: pluralist democracy on the western model, respect for the rule 
of law, and commitments to human rights. (H. Smith 1998, 168) 
Amidst growing EU foreign policy activity towards the region from the 1990s 
onwards, a volume edited by Wolf Grabendorff and Reimund Seidelmann (2005) 
discussed the evolution of the EU’s ties with Latin America’s different regional integration 
mechanisms, focusing on Mercosur in particular. Conceptually, the ties are elaborated on 
by using the concept of biregionalism, ie. the development of ties between two 
geographical regions and how these are shaped by factors internal and external to the diad 
under consideration. Crucially, the book also considers how EU-Latin American 
biregionalism has been shaped by a triangular relationship including the United States, be 
it with the latter conceptualised as a partner or a competitor. 
The latest detailed account of the state of EU-Latin American relations over 
time is a book by Roberto Dominguez (2015) entitled EU Foreign Policy Towards Latin 
America, which categorizes the EU’s ties with the region according to the degree in which 
it is based on interregional relations. Overall, the book outlines a varied picture of the 
relationship as having been shaped primarily by a number of EU strategies developed as 
the result of disagreements between the EU and Latin American actors. In consequence, 
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the book describes the EU abandonment of some of the Association Agreement 
negotiations primarily as the result of Latin America’s unwillingness to proceed with its 
own regional integration (Dominguez 2015, 173–74). 
Leaving aside the consideration of regional and subregional factors of the two 
volumes introduced above, a further edited volume on The Europeanization of national foreign 
policies towards Latin America (Ruano 2013b) applies the concept of Europeanization to 
study the linkage between national policies and EU policies towards the region. This is 
explained as follows: 
in order to understand the EU’s policy towards Latin America and how it has 
evolved over time, it is necessary to analyze both the EU and member states’ 
policies towards the region, especially the interaction between them. (Ruano 
2013a, 3) 
Through its consideration of various national foreign policies towards the region 
the book’s main contribution is thus that the history of member states’ ties with Latin 
America is an important explanatory factor for whether a member state tends to want to 
shape the EU’s policy towards the region (such as Spain), or rather tends to accept an 
existing consensus (such as Poland) (Ruano 2013a, 4–5). 
Other works have focused on the evolution of the EU’s ties with individual 
actors on the Latin American continent. For instance, María García has described the 
EU’s negotiations for an Association Agreement with Chile in detail, using historical 
institutionalism to structure her analysis (García 2008, 2011). She focuses on a number of 
critical junctures that have shaped the negotiations with the country, thus explaining how 
the EU came to conclude an agreement despite important odds against it from the outset. 
The same author has written on the evolution of the EU’s ties with Latin America’s 
regional integration organizations (García 2015), emphasizing how these have been 
shaped by the EU’s structural power towards the countries concerned and the primordial 
importance of EU trade interests to elaborate on the different fate of negotiations with 
Mercosur, CAN and Central America. 
The EU’s ties with various countries and regional organizations in the region 
have also been the focus of specific book chapters and articles. For instance, a dedicated 
group of researchers at Sciences Po Paris has followed the EU-Mercosur negotiations, 
producing almost annual reports on their progress and how these can be conceptualised 
(Giordano, Vallãdao, and Durand 2001; Working Group on European Union-Mercosur 
negotiations 2000, 2003, 2005, 2006). Specific developments in the relationship have also 
been the focus of some research, such as the EU-Mexico Global Agreement of 
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1997/1999 (Szymanski and Smith 2005), the EU’s strategic partnership with Brazil 
(Whitman and Rodt 2012), or the 2010 EU-Central America Association Agreement 
(Arana 2015). 
For the most part, however, the EU’s Latin America policy has not been seen as 
an object of analysis in its own right, but rather as one expression of a nascent 
phenomenon of interregionalism in International Relations, in which the EU has played 
a central role. The body of literature, to which some of the works cited above have also 
contributed, revolves around the conceptual terms of interregionalism (Börzel and Risse 
2009; Doctor 2015; Grisanti 2004; Ha ̈nggi, Roloff, and Rüland 2006; Söderbaum, 
Stålgren, and Van Langenhove 2005; Telò, Fawcett, and Ponjaert 2015; Vinod K. 
Aggarwal and Edward A. Fogarty 2004), new regionalism (J. B. Grugel 2004), or biregionalism 
(Grabendorff and Seidelmann 2005). This literature offers extensive accounts of the EU’s 
motivations for promoting interregional ties, evaluates its prospects and comments on 
what conclusions can be drawn from it for the study of International Relations. 
In reality there are different kinds of interregional ties that need to be considered, 
ranging from relations based purely on direct ties between two regional organizations with 
a capacity to enter into direct agreements, to hybrid regionalism where one regional 
organization such as the EU enters into ties with multiple states in another region (De 
Lombaerde, Söderbaum, and Wunderlich 2015, 754), sometimes with a goal of 
influencing ties between states in the region targeted to develop regional ties on their own. 
Authors working on this phenomenon claim that: “Interregionalism is deeply 
rooted in the foreign policies and external relations of the EU.” (De Lombaerde, 
Söderbaum, and Wunderlich 2015, 750) The officially stated aim of the EU’s 
interregionalism policies is to expand and formalize its ties to other regional integration 
organisations and thereby strengthen them. Tanja Börzel and Thomas Risse (2009, 2015) 
discuss the EU’s motivation to promote regional integration through interregionalism as 
an attempt “to diffuse its own model of democracy, social welfare and regional integration 
through partnership agreements and political dialogue” (2009, 22). 
Exercising somewhat more caution as to the overall importance of the 
phenomenon Frederik Söderbaum et al. (2005) have argued that in an attempt to develop 
its distinct identity as an international actor, the EU has aimed to spread its own model 
of regional integration. In this sense, the EU has aimed to legitimize its own existence by 
bolstering similar organisations in Africa, Asia and Latin America through engagement 
with them (De Lombaerde, Söderbaum, and Wunderlich 2015, 751). In reality, however, 
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reality this has proven to be difficult across the board (De Lombaerde, Söderbaum, and 
Wunderlich 2015, 750), leading to an assessment that interregionalism has recently 
declined, to be replaced by a renewed focus on bilateralism (De Lombaerde, Söderbaum, 
and Wunderlich 2015, 752). Yet looking at one particular such interaction, Alfredo 
Valladão asserts that with regards to the EU’s policy towards one of Latin America’s 
regional blocs, Mercosur, the “EU had an almost missionary drive to diffuse its own 
‘unique experience’” (2015, 121). 
The analysis of the EU’s ties with Latin America often serves as a core empirical 
portion of works concerned with the EU’s interregionalism, such as in an edited volume 
which considers the EU’s policies towards the region and their effect on Latin American 
regional integration (Franck, Defraigne, and de Moriamé 2009). A further edited volume 
on The European Union and the Global South analyses the EU’s interregional policies towards 
Latin America in the realm of development cooperation and trade ties alongside chapters 
that consider its relations with other regional organizations (Söderbaum and Stålgren 
2010). One of the latest addition to this literature is a volume on Interregionalism and the 
European Union (Telo ̀, Fawcett, and Ponjaert 2015) that tries to broaden the debate on EU 
interregionalism further. Crucially, the empirical chapter focused on Latin America 
(Valladão 2015) outlines the impact that the EU’s interregionalism policies have had on 
regional integration. 
Often the EU’s interregional ties with Latin America will also serve as a point of 
comparison to its activity towards other regions, such as the South African Development 
Community (SADC) (Lenz 2012; Robles 2008a), or the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) (Robles 2008b). It is important to note, however, that studying the 
EU’s ties with Latin America is only one strand of the literature on the EU and 
interregionalism. Some works detail the EU’s ties with other regional organizations and 
geographical regions exclusively, such as in South East Asia (L. Allison 2015; Gaens 2011; 
Jetschke and Murray 2012; Shu 2015) or considering the SADC on its own (Jakobeit 
2015). 
While the initial literature concerned with interregionalism often portrayed it as 
a trend that could have an important impact on the international system itself, gradually 
authors have also come to be more critical of interregionalism, once more using the EU’s 
ties with Latin America to caution that it may have important limitations. Sébastian 
Santander (2009, 2010a, 2010b), for instance, has argued that EU interregionalism appears 
to have come to an end given the EU’s experience with Mercosur. Such analyses are based 
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mainly on recent setbacks of regional integration projects akin to the EU in the rest of 
the world, as well as problems that the EU is currently facing in extending its ties with 
such organizations. This is also reflected in Alan Hardacre’s and Michael Smith’s  work 
that attempts to reconcile the persistence of the EU’s interregionalism policies with a 
parallel move towards bilateralism under the term complex interregionalism (Hardacre 2008; 
Hardacre and Smith 2009). Nonetheless, the existing literature has yet to engage fully with 
the phenomenon of policy incoherence towards Latin America that has seen the EU 
abandon interregional ties on a number of occasions. 
While analysing the EU’s links to other regions in the world through an 
interregionalist lens has generated a large body of literature, there are also works whose 
main aim is to study aspects of the EU’s foreign policy in and of itself by using empirical 
case studies based on the EU’s ties with other regions. Given the focus on EU foreign 
policy-making in this thesis, such works need to be considered also before discussing 
possible determinants of EU foreign policy incoherence. A part of the findings in Hazel 
Smith’s (1995) book on the EU’s relations with Central America is on internal 
determinants of the EU’s foreign policy, discussing the role of the European Commission 
in particular.    While also using interregionalism to frame her case study, Laura Allison 
has studied the EU’s ties with ASEAN to gain insights into the EU’s actorness in 
international relations. When studying EU foreign policy, she cautions that 
[a]ctorness is only realized […] if the actor and its interlocutors both perceive 
it to have the responsibility and ability to do so, and once this is determined, 
the actor utilises its resources effectively to ensure that its aims are achieved 
(L. Allison 2015, 3) 
While conceptually different from foreign policy coherence, her approach 
nonetheless demonstrates that important insights into EU foreign policy-making can be 
gained from studying the EU’s ties with specific third actors, and regional organizations 
in particular. Similarly, in studying the EU’s policy towards the Mediterranean, Federica 
Bicchi (2007) analyses which conditions internal to the EU contribute to the formulation 
of new initiatives in the EU’s foreign policy, thus elaborating on the importance of policy 
windows, ideational concerns, and the role of policy entrepreneurs. An edited volume on 
the EU’s ties with the Mediterranean after the Arab Spring (Horst, Jünemann, and Rothe 
2013) in turn uses this case study to argue that its foreign policy can best be understood 
by a framework entitled Logics of Action, which focuses on an interaction between the 
legal framework and the activity of the actors active in its decision-making, collectively 
reinforcing the weakness of the EU’s foreign policy. 
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In addition to a literature focused on using the EU’s ties with third actors to 
further our understanding of EU foreign policy, there is also a dedicated body of literature 
that studies the EU’s foreign policy coherence and how it relates to the EU’s actorness 
towards third actors: 
The importance of speaking and acting as one is a prominent theme, both 
explicitly and implicitly, in the scholarly literature on EU foreign policy and 
especially EU ‘actorness’ in world affairs […] Yet contributors to this 
literature disagree on how to define and measure the concept. Some scholars 
focus on the activities of Member States while others focus on EU 
institutions; some focus on policy-makers’ values, some on policy-makers’ 
rhetoric, some on the policy-making process, and still others on policy choices 
or outcomes. (Thomas 2012, 458) 
When focusing on the sources of EU foreign policy (in)coherence, researchers 
have often been concerned with the large number of actors involved in European foreign 
policy decision-making processes, an issue which has remained on the top of the agenda 
despite the provisions in different treaties which were aimed at clarifying the roles of 
different actors in the EU’s foreign policy decision-making processes (Allen 1998). When 
considering the EU’s foreign policy output, one frequent theme in the literature is the 
problem of foreign policy coherence due to multiple parallel EU policies that target the 
same third actors in different ways. This can be witnessed when analysing how the EU’s 
development policy goals diverge from those in some other policy areas (Carbone 2008, 
2009; Matthews 2008). 
Others still have focused on problems of policy coherence arising out of the 
EU’s former pillar structure, a problem that has remained important even after the Treaty 
of Lisbon. For instance, Michael Smith cautions that 
while the EU is what some might describe as a ‘commercial superpower’, in 
other areas of its external action it is decidedly stunted. For the EU, this 
creates a problem of coherence and consistency, which is underlined by the 
interinstitutional problems that persist even after (or because of ?) Lisbon. 
(M. Smith 2013, 657) 
 Such problems have also been observed within specific policies spanning 
multiple modes of decision-making, such as the EU’s conflict prevention policies in 
general (Stewart 2008) or those aimed at the promotion of democracy and human rights 
(Verdonck 2015). Others have also pointed out that where the EU simultaneously pursues 
economic and political goals, as was the case for its Asia policy in the 1990s (Algieri 1999), 
or in the negotiation for the Global Agreement with Mexico (Szymanski and Smith 2005), 
these may ultimately contradict one another with one typically winning out (Dandashly 
2015). Something similar was observed in the EU’s response to the Arab Spring, with 
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concerns over the promotion of democracy contrasting with security interests, and the 
latter ultimately winning out. Coherence difficulties can be observed as well when 
considering two policy areas that have the same objectives, yet originated in different 
modes of the EU’s decision-making system, such as the possibility to grant or withdraw 
trade access under the EU’s Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) (former 1st pillar), 
or CFSP sanctions (Portela and Orbie 2014). Lastly, conflicts of interest between internal 
EU actors are often cited as a source for incoherence, such as among member states when 
responding to the events of the Arab Spring (Noutcheva 2015), or the Libyan crisis in 
particular (Koenig 2011). 
While a body of literature that outlines EU-Latin American relations exists, this 
has so far seen these ties through the analytical lens of interregionalism, rather than as 
case studies for EU foreign policy decision-making processes in and of themselves. Yet, 
books using the EU’s ties to specific regions have been able to generate important insights 
as to functioning of the EU’s foreign policy. Given an important concern for policy 
coherence towards third actors in a distinct set of literature, this thesis aims to utilize the 
analysis of the EU’s ties with Latin America primarily to further our understanding of 
determinants of EU foreign policy coherence. 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has presented the analytical framework adopted in this thesis which contrasts 
assumptions of the EU’s foreign policy change towards Latin America having been based 
on rational considerations with others derived from FPA literature which emphasize the 
impact of bureaucratic factors on the EU’s foreign policy (in)coherence towards the 
region over time. 
It has also discussed how this thesis fits within the existing literature on the 
coherence of the EU’s foreign policy and factors that can contribute or hamper the 
formulation of coherent foreign policy outputs. Furthermore, the thesis has explored 
existing research on EU-Latin American relations, and situated the thesis in the wider 
literature on the EU’s and interregionalism. The following chapter now offers an 
overviews of how the EU’s foreign policy decision-making system has changed over time, 
before elaborating on how this has influenced the formulation of the EU’s Latin America 
policy in line with the hypotheses outlined above in the empirical chapters. 
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CHAPTER 3:  
An overview of EU foreign policy decision-making over time 
3.1 Introduction 
As explored briefly in the first two chapters, EU foreign policy decision-making involves 
a large number of actors in differing roles throughout the duration of decision-making 
processes. While decision-making in any given EU policy area with an external remit is 
already complex, this is rendered more so by the continued parallel existence of individual 
policies, varying modes of decision-making, as well as a patchwork of mechanisms meant 
to ensure policy coherence between them. 
Unlike decision-making in national contexts, which is the subject of most of the 
Foreign Policy Analysis literature, the very foundations of the EU’s foreign policy system 
have been volatile given the EU’s frequent treaty reforms, its enlargement processes, and 
changes to internal bureaucratic structures. This chapter aims to take stock of the relevant 
actors of the EU’s foreign policy system, its decision-making rules and practice relevant 
for the policy areas under consideration, and the changes that have occurred over time. 
This allows me to identify possible bureaucratic sources for the EU’s foreign policy 
incoherence towards Latin America in more detail, thus providing the necessary 
background information for the analysis in the empirical chapters. 
Re-iterating a previously stated claim, “each progress towards enhanced 
coherence was paradoxically increasing internal complexity” (Telò 2013, 27). While there 
is some truth to this statement as is explored in the following, it is nonetheless important 
to note that the full effects of the most recent iteration of the EU’s treaties, the changes 
introduced through the Treaty of Lisbon, will only be felt in the long term (Holland and 
Doidge 2012, 125) and the empirical analysis in this chapter can only provide some 
evidence as to the short to medium term effects of the changes introduced with it. 
The increase in complexity observed by Mario Telò is related to issues such as 
the continuous increase of the powers of the European Parliament, or the rising use of 
qualified majority voting. With the creation of new institutional actors like the High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HRVP) and the 
European External Action Service (EEAS), the overall number of stakeholders in the 
EU’s Latin America policy has increased even further. While research on decision-making 
in the EU’s foreign policy has often focused primarily on the interactions between 
different of the EU’s institutional actors, it is also necessary to consider decision-making 
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within them, as an entity like the European Commission is in turn composed of different 
administrative entities. Only a consideration of both inter-institutional and intra-
institutional decision-making processes can reveal the full picture of bureaucratic politics 
influencing the coherence of the EU’s foreign policy decision-making (Christiansen 
2001). After all, 
Contradictory views and policies within as important an institution as the 
Commission are every bit as damaging to external perceptions of the 
European Union as is disunity between the Commission and the Council, or 
among the member states. (Donnelly 2010, 21) 
While the account below offers insights into most aspects of EU foreign policy 
decision-making, its focus is on decision-making in the policy areas most relevant for the 
EU’s relations which Latin America and for the time period relevant for the empirical 
analysis in this thesis. Consequently, aspects like trade policy decision-making or that for 
the EU’s development policy are elaborated on in detail, with other aspects featuring less 
prominently. Thus this chapter should not be seen as an exhaustive list of all actors and 
decision-making procedures in the EU’s foreign policy. Instead, it establishes the 
background information necessary to comprehend how the set-up of EU foreign policy 
decision-making has influenced its Latin America policy in line with the hypotheses based 
on bureaucratic politics outlined in the introductory chapter. 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: it first offers an overview 
of decision-making in the different policy areas relevant for the EU’s Latin America 
policy. It then focuses on the internal organisation of the Commission and the Council 
over time, and how this has likely influenced the bureaucratic processes underlying the 
EU’s Latin America policy. Lastly, the chapter details overarching changes to the 
functioning of the EU’s foreign policy decision-making system which have attempted to 
eliminate some of the bureaucratic factors influencing the EU’s foreign policy decision-
making, and elaborates on whether this is likely to have changed the autonomy of 
institutional actors in the EU’s Latin America policy. 
 
3.2 Decision-making in policy areas relevant for EU-Latin American relations 
Decision-making for the three policy areas most relevant for the EU’s relations with Latin 
America, namely trade policy, development policy and political cooperation, differs 
radically along policy lines and given the EU’s former pillar structure that was nominally 
abandoned with the Treaty of Lisbon. While the first two emerged from its former 
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Community pillar, albeit still following different modes of decision-making, the latter 
originated in the pillar on the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). When 
considering different aspects of the EU’s Latin America policy, as is done in the empirical 
chapters of this thesis, these different modes of decision-making and policy areas need to 
be taken into account when considering the possible origin of the EU’s policy incoherence 
towards the region through the lens of bureaucratic politics. 
 
3.2.1 EU Trade Policy 
The Common Commercial Policy (CCP) is one of the most important and visible policy 
areas of the EU’s external relations as the EU and its predecessors have been active in it 
for a long period of time, and given the potential economic repercussions on the EU and 
its member states, as well as its trade partners. While only one out of three policy areas 
included in negotiations for Association Agreements, “The common element in all these 
[external] agreements is trade” (Bretherton and Vogler 1999, 61). This has not been any 
different in the specific Latin American context, and provisions on trade policy decision-
making in the EU have shaped its Latin America policy in important ways, which is why 
the parts relevant for the empirical cases under consideration are explored in detail below. 
While the EU conducts trade policy through being represented in the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) as a full member, the most relevant aspects of the EU’s trade 
policy-making for the Latin America context are its capacity to negotiate plurilateral and 
bilateral trade agreements with third actors. As Figure 1 outlines, the process under which 
this occurs is divided in three distinct phases, namely the approval of a negotiation 
mandate, which is an internal EU process, the actual negotiations with a third actor and 
finally the ratification process (Meunier and Nicolaïdis 2011, 283–86). Only once the latter 
is complete in the EU and the third actor(s) concerned can a trade agreement be 
implemented. Given that this policy area is one which has originated within the EU’s 
former first pillar, the role of EU-level institutions is particularly pronounced (Orbie 2008, 
37), attributing clear roles to the Commission, the Council and the European Parliament 
in the policy-making process. Nonetheless the process in itself is lengthy and highly 
complex; in line with the last hypothesis based on the complexity of EU decision-making 
processes, one can expect such processes to be prone to generating incoherent policy 
outcomes over time, as is elaborated on below. 
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Figure 1: EU trade agreement decision-making 
 
Source: Own compilation based on different sources. 
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phase. 
While the above considerations are true for trade agreements that relate to the 
exclusive remit of the EU, some agreements are also considered mixed agreements, which 
follow a different ratification procedure, as they touch on the competencies of the EU 
and some exclusive competencies of the member states. In said case, unanimity is required 
and all member states need to ratify the agreement in question individually and according 
to their own domestic constitutional provisions (Diedrichs and Wessels 2006, 231). 
Nonetheless, even before member states ratify agreements, but after the EP’s consent and 
the Council’s final decision, parts of the agreement falling under the EU’s exclusive 
Preparatory Phase Negotiations Phase Ratification Phase
COMMISSION
Responsible Commissioner 
& DG prepare mandate

Vote by the College of  
Commissioners
COUNCIL
Discussion in Working 
Groups (COLAC, TPC)

Council amends & formally 
adopts mandate
COMMISSION
Commission negotiator(s) 
lead negotiations with third 
partner(s)
&
reports to Council (& EP)
COUNCIL
Special committee supervises 
negotiations
&
Working groups discuss 
issues
COUNCIL
Authorises signature on 
suggestion from negotiator
EP
Discusses in Committees 
(INTA, AFET)

Grants Consent
COUNCIL
Adopts agreement
¼
º º
5 6
»
»
 66 
(former first pillar) competence may be provisionally applied, as is the case, for instance, 
in the liberalization of tariffs on the trade of goods. 
Taking a closer look at the practice of EU trade policy-making reveals a number 
of intra-institutional actors involved in the process. Within the Commission it is today the 
Directorate-General for Trade (DG Trade) led by the EU’s Trade Commissioner that 
undertakes the EU’s negotiations. This structure has been relatively stable over time, 
though the supervisory role of individual Commissioners has been split according to 
geographical portfolios from time to time (see below). Before the Commission can ask 
the Council for a negotiation mandate, a vote by the College of Commissioners is also 
required. 
While the Council does not dispose of a specific trade composition, it was the 
General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) that dealt with the EU’s trade 
policy (Bretherton and Vogler 1999, 51) until the Treaty of Lisbon. Since then this Council 
composition has been split in two, with the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) now holding 
the overall responsibility for the EU’s trade policy. This is assisted by a specific Trade 
Policy Committee (TPC, formerly known as the Article 113 or Article 133 Committee), 
which is one of the few Council working groups created directly through the EU’s treaties, 
rather than being set up as member states see fit. As one of the oldest Council bodies in 
continued existence, it is responsible for recommending its views on negotiation 
mandates to the FAC, and follows the Commission’s work during actual negotiations in 
the form of a special committee (Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 2006, 91). The body itself 
has two main compositions, one staffed by the most senior member state trade officials. 
It furthermore has an official secretary and is attended by DG Trade’s Director-General. 
This composition is responsible for reflections on the overall direction of the EU’s trade 
policy, while lower level meetings are there to discuss the actual content of mandates and 
negotiations (Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 2006, 91–92). Lastly, while no formal voting 
takes place in the TPC given its advisory role to the Council, recommendations and 
discussions will nonetheless informally take member states’ voting weights into account 
(Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 2006, 93). 
The role of the European Parliament on EU trade agreements was relatively 
limited in the past. While the Council was regularly kept updated on DG Trade’s work, 
the Parliament did not dispose of similar information rights. Within the Parliament, 
regular oversight of the EU’s Trade policy is conducted through its Committee on 
International Trade (INTA). While some informal contacts between the Commission and 
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the EP have always existed, its influence was relatively limited overall as its legislative role 
was very constrained for most FTAs prior to Lisbon.4  
While the Amsterdam and Nice treaties made some minor changes to the scope 
of the EU’s Common Commercial Policy and the related voting procedures in the Council 
(Dominguez 2008, 128), major changes were only introduced with the Treaty of Lisbon, 
expanding the scope of the CCP to include investment treaties and altering the underlying 
institutional set-up. In particular, the Parliament’s information rights in on-going 
negotiations were significantly increased to be technically on par with those of the Council 
(Woolcock 2010, 23). Even in the post-Lisbon context its consent is only required at the 
very end of the process (Hillman and Kleimann 2010, 5; Woolcock 2010, 23), and the use 
of this specific legislative procedure means that it can only vote for an agreement in full, 
or wholly reject it without being able to introduce amendments. 
Researchers disagree as to which institutional actors ultimately have the most 
influence on the EU’s trade policy under this set-up, though the focus was on the 
Commission and the Council prior to Lisbon (Orbie 2008, 39–41). Some have claimed 
that the Commission’s powers ultimately depend on the member states’ agreement for 
receiving a negotiation mandate and the approval of a finished agreement (Meunier 2007). 
This also extends to the actual negotiation period. While the underlying mandates are 
often vague, the presence of member state representatives nevertheless allows them to 
control the process to an important extent (Meunier and Nicolaïdis 2011, 286). 
Others have stressed that the multi-level nature of the EU’s trade policy plays 
into the hands of the Commission as the central actor (Billiet 2009; Elsig 2007), which is 
able to exploit different preferences of individual member states and the associated vague 
mandates provided (Conceição-Heldt 2011). Its formal role as the initiator of a process 
leading towards trade negotiations also means that “Member States tend to respond to, 
rather than be part of, the initial development of the agenda” (emphasis in the original, 
Frennhoff Larsén 2007, 861). 
Further research has emphasized the key role that the Commission plays in 
choosing the venue in which negotiations are undertaken, be it in the multilateral, regional 
or bilateral realm (Dür and Elsig 2011, 334; Elsig 2007). Charlotte Bretherton and John 
Vogler attribute this to the long-lasting experience of DG Trade, which allows for it to 
defend a generally pro free trade position—sometimes even against the specific wishes of 
some member states (Bretherton and Vogler 1999, 65). However, once more the 
                                                
4 European Parliament official, Brussels, 24.6.2015 (Interview 25). 
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Commission should not be seen as a single bureaucratic actor either, as for instance 
internal differences between DG Trade officials and those of the Directorate-General for 
Agriculture and Rural Development (DG AGRI), responsible for the EU’s Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP), have reduced the Commission’s intra-actor coherence ever 
since the WTO Uruguay round negotiations (Bretherton and Vogler 1999, 54). While DG 
Trade’s institutional role is to defend the EU’s trade interests, DG AGRI’s is to ensure 
the functioning of the EU’s system of agricultural subsidies, which makes for a natural 
source of diverging views on trade matters that might require the liberalization of the 
EU’s agricultural market. 
It is important to note also that one cannot necessarily conceptualise the 
relationship between the Commission and the Council as one of antagonists. Rather, the 
latter’s Trade Policy Committee is composed of officials who tend to stay in their posts 
for long periods of time and are socialized into the logic of the EU’s trade policy and the 
defence of the Union’s underlying interests (Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 2006, 94), 
sometime against the preferences of the member states that they represent. In 
consequence, the relationship between the TPC and DG Trade has been described as one 
of collaboration, rather than controlling (Bretherton and Vogler 1999, 52). Some 
researchers have even pointed out that specific interest coalitions between the Council 
and the Commission exist that represent the EU’s trade policy on the one hand, and 
agricultural interests on the other (van den Hoven 2007, 62–64), mirroring the opposition 
within the Commission itself. Lastly, the very complexity of the EU’s internal trade policy 
decision-making can actually strengthen the Commission’s position in external 
negotiations as its room for manoeuvre tends to be regarded as relatively limited by third 
actor representatives (Bretherton and Vogler 1999, 41). 
Decision-making under the Common Commercial Policy is a key element for 
understanding the EU’s relations with Latin America. While it is a former first pillar 
policy, decision-making for EU trade agreements is nonetheless complex, and even more 
so in the case of mixed agreements. This raises the potential for individual actors at 
different stages of the policy-making process to influence the EU’s policy outputs when 
these hold diverging views and due to the complexity of the EU’s decision-making system 
in itself, which is in line with two of the hypotheses considered under the lens of 
bureaucratic politics. 
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3.2.2 Development Cooperation 
The EU’s development policy was perhaps the EU’s most relevant policy area for 
relations with Latin America until the start of trade negotiations with the region. As a 
former first pillar policy legislative decision-making takes a central role and attributes 
formally equal decision-making powers to the European Parliament and the Council 
under what is now the Ordinary Legislative Procedure (OLP) since the Treaty of Lisbon. 
Before said treaty change the Commission held the sole right for legislative initiative and 
the implementation of the policy. Nonetheless, decision-making in the policy area needs 
to be analysed closely to identify possible bureaucratic sources for the EU’s foreign policy 
incoherence towards the region, as it depends on budget allocations to function, the 
continued existence of member states’ own development policies, and the changes that 
the policy has undergone since the Treaty of Lisbon. 
Furthermore, the importance of the EU’s development policy for the overall 
coherence of the EU’s foreign policy has been noted by others in the past: 
Achieving coordination, coherence and complementarity between and across 
[…] [different aspects of foreign policy] is a mammoth task; but it is also an 
essential one […]. In such a scenario development policy cannot be an 
optional extra, but constitutes a core component of Europe’s external 
relations and CFSP. (Holland and Doidge 2012, 19) 
After all, development policy targets and the underlying policies supporting 
them can only be successfully implemented if other activities and interests of the 
European Union do not contradict them. While this is a very basic insight, other 
considerations, such as those in the realm of trade (see above), may contradict this 
development-policy specific goal.  
In this context it is important to note that when considering development 
budgets, the EU and its member states may be the largest donor of Official Development 
Aid (ODA) overall, but it is the member states in sum that dispose of the most relevant 
development cooperation budgets (Dür and Elsig 2011, 327). Despite the underlying 
legislative decision-making having remained largely the same since the Treaty of 
Maastricht (when the OLP’s predecessor known as co-decision applied to the policy area), 
the underlying bureaucracy within the Commission has nonetheless undergone radical 
changes over time (Holland and Doidge 2012, 102–33). 
The overall budget allocations for the EU’s development policy depend on the 
Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF), which determines the overall size of the EU’s 
budget for seven-year periods, while already allocating proportions to very broad policy 
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areas. It is only within this overall frame that decisions on how to allocate the EU’s 
development money are taken, and in consequence the OLP only applies to this. The 
implementation of the policy, done largely through the administration of actual 
development cooperation instruments, such as the European Development Fund (EDF), 
was then mainly delegated to the European Commission. In turn, an analysis of how the 
Commission’s development bureaucracy is structured at different points in time can 
reveal further insights into its capacity for coordinating the EU’s development policy with 
other policy areas. The Council, on the other hand, is formally involved in the oversight 
of the policy area through its Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) composition and more 
informal meetings of national development ministers (Holland and Doidge 2012, 97–98), 
which are in turn prepared by specialized Council working groups. 
Internal  sources of incoherence in the EU’s development policy outputs are 
partly down to differences between EU-level and member state level development 
cooperation activity (Bretherton and Vogler 1999, 132–33). Major problems also arise out 
of the previous division of development-related competencies within the European 
Commission itself (Bretherton and Vogler 1999, 132) and consistently low staffing levels 
in the policy’s administration given the relatively large budgets administrated (Holland 
and Doidge 2012, 102; Orbie and Versluys 2008, 69). 
While the definition and implementation of the EU’s development policy was 
initially handled within the same bureaucratic structure of the Commission, the Prodi 
Commission’s reorganization in 1999 saw the responsibility for the bulk of the definition 
of the EU’s development policy being attributed to RELEX Commissioner Chris Patten 
(Holland and Doidge 2012, 104). In consequence, a separate body, which came to be 
known as EuropeAid, was set up to handle the policy’s implementation (Holland and 
Doidge 2012, 120–23). This created the potential for tension between DG RELEX, which 
would set the policy’s overall goals, and officials within EuropeAid, which enjoyed 
considerable leeway over how to implement the policy on a day-to-day basis. 
While the system had remained relatively stable over the intervening years, the 
Treaty of Lisbon then once more introduced significant administrative changes for this 
policy area. It is very difficult to understand and describe the exact nature of the changes 
introduced with the Treaty of Lisbon, which is down in part to the vagueness of the 
treaties’ provisions on the functioning of the EU’s development policy (see Tannous 
2013). The complexity and uncertain nature of the changes introduced with Lisbon have 
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been noted by Commission development policy officials as a major source for frustration 
in their work.5 
Therefore, the following is only a rough description of how the Treaty of Lisbon 
has changed decision-making within the EU’s development policy hierarchy. Most 
relevantly perhaps, with DG RELEX and the External Relations portfolio being 
integrated into the newly formed EEAS and the role of the HRVP respectively, the 
responsibility for defining the EU’s development policy was moved out of the European 
Commission entirely. This was accompanied by parts of the staff from the Commission’s 
DG Development (DG DEV) who had worked on geographical desks being moved into 
the EEAS alongside DG RELEX officials. The remnants of DG Development were then 
fused with EuropeAid to form the new Directorate General for International 
Cooperation and Development (DG DEVCO), which once more united some policy 
definition with the bulk of the EU’s development cooperation implementation. As a 
further important change from the pre-Lisbon set-up, DG DEVCO has gained powers 
over the annual programming of development cooperation budgets (Holland and Doidge 
2012, 126), making it difficult to discern a clear decision-making hierarchy and creating 
potential for competence overlap. 
 The duality of the roles of the EEAS and DG DEVCO in this realm have thus 
once more created problems of policy ownership and double structures that make policy 
coordination difficult and raise the prospect of conflict between the two institutions  
(Duke 2012, 58; Holland and Doidge 2012, 126–27). Taking stock of the Lisbon-induced 
changes, Martin Holland and Matthew Doidge conclude: 
With the above changes in mind, what remains unclear is precisely who speaks 
for Europe on development – the exact opposite of what the Lisbon reforms 
had originally promised. (Holland and Doidge 2012, 128) 
Decision-making in the EU’s development policy thus involves a large number 
of actors in different capacities that cannot all be discerned by analysing the functioning 
of the EU’s Ordinary Legislative Procedure only. In consequence, it is possible to identify 
a potential for diverging views of different institutional actors to emerge, formerly within 
the Commission and now between the Commission and the EEAS, or between the EU’s 
institutions and the development policies of the EU’s member states. This potential for 
diverging views influencing the coherence of the EU’s foreign policy outputs is rendered 
even more prominent when it has to be coordinated with other policy areas, as is the case 
                                                
5 DG DEVCO officials, Brussels, 24.6.2015 (Interview 24). 
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for the EU’s Association Agreements (Holland and Doidge 2012, 96–97), the decision-
making for which is explored in detail below. 
 
3.2.3 Political elements 
Political and cooperation concerns relevant for the EU’s relations with Latin America are 
dealt with according to a mode of decision-making that differs from that in the EU’s 
Trade and development policy, as it is largely intergovernmental. This is due to the fact 
that what today has come to be known as the European Union’s Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP) evolved out of a purely intergovernmental format, the European 
Political Cooperation (EPC) in the pre-Maastricht period. 
As a consequence, even if CFSP matters have gradually been normalized within 
the EU’s institutional framework, the EU’s member states still have a role to play in their 
own right, rather than as simple members of the Council. For instance, the formation of 
the San José Dialogue, one of the oldest formats of structured cooperation with Latin 
American countries (see the next chapter), was set up at the outset of a meeting between 
member state ministers and those of their Latin American counterparts. While the 
European Commission has always taken part in such meetings, the member states—or 
their formal Council representation through, for instance, the rotating Council 
presidency—can nonetheless claim an equal footing in this and similar dialogue formats 
set up with the region and elsewhere. 
This prominent role of the member states is perhaps most visible at the biennial 
EU-Latin America and the Caribbean summits, which are intergovernmental in nature 
and regularly attended by Latin American heads of states, representatives of the EU’s 
institutions, as well as European heads of states and government. Given the range of 
issues discussed at such meetings (see for instance EU-CELAC Summit 2015), including 
non-proliferation, the Colombian peace process or the fight against terrorism, which are 
all elements in which member states retain important competencies, this role played by 
them is logical. 
As an important difference from the policy areas discussed above, decision-
making rules under the CFSP largely exclude the European Commission and require 
unanimous decision-making in the Council instead. While the Treaty of Lisbon has 
introduced some changes to this end, with the HRVP and the EEAS taking over some of 
the tasks of the rotating Council presidency and the Council’s CFSP staff, this rule has 
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remained largely unchanged. Political issues in the Latin American context are rarely a 
matter for important disagreements between member states when these concern 
discussions of a general nature. Nonetheless, this differing mode of decision-making 
makes linking the political elements of the EU’s relations with Latin America to those 
arising out of the former Community pillar more difficult. This is particularly relevant as 
concerns over the rule of law, human rights and democracy all have repercussions 
(Bretherton and Vogler 1999, 132) in the two policy areas discussed above. 
Overall, the political side of the EU’s relations with Latin America operates in a 
radically different manner from those outlined above, relegating the European 
Commission to an actor of a secondary importance, and putting an emphasis on the role 
of the Council (and now the HRVP and the EEAS) and the member states themselves. 
These different modes of decision-making are likely to have an impact on foreign policy 
coordination between the different policy areas discussed, and when discussing political 
elements of Association Agreements in particular. 
 
3.2.4 EU Association Agreements: Combining modes of decision-making 
Having summarized the decision-making on the most relevant policy areas for the EU’s 
relations with Latin America, this section provides a brief overview over how these relate 
to the specific context of negotiating EU Association Agreements with third actors. 
Crucially, in this context, negotiations for Association Agreements require the parallel use 
of decision-making mechanisms for the different policy areas concerned, rendering the 
process more complex than the one for ‘pure’ EU trade agreements, as Figure 2 shows. 
The complexity arises out of two elements: Firstly, the initial preparation of a 
negotiation mandate is done by multiple institutional actors and requires coordination 
between them, and this duality is upheld for the EU’s negotiators in the negotiations 
phase. Secondly, given the inclusion of political clauses Association Agreements are 
necessarily mixed in nature, automatically requiring the ratification in all of the EU’s 28 
member states. Whereas, prior to the Treaty of Lisbon, internal coordination for the 
preparation of a mandate and between the EU’s negotiators was limited to administrative 
entities within the Commission, and typically DG Trade and DG RELEX (holding the 
responsibility for the political components and development policy goals), this now 
requires coordination between administrative units within the Commission and the 
EEAS, raising the possibility for these to hold diverging views on any given issue. 
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Figure 2: EU Association Agreement decision-making 
 
Source: Own compilation based on different sources. 
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(Keukeleire and Delreux 2014, 207). This has occurred despite the fact that in the pre-
Lisbon period DG RELEX most often held the formal leadership role on Association 
Agreement negotiations, with the exception of the Prodi Commission when this resided 
with DG Trade (García 2008, 135). Since Lisbon, as elaborated on above, this 
responsibility has moved to the EEAS. No matter the formal institutional responsibilities, 
however, an informal coalition between Commission Trade officials and members of the 
Preparatory Phase Negotiations Phase Ratification Phase
COM
Trade 
Com. & 
DG Trade 
prepare 
mandate
COUNCIL
Discussion in Working 
Groups (COLAC, TPC)

Council amends & formally 
adopts mandate
COM/EEAS
EU negotiators lead negotia-
tions with third partner(s)
&
report to Council (& EP)
COUNCIL
Special committee supervises 
negotiations
&
Working groups discuss 
issues
COUNCIL
Authorises signature on 
suggestion from negotiators
EP
Discusses in Committees 
(INTA, AFET)

Grants Consent
COUNCIL
Adopts agreement
¼
º º
5 6
»
»
EEAS
HRVP
& EEAS 
prepare 
mandate
COMMISSION
Vote by the College of  
Commissioners
4
3
¼
MEMBER STATES
28 member states ratify 
domestically
»
 75 
TPC (Orbie 2008, 40) has often led to trade issues being perceived as more important 
than others. 
The automatic mixity and requirement for unanimity in the Council and national 
ratification aside (Dominguez 2008, 72), the dynamics of negotiations for Association 
Agreements are thus mainly shaped by procedures for the conclusion of EU’s trade 
agreements. While the European Parliament still has to give its consent, it is its Foreign 
Affairs Committee (AFET) which takes the lead on Association Agreements, while the 
opinion of INTA is being taken into account. Nonetheless, even here trade policy 
elements will be important as its information rights on the progress of negotiations are 
largely based on those that it has gained in the realm of trade policy since the Treaty of 
Lisbon. 
Given the primacy of trade concerns amongst the three most relevant policies 
outlined here, negotiations for Association Agreements are shaped by decision-making 
procedures and dynamics emanating from the EU’s trade policy. While this does not 
represent a problem for the coherence of the EU’s foreign policy outputs in itself, it 
nonetheless risks emphasizing the divergence of views between different institutional 
actors responsible for the definition of different areas of the EU’s foreign policy, and the 
likelihood of policy coherence is thus likely going to depend on the strength of 
coordination mechanisms between them. 
 
3.3 Intra-actor sources of policy incoherence 
The overview over decision-making mechanisms in the policy areas relevant for the EU’s 
Latin America policy has revealed that the EU’s institutional actors, and particularly the 
European Commission, cannot be considered unitary actors. As a consequence, sources 
for the incoherence of the EU’s policy output within the set-up of individual institutional 
actors, and particularly the Commission need to be explored (Donnelly 2010, 21). The 
following section thus outlines changes to the functioning of the Commission over time, 
and particularly the change of portfolios and supporting Directorates-General, before 
taking a brief look at the internal organisation of the Council and its preparatory bodies, 
as well as the European Parliament. 
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3.3.1 The European Commission and foreign policy decision-making 
While the general role and functioning of the Commission in the EU’s foreign policy 
system has remained relatively constant over the period under consideration, there have 
nonetheless been important changes to its internal functioning that need to be considered 
here. These have influenced its capacity to define, coordinate and execute important 
elements of the EU’s Latin America policy, and could thus contribute to our 
understanding of bureaucratic factors shaping the EU’s foreign policy. 
One main problem identified in the literature is that of the autonomy of different 
administrative units within the Commission vis-à-vis others. Thomas Christiansen points 
out that this is a defining feature of the Commission: 
the very nature of the Commission – a single institution encompassing large 
and relatively self-contained Directorates-General (DGs) – is a recipe for 
fragmentation and internal tension. Owing to the internal divisions running 
through it, authors have for some time regarded it as a ‘multi-organization’ in 
which the policy-making of different administrative units creates different 
bureaucratic and organizational logics (Christiansen 2001, 751). 
This underlying complexity of the Commission’s structure and operational logics 
has been rendered more complex by many organizational changes it has undergone, thus 
weakening established coordination mechanisms and increasing the autonomy of 
individual DGs and Commissioners. The most important changes impacting the 
Commission in such a way were fundamental alterations to the EU’s treaties and 
membership, such as through an increase in the EU’s foreign policy competencies, the 
creation of the EEAS, or in line with the EU’s various enlargement rounds. Nonetheless, 
individual factors like portfolio allocation and the personalities of Commissioners also 
need to be considered. This is even more relevant as: 
Although the Commission is in general – beyond foreign policy – probably 
the most studied EU bureaucracy […], the bureaucratic entities in the 
Commission that deal with foreign policy or external relations […] have 
largely escaped the attention of bureaucratic politics. (Delreux 2015, 155) 
While the EU’s treaties define the Commissioners’ role as neutral defenders of 
the EU’s interests, it would be too simplistic to believe that, once appointed, 
Commissioners lose their national and party loyalties. The interplay between 
Commissioners’ formal role and their personal background should thus not be 
underestimated (Lequesne 2000, 47–48). Given this and the appointment procedure 
which gives each member state a significant say, cohesion between the Commissioners 
has historically been very low and the Commission’s central administration typically takes 
a hands-off approach (Kassim et al. 2013, 184–86). 
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Furthermore, the decision-making style of the Commission has been shaped by 
a desire to reach a consensus from the lowest to the highest administrative level, including 
the College of Commissioners. This means that even when no consensus can be reached 
at that level, a secret vote may take place, with information on voting patterns only 
occasionally becoming publicly available (Spence 2006b, 48). 
The consensus-driven decision-making is particularly relevant given that 
historically the Commission president did not play a preponderant role in the College of 
Commissioners. While the Treaty of Amsterdam ultimately strengthened the role of the 
president, the influence of this institutional memory should not be underestimated 
(Lequesne 2000, 46). Ultimately the strength of the Commission president’s authority that 
could lead to more policy coordination within the Commission is largely dependent on 
the president’s leadership style given important constraints on his or her powers (Spence 
2006b, 28–29). In sum, 
A strong President can have his own way. A weak President is perforce 
obliged to preside over dissent, occasional incoherence among his team and, 
in the case of Santer, over outright censurable practice or at the very least 
inappropriate behaviour. (Spence 2006b, 27) 
Given that individual Commissioners thus possess significant individual powers, 
a consideration of the distribution of portfolios and its holders is important. Here, again, 
the particular nature of the European Commission has influenced the way in which 
Commission portfolios have been assigned, as member states used to hold considerable 
sway over portfolio responsibilities and allocation. 
This was particularly down to member states’ desire to ensure that their 
designated Commissioners would receive positions of responsibility, rather than more 
symbolic portfolios. As Fraser Cameron argues, the necessity to find Commission 
portfolios taken together with the preservation of existing ones is what has hindered the 
creation of a functioning European Commission foreign policy apparatus since the Treaty 
of Maastricht (Cameron 2007, 53). It was only through changes introduced with the 
Treaty of Amsterdam in 1999 that the designated Commission president was able to 
influence the division of portfolios in his Commission (Nugent and Saurugger 2002, 349). 
While President Romano Prodi made extensive use of this new right, his successor José 
Manuel Barroso initially faced some difficulties in exercising this power over the 
preferences of the member states (Spence 2006b, 37). 
The EU’s enlargement rounds in the mid-2000s counteracted the effects of this 
change, as a sufficient number of portfolios had to be found for the acceding member 
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states. While this problem has been addressed today by the use of a number of Vice-
Presidents with coordination responsibilities, member states initially resisted instating a 
hierarchy between Commissioners as was floated by different Commission presidents. 
There has been a long-lasting emphasis on the Commissioner holding the 
External Relations portfolio as having a coordination role for other Commission 
portfolios dealing with issues touching on the EU’s foreign policy (Spence 2006b, 50), 
with RELEX Commissioners also attending meetings of the former General Affairs & 
External Relations Council (GAERC) composition (Spence 2006b, 49). Nonetheless, this 
coordination system has never worked particularly well as individual Commissioners 
often preferred pursuing their own policies (Cameron 2007, 54). 
The next sections thus focus on the allocation and organization of Commission 
portfolios over time, and what this has meant for intra-institutional policy coordination, 
before proceeding in a similar manner for the analysis of the underlying bureaucratic 
structures within the Commission. 
 
3.3.1.1. Commission portfolios over time 
The allocation of Commission portfolios has changed considerably over time, in line with 
the factors outlined above. Aside from these, two opposing paradigms as to the 
organisation of the portfolios with an external remit have shaped various Commission 
reorganizations. One would see different Commissioners holding responsibilities for 
relations with different regions or countries (largely based on a country’s state of 
development and geographical region), which should maximize the capacity for cross-
policy coordination. The other paradigm holds that portfolios should rather be organized 
according to policy areas, with each Commissioner being responsible for at least one 
policy with an external remit, thus increasing intra-policy coordination. 
Table 5 provides an overview over the evolution of the Commission portfolios 
with a significant external remit. In line with the broad definition of EU foreign policy 
taken in this thesis, this includes primarily internal policy areas such as agriculture or 
fisheries, which—at times—play an important role in EU negotiations. 
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Table 5: European Commissioners with External Relations portfolios over time 
 
Delors III (1993-1994) 
  
• Vice-President: External Economic 
Affairs and Trade Policy 
Leon Brittan UK 
• Vice-President: Cooperation, 
Development and Humanitarian Aid 
Manuel Marín Spain 
• External Relations and Enlargement Hans van den Broek Netherlands 
• Agriculture and Rural Development René Steichen Luxembourg 
• Environment, Fisheries Ioannis Paleokrassas Greece 
 
Santer (1995-1999) 
  
• Common Commercial Policy; 
Relations with North America, 
Japan, China, South Korea, Hong 
Kong, Macao and Taiwan 
Leon Brittan UK 
• CFSP; Delegations to third 
countries; Relations with Turkey, 
Cyprus, Malta, CEEC and NIS 
countries 
Hans van den Broek Netherlands 
• Relations with the Southern 
Mediterranean, Latin America, Near 
and Middle East, developing 
countries in Asia 
Manuel Marín Spain 
• Lomé Convention; Relations with 
South Africa, ACP countries and 
NGOs 
João de Deus Pinheiro Portugal 
• Consumer Policy, Fisheries, 
Humanitarian Assistance and 
Emergency Aid 
Emma Bonino Italy 
• Agriculture and Rural Development Franz Fischler Austria 
 
Prodi (1999-2004) 
  
• Trade Pascal Lamy France 
• External Relations Chris Patten UK 
• Development & Humanitarian Aid Poul Nielson Denmark 
• Agriculture & Fisheries Franz Fischler Austria 
• Environment Margot Wallström Sweden 
 
Barroso I (2004-2009) 
  
• Trade Peter Mandelson UK 
• External Relations & ENP Benita Ferrero-Waldner Austria 
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• Development & Humanitarian Aid Louis Michel Belgium 
• Agriculture & Rural Development Mariann Fischer Boel Denmark 
• Fisheries & Maritime Affairs Joe Borg Malta 
 
Barroso II (2010-2014) 
  
• First Vice-President: Foreign Affairs 
& Security Policy 
Catherine Ashton UK 
• Trade Karel De Gucht Belgium 
• Development Andris Piebalgs Latvia 
• Agriculture & Rural Development Dacian Cioloş Romania 
• Enlargement & ENP Štefan Füle Czech 
Republic 
• Maritime Affairs & Fisheries Maria Damanaki Greece 
• Climate Action Connie Hedegaard Denmark 
 
Juncker (2014-) 
  
• Vice-President: Foreign Affairs & 
Security Policy 
Federica Mogherini Italy 
• Trade Cecilia Malmström Sweden 
• International Cooperation & 
Development 
Nevem Mimica Croatia 
• Humanitarian Aid & Crisis 
Management 
Christos Stylianides Cyprus 
• Enlargement & ENP Johannes Hahn Austria 
• Agriculture & Rural Development Phil Hogan Ireland 
• Environment, Maritime Affairs & 
Fisheries 
Karmenu Vella Malta 
• Climate Action & Energy Miguel Arias Cañete Spain 
   
Source: Own compilation from multiple sources 
 
Prior to the entry into force of the Treaty of Maastricht, during Delors II the 
portfolios most relevant for the EU’s Latin America policy were divided between two 
Spanish Commissioners6, Abel Matutes, the Commissioner for Mediterranean and Latin 
America policy, as well as Manuel Marín, the Commissioner responsible for 
Development, Cooperation and Fisheries policy. However, the overall responsibility for 
trade policy and external relations lay with the German Commissioner Frans Andriessen. 
                                                
6 Prior to the 2004 enlargement round large member states appointed two, rather than one 
Commissioner. 
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The January 1993 reorganization of the Commission in line with the Treaty of 
Maastricht then did away with a geographical logic and created largely policy-based 
portfolios. Leon Brittan was made a Vice-President of the Commission and held 
responsibility for the trade portfolio and external economic relations. An additional 
portfolio with an external remit was created under the heading of External (Political) 
Relations and Enlargement under Commissioner Hans van den Broek. The portfolio for 
Cooperation, Development and Humanitarian Aid, however, was unified under Manuel 
Marín’s portfolio (Lister 1997, 14). It appears that in addition to questions as to the exact 
distinction between the different portfolios, foreign policy coordination in the 
Commission was hindered by personal issues as the “frequently public disputes between 
van den Broek and Brittan were hardly conducive to efficient delivery of policy” 
(Cameron 2007, 53). 
This change of organization was short-lived, however, and a geographical logic 
returned under the following Santer Commission. Under this Commission the number of 
portfolios with an external remit increased overall, with some foreign policy coordination 
responsibilities remaining with the Commission president himself. This increase of 
portfolios with an external outlook was mainly due to disputes between member state 
governments as to who would hold the influential External Relations portfolio, with the 
responsibilities ultimately having been split (Lequesne 2000, 47; Nugent and Saurugger 
2002, 354).  
This reorganization thus emphasized the regional aspects of the EU’s external 
relations, and created a portfolio for relations with Latin America, the Mediterranean, the 
Middle East, as well as the coordination of development policy, which was given to 
Manuel Marín. Other regional portfolios were also created, such as one focusing on 
relations with ACP states. 
While Leon Brittan remained responsible for what had become the Common 
Commercial Policy, the coordination of the EU’s Latin America policy did not fall within 
his policy remit. In addition to these changes, an External Relations Group of the 
Commission was created, uniting the Commission president with the different 
Commissioners responsible for external relations (Lister 1997, 14–15). This entity was 
meant to introduce greater overall coordination into the Commission aspects of the EU’s 
external relations. However, observers at the time pointed out: 
The Relex Commissioners meet on a monthly basis in an attempt to 
coordinate vertical and horizontal issues, but there is no doubt that the 
overlaps between their areas of responsibility generate antagonisms; and that 
 82 
these tensions are also evident within the DGs. (Bretherton and Vogler 1999, 
182) 
The geographical division of portfolios between 1995 and 1999 had two 
opposing effects on the coordination of the EU’s foreign policy. On the one hand it 
decreased the Commission’s coordination capacity within different EU policy areas 
(Dominguez 2008, 132), as for instance international trade agreements were negotiated 
mostly on an ad-hoc basis by different Commissioners at the time (Peterson 1999, 104), 
as ”[e]ach Commissioner defended each subsequent FTA as a means to strengthen the 
Union’s hand in their ‘patch’ of the globe.“ (Peterson 1999, 105). On the other hand, this 
focus on geography (Holland and Doidge 2012, 102) helped the European Commission 
identify and coordinate all policy areas relevant for its relations with Latin America (Orbie 
and Versluys 2008, 69). 
Table 5 does not take into account a brief interregnum between the collective 
resignation of the Santer Commission on 15 March 1999 and the Prodi Commission’s 
inauguration in September of that year. In the meantime, a caretaker Commission headed 
by Commissioner Marín remained in office. This drastic step had occurred over fraud 
allegations, thus widely weakening confidence in the Commission itself, as well as its 
organization at that point in time. 
Overall, the role of the Commission in the EU’s external relations was weakened 
throughout the 1990s due to the multiplicity of External Relations portfolios, the 
Commission’s reticence to become involved in the intergovernmental CFSP, and on-
going differences between different Commissioners (Cameron and Spence 2004, 127). 
While RELEX Commissioners did met at least monthly during this period in an attempt 
to coordinate different aspects of the Commission’s foreign policy (Bretherton and 
Vogler 1999, 182), the roadblocks for this were nonetheless sufficiently large. Charlotte 
Bretherton and John Vogler summarized the state of Commission-internal policy 
coordination as follows: 
There are tensions and jealousies between officials of Relex DGs at all levels; 
and these are reflected in the College of Commissioners. This problem is 
exacerbated, at present, by the absence of a satisfactory mechanism for 
resolving disputes between Commissioners. (Bretherton and Vogler 1999, 39) 
While the Commissioners with responsibilities for a region were thus 
theoretically able to coordinate the policies towards that region, this was not necessarily 
the case when competencies overlapped, or for policy areas in which member state 
governments would have a more active role. 
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Against this backdrop the Treaty of Amsterdam (see above) and the Prodi 
Commission were then seen as a fresh start for the institution. Through a declaration 
annexed to the treaty an attempt was made to overhaul the way in which the Commission 
dealt with its External Relations competencies (Bretherton and Vogler 1999, 40–41). 
Specifically, Declaration 32 in the Annex of the Treaty read as follows: 
The Conference notes the Commission's intention to prepare a 
reorganization of tasks within the college in good time for the Commission 
which will take up office in 2000, in order to ensure an optimum division 
between conventional portfolios and specific tasks.  
In this context, it considers that the President of the Commission must enjoy 
broad discretion in the allocation of tasks within the college, as well as in any 
reshuffling of those tasks during a Commission's term of office.  
The Conference also notes the Commission's intention to undertake in 
parallel a corresponding reorganisation of its departments. It notes in 
particular the desirability of bringing external relations under the 
responsibility of a Vice-President. (European Union 1997, Annex, 
Declaration 32) 
While nominally giving the President of the Commission more decision-making 
powers on the allocation of portfolios and underlying services, it nonetheless carried 
instructions as to how to organize the portfolio dealing with External Relations. Under 
this guidance, an organisation along policy-areas rather than regions ultimately prevailed. 
Alongside important administrative reforms, Prodi’s appointment of Pascal Lamy as the 
EU’s Trade Commissioner and that of Patten as External Relations Commissioner 
demonstrate the Commission president’s focus on external relations (Dimitrakopoulos 
2004, 5–6). 
Despite Prodi’s streamlining efforts for EU foreign policy, overall responsibility 
for Latin America shifted to the Trade Commissioner, while development aid to the 
region was now Patten’s responsibility (Holland and Doidge 2012, 104). Nonetheless, 
other attempts were undertaken to strengthen the coordination of the EU’s external 
relations. This is particularly relevant as the very aim of the administrative reform in the 
realm of external relations was to “define a coherent global approach that combined trade, 
aid and political dialogues” (Holland and Doidge 2012, 105). 
This manifested itself in the creation of different coordination mechanisms 
amongst the four Commissioners most centrally involved: Trade, External Relations, 
Enlargement and Development (Dominguez 2008, 121–22). A high-level coordination 
mechanism for external policy, called the RELEX Group, was also created, uniting the 
responsible Commissioners and senior officials (Dominguez 2008, 132). Nonetheless, a 
potentially even more significant attempt to ensure coordination through the use of 
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Commission vice-presidents was at the time met with scepticism by member states over 
a fear of competition with the newly created post of the High Representative for CFSP, 
and small member states particularly feared that their Commissioners would be relegated 
to a ‘junior’ position (Kassim and Menon 2004, 101; Nugent and Saurugger 2002, 354). 
The biggest challenge for the Commission’s next President, José Manuel 
Barroso, was to find a sufficient number of portfolios after the EU’s 2004 enlargement 
round, and once more after the enlargement to include Bulgaria and Romania in 2007. 
Despite this, the portfolios with an external relations remit remained very constant, as 
Barroso did not return to the geographical allocation of the Santer Commission. 
Nonetheless, the Commissioners holding these portfolios changed, with Benita Ferrero-
Waldner receiving the external relations portfolio and Peter Mandelson the trade brief. 
Furthermore, Ferrero-Waldner was made Deputy-Chair of the RELEX group of 
Commissioners, thus officially being given the coordination role in absence of Barroso 
(Cameron 2007, 54). Shortly before the end of the tenure of Barroso I in October 2009 
Mandelson was replaced by Catherine Ashton, who then remained in the post until the 
inauguration of Barroso II. Similarly, Karel de Gucht took over Louis Michel’s portfolio 
after he joined the European Parliament in July 2009. 
Adapting the previous coordination practice, during his first tenure as president, 
Barroso decided to preside over the group of Commissioners with external relations 
portfolios (Dominguez 2008, 121). This could have given him the possibility to weigh 
significantly into the Commissioners’ separate portfolios. However, as a former member 
of Mr. Barroso’s cabinet pointed out, the Commission president “picked his fights” and 
did not want to micromanage the work of any of the important external relations 
Commission portfolios,7 allowing individual Commissioners significant leeway in their 
specific policy domains.8 
The most significant change to the powers and composition of the Commission 
occurred with the creation of the HRVP and the EEAS under the Treaty of Lisbon. Its 
entry into force almost coincided with the beginning of Barroso’s second term in office 
and meant that the Commission would be stripped of its External Relations portfolio and 
certain other competencies which with the underlying services and staff would become 
part of the new EEAS. At the same time, the post of the External Relations 
Commissioner was fused with that of the new High Representative for the CFSP to form 
                                                
7 Former Barroso cabinet official, London, 8.6.2015 (Interview 3). 
8 Ibid. 
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the new HRVP who would now be a permanent vice-president of the Commission 
(similar to the role of the RELEX Commissioner mandated since Amsterdam). Like most 
bureaucracies, the European Commission accepted these changes only reluctantly, as it 
was not very eager to give up its competences in external policy areas outside 
the domain of CFSP/CSDP such as Trade, Development, Neighborhood, or 
Humanitarian Aid. Development policy in particular was vehemently 
defended as a competence of the Commission, with the support of the EP. 
(Blom and Vanhoonacker 2015, 214) 
While some External Relations competencies thus ultimately remained within 
the Commission, what used to be the External Relations portfolio was entirely moved out 
of the Commission and incorporated into the EEAS. Catherine Ashton was made the 
first HRVP of the Union in November 2009, which led to Ferrero-Waldner taking over 
the Trade portfolio until the inauguration of the second Barroso Commission. While the 
composition of the Trade portfolio then remained unchanged with Karel De Gucht as its 
new Commissioner, most other external relations portfolios saw a change of the make-
up of portfolios and the Commissioners holding the posts. 
It was intended that the newly created HRVP would continue in her role as a 
coordinating factor for the Commission’s External Relations policies in the RELEX 
Commissioners’ group. However, Catherine Ashton hardly ever chaired these meetings 
(thus privileging her role within the Council), with Barroso often taking over the role 
himself during his second mandate (Vanhoonacker and Pomorska 2016, 54–55). 
In 2014, with the inauguration of the Juncker Commission a number of portfolio 
and Commissioner changes occurred. Most notably for this thesis is Federica Mogherini’s 
appointment as HRVP, as well as that of Cecilia Malmström as EU Trade Commissioner. 
The most relevant innovation, however, was the creation of a number of Commission 
vice-presidents whose role it is to coordinate the Commission’s action in a number of 
different policy areas, and thus creating a hierarchy between different kinds of 
Commissioners. While this represents the very kind of streamlining effort that Prodi 
initially advocated, its usefulness in the realm of the EU’s external relations is not 
immediately clear. This is due to the fact that responsibilities for the activities of most of 
the Commission’s vice-presidents touch on the EU’s external relations in one way or 
another, including across different Commission portfolios. For instance, while Cecilia 
Malmström is responsible for the EU’s Trade Policy overall, Vice-President Frans 
Timmerman’s responsibility is to ensure that EU’s trade policy is transparent as part of 
the Commission’s ‘Better Regulation’ agenda. Additionally, Vice-President Jyrki 
Katainen’s Jobs, Growth, Investment and Competitiveness mandate has obvious links 
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with the EU’s Common Commercial Policy. At least on paper this creates a risk for 
competence overlap and the divergence of positions between different Commissioners. 
As a change from the Ashton period, HRVP Federica Mogherini has also taken a more 
active role within the Commission.9 
Overall, the necessary division of portfolios as well as the lack or malfunctioning 
of coordination mechanisms between different Commissioners have remained a 
prominent feature of any kind of portfolio organisation of the Commission. While many 
of these aspects are rather technical in nature, personal factors, such as Catherine Ashton’s 
focus on her duties outside of the Commission have further contributed to this picture, 
thus making for important elements to consider when studying bureaucratic sources of 
the EU’s foreign policy incoherence towards Latin America in the empirical chapters. 
 
3.3.1.2. The organisation of the Commission’s Directorates-General over time 
Alongside the changes to the Commission’s portfolio structure, the Commission’s 
bureaucracy has also been reorganised a number of times. Paying attention to this is 
important as “the position of the Commission in international negotiations, is often 
affected by turf wars between competing DGs.” (Delreux 2015, 155) These problems 
have been particularly accentuated where policy formulation and policy implementation 
are split between different administrative entities, as was and is the case for the EU’s 
development policy (Vanhoonacker and Pomorska 2016, 55). The alterations to the 
structure of the underlying DG’s were either in the realm of functional mergers or 
separations of different Directorates-General, or changes to their internal functioning. 
While these changes have often accompanied reorganizations of the Commission’s 
portfolio structure, this wasn’t always the case, and at times the set-up of Directorates’ 
General has not matched the broader portfolio structure (Spence 2006a, 135). 
These mismatches were often related to the fact that the different 
Commissioners needed to receive sufficiently important portfolios, with their 
competencies often spanning the work of multiple DGs, or parts of specific ones (Kassim 
and Menon 2004, 98). Much as the absence of a hierarchy amongst the Commissioners 
rendered coordination difficult at the highest level, this set-up has often led to in-fighting 
between DGs and a lack of oversight of their work, particularly when one DG reports to 
multiple Commissioners at once (Spence 2006a, 136). This was also influenced by 
                                                
9 EEAS officials, Brussels, 16.6.2015 (Interview 8). 
 87 
different logics as to how to integrate the Commissioners and their cabinets on the one 
hand, and the staff of their DGs on the other. For a long time Commissioners and their 
cabinets were located centrally in the Berlaymont building so as to facilitate interaction 
amongst them, which changed towards locating them within their DGs during the Prodi 
Commission, and has reverted to the previous logic ever since (Spence 2006a, 135). 
Table 6 provides an overview of relevant changes to Commission Directorates-
General over time, as well as their internal division. The 1990s can be seen as a period of 
fragmentation in this regard. While prior to the Delors III Commission both External 
Economic and Political Relations were being dealt with by DG I (Nugent 2001, 301), the 
necessity to allocate important tasks to different Commissioners led to the split-off of 
DG IA. 
 
Table 6: Relevant Commission Directorates-General and Directorates over time 
 
Delors III (1993-1994) 
 
• DG I (External 
Economic Relations) 
- External Economic Relations and 
Commercial Policy 
- Relations with North America, South 
Africa, Australia and New Zealand 
- Relations with the Newly Independent 
States 
- Relations with the Countries of the Far 
East 
- GATT, OECD, Commercial Questions in 
the areas of Agriculture and Fisheries 
- Mediterranean, Near and Middle East 
- Latin America 
 
• DG IA (External 
Political Relations) 
- Multilateral Political Relations 
- Political Relations with European and CIS 
Countries 
- Political Relations with North America, 
Asia, Australia and New Zealand 
- Political Relations with the Countries of 
Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East 
- Administration of the External Service 
 
• DG VI (Agriculture) - International Affairs Concerning 
Agriculture 
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• DG VIII 
(Development) 
 
- Development Policy 
Santer (1995-1999)  
• DG I (External 
Relations: Commercial 
Policy and Relations 
with North America, 
the far East, Australia 
and New Zealand) 
- Relations with North America, Australia, 
New Zealand, NAFTA and APEC 
- Relations with Far East Countries 
- WTO, OECD, Commercial Questions with 
Respect to Agriculture and Fisheries 
 
 
• DG IA (External 
Relations: Europe and 
the New Independent 
States, Common 
Foreign and Security 
Policy and External 
Missions) 
 
- Multilateral Relations 
- Management of External Missions 
• DG IB (External 
Relations: Southern 
Mediterranean, Middle 
East, Latin America, 
South and South-East 
Asia and North-South 
Cooperation) 
 
- Southern Mediterranean, Middle East and 
Near East 
- Latin America 
- South and South-East Asia 
- North-South Relations 
• DG VI (Agriculture) 
 
- International Affairs relating to Agriculture 
• DG VIII 
(Development: External 
relations and 
development 
cooperation with Arica, 
Caribbean and Pacific; 
Lomé convention) 
 
- Projects in the Southern Mediterranean, 
Middle East, Latin America, South and 
South East Asia, Forests and Environment, 
Gender Issues 
• European Community 
Humanitarian Office 
(ECHO) 
 
 
Prodi (1999-2004)  
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• DG Agriculture (DG 
AGRI) 
 
 
- International Affairs I, WTO negotiations 
in particular 
- International Affairs II, Enlargement in 
particular 
• DG External Relations 
(RELEX) 
 
 
 
 
 
- CFSP 
- Multilateral Relations and Human Rights 
- North America, East Asia, Australia, New 
Zealand, EEA, EFTA, San Marino, 
Andorra, Monaco 
- Latin America 
- External Services 
• DG Trade 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- General Affairs, Resources, Bilateral Trade 
Relations I 
- Free Trade Agreements, Agricultural Trade 
Questions, ACP, Bilateral Trade Relations 
II 
- Coordination of WTO and OECD Matters, 
Services, Dispute Settlement and Trade 
Barriers Regulation 
- Sectoral Trade Questions and Market 
Access, Bilateral Relations III 
• DG Development 
(DEV) 
 
- General Affairs and operational support 
- Development policy and sectoral questions 
• Humanitarian Aid 
Office (ECHO) 
 
• Common Service for 
External Relations 
 
 
Barroso I (2004-2009)  
• DG Agriculture & 
Rural Development 
(AGRI) 
 
- International Affairs I, in particular 
Multilateral Negotiations 
• Development and 
Relations with African, 
Caribbean and Pacific 
States (DEV) 
 
- EU Development Policy: Horizontal Issues 
- Development Policy: Thematic Issues 
• DG External Relations 
(RELEX) 
 
 
- Crisis Platform - Policy Co-ordination in 
Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP) 
- Multilateral relations and Human rights 
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- North America, East Asia, Australia, New 
Zealand, EEA, EFTA, San Marino, 
Andorra, Monaco 
- Latin America 
• DG Trade - Services and Investment, Bilateral Trade 
and Relations 
- Sustainable Development, Bilateral Trade 
Relations 
- Development and Economic Partnership 
Agreements 
- Public Procurement and Intellectual 
Property, Bilateral Trade Relations 
- WTO Affairs, OECD and Food-related 
sectors 
 
Barroso II (2010-2014)  
• European External Action 
Service (EEAS) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- Americas 
- Latin America 
- Mexico, Central America 
- Andean countries 
- Mercosur countries 
- North America and Caribbean 
- US, Canada 
- Caribbean 
• DG Development and 
Cooperation – 
EuropeAid (DEVCO) 
 
- Latin America 
- Horizontal Questions 
- Thematic Questions 
• DG Maritime Affairs 
and Fisheries (MARE)  
 
- International Affairs & Markets 
• DG Agriculture and 
Rural Development 
(AGRI) 
 
- International Bilateral Relations 
• DG Trade 
 
 
 
 
 
- Resources, information and Policy 
Coordination  
- Asia and Latin America  
- Sustainable Development; Economic 
Partnership Agreements, Africa-Caribbean 
and Pacific, Agri-food and fisheries 
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• Service for Foreign 
Policy Instruments 
 
- Partnership Instrument 
Juncker (2014-)  
• European External Action 
Service (EEAS) 
- Americas 
- United States, Canada 
- Mexico, Central America, Caribbean 
- South America 
- Regional Affairs 
• Service for Foreign 
Policy Instruments 
 
- Partnership Instrument 
• DG Trade 
 
- See 2010-14 
• DG Development and 
Cooperation – 
EuropeAid (DG 
DEVCO) 
 
- Policy and thematic coordination 
- Geographic coordination 
• DG Maritime Affairs 
and Fisheries (MARE)  
 
- International Affairs & Markets 
• DG Agriculture and 
Rural Development 
(AGRI) 
 
- International Bilateral Relations 
Source: WZB (2014); own compilation. 
 
In the Santer Commission the portfolio shift towards geographical 
responsibilities was then partially reproduced in the Commission’s DGs (García 2008, 
225; Nugent 2001, 301), leading to the creation of a further DG responsible for external 
relations. Strikingly though, while geographic responsibilities were now allocated across 
DG I, DG IA and DG IB, the former two also kept their previous responsibility for 
economic and political relations respectively, thus increasing the number of actors 
involved in policy coordination. To render this picture even more complex, the role for 
policy coordination of the Commission’s policies in Latin America was given to DG VIII 
(Development). 
When assessing the functioning of the Commission’s external relations 
bureaucracy in the pre-Prodi period, most point to important problems that arose out of 
this increasing fragmentation: 
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The choice of the creation of DG IA and the bureaucratic rivalry seemingly 
caused by the need to find Commissioners and Directors-General adequate 
portfolios did much to keep the Commission from becoming the streamlined 
foreign service to which it might have aspired. (Cameron and Spence 2004, 
128) 
While the European Commission already disposed of offices in third countries 
at the time, which have turned into EU Delegations since the Treaty of Lisbon, the 
functioning of these during the 1990s illustrates some of the difficulties that the 
Commission faced in becoming an actor which focused on foreign policy coordination. 
While Commission personnel were on the ground in many Commission offices around 
the globe, which could have provided country-based insights into the EU’s policies, the 
plethora of Commissioners with various External Relations related portfolios in reality 
meant that there was very little interaction with officials posted abroad. This only changed 
slowly when DG Trade officials began to join the Commission offices in the mid to late 
1990s.10 
Bretherton and Vogler furthermore point out that these “tensions and jealousies 
between officials of Relex DGs at all levels […] are reflected in the College of 
Commissioners.” (1999, 39) In their opinion this problem was further exacerbated by the 
lack of coordination mechanisms pointed to in the section above. When it comes to the 
organisation of DGs in the Santer period, the same authors have also outlined natural 
tensions between geographically-organised horizontal external relations DGs, as well as 
those administering individual policies vertically (Bretherton and Vogler 1999, 132). 
With the Prodi Commission’s administrative changes, the set-up of Commission 
DGs was also overhauled significantly. Not only did DGs return to a functional, rather 
than geographical logic, but the old nomenclature was also abandoned in favour of names 
designating their functions that remain large intact to this date. The newly created DG 
External Relations (DG RELEX) after the Treaty of Amsterdam was furthermore 
designed specifically to address previous policy coordination problems by creating a 
central administration meant to coordinate the external relations policies of the 
Commission, including through being put in charge of the Commission’s delegations in 
third countries (Cameron and Spence 2004, 129–30). 
These new administrative divisions together with more fundamental changes to 
the functioning of Commission cabinets and the way in which the work of DGs is being 
overseen have indeed had some effect. This was further helped by a system in which DG 
                                                
10 Former DG RELEX official, Brussels, 22.6.2015 (Interview 18). 
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RELEX did take leadership on many policies under the guidance of Commissioner 
Patten, as well as a new way for distributing the Commission’s development aid. 
Nonetheless, this emerging shift between the EU’s policy definition and implementation 
did create new room for administrative rivalries (Cameron and Spence 2004, 128). 
Not much changed in this system during the first presidency of Barroso between 
2004 and 2009. While the EU’s enlargement rounds necessitated the creation of new 
Commission portfolios, the administrative services supporting the Commission’s external 
relations remained largely intact. It was only with the changes of the Treaty of Lisbon that 
coincided with the beginning of Barroso’s second mandate that the Commission’s 
services were once more significantly overhauled. 
With the Lisbon changes both DG RELEX’s geographical units and those of 
DG DEV were moved to the newly created EEAS, thus doing away with this division 
that first emerged in the Santer period (Holland and Doidge 2012, 125). Nonetheless, the 
continued division between the EEAS and DG DEVCO has once more created a 
complex balance of competences between what is now two different institutions (Holland 
and Doidge 2012, 126–28). Internally, however, the historically fragmented 
administration of different parts of the EU’s development policy has now been 
streamlined within DG DEVCO. The system that ensued which once more brings 
together policy definition and implementation thus looks much more like the one that 
can be observed in states (Holland and Doidge 2012, 121–23). 
While the creation of the EEAS was meant to address some of the previous 
problems of policy coordination, a new fundamental problem for the coordination of the 
EU’s foreign policy is that the oversight role is now attributed to a new actor which is no 
longer a part of the European Commission’s bureaucracy, with the exception of the 
Foreign Policy Instruments Service (though part of the Commission, it is housed within 
the EEAS). While Vanhoonacker and Pomorska have recently argued that EEAS and 
DGs now appear to work better together as the EEAS has been included in intra-
Commission coordination meetings (Vanhoonacker and Pomorska 2016, 55), interviews 
for this project did not confirm this relatively positive outlook. Equally importantly, a 
fundamental problem remains with the functional division of the different external 
relations DGs that have persisted in the Commission even after the Treaty of Lisbon. As 
Keukeleire and Delreux argue: 
They each have their own working culture, set of objectives, legal bases for 
policy initiatives, and different type of instruments. This explains why, 
beyond the normal turf battles, coherent action is not always straightforward. 
(2014, 73) 
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Overall, while the Commission’s services have thus seen a major overhaul over 
the period under consideration for this thesis, issues of administrative divisions have 
remained relevant up to this day and thus form part of the enquiry into the origin of 
incoherence in the EU’s Latin America policy. 
 
3.3.2 The Council’s internal organisation 
While, given its size and competencies, the European Commission is responsible for the 
bulk of the decision-making and implementation activity relevant for the EU’s Latin 
America policy, the Council nonetheless has a role to play in all of the policy areas 
concerned, be it as a co-legislator, the granter of negotiation mandates, or the primary 
institution which serves as an interlocutor for political dialogues. Thus, the Council’s 
intra-institutional aspects potentially relevant for explaining the EU’s policy incoherence 
towards Latin America also need to be explored. Its role in foreign policy coordination 
towards Latin America depends on the composition and roles of its preparatory bodies, 
as well as the activity of the independent Council Secretariat. 
Much as is the case for the European Commission, the Council’s preparatory 
bodies taking part in its internal decision-making process (ultimately culminating in the 
meetings of the actual Council of Ministers in its different compositions) have been 
shaped by functional logics arising out of the European Union’s former pillar structure. 
While its internal decision-making process is ultimately hierarchical, thus differing from 
processes within the European Commission, the presence of different preparatory bodies 
with various and overlapping policy competencies—often staffed by different member 
state officials according to policy areas—can nonetheless be a hurdle for EU foreign 
policy coordination. 
For the period under consideration here, Latin American issues have been dealt 
with inside the Council by working groups operating on a policy-oriented logic on the 
one hand, and those holding a geographical coordination role on the other. While the set-
up of the former is the result of decision-making in what used to be the EU’s first pillar, 
the latter have emerged out of European Political Cooperation and later on the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy. Over time, some reform efforts were made to better integrate 
bodies which have originated within the different pillars of the EU’s superstructure (M. 
E. Smith 2004, 223–24). Nonetheless, the overall set-up of bodies within the Council 
remains largely untouched. Post-Lisbon the Trade Policy Committee (TPC), the Working 
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Party on Latin America and the Caribbean (COLAC), and the Working Party on 
Development Cooperation are the most relevant Council preparatory bodies for the EU’s 
Latin America policy at the initial stage, and excluding those that prepare the actual 
meetings of the Council of Ministers higher up in the Council’s hierarchy. 
While the TPC has always existed per the EU’s foundational treaties, its name 
has nonetheless varied over time, and used to be known as the Article 133 and Article 
113 Committee in reference to the treaty articles outlining the EU’s powers in the realm 
of trade policy-making. Considering the explicitly political side of relations with Latin 
America, the responsible Council preparatory body has undergone a few changes 
(formerly known as COLAT). On the one hand, in line with the development of the EU’s 
summits with the Latin American and Caribbean region its name was changed to reflect 
this, while formerly a second Council preparatory body, AMLAT, was in existence. Both 
AMLAT and COLAT were concerned with relations with the Latin American region, but 
one was staffed by officials permanently based in Brussels, whereas the more senior 
COLAT was staffed by diplomats based in national capitals and met less frequently.11 
Formerly all of these bodies were chaired by a representative of the rotating 
Council presidency. This has been altered somewhat since the Treaty of Lisbon, with 
most bodies relating to the EU’s External Action being chaired by a representative from 
the EEAS in the name of the HRVP. For the three bodies mentioned above, both 
COLAC and the Working Party on Development Cooperation are permanently chaired 
by the EEAS, while the TPC retains the rotating Council presidency (General Secretariat 
of the Council 2016).  
The organization of most Permanent Representations of member states to the 
EU also follows this functional logic, with officials from different ministries holding 
responsibilities for individual policy areas and only attending the meetings of the relevant 
Council preparatory bodies. Only some Permanent Representations, such as those of 
France or Spain12 integrate their officials or attribute competencies based on external 
partners, thus making it easier to link political concerns with those arising in other EU 
policy areas.  
The role and structure of the underlying bureaucracy that provides 
administrative support, the Council Secretariat, also needs to be explored. While it 
employs comparatively few civil servants compared to the European Commission, its 
                                                
11 Former EU official, Brussels, 19.6.2016 (Interview 17). 
12 Member state diplomat, Brussels, 22.6.2015 (Interview 19); Member state diplomat, 4.11.2015 
(Interview 29). 
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central and permanent role within the Council puts its officials into privileged positions. 
Its formal role is limited to that of administrators of the Council’s activity, and supporting 
the presidency (be it the rotating one or the permanent chairmanship of the European 
Council introduced with the Treaty of Lisbon), but its autonomous influence on the EU’s 
policy-making should not be underestimated (Stetter 2007, 153–59). 
Ultimately this actor is central in advising the presidency, is crucial for finding 
compromise solutions between the positions of different member states and provides the 
official record of the Council’s meetings (Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 2006, 114, 117). 
The latter is particularly important, as Council officials are present at every Council 
Working Group session, and can influence future discussions through emphasizing 
certain aspects in the minutes of previous meetings and the structure of meeting 
agendas,13 something which has also been recognized for the EU’s relations with Latin 
America.14 
While the Council Secretariat was originally split between officials dealing with 
issues arising out of the former European Political Cooperation (EPC) in the pre-
Maastricht days, since then the administrative structures have been integrated, originally 
creating some tensions within the Secretariat itself given the presence of different 
administrative cultures and roles (Bretherton and Vogler 1999, 181). 
Overall, the structure of the Council’s preparatory bodies closely resembles the 
functional policy-based logic that has come to be the norm for portfolio attribution within 
the European Commission. This creates similar coordination problems as are present in 
the latter actor. While the representatives of the member states attending such meetings 
all ultimately serve in the same national government, the fact that attendance at the TPC 
may differ from that in COLAC makes it difficult to see the EU’s Latin America policy 
in a manner that emphasizes the entirety of the EU’s policies towards the region, rather 
than a sectoral focus on policy areas. Adding to this complexity, when considering actors 
involved in the EU’s foreign policy-making towards the region, the Council Secretariat 
needs to be taken into account in the analysis as well. 
 
                                                
13 Former EU official, Brussels, 19.6.2015 (Interview 17). 
14 EU officials, Brussels, 17.6.2015 (Interview 11). 
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3.4 The quest for coherence in EU foreign policy-making 
The above has outlined potential sources for the EU’s foreign policy incoherence towards 
Latin America arising out of differing modes of decision-making for different parts of the 
EU’s foreign policy and the complexity of the internal structure of the Council, as well as 
that of the European Commission in particular. In contrast, the following section outlines 
attempts to improve the coherence of decision-making in the EU’s foreign policy over 
time, so as to establish whether the complexity of decision-making and the divergence of 
differing institutional actors’ views may have been mitigated through the establishment 
of coordination mechanisms. This in turn can provide important background insights 
necessary for evaluating the hypothesis based on actor autonomy in the empirical section 
of this thesis. 
Attempts to address problems of policy coordination in the EU’s foreign policy 
have regularly featured on the agenda of EU treaty reforms and in more informal 
discussions between the various actors involved. Despite these continuous efforts to 
increase the coherence of the EU’s foreign policy outputs, and horizontal policy 
coherence in particular, the underlying issues have not been resolved up to this day. This 
can be attributed primarily to the continued existence of different modes of decision-
making on various aspects of the EU’s foreign policy, which is in turn related to member 
states’ reluctance to give up parts of their control over certain EU policy areas. 
The first treaty-based provisions on the necessity for foreign policy coherence 
in the context of what today is called the Union’s External Action go back to the period 
of the Single European Act (SEA) (Gauttier 2004, 25). These were extended with the 
Treaty of Maastricht, which introduced a specific article C on the coherence of the EU’s 
foreign policy, which reads as follows: 
The Union shall be served by a single institutional framework which shall 
ensure the consistency and the continuity of the activities carried out in order 
to attain its objectives while respecting and building upon the ‘acquis 
communautaire’.  
The Union shall in particular ensure the consistency of its external activities 
as a whole in the context of its external relations, security, economic and 
development policies. The Council and the Commission shall be responsible 
for ensuring such consistency. They shall ensure the implementation of these 
policies, each in accordance with its respective powers. (Official Journal of 
the European Communities 1992, Article C) 
The Treaty thus sets out a list of policy areas that needed to be consistent with 
one another, and distributed the responsibility for this to the Commission and the 
Council. In reality, however, the Treaty did not set up ‘a single institutional framework’ 
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as it claimed, but structured the functioning of the EU’s policy-making according to the 
three different pillars, which varied greatly in the underlying decision-making provisions 
and functioned largely separately from one another. Furthermore, the above article in the 
treaty concerned with policy coherence provides a coordinating role both for the 
Commission and the Council, without clearly delineating when each should take a 
leadership role. This led to significant conflict potential as to the competencies of each. 
After all, both actors could adopt a reading of the article in question that would best suit 
their preferences (Gauttier 2004, 27–28). 
Pascal Gauttier also cautions that the Treaty of Maastricht set up a number of 
overlapping competencies for certain parts of the EU’s foreign policy (Gauttier 2004, 28–
32), such as the fact that concerns over rule of law, human rights and democracy in partner 
countries would need to be reflected not only in its CFSP, but also in the policies 
administered under the first pillar (Bretherton and Vogler 1999, 132). Such overlapping 
competencies made it particularly hard to identify decision-making hierarchies or 
leadership roles between them. While coordination mechanisms between CFSP officials 
and those in the Commission have been in place since the Treaty of Maastricht (M. E. 
Smith 2004, 223), these ultimately fuelled misunderstanding and administrative rivalry 
(Bretherton and Vogler 1999, 182). 
Such problems occurred not only between the Commission and the Council, the 
main institutional actors involved here, but also in their internal organisational structure. 
While some member states suggested that the Treaty of Amsterdam address some of 
these problems by uniting the former treaty’s provisions on the EU’s foreign policy under 
a single heading, this did not come about due to a lack of consensus between the member 
states (Bretherton and Vogler 1999, 191). Ultimately, the Treaty of Amsterdam thus did 
little to resolve the fundamental issues that the Treaty of Maastricht introduced to the 
coordination of the EU’s foreign policy (Gauttier 2004, 27). As some authors have 
outlined, while many informal and ad-hoc attempts were made to overcome such 
difficulties, ultimately the structural elements and the different preferences of the 
institutions trumped such efforts (Gauttier 2004, 33–37; M. E. Smith 2001), and an 
institutional answer to the issue of foreign policy coordination remained absent even 
beyond the Treaty of Amsterdam. 
Literature on what this meant for the coordination of the EU’s foreign policy at 
the time has cautioned that this set-up was particularly problematic for relations between 
staff charged with the management of the EU’s new Common Foreign and Security Policy 
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and Directorate-General for External Relations (DG RELEX) staff in the Commission, 
creating large potential for rivalry and mutual misunderstanding (Bretherton and Vogler 
1999, 182). Others have pointed out that the overlapping competencies that the 
Commission holds in the different pillars have particularly impacted on this institution: 
More than any other actor, the Commission has struggled with the major 
boundary problem between CFSP/CSDP and non-CFSP/CSDP 
competences, and thus also between being centre stage, backstage or not on 
the stage at all. […] These […] problems have led to a succession of ‘border 
conflicts’ or outright ‘wars’ or stalemates, not only between the Commission 
and the Council […], but also within the Commission’s own internal 
structures. (Keukeleire and Delreux 2014, 72–73) 
From a macro perspective on the EU’s foreign policy, in the pre-Lisbon period 
the presence of the EU’s pillar structure, the lack of coordination mechanisms between 
the key institutions involved in the EU’s foreign policy decision-making process, as well 
as within the Commission itself, have thus created significant hurdles for the formulation 
of a coordinated EU foreign policy, and these insights are used in this thesis to structure 
the empirical analysis in the following chapters. 
The Treaty of Lisbon then formally did away with the distinction between the 
EU’s various pillars and introduced new language as to the coherence of the EU’s foreign 
policy under a specific heading entitled External Action. On the surface this resolves some 
of the problems that some member states had wanted to address since the Treaty of 
Amsterdam. First of all, the treaty’s Article 21 sets out a number of objectives for the 
Union’s External Action, such as a reference to certain universal values: 
The Union's action on the international scene shall be guided by the principles 
which have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and 
which it seeks to advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the 
universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, 
respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect 
for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law. 
(Official Journal of the European Union 2008, Article 21, 1) 
More specifically it tasks specific institutions at the EU with the coordination of 
its foreign policy by stating that: 
The Union shall ensure consistency between the different areas of its external 
action and between these and its other policies. The Council and the 
Commission, assisted by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy, shall ensure that consistency and shall cooperate 
to that effect. (Official Journal of the European Union 2008, Article 21, 3) 
While the Treaty upholds the language that gives both the Council and the 
Commission a role in policy coordination, the inclusion of the newly created HRVP 
(making use of the EEAS at its service) attributes the roles somewhat more clearly to the 
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different institutions. It is important to note, however, that the European Parliament is 
still not mentioned in this context. 
Despite this, the treaty did not define a specific framework for the HRVP’s and 
the EEAS’ powers, functions and competencies (Holland and Doidge 2012, 124). Thus, 
the “Lisbon Treaty left the modus operandi of any more detailed coordination within the 
EEAS and between the Service and the EU institutions open.” (Duke 2012, 53) This once 
more created room for conflict between the institutions, only this time with an entirely 
new actor involved in the process. Furthermore, despite formally abandoning the former 
three-pillar structure, 
The Lisbon Treaty emphatically does not take one step that integrationists 
would have wished it to take, namely any significant extension within the area 
of foreign policy of the traditional ‘Community method’ of decision-making. 
(Donnelly 2010, 18)  
The presence of different modes of decision-making were thus not abandoned 
with the new treaty either. 
The creation of an entirely new institution at the EU level externalised some of 
the necessity for intra-institutional coordination that had formerly been addressed within 
the European Commission and the Council itself, thus disrupting established mechanisms 
for policy coordination. This is mainly related to the fact that the separation of parts of 
the Commission bureaucracy to be included in the new service created the potential for 
policy overlap within the structures of the EEAS, as well as between the EEAS and the 
Commission. Attributing this to the hybrid origin of the different policies contained under 
the External Action heading, Michael Smith has pointed out that, even after Lisbon, due 
to  
constant challenges of adjustment and institutional boundary-drawing […] 
the institutional context for EU diplomacy has remained uncertain, as has the 
more material dimension of institutional resources and capacity. (M. Smith 
2013, 655–56) 
 While the EEAS gained a formal role in providing political guidance for the 
EU’s External Action, most relevant funding sources and implementation powers 
remained with the European Commission (Balfour 2015, 37). As a consequence, new 
realms of overlapping competences were introduced, while reducing the EEAS’ 
possibility to provide guidance due to its lack of resources (Carta and Duke 2015, 60). 
Furthermore, given that the EEAS itself is staffed by personnel of different origins within 
the Council, the Commission and member state foreign services, its activity will likely 
have been shaped by the continued presence of differing administrative cultures internally 
(Lequesne 2015, 46–48). 
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After a few years of operation, the HRVP suggested changes to the functioning 
of the EEAS to increase its role in ensuring the coherence of the EU’s foreign policy. The 
2013 EEAS review document that is the result of this process then devoted an entire 
chapter to the issue of policy coherence (EEAS 2013, 7–12), stressing that: 
It is not always easy to achieve this [policy coherence] since it requires the 
establishment of linkages between: related geographic or thematic topics; the 
work in different institutions, and even the different levels of discussion in 
the Council bodies (European Council, Ministerial Council formations, PSC, 
thematic working groups). (EEAS 2013, 7) 
While the document made some suggestions as to how to change its functioning 
to increase its coordination role, there is only anecdotal evidence that coordination 
between the EEAS and Commission Directorates-General has increased ever since 
having been formally included in internal Commission coordination meetings 
(Vanhoonacker and Pomorska 2016, 55). 
There have been provisions in the foundational treaties of the EU that are meant 
to ensure policy coherence ever since the Single European Act. Nonetheless, the general 
nature of these has meant that at the macro level coordination mechanisms for inter-
institutional EU foreign policy coordination were incomplete in the period prior to the 
Treaty of Lisbon, and marred by the vague attribution of roles to different institutional 
actors. While the creation of the EEAS was meant to address this by setting up an 
institution that would be able to provide political guidance for the EU’s External Action, 
its limited remit and resources, the unclear position in the EU’s institutional set-up, as 
well as factors internal to it have so far kept it from being able to take up this role. The 
analysis in the empirical chapters will use these insights to verify the validity of the 
hypothesis based on the autonomy of individual actors in the EU’s foreign policy 
decision-making system. 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has further detailed the functioning of the EU’s foreign policy decision-
making that is relevant for the evolution of its relations with Latin America. In so doing 
it has provided the necessary background knowledge for the empirical analysis beginning 
with the next chapter, and further highlighted potential bureaucratic sources of the EU’s 
foreign policy incoherence towards the region across time that are considered in the 
remainder of this thesis. 
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While many attempts have been made to increase the coordination and 
coherence of the EU’s foreign policy over time, these efforts appear to have had only a 
limited success up to now. This can be attributed primarily to the fact the roles of the 
different actors in the coordination of the EU’s foreign policy are not clearly defined, 
creating the potential for competence overlap, and that existing mechanisms have been 
disrupted by nearly continuous reforms to the foreign policy decision-making system in 
itself. Additionally, the organisation of and complexity within the EU’s institutional actors 
can have an important impact on the coherence of the EU’s foreign policy, and these thus 
need to be considered in the empirical analysis.
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CHAPTER 4:  
The development of ‘one-size fits all’ during the 1990s 
4.1 Introduction 
The 1990s were an important period of change, not just for the European Union itself 
but also for its relations with third countries and organisations. Prior to the Treaty of 
Maastricht the Community’s ties to Latin America were very limited. This would change 
immediately after the creation of the European Union at the end of 1993. Where previous 
ties to Latin America were principally bilateral in nature, with a focus on supporting peace 
processes in Central America, a new Latin America policy was designed that would give 
a structure to the relations with the continent while setting out clear priorities for action. 
This has been described as the creation of a “one-size-fits-all“ (Börzel and Risse 
2009, 10) approach towards Latin America, under which relations with all actors in the 
region would follow the same model. The emphasis of the EU’s Latin America policy was 
to develop its ties with regional organizations, rather than individual countries, and to 
integrate the ties into an overarching framework that would see economic, development 
and political dialogue aspects considered in a single agreement. This focus on 
interregionalism, rather than sectoral bilateral relations has remained the rhetorical anchor 
of the EU’s Latin America policy up to today. 
In line with the hypothesis based on rational decision-making, a number of 
developments have contributed to this policy focus on the region. While the gradual 
return of political and economic stability in Latin America provides the backdrop for the 
increase in EU interest in the region, the main external motivating factors arose as results 
of this process. First of all, the region’s increased stability coincided with a return of 
regionalism, sparking the deepening or creation of some regional blocs not unlike the EU 
in their stated aims. Secondly, the region’s growing importance meant that the United 
States launched a number of initiatives to deepen its ties with the region itself. While these 
are relevant external developments, the Treaty of Maastricht has also provided a 
substantial impetus for the formulation of an EU foreign policy towards the region. These 
factors and the associated development of the EU’s Latin America strategy meant to unify 
the EU’s policy towards the region thus support the hypothesis based on rational 
decision-making.   
Nonetheless, while the origin of the EU’s interest in the region can be easily 
identified, it cannot help to explain the initial attempts to turn it into practice. Rather, to 
 104 
understand why the EU began negotiating for international agreements with some of the 
region’s organizations but not others, or why the Mexico agreement was negotiated in 
stages, one needs to take into account factors of bureaucratic politics. It is here that one 
can understand that it was only the autonomy of the Commissioner responsible for 
relations with Latin America that allowed the EU to develop its strategy and align its 
development cooperation funding alongside. This was also facilitated through a lack of 
existing commitments and previous ties with the region, meaning that policy inertia did 
not affect the development of a coherent strategy negatively. Additionally, the lack of 
salience of the issue at the time meant that there was little internal opposition to 
strengthening the EU’s ties with the region. Nonetheless, once more substantial aspects 
of the Latin America strategy were discussed, such as the negotiation of an agreement 
with Mercosur which would include a trade component, the interests of different actors 
started to diverge and the complexity of decision-making on international agreements and 
a lack of coordination mechanisms meant that it was Mexico instead of Mercosur which 
would sign the first Association Agreement with the EU in the region. 
In order to explore the developments leading to the formulation of the EU’s 
‘one-size fits all’ approach and the attempts to turn it into practice, this chapter is 
structured as follows: The first section places the development of EU-Latin American 
relations in the 1990s in the EU’s attempts to develop ties to other regional organisations 
in general, while the following one is concerned with the state of EU-Latin American 
relations prior to the Treaty of Maastricht, thus providing the background knowledge to 
situate the EU’s later policies towards the region. The next section then explores the 
advent of its Latin America strategy, followed by a discussion of the first attempts to turn 
it into practice. The last section then explores the specific case of Mexico—
simultaneously an outlier and a confirmation of the EU’s attempts to turn its Latin 
America strategy into practice. 
 
4.2 The European Union and interregionalism 
As discussed in chapter 2, the literature on the EU’s interregionalism policies has 
identified the 1990s as a crucial period for its attempts to develop ties with other regional 
organisations across the globe (De Lombaerde, Söderbaum, and Wunderlich 2015, 752). 
The EU’s attempts to develop interregional ties directly with the region’s regional 
 105 
integration mechanisms thus needs to be seen in the context of a wider move in the EU’s 
foreign policy-making. 
This was in turn related to the of the Cold War, which allowed the EU to play a 
more active role in an increasingly polycentric world amidst the momentum of the Treaty 
of Maastricht (Fawcett, Ponjaert, and Telò 2015, 358). “The EU used to do little to 
promote the diffusion of its own model. This changed with the end of the Cold War when 
it subsequently expanded its foreign policy.” (Börzel and Risse 2015, 56) In consequence 
“the promotion of regional integration has become part of the governance package the 
EU seeks to export”, and interregionalism as a tool “to promote socio-economic 
development, democracy and good governance through dialogue and mutual cooperation 
(partnership) has developed into one of the foundations of its foreign policy” (Börzel and 
Risse 2015, 56). 
This initial period of strong EU interregionalism promotion during the 1990s, 
for which only the Latin American dimension is discussed in this chapter was based on 
attempts for pure interregionalism (De Lombaerde, Söderbaum, and Wunderlich 2015, 
754), meaning that the EU attempted to develop ties directly with existing or nascent 
regional integration organizations such as Mercosur wherever possible, and thereby 
attempting to strengthen them. A similar development occurred in the EU’s policies 
towards ASEAN in South East Asia, yet the EU’s efforts got underway only somewhat 
later than was the case for Latin America (L. Allison 2015). Furthermore, the very 
foundations for regional association with countries benefitting from the EU’s ACP 
schemes were only laid in 2000 (Heron 2011, 338–40), making Latin America the first 
true testing ground for the EU’s promotion of interregional ties. 
 
4.3 Limited EU-Latin American relations prior to Maastricht 
Prior to the entry into force of the Treaty of Maastricht, which created the European 
Union, ties between its predecessor the European Communities (EC) and Latin America 
were very limited, in line with the organisation’s restrained role in international affairs at 
the time (see H. Smith 1995, 1998). While European Political Cooperation (EPC) had 
provided the organisation’s then 12 member states with a structural mechanism to discuss 
external political issues and react to them, the extent to which this was used with regards 
to Latin America was very limited. Nonetheless, in the running up to the creation of the 
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European Union both the Community itself and the member states through EPC 
displayed a growing interest in the region. 
Ultimately, however, the limited nature of European Community and EPC 
relations with the region—with a heavy focus on Central America and the Andean 
region—meant that a new foreign policy towards the region could be initiated from 1994 
onwards without too many existing stumbling blocks. In line with the hypothesis based 
on policy inertia, the absence of existing commitments, sunk costs and otherwise 
important goals for the region meant that a coherent Latin American strategy could be 
developed without bureaucratic hindrance. 
Prior to the 1990s EC relations with Latin America were almost absent, as the 
economic and political turmoil in large countries like Brazil rendered them relatively 
unattractive partners.15 EC activity in the region was largely limited to the disbursement 
of development funding and political dialogues set up in the context of Central America’s 
civil wars and the unrest that these inflicted on larger parts of the region. First set up in 
1984 (H. Smith 1995, 78–80), the San José Dialogue between the EC, its member states 
and the six states in the Central American region provided for the bulk of the EU’s foreign 
policy activity in the Latin America at the time. It was labelled by one interviewee as an 
“exercise of soft power”16 to ease the burden left by the region’s civil wars that was 
envisioned after Hans-Dietrich Genscher and Emilio Colombo’s 1981 initiative to 
provide the EC with a stronger presence in international affairs.17 In its formalized 
iteration under the 1985 Luxembourg Agreement, the San José Dialogue then created a 
format for regular meetings between Central America’s countries and the EC and its 
member states, while similar arrangements were still absent for the other countries of the 
region. 
With the EC’s enlargement to Spain and Portugal in 1986, two countries with 
an obvious interest in strengthening the Community’s ties with countries in the region 
joined the bloc, thus providing an important background factor for the EC to strengthen 
its activity in the region in line with the hypothesis based on rational decision-making. 
This enlargement round indeed paved the way for a range of activities in the Commission 
that would eventually see bilateral relations being upgraded to a similar level as those with 
countries in other regions, mainly under the initiative of the European Commission. This 
                                                
15 Former DG RELEX official, Brussels, 22.6.2015 (Interview 18). 
16 Former EU official, Brussels, 19.6.2015 (Interview 17). 
17 Member state diplomat, Brussels, 4.11.2015 (Interview 29); Former EU official, Brussels, 
19.6.2015 (Interview 17). 
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was easily possible as setting up a number of dialogue formats had no obvious drawbacks 
for the existing EC member states, with the low salience of the issue contributing to a 
lack of diverging interests between them. 
Nonetheless, outside of the realm of the Commission’s activity, member state 
interest as expressed through EPC remained very limited during this period of time. An 
analysis of EPC documents shows that there were very few discussions or declarations 
on the region, as member states likely preferred national foreign policy to advance their 
interests there. EPC declarations from 1990 to 199318 reveal that the key issues discussed 
were democratization and peace processes in the region, and the fight against drug 
trafficking. The overall number of declarations produced on Latin America under EPC 
during that period remained very small and was mainly concerned with Central America 
and the Andean states. 
Institutionally speaking, the only significant innovation at this time occurred 
with the signature of the Rome Declaration in December 1990, establishing a format of 
annual ministerial meetings with the Rio Group,19 and thus creating a forum for dialogue 
and cooperation with parts of Latin America absent from the San José process. Originally 
initiated by countries in the region, Spanish and Portuguese lobbying meant that the idea 
was finally taken seriously by EC officials and turned into practice given that few costs 
were associated with it.20 The Rome declaration itself then set out a list of priorities for 
EU-Latin American relations, such as increasing European investment and development 
aid in the region, the strengthening of Latin American regional integration projects, or the 
fight against drugs (Agence Europe 1990g, 1990h). 
While this document and the public statements that accompanied it marked a 
first European interest in the region at large, its contents remained largely tied to a vision 
of increased bilateral cooperation with individual Latin American countries, and primarily 
in the realm of unilateral EC development support. As such, the dialogue set up with the 
Rio Group principally served as a launch pad for Commission suggestions to develop 
formalized treaty-based ties with the region’s individual countries, rather than developing 
ties with the region itself (EPC Bulletin 1994, 216–25, 1995, 265–73, 1996, 230–38). 
                                                
18 The analysis for 1990-1992 is based on (J. Grugel 1996, 86–87). I have supplemented this with 
an analysis of EPC documents from 1993 as reported in (EPC Bulletin 1996). During all of 1993 
only 7 statements relating to LA were produced altogether. 
19 This international organization was founded in 1986. At the time of the signature of the Rome 
Declaration its membership included all hispano- and lusophone countries of South America 
and Mexico. Over time its membership has grown to include all Latin American and some 
Caribbean states. 
20 Former EU official, Brussels, 19.6.2015 (Interview 17). 
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There were some differences between the various ‘third generation’ agreements 
ultimately concluded with actors in the region (IRELA 1997). However, their key 
commonality was the introduction of innovative elements, such as a ‘democracy clause’. 
This was meant to allow for agreements or parts of them to be suspended if any party 
had concerns as to the democratic credentials of the other. They also included provisions 
to expand existing cooperation under the agreements by common accord, and the 
promise of some economic and trade facilitation (del Arenal 1997, 123–25). Overall, 
however, the traditional focus on development policy was maintained. As an additional 
factor that foreshadowed the EU’s policy from 1994, all these agreements stressed the 
necessity for increased Latin American regional integration and the EU’s support for it. 
Given that the EC’s ties with Latin America remained without political salience, 
on the suggestion of the European Commission a first such agreement was signed with 
Argentina in 1990 (Agence Europe 1990j), rapidly followed by one with Chile built on the 
Argentinian model (Agence Europe 1990f), and signed on the occasion of the launch of 
the Rome Declaration. Over the coming years the Commission suggested proceeding in 
a similar manner with all of the region’s countries, likely because this would see it lead the 
negotiations and have a formal role under the dialogue mechanisms created through the 
agreements. This process was finished by 1993—a very rapid development when 
comparing it to later EU negotiations in the region—with the conclusion of such 
agreements with the Andean Community of Nations and Central America. While these 
were formally concluded with the regional organizations in question, in reality these 
required individual country signatures and ratification in each case.  
While the above required the—mostly uncontroversial—agreement of the 
European Commission and the member states in line with the EU’s procedures to 
conclude international agreements, the former actor’s activity in the region was not limited 
to this. Once the EU-Rio Group format was established, the European Commission used 
the 1991 ministerial meeting to sign a technical cooperation agreement with the Latin 
American Integration Association (ALADI)21 (Agence Europe 1991c), followed by a 
similar agreement with Mercosur in 1992 (Agence Europe 1992a), thus foreshadowing 
the importance of ties with regional integration organisations in the aftermath of 
Maastricht. Through these agreements the Commission could share its expertise in the 
                                                
21 An organization founded in 1980 that replaced the Latin American Free Trade Association. 
While discussions for different LAC integration efforts took place in the context of this 
organization, it has been overshadowed by projects such as the Union of South American 
Nations (UNASUR) and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC). 
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realm of European integration with these similar minded organizations and their 
bureaucrats in the Latin American context. 
Simultaneously the European Commission increased its presence through a 
doubling of the number of its delegations in the region, opening up representations in 
countries like Colombia and Peru (Agence Europe 1990i, 1993b), the latter of which 
doubled as its representation to the Andean Community. This could be seen largely as a 
symbolic move, as their staffing levels remained limited and negotiations for the third 
generation agreements such as those with Brazil did not involve the delegations at all.22 
 
Table 7: Net ODA by the EU's institutions in million current $ 
  
Americas 
 
Asia 
 
Total EC/EU 
1985 75 152 1,320 
1986 97 193 1,473 
1987 170 257 1,693 
1988 235 370 2,508 
1989 255 394 2,611 
1990 316 328 2,808 
1991 297 516 3,707 
1992 386 471 4,515 
1993 396 483 4,211 
1994 479 890 5,069 
1995 661 877 5,398 
    
Source: Own compilation based on OECD (2016). 
 
Given the development focus of the third generation agreements signed with 
the countries in the region, the Commission’s role as a development actor increased in 
important ways, thus justifying the institution’s increased presence on the ground. The 
1991-1995 financial period saw the budget allocation for development funding, or Official 
Development Aid (ODA), in the region increase importantly under the guidance of 
Spanish Commissioner Abel Matutes, thus following a trend that had already begun with 
Spain’s and Portugal’s accession to the EU in 1986 (see Table 7). The autonomy and lack 
of clear hierarchies and coordination mechanisms in the Commission at the time allowed 
this change to be suggested with ease. While the final allocation did not reach the initially 
proposed level that was to match Europe’s support for Central and Eastern European 
                                                
22 Former DG RELEX official, Brussels, 22.6.2015 (Interview 18). 
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countries (Agence Europe 1990c), the commitment was so important that it led Matutes 
to speak of a ”double leap“ (Matutes cited in Agence Europe 1990b) for the EC’s activity 
in the region. 
This was flanked by a somewhat controversial decision to allow the European 
Investment Bank (EIB)23 to fund projects in the region, a treatment previously reserved 
for the ACP group of states. The issue was first raised at the first EU-Rio Group 
ministerial meeting in 1991 by Latin American representatives (Agence Europe 1991b) 
and the possibility specifically included in the final document (Agence Europe 1991c). It 
was discussed extensively between the Commission and the Council and within the 
Council itself between 1990 and 1992. Ultimately the Council decided in May 1992 to 
extend this possibility to Latin American countries (Agence Europe 1992b), offering a 
new way of strengthening cooperation with the continent outside of the elements 
described above. 
EC-Latin American relations were thus very limited in the period prior to the 
Treaty of Maastricht. While the development of the admission of Spain and Portugal into 
the Community meant that its activities in the region, and particularly bilateral 
development funding, increased gradually, EC activity paled in comparison to its focus 
on other regions of the world, such as Asia (see Table 7). While these changes can be seen 
through the lens of Hypothesis 1 as a result of rational decision-making after the EU’s 
1986 enlargement round, bureaucratic factors have nonetheless played a relevant role. In 
line with the hypotheses based on policy inertia and diverging interests, it was particularly 
the lack of previous commitments and the low salience that allowed the Commission, and 
particularly Abel Matutes, to initiate the negotiations for third generation agreements with 
the region and increase the allocation of development aid for it. The latter was largely 
independent to develop his proposals given the autonomy of individual Commissioners 
and their DGs at the time. 
 
4.4 The advent of ‘one-size fits all’ 
The development of the EU’s Latin America strategy since 1994 can be attributed to a 
number of external and internal developments, supporting the validity of the hypothesis 
based on rational decision-making. Nonetheless, even here the contrasting analytical lens 
                                                
23 The EIB is a non-profit financial institution that is owned collectively by the EU’s member 
states and that provides funding for projects along criteria set by its owners. 
 111 
of bureaucratic politics can generate some additional insights, such as the influence of a 
lack of salience of the Latin America strategy for most internal EU actors. 
 The return of political stability, democratic governance and economic growth 
in the Latin American region provided the backdrop for the EU’s ‘discovery’ of the region 
after 1994 (Devlin 2001, 82; García 2008, 53). While there were brief periods of acute 
crisis on the continent at the end of the 1990s and in the early 2000s, events such as the 
Mexican Tequila crisis of 1994 could not undo the stability that the continent had found, 
and could not stop further progress in the peace settlements in Central America. 
Alongside the above-mentioned developments within the region, intra-regional 
trade increased and a number of regional integration mechanisms were either created or 
revived (Devlin 2001, 79). Against this backdrop the Mercado Común del Sur (Mercosur) 
formed in 1991,24 and Andean as well as Central American integration processes picked 
up steam. The advent of a period of ‘new regionalism’ has to be regarded as one of the 
main external factors motivating the development of the EU’s Latin America strategy. 
While the democratization and economic opening efforts were beneficial for the 
revitalization of regional integration in Latin America at first, this meant that these were 
increasingly looking for developing relations with other regional organizations like the 
EU on an interregional basis (Devlin 2001, 84), and applying the concepts of the 
Washington consensus25 through FTA negotiations.26 
While the processes in the region rendered it more and more relevant for the 
EU’s external relations in and of itself, a related external development further contributed 
to this, namely the renewed interests of the United States in developing ties with the 
region. Seeking to increase its trade with Latin American countries, Mexico was included 
in negotiations for the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) between the 
United States and Canada, negotiations for which concluded successfully in 1992 (see the 
section on EU-Mexico relations below). When the agreement entered into force in 1994, 
talks began on a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) that aimed at eliminating tariffs 
between all of North, Central and South America (Nelson 2015, 79–83). While the launch 
of these two negotiations provided for important external developments that influenced 
the cost-benefit analysis of EU policy-makers, fears over an increased influence of the 
                                                
24 At the time this grouping consisted of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay. 
25 The Washington consensus describes prescriptions for the improvement of growth in 
developing economies based on liberalisation and opening up of these economies to 
international trade.  
26 Former EU official, Brussels, 19.6.2015 (Interview 17). 
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United States to the detriment of the EU were already present beforehand, as the Mexico, 
Brazil and Paraguay third generation agreements of the early 1990s explicitly mention the 
aim to strengthen regional integration within Latin America while leaving out the United 
States (Page 2001, 130). 
Aside from these two factors external to the EU, changes to the nature of the 
EU itself have also created incentives for a change to the EU’s policy towards the region. 
The Treaty of Maastricht, which entered into force on November 1st 1993, created today’s 
European Union and provided it with specific external relations competencies under the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). This treaty change meant that European 
integration had taken a qualitative leap forward as the extension of the organization’s 
competencies made for a period of dynamism that occurred in parallel to the 
strengthening of Europe’s relationship with Latin America. 
Celestino del Arenal (1997, 112, 122–23) notes that the dynamics of European 
integration around the time of the Treaty of Maastricht were crucial for the EU’s attempt 
to intensify and redefine its relationship with third actors, and Latin America in particular. 
After all, the idea behind a European Union went beyond the prior economic remit of 
the EC and a rethinking of its foreign policy in line with its new status was only logical. 
While such effects are not directly tangible and therefore difficult to trace, the rhetoric of 
an international European responsibility in official documents and declarations points to 
their importance to the EU’s member states. 
When the new CFSP was discussed at the 1992 Lisbon European Council 
meeting, this sense of growing European responsibility in external affairs and particularly 
promoting regional integration could be seen in the meeting’s conclusions. Without being 
specific to the Latin American region, one of the aims of the CFSP was defined as 
promoting regional political stability and contributing to the creation of 
political and/or economic frameworks that encourage regional cooperation 
or moves towards regional or subregional integration (Portuguese Presidency 
of the European Council 1992, 31). 
With the promotion of regional organizations defined as one of CFSP’s goals, 
the definition of the EU’s Latin America policy along these lines would be significantly 
easier. 
Even before the creation of the CFSP under Maastricht, however, some EU 
activity in the realm of regionalism support already existed (see Edwards and Regelsberger 
1990). First and foremost, EU Commissioners during the tenure of Jacques Delors as 
Commission President had espoused the concept and mentioned it whenever possible. 
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Representative of many similar declarations, on an official visit to a summit of ALADI, 
the responsible Commissioner Matutes stated that 
[t]he development of steadily closer relations between the Community and 
Latin America implies necessarily a greater regional integration (cited in 
Agence Europe 1990e).  
Over time this issue became a focus of the EU’s talks in the EU-Rio Group 
format to the extent that Matutes’ successor Manuel Marín put it at the top of the agenda 
of its third annual ministerial meeting (Agence Europe 1993a). 
The public indication of the EU’s shift towards a ‘one-size fits all’ approach in 
Latin America was then present in the declaration of the IV EU-Rio Group ministerial 
meeting in April 1994. The document (as partially reproduced in European Foreign Policy 
Bulletin 1997, 213–20) specifically mentioned the importance of regional integration in 
Latin America, and both regions’ intention to cooperate at the interregional level. It was 
also in this document that an EU-Mercosur interregional agreement was first envisioned 
(del Arenal 1997, 127). Regionalism promotion and interregional itself had come to be 
the EU’s policy priority for the region by then, and this coincided with important drivers 
for the EU’s foreign policy towards the region to change, supporting the validity of 
Hypothesis 1, which is based on rational decision-making. Nonetheless, a consideration 
of bureaucratic politics can generate additional insights into the development of the EU’s 
Latin America strategy as outlined above. 
Once more, given the absence of any previous policy covering Latin America as 
a region and the presence a relatively permissive consensus among the member states, the 
bureaucratic factors of policy inertia nor the divergence of interests played a role here. 
On the other hand, it is here that the autonomy of individual actors, and in particular that 
of Commissioner Manuel Marín has to be emphasized. Once more, the division of 
portfolios within the Commission and their relative independence at the time helped the 
EU to define its Latin America strategy. 
The Commission’s portfolio for the EU’s relations with Latin America—which 
existed given the regional logic of the organisation of its portfolios at the time—had been 
in the hands of a Spanish Commissioner since the country joined the European Union in 
1986. A first important advocate for a European focus on the region was the EC’s Spanish 
Development Commissioner Abel Matutes, who emphasized at a meeting of ALADI in 
1990 that: 
I would like to assure you [Latin American ministers] of the Commission's 
availability and of my own in a personal capacity to contribute to the relaunch 
of the Latin American integration process. (cited in Agence Europe 1990e) 
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He proposed the almost doubling of development funding for the region 
(alongside that for Asia) in the 1991-1995 timeframe (Agence Europe 1990d), thus 
establishing the Commission as a relevant development actor in the region. 
His portfolio was taken over by Manuel Marín, another Commissioner from 
Spain, in 1993 with the entry into force of the Treaty of Maastricht. He continued to be 
an advocate for developing strong ties with Latin America. Under the Delors III 
Commission EU-Latin American relations were still largely limited to the realm of 
development cooperation, and CFSP initiatives in the region were almost absent. Marín’s 
role as Development Commissioner thus meant that he could propose changes to the 
EU’s Latin America policy without being challenged by other colleagues, supporting the 
hypothesis based on policy autonomy. His influence on the definition of the EU’s Latin 
America policy was seen by Maria Garcia (2008) as so significant that she talks about a 
‘Marín Effect’. 
In effect, Marín developed an internal Commission proposal circulated in 
October 1994 which came to be known as the ‘Marín Document’ (García 2008, 116). It 
advocated for the deepening of ties with LAC by signing new agreements, and in 
particular for the conclusion of an Association Agreement with Mercosur and Chile 
(García 2008, 199) as a single undertaking. The stated aims of this document once more 
need to be understood in the context of regionalism support, as they would link the 
different policy fields of development aid, cooperation and political dialogue. In a mindset 
framed by development concerns, as would be logical for a Development Commissioner 
and the underlying bureaucracy, regionalism support would have to contain all these 
elements so as to increase the partner region’s institutional capacity for cooperation with 
the EU (Page 2001, 117–18). 
While Marín’s views and that of other officials in the Commission were 
influenced by the attempts of the United States to conclude FTAs (Sanahuja 2000, 44) 
supporting the idea of rational decision-making within the EU, his motivation went 
beyond that as he generally favoured the Latin American region. When looking at the 
Commission’s Asia strategy that Marín oversaw at the same point in time (European 
Commission 1994b) then one notices that it promoted a more gradual deepening of the 
relationship with the region than the approach he favoured towards Latin America 
(García 2008, 119–20). Marín wasn’t shy either to voice his vision of strengthening 
subregional organizations in Latin America and increased cooperation with the region as 
a whole even prior to the ‘Marín Document’, such as during the IV EU-Rio Group 
 115 
ministerial meeting in April 1994 (Agence Europe 1994c) or in an op-ed for El País 
discussing the importance of the conclusions of the June Corfu Council for the EU’s 
Latin America policy (Marín 1994). 
Both Commissioners’ activism was further helped by sharing this vision with 
Jacques Delors, who envisioned a closer cooperation with Latin America as part of his 
attempts to strengthen the global role of the European Union (Lister 1997, 16–17). Delors 
wasn’t shy either in advocating for this goal, such as during a 1993 visit to the continent 
(Agence Europe 1993d). The supporting administrators in Marín’s Directorate-General 
were also largely favourable of this approach, as those dealing with Latin America in the 
Commission during the 1990s were primarily Spanish nationals (García 2008, 118) a 
tendency that was reinforced over time. For instance, when DG I expanded in 1990 to 
reflect the EU’s increased international ties, Matutes’ former chef de cabinet Juan Prat 
was made responsible for the North-South and Latin America portfolio (Agence Europe 
1990a). Such staffing decisions, however, should not only be considered in the context of 
national interest promotion, as Spanish officials brought along the necessary linguistic 
competences and regional expertise given the country’s strong ties to Latin America. 
Marín’s agency in this field was also aided by the fact that both within the EU-
12 countries, and then the EU of 15 member states from 1995 there was a widespread 
consensus on the necessity to strengthen relations with Latin America, and specifically by 
concluding interregional Association Agreements. This was due to the fact that the issue 
remained without salience for most countries, all while being able to accommodate the 
preferences of Spain and Portugal. The conclusions of the Corfu European Council in 
June 1994 (Greek Presidency of the European Council 1994) underlined Europe’s 
willingness to deepen its relations with LAC. The document becomes very specific in 
mentioning that the relationship with Mercosur should be strengthened, and economic 
and political relations with Mexico deepened. The last sentence contains an element that 
comes close to an operative clause, as it specifically invited the Commission ”to pursue 
these questions further“ (Greek Presidency of the European Council 1994, 16). Given 
that the EU had already concluded third generation agreements with Mexico as well as all 
Mercosur states individually, this meant that a further deepening of the relationship with 
these actors would necessitate a new type of agreement, thus giving Marín the authority 
to develop these ideas further. 
Marín’s concrete proposals were then incorporated into the ‘Basic Document’ 
of the Council on EU-Latin American relations of 1994. In terms of its content the 
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document outlines the state of EU’s relations with the region at the time, notably 
differentiated by subregional organizations. Crucially, it states that 
We [the Council] seek to intensify the dialogue and cooperation between the 
European Union, the Rio-Group, Central America (San Jose), and Mercosur, 
broaden the agenda and enhance the political aspects of this dialogue. We are 
prepared to take up and strengthen dialogue and cooperation with other 
regional and sub-regional groupings, as well as with individual countries. 
(Council of the European Union 1994, 5) 
In terms of concrete proposals for strengthening the relationship, the necessity 
of an intensified political and economic relationship with Mexico, as well as the ”vision 
of a free trade agreement between the EU and MERCOSUR“ (Council of the European 
Union 1994, 5) (as well as Chile)27 is mentioned. The relationship with the Rio Group is 
portrayed more as a forum for discussing common issues with the largest number of 
partners possible, and no concrete proposals were made. 
This absence of diverging interests between the member states is not 
unsurprising, as none of the member states stood to lose in principle from this approach, 
while Spain, Germany and the United Kingdom could deepen their already strong 
economic ties with the region. While Spain had only been a member of the EU since 
1986, it was nonetheless particularly keen on improving the EU’s relationship with Latin 
America and had deepened its ties bilaterally during the 1980s. Aside from this general 
incentive to advocate closer EU ties with the continent, one also has to consider that 
Spain’s economic entanglement with the region increased importantly throughout the 
1990s. From a much lower level overall, by the end of the decade it had become the 
second source of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) to the region, only being surpassed by 
the United States (García 2008, 70–72). 
It was his home country that turned out to be Marín’s closest ally in turning the 
proposed policy change towards Latin America into action. During its Council presidency 
in the second half of 1995, during which member states dispose of important policy 
autonomy, one of the stated priorities was to push forward this agenda towards Latin 
America, namely by working towards “increasing the existing cooperation and negotiating 
new treaties” (Comité Organizador de la Presidencia Española del Consejo de la Unión 
Europea 1995, 29; translation mine). In particular, the document refers to the negotiation 
of new treaties with Mercosur, Mexico, Chile and Cuba. 
                                                
27 The EU hoped for a Chilean accession to Mercosur, which is why they are mentioned in the 
same section. See the section on Mercosur/Chile later in this chapter, as well as in the next 
chapter for a discussion of the consequences of this position. 
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Given the support in principle by the member states, the work by Marín in the 
Commission could then continue. Without being specific to Latin America, a document 
from 1995 (European Commission 1995a) establishes regional integration policies as a 
core part of the Commission’s aims to support sustainable economic development in 
developing countries. It also issued a Communication on the perspective for the EU’s 
relations with Latin America in the 1996-2000 period (European Commission 1995c). 
This can be considered as an outline for a broad EU Latin America strategy as 
it contains a long list of reasons for the EU to increase its cooperation with the region, 
and particularly the favourable political climate that preceded a stabilization of the region’s 
economies. Aside from these more general reasons for increased cooperation, the 
document mentions that Europe is the region’s most important development aid donor, 
that the number of political meetings between the EU and the region has increased, and 
that it is an important export market for the EU. An emphasis on these issues follows the 
tripartite structure of the different policy areas to be covered under comprehensive 
Association Agreements. On the basis of the underlying analysis the document then 
proposes to further the relationship across all three policy areas, using the interregional 
cooperation framework overall. The document specifically names Mercosur, Central 
America and the Andean Community of Nations as subregional organizations with which 
Association Agreements should be pursued. 
While the various external and internal factors that have influenced the EU’s 
decision-making to develop its Latin America strategy during the 1990s provide strong 
support for the hypothesis based on rational decision-making, the process can only be 
understood in full when considering bureaucratic politics. Once more, it was the absence 
of policy inertia and diverging interests between internal EU actors that allowed the 
decision-making process to get underway. This was coupled with the autonomy of 
Commissioner Marín to outline his proposals and that of Spain to advocate for them 
during its Council presidency. In this instance, the assumption of rational decision-making 
is thus largely compatible with the consideration of bureaucratic politics, something which 
changed during the early implementation phase of the EU’s Latin America policy, as is 
outlined below. 
 
 118 
4.5 The difficult implementation of the EU’s new Latin America strategy 
While the definition of the EU’s ‘one-size fits all’ Latin America strategy was based on a 
relative consensus of the relevant actors in the EU’s foreign policy system, attempts to 
turn it into practice show the difficulties that can arise when internal EU disagreements 
are present. Given the lack of coordination mechanisms that would be strong enough to 
mitigate these differences and the complexity of the EU’s decision-making system, these 
shaped the EU’s attempts to negotiate agreements in the region, and the timeline under 
which these occurred. 
Developing ties with Mercosur and Chile was to be the initial testing ground for 
the EU’s new Latin America strategy as negotiations for agreements with both had been 
mentioned specifically in the documents defining it. While the next chapter outlines the 
negotiations for Association Agreements with parts of the region since the late 1990s, the 
following sets out the initial development of ties with Mercosur. After all, the organisation 
had only been founded in 1991, and policy inertia was thus not an issue given the lack of 
previous ties with the region. 
Informal ties between the EC and Mercosur had already existed since its 
inception in 1991. After the signature of the Treaty of Asunción, its foundational 
document, but before its ratification, the project was presented to EU officials on the 
fringe of the 1st EU-Rio Group ministerial meeting in 1991. It was also at that meeting 
that Mercosur foreign ministers first proposed the conclusion of an EU third generation 
Framework Cooperation Agreement with the organization (Agence Europe 1991a). The 
European Commission led by Commissioner Matutes then signed a technical agreement 
meant to provide administrative assistance to the nascent organization on the fringe of 
the 2nd EU-Rio Group meeting a year later (Agence Europe 1992a). 
While Brazil, the bloc’s most important economy, had not figured prominently 
on the EU’s horizon, the creation of Mercosur in 1991 and the 1992 Rio Earth Summit 
slowly changed this perception.28 The foundation of Mercosur in itself thus provided for 
a development that would change the EU’s cost-benefit analysis of ties with this 
subregion. The desire for developing ties to this new actor was also exacerbated by the 
FTAA process, first announced by Bill Clinton in 1994. This process has furthermore 
been mentioned in the literature as one of the key reasons for the EU’s focus on 
                                                
28 Former DG RELEX official, 22.6.2015 (Interview 18). 
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developing ties with Mercosur and Chile in the first place (Devlin 2001, 86; García 2008, 
75; Vallãdao 2001, 44). 
Under the guidance of Manuel Marín, whose autonomy had remained 
unchanged, the Commission proposed three scenarios for relations with Mercosur in 
1994 in a communication issued after the adoption of the ‘Basic Document’. Two of these 
options emphasized the immediate necessity to enter into free trade negotiations with the 
region, either as a policy-specific agreement, or in the context of an Association 
Agreement. The third option proposed the immediate start of negotiations for a third 
generation agreement, which would involve “preparations for the liberalization of trade” 
(European Commission 1994a, 15). Underlining the importance that the Commission 
attributed to the regional component, the formal request for a negotiation mandate to be 
issued by the Council was delayed to the very end of 1994. By then the Ouro Preto 
Protocol had modified Mercosur’s legal basis so that it would gain legal personality 
(Torrent 2001, 143). This meant that the Commission could negotiate with its Mercosur 
equivalent directly, rather than diplomats from all of Mercosur’s Member States only. 
Marín’s work on this proposal in the Commission was facilitated once more by 
his relative autonomy and a supportive administrative apparatus in his DG due to the 
posts relating to Latin America being staffed mainly by Spaniards (García 2008, 118), thus 
reaching a high administrative continuity of the very officials who had been responsible 
for the negotiations of other third generation agreements. The independence of his 
portfolio also meant that his work was shielded from the criticism of other 
Commissioners, such as Leon Brittan, with whom Marín had an almost hostile 
relationship (Lister 1997, 14), or René Steichen (Agence Europe 1994b) who voiced 
concerns as to the EU’s agricultural interests. 
The further fate of the proposal is illustrative of a divergence of interests 
between Marín and member state representatives in some of the Council’s compositions. 
Agricultural ministers from several countries with a large agricultural sector, such as 
France, Italy or Ireland, voiced concerns that an FTA with the region could hurt the EU’s 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) (Agence Europe 1995a) given Mercosur’s large 
agricultural sector and its capacity to produce agricultural products more competitively 
than the EU. Due to reluctance in the Council to accept the Commission’s proposals for 
negotiations, there was a risk of European embarrassment vis-à-vis their Mercosur 
partners, given that the Commission proposal had already been made, thus possibly 
rendering the EU’s foreign policy rhetorically and horizontally incoherent. As this would 
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ultimately be an agreement of mixed competencies between the EU and its member states, 
it would have to be ratified in Council, but also by all member states individually. This 
gave every single member state a de facto veto over the suggested negotiations.  
A solution to the problem consisting in emptying the mandate of its contentious 
(trade) content—much like the third option initially floated by the Commission—was 
proposed by the Council’s judicial service (Torrent 2001, 143). This was in turn taken up 
by Spain’s Council presidency in 1995. After having convinced the Commission of this 
approach, the actual negotiations were so speedy that the accord could be signed in the 
margins of the Madrid summit of the same Council presidency (Council of the European 
Union 1995), illustrating how little content remained in the actual accord. Nonetheless,  
the Madrid Declaration adopted at the same time set out a roadmap for the further 
deepening of the relationship (García 2008, 76), acknowledging that the ultimate goal 
would be to sign an Association Agreement with Mercosur which would include an FTA. 
The presence of a strong agricultural interest coalition combined with the complexity of 
decision-making on EU international agreements thus meant that these clashed with the 
desires of other institutional actors, with the former ultimately winning out. This rendered 
the EU’s foreign policy output towards Mercosur incoherent given the Commission’s 
previous declarations and the work done by Marín’s DG.   
The development of the EU’s relationship with Chile at the same time has to be 
considered in the context of its relationship with Mercosur, as the EU hoped that the 
country would eventually join the organization (García 2008, 123). This became 
unrealistic as a short-term development by 1996 (Agence Europe 1996a), and a similar 
agreement to the 1995 EU-Mercosur Framework Agreement was reached with Chile on 
the fringe of the Florence European Council in 1996 (Council of the European Union 
1996b). 
Chile was particularly keen on an update of the relationship, as it had already 
made a request to establish closer ties with the EU in July 1994, even before the 1991 
Agreement had expired after the initial 5 year period (García 2008, 116). When the Global 
Agreement with Mexico was discussed during 1995 (see below), the country stepped up 
its diplomatic efforts once again and asked the EU to update its relationship along similar 
lines (Agence Europe 1995b), providing further external incentives for the EU to enter 
into negotiations with the country in line with the hypothesis based on rational decision-
making. While the 1996 agreement was briefly put in jeopardy by the UK’s obstructive 
stance in EU affairs over the internal EU ‘beef war’, the country later revised its position, 
 121 
allowing the agreement to pass (Agence Europe 1996e; Gabara 1996). A different decision 
would have been paradoxical in any case, as the United Kingdom was one of the strongest 
advocates for the Chile agreement (Agence Europe 1996i), and no significant opposition 
was present in any of the other member states. Nonetheless, this period of obstruction 
demonstrates the influence that the complexity of the EU’s foreign policy decision-
making system can have on its foreign policy outputs. After all, a single member state 
could have halted an agreement consented to by a very large majority. 
In absence of the focus on Mercosur and Chile as the EU’s first testing ground 
for its new Latin America policy, the EU also had to redefine its approach to Central 
America and the Andean region, the origin of the EC’s political efforts in the region. 
Nonetheless, after the conclusion of the third generation agreements with both regions 
in 1993, relations with these would not be a priority until the mid-2000s (see chapter 6). 
This can mainly be attributed to the fact that unlike Mexico or the Mercosur countries 
their economies were largely irrelevant for the EU’s external trade or broader political 
goals, thus rendering even the development of the proposed FTAA largely irrelevant. The 
Commission and member states were thus mainly focused on the Mercosur process at 
the time. 
Nonetheless, there were advocates for negotiations with CAN and Central 
America within the EU’s foreign policy apparatus, and particularly Italy during its Council 
presidency in the first half of 1996 (Italian Presidency of the European Council 1996a). 
While the country has fewer interests in the region than Spain or Germany, the presidency 
nonetheless wanted to prove its capacity to further a number of important EU dossiers. 
Given that work on developing the EU’s ties with Mercosur was already underway, one 
of its aims was thus to restructure the existing dialogue and cooperation arrangements 
with Central America, and to set up a similar system for the Andean region.  
The San José dialogue had already been renewed for a further decade at its 10th 
meeting in 1994, one year after the signature of the third generation agreement with the 
region. At the same time participants vowed to launch a new phase in their cooperation 
through the signature of several EU aid agreements for the region (Agence Europe 
1994a). The European Commission in turn—in line with its strategy documents for other 
LA regions made public earlier in 1994 and 1995—published a Communication ”on the 
renewal of the San José dialogue“ (European Commission 1995b). At the XII San José 
dialogue in 1996 during the Italian Council presidency the Florence Solemn Declaration was 
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then adopted, which stated that the dialogue would indeed be intensified (Agence Europe 
1996b). 
The declaration was based on the blueprint of the Commission’s earlier 
Communication. In the following years issues related to the rule of law, human rights, 
regional integration and the fight against drugs were discussed based on the EU’s interests, 
while Central American countries were keen on discussing trade facilitations under the 
EU’s Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) (Agence Europe 1995c, 1998b, 2000b). 
Nonetheless, furthering ties with the region in a similar manner as was proposed for EU-
Mercosur relations appeared nowhere on the horizon, and even the ratification process 
of the 1993 third generation agreement remained slow, only entering into force in 1999. 
Developments in the EU’s relationship with the Andean Community of Nations 
remained similarly limited. While the third generation agreement finally entered into force 
in 1998 (Italian Presidency of the European Council 1996a), the only other significant 
change in the relationship occurred when a dialogue similar to the San José format—
although less formalized (Agence Europe 1996d)—was set up with the Declaration of 
Rome (Italian Presidency of the European Council 1996b) at the very end of the Italian 
Council presidency in June 1996. While the UK similarly threatened to block this process, 
its opposition dissipated at the same time as was the case with Chile. 
Unlike in the other dialogue formats with Latin America, the short document 
only stipulates that regular meetings will be held “on the sidelines of other ongoing 
political dialogues” (Italian Presidency of the European Council 1996b, 2). The creation 
of this political dialogue format thus meant an addition to the more technical meetings of 
the Joint EU-Andean Pact Committee set up with the signature of the 1993 agreement. 
This weaker format can be attributed to the fact that there were some divisions within the 
Council as to whether a separate meeting with the Andean states would weaken the 
previously successful Rio Group format.29 
Suggested by the Andean states before the 6th annual ministerial meeting in 
Cochabamba during the Italian presidency, the EU went into the meeting without having 
developed a clear position. This was mainly due to divisions not only between the Council 
and Commission officials, but also because the two Council bodies dealing with Latin 
American issues, namely EPC officials from national capitals (COLAT), and those 
permanently based in Brussels and meeting in the AMLAT grouping couldn’t agree on a 
common position. At the meeting in Cochabamba the chair of the EU’s delegation 
                                                
29 Former EU official, Brussels, 19.6.2015 (Interview 17). 
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Susanna Agnelli furthermore received different advice from both the Commission and 
Council officials present.30 
The evolution of the dialogues with Central America and CAN has shown 
bureaucratic politics at work. The autonomy of the Council presidency to prepare foreign 
policy initiatives allowed discussions on these to go ahead in the first place. Nonetheless, 
the complexity of internal EU decision-making, this time primarily within the Council and 
between the Council and the Commission, meant that the presence of diverging interests 
could be seen at play during direct talks with the EU’s partners. 
Aside from this development the European Commission under Marín once 
more used the opportunity to deepen its ties with the organization by providing funding 
for technical projects aiding its integration (Agence Europe 1997a). This came after the 
Andean Pact transformed itself into the Andean Community of Nations after its 
respective 1996 and 1997 deepening rounds. Similar to the case of Central America, the 
issue of opening the EU’s market was raised by the Andean countries during biregional 
meetings (Agence Europe 1997b), but rejected by the EU at the time as EU officials 
believed that these countries were not ready for an FTA.31 It was only in 1999, on the 
fringe of the Rio summit that such an agreement similar to the one proposed to Mercosur 
was first officially considered, albeit once more receiving only a lukewarm European 
response (Agence Europe 1999a). 
While both Commission and member state differences thus shaped the EU’s 
attempts to turn its Latin America strategy into practice vis-à-vis some of the regions 
subregional organizations, relations at the regional level—which would be limited to 
political relations—evolved independently due to member state activism. This manifested 
itself in the development of a dialogue format with all of the region’s countries, which 
culminated in the agreement on regular summits at the level of head of state or 
government. Once more, the fact that there was little to lose from setting up such 
meetings and the prestige that could arise out of hosting such a summit rendered the 
process relatively smooth, as is elaborated below. 
The idea to hold regular summits between the EU and Latin American states 
was first floated by the Spanish Prime Minister in 1996 (Agence Europe 1996f), 
attempting to provide an additional venue within which the changed approach towards 
the region could be demonstrated. Holding such a regular summit was first proposed to 
                                                
30 Ibid. 
31 Former Latin American diplomat, Hamburg, 7.5.2015 (Interview 2). 
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the Council in March of 1997 (Agence Europe 1997c, 1997e) and France soon came be a 
strong advocate for it. President Jacques Chirac even suggested this as his own idea during 
a visit to Latin America in March of 1997, and this has found its way into existing research 
and media coverage (European Voice 1998b; García 2008, 149; Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet 
2000, 571). When it became clear that Austria was reluctant to hold it during its Council 
presidency in 1998 as initially proposed given that it felt that this was too large a 
responsibility in addition to its first Council presidency, it was decided to hold the summit 
during the ensuing German presidency (Agence Europe 1997d). The latter country then 
also came to be a strong advocate of the proposal (Agence Europe 1997d, 1997f; 
European Voice 1998b). 
The advent of this new summit format then allowed the Commission to restate 
its focus on the region, and to attempt to bring forward some of the processes that had 
run into difficulties above. Crucially, this fell into the period of the demise of the Santer 
Commission and Marín’s caretaker Commission presidency, which allowed the latter even 
more leeway in his activities than beforehand. These efforts culminated in the publication 
of a new strategy document for Latin America in the first half of 1999 that outlined new 
priorities for the EU’s ties with the region and seeking to influence the agenda for the 
upcoming Rio EU-Latin America summit. This fell in the immediate preparation period 
of the first EU-LAC summit due to be held later that year. In the document the 
Commission proposes to develop a “strategic partnership” (European Commission 
1999a, 8) with the region, based on the same three policy priorities as outlined beforehand, 
and continuing this preferably by signing Association Agreements with the region’s 
subregional organizations. 
The summit then brought together the heads of state and government from both 
regions, thus symbolizing each region’s interest in the other. The summit’s Rio Declaration 
(EU-LAC summit 1999) underlined the common interests between the two regions, listed 
existing areas of cooperation and outlined general areas to strengthen the relationship. 
However, the document did not outline concrete proposals as to how the relationship 
between the regions would be strengthened in detail, most likely given the internal 
differences outlined above. The declaration avoided a commitment to any particular 
negotiations, and thus limited the possibility for future policy inertia. 
The conclusion of the summit then caused a flurry of public information activity 
within the European Commission, which published an information booklet on the EU’s 
relations with LAC in June of that year (European Commission 1999b). In 2000 the new 
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Prodi Commission created a strategic follow-up document to the Rio summit (European 
Commission 2000b). Much like the summit’s declaration it does not contain any radically 
new proposals for enhancing the relationship, with the exception of the Commission’s 
aim to implement the EU-Mexico Global Agreement that had been reached by then (see 
below). Rather, the document is primarily concerned with the reaffirmation of prior goals 
in the relationship, which is unsurprising given how early this was produced in the tenure 
of a Commission with a completely redesigned foreign policy apparatus. 
The Commission and some allied member states were thus eager to translate the 
EU’s new Latin America strategy into political practice given a number of external 
developments, a fact that was helped by the absence of prior EU ties with regional 
organizations in Latin America. Nonetheless, important difficulties in translating this 
strategy into practice could be seen. In line with the hypothesis based on a divergence of 
positions, a first problem arose on the content of negotiations with Mercosur, as sensitive 
agricultural issues would have to be addressed if including an FTA component. While this 
was not necessarily the case for relations with the other subregional organizations, there 
was no significant external development that warranted a focus on these, and the EU’s 
position thus remained largely unchanged for the time being. Nonetheless, the importance 
of the autonomy of individual actors could be seen through the case of the Italian Council 
presidency and the Rome Declaration, and the beginning of the EU-Latin America summit 
process. As each Council presidency stood to gain from these proposals, there was 
continuously strong advocacy for these plans that would come to fruition with the 1999 
Rio summit and have turned into regular meetings ever since. 
 
4.6 Negotiating the PCA with Mexico 
The EU’s negotiations for the EU-Mexico Global Agreement, which was initially signed 
in 1997 and supplemented by a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) in 1999 is simultaneously 
an outlier from and a symbol of the Union’s ‘one-size fits all’ policy towards Latin 
America. While conforming to the requirements of an Association Agreement in all but 
its name, its bilateral nature has meant that it lacked the initially desired interregional 
aspect. Most importantly, Mexico would be the first and only Latin American country 
with which the EU had concluded an Association Agreement until the one with Chile in 
2002. 
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While the EU’s relations with Mexico initially did not differ from those with 
other countries in the region, the coming-into-force of NAFTA in 1994 set it radically 
apart economically from the remainder of the region. This provided for an external 
development which would ultimately see the country being treated differently from the 
rest of the region in line with the hypothesis based on rational decision-making. While it 
was the NAFTA experience that ultimately made Mexico a case apart, the precise nature 
of the policy change towards the country and its distinction from the ‘one-size fits all’ 
approach can be explained by different factors of bureaucratic politics. 
In line with the hypothesis based on policy inertia the EU’s policy change 
towards the country was facilitated by the fact that, just like for the rest of the region, the 
EU’s relations with the country were limited, and the existing third generation agreement 
even set to expire in 1996. This allowed for the EU to develop a novel approach towards 
the country with the coming-into-force of NAFTA in 1994. While internal EU actors 
largely agreed on the necessity to react to this with the conclusion of an FTA with the 
country, thus fulfilling some preconditions for the ensuing Mexican exceptionalism to be 
compatible with the assumption of rational incoherence, dissent as to the precise nature 
of the agreement rendered the process time-consuming and further contributed to its 
isolation from the remainder of the EU’s Latin America policy. This was primarily due to 
the lack of strong coordination mechanisms within the European Commission at the time.  
NAFTA as an important external development emerged in the same context as 
the EU’s increasing interest in Latin America, albeit somewhat earlier. Much as the United 
States became increasingly interested in strengthening its ties with the region as a whole, 
Mexico’s inclusion in the project of a North American Free Trade Area between the US 
and Canada was only natural given the country’s geographic proximity and the strong 
existing economic ties between the two countries. With the signature of the agreement in 
1992, only two years after the beginning of talks on the issue, and its coming-into-force 
in 1994 the process itself was speedy. Both the process itself and its progress have been 
explained by difficulties in liberalizing multilateral trade at the time (García 2008, 60). 
NAFTA left EU officials and member states worried about its terms of trade 
not only with Mexico itself, but with all of the three North American countries, thus 
influencing the thought process that would lead to the EU’s negotiations with Mexico 
(De Lombaerde, Pietrangeli, and Schulz 2009; García 2008, 75; Page 2001, 127). While an 
FTA with the United States or Canada was regarded as unrealistic at the time, Mexico 
would be able to provide a back door into NAFTA, while signalling its interest in 
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negotiating an FTA with the EU in an attempt to diversify the structure of its external 
trade. Furthermore, the country could serve a bridging function between North America 
and Latin America (Grevi and Khandekar 2011; Hess 2009), thus justifying a political 
focus on the country. 
Concerns over worsening terms of trade became more and more widespread 
after NAFTA had entered into force32 and its negative economic effects for the EU could 
be felt in the decoupling of the EU and United States’ trade volume with the region (see 
Graph 1). All of this would set Mexico apart from the upgrade of relations with the rest 
of the region, as FTAs with other Latin American countries were not envisioned at the 
time, making relations with Mexico a case apart (Sanahuja 2000, 45–46). 
 
Graph 1: EU and US trade with Mexico 
 
Base year 1990 = 100; EU-12 data for 1990-1994, EU-15 after. Source: Own compilation 
based on Eurostat (2014), United States Census Bureau (2014). 
 
While EU member states and Commission officials agreed on the ultimate goal 
of an FTA with Mexico, discord over the details of the kind of agreement to be signed 
and the negotiation process rendered the process relatively lengthy and contributed to the 
separation of the EU’s Mexico policy from the remainder of its Latin America policy, in 
                                                
32 Former EU official, Brussels, 19.6.2015 (Interview 17); (Szymanski and Smith 2005, 173). 
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line with the hypotheses based on interest divergence, actor autonomy and the complexity 
of decision-making. The key institutional factor in this development was the autonomy 
of the different portfolios within the European Commission. 
The idea to upgrade EU-Mexico relations was initially discussed during the 
December 1994 European Council meeting in Essen, which urged the Commission to 
“put ideas on the future form of treaty relations with Mexico […] into concrete form 
without delay.” (European Council 1994), recognizing the threat from NAFTA and taking 
note of the scheduled expiry of the existing agreement with the country in 1996 
(Szymanski and Smith 2005, 180). The shape of the proposed agreement with the country, 
however, was then developed in the Commission itself.  
In essence, the document outlining its proposal for the evolution of the EU’s 
treaty-based ties with the country proposed the conclusion of an Association Agreement, 
including an FTA, in all but its name (European Commission 1995d). This was in line 
with Mexico’s desire to deepen the relationship, which it voiced as early as September 
1993, and which was already well received by the responsible European Commissioners 
of the time (Agence Europe 1993c). In 1995, and in parallel to the Commission’s 
proposal, Mexico began strong lobbying efforts in Europe in support of such an 
agreement (Sanahuja 2000, 46; Szymanski and Smith 2005, 180), thus creating an 
additional external factor contributing to the EU’s rationale to handle Mexico as a case 
apart in line with the hypothesis based on rational incoherence. 
While the Commission’s 1995 paper specifically framed the proposed 
negotiations with the country in the context of the EU’s Latin America strategy, its focus 
on economic and trade issues already set it apart in form. This is unsurprising given the 
division of Commission portfolios in the Santer Commission, with its previously noted 
negative consequences for the coordination of the EU’s external policies (Dominguez 
2008, 132). Under this set-up, relations with Mexico formed part of Leon Brittan’s 
portfolio which included North America, while the Latin America policy was Manuel 
Marín’s responsibility, a state of affairs mirrored in the divisions between DG I and DG 
IB at the time. Brittan was thus able to initiate the process for an agreement with Mexico 
without extensive consultation and policy coordination with Marín and his DG, 
supporting the hypothesis based on the autonomy of individual actors. 
In order to render Brittan’s proposal and priorities for Mexico compatible with 
the wider Latin America strategy in more than rhetoric, and so as to overcome the 
divergence of positions between him and Marín, extensive coordination between these 
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two portfolios and DGs would have been necessary, but was largely absent given the 
independence of Commissioners at the time. To make things worse, as mentioned 
previously, there was considerable hostility between Commissioners Brittan and Marín 
(Lister 1997, 14). 
The complexity of decision-making and the divergence of the positions of 
different member states further contributed to making the EU’s Mexico policy a case 
apart. While member states agreed to Brittan’s idea in principle, differences nonetheless 
arose between member states as to the exact shape of negotiations and which elements 
to include, contributing to the relatively lengthy negotiation period overall. The main 
discord arose over whether the agreement to be negotiated with Mexico would contain 
an FTA component from the outset, as favoured by the Mexican side (Agence Europe 
1996h), or whether the political and dialogue component (for which negotiations would 
be led by Marín’s DG) would come first, followed by a lengthier process of FTA 
negotiations. Once more, agricultural issues were behind these disagreements despite the 
fact that agriculture would play a considerably lesser role in trade with Mexico than in 
negotiations with Mercosur (Allen and Smith 1990, 104). Ultimately the provision of an 
important safeguard to more sceptical countries, as well as putting the agreement on the 
agenda of pro-FTA Council presidencies over the negotiation period helped to overcome 
these difficulties. 
While Spain and the UK (in absence of its short period of obstruction as outlined 
above) were particularly vocal as to the necessity of speedy FTA negotiations, thus 
advocating for a negotiation in a single undertaking (Agence Europe 1996c, 1997j) given 
the negative effects of NAFTA, other countries voiced fears over the effects on European 
agricultural markets. In this case a coalition centred around France, Portugal and Austria 
opposed the negotiation of all elements at the same time, fearing that this would set a 
precedent for negotiations with Mercosur (Page 2001, 127). Their concerns were shared 
by the Commissioner for Agriculture Franz Fischler (Peterson 1999, 105). 
These differences were slowly resolved by different Council presidencies—once 
more pointing to the importance of their autonomy at the time—which made progress 
on the agreement a policy priority. As mentioned earlier, Spain’s 1995 Council presidency 
made Latin American relations a priority, including to reach an agreement on negotiations 
with Mexico itself. While a compromise on negotiations for the Global Agreement with 
Mexico was only reached under the Italian Council presidency in the first half of 1996, 
conceding to the more reluctant camp by allowing for a two-tier process, Spain 
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nonetheless provided the necessary groundwork for this to occur.33 In line with its 
commitments towards the Latin American region, the German Council presidency in the 
first half of 1999 allowed for important progress in the FTA negotiations (von Kyaw 
1999, 14), which was effectively concluded during Finland’s tenure in the second half of 
1999. 
While previous research has pointed to important discord between the EU and 
Mexico in the negotiations on the inclusion of the ‘democracy clause’ (Szymanski and 
Smith 2005), interviews conducted for this thesis have provided for a different account 
of the events. Since 1995 a standard ‘democracy clause’ was to be included in all EU 
international agreements,34 and would thus also have to form part of the Global 
Agreement. Mexico had already attempted to resist the inclusion of a prior version in the 
1991 Framework Agreement (del Arenal 1997, 124) and did show a similar reluctance in 
the negotiations for the PCA. While the Commission initially agreed to modify the 
standard text for the agreement (Agence Europe 1997h) this led to protests by a majority 
of Member States (Agence Europe 1997g) and finally Mexico agreed to the inclusion of 
the standard formulation (Agence Europe 1997i). 
Szymanski and Smith (2005) explain Mexico’s initial reluctance by referring to 
the country’s concerns that the clause would represent a limitation of its rights as a 
sovereign nation, and that references to democratic governance would alter the technical 
nature of trade negotiations. Asked about this, however, an interviewee familiar with the 
negotiations asserted that the discord over the democracy clause had less to do with 
Mexico’s position in itself, but rather with the position of Armen Dariz, Mexico’s 
ambassador to the EU at the time.35 According to this account, once the ambassador was 
recalled on the behest of the EU, the difficulties in the negotiations disappeared. 
While the role of the European Parliament in the conclusion of international 
agreements was limited at this period of time, concerns of some of the parties represented 
in it nonetheless briefly threatened the conclusion of the Global Agreement as its assent 
was nonetheless required due to the agreement being one for an Association, rather than 
a pure Free Trade Agreement. This development supports the hypothesis based on the 
complexity of the EU’s decision-making system. The EP’s concerns were due to Mexico’s 
human rights track record, which led to the country’s government to lobby the EP (see 
                                                
33 Former EU official, Brussels, 19.6.2015 (Interview 17). 
34 For a detailed discussion of the evolution of the democracy clause see (Crawford 1997). 
35 Former EU official, Brussels, 19.6.2015 (Interview 17). 
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footnote 162 in Dominguez 2008, 77), and Mexico’s foreign minister was even questioned 
by it before it agreed to its 1997 version (Szymanski and Smith 2005, 127). 
While NAFTA provided the rationale for the EU to separate Mexico from the 
remainder of its Latin America policy, the main influence on the shape of the ultimate 
agreement can be found in factors of bureaucratic politics. It is here that the final decision 
to negotiate all of the agreement’s components in a single undertaking can be attributed 
directly to discord between the member states. Ultimately, the agreement reached during 
the Italian Council presidency of 1996 meant that a concession to the more sceptical 
countries was granted, splitting the negotiation process in two. As such the version of the 
Global Agreement concluded in 1997 (European Commission 1997) did not yet cover 
trade relations, for which negotiations only concluded in November of 1999, with the 
agreement entering into force in 2000. The agreement represented the first successful 
instance of a transatlantic free trade accord that was unprecedented in its depth and the 
number of cross-policy linkages at the time (Szymanski and Smith 2005). The 
communication on its conclusion once more emphasized the important link to NAFTA, 
as it stated that the FTA component would see the EU receive similar treatment in Mexico 
as was the case for the United States and Canada (European Commission 2000a). 
Overall, the specific nature of the agreement and its outlier status from the EU’s 
Latin America policy can be attributed to the fact that the responsibility for relations with 
the country in the Commission resided with Leon Brittan rather than Manuel Marín and 
that these could act largely independently, while a majority of member states was 
concerned over a loss of market share in the country to the United States. While the issue 
of the democracy clause is important in itself, it has only shaped the timeline of the EU’s 
policy change, rather than the nature of the agreement itself. 
 
4.7 Conclusion 
The development of the EU’s Latin America strategy during the 1990s amounted to a 
completely novel focus on the region given the lack of previous engagement with it 
outside of Central America. Whereas the region was only seen as a recipient of EU 
development funding and EU-brokered attempts to ease the burden of transitioning to 
democracy after a period of civil war and political instability in many countries, the aim 
of interregionalism and Association Agreements meant that the region was seen more as 
a partner than had been the case before.  
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While the formulation of the EU’s ‘one-size fits all’ Latin America strategy since 
1994 was largely coherent, some strategic, rhetorical and horizontal incoherence in the 
EU’s foreign policy outputs could nonetheless be observed. For instance, while the 
Commission’s stated aim was to negotiate an Association Agreement with Mercosur as 
the first step to turn the strategy into practice, many EU member states voiced their 
concern about the likely impact on the EU’s agricultural policy. This pattern was repeated 
later on when the decision was made to split the EU’s negotiations with Mexico in two. 
This can be explained partially by a consideration of external and internal factors 
that have altered the EU’s cost-benefit analysis of relation with the region. It was Latin 
America’s economic growth, the return to stability and a renewed focus on regional 
integration that served as a motivating factor for the EU’s Latin America strategy in the 
first place. Additionally, the United States’ trade policy, as evidenced through the NAFTA 
project can explain why Mexico was the first country in the region with which the EU 
signed an Association Agreement which included free trade provisions. 
Nonetheless, a consideration of bureaucratic politics can help our understanding 
of other aspects of the EU’s Latin America policy at the time and provide additional 
insights not accurately captured by a consideration of rational decision-making. While 
policy inertia was largely irrelevant during this period given the lack of important previous 
ties to the region, there is some evidence in support of the hypothesis based on a 
divergence of positions between various actors in the EU’s complex foreign policy 
system. The initial formulation of the Latin America strategy was facilitated by the issue’s 
lack of salience for most member states. Later on, an increasing divergence of opinion 
over agricultural aspects of the proposed trade negotiations with Mercosur and Mexico 
can explain why the former negotiations were limited to a political agreement, and the 
latter was negotiated in two stages. 
Additionally, the autonomy of individual actors in the European Commission, 
and particularly that of Manuel Marín and his supporting Directorate-General can explain 
the EU’s focus on Latin America at the time and over other regions such as Asia. Similarly, 
the autonomy of Leon Brittan and his DG, which included a responsibility for ties with 
Mexico, can help explain why the negotiations for the Global Agreement were largely 
separate from the broader Latin America strategy. Lastly, while decision-making 
complexity did not hinder the conclusion of any EU agreement at this stage, there were 
nonetheless moments when the necessity for an agreement by many institutional actors 
could have put the conclusion of agreements in jeopardy, as is evidenced in the UK’s 
 133 
position in the context of the ‘beef wars’, or indeed the European Parliament’s criticism 
of the Global Agreement after negotiations had concluded with Mexico. 
With its elaboration of the EU’s Latin America strategy this chapter has shown 
that the EU is capable of formulating coherent foreign policy outputs towards third 
regions under certain conditions. It is on this basis that the EU’s further negotiations with 
Mercosur and Chile will be discussed in the next chapter, illustrating how factors of 
bureaucratic politics can limit the EU’s capacity to generate coherent foreign policy 
outputs even more than can already be seen in the case of Mercosur and Mexico here. 
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CHAPTER 5:  
Failing interregionalism: Negotiations with Mercosur and 
Chile 
5.1 Introduction 
The negotiations with Mercosur and Chile were to be the first true testing ground of the 
EU’s ‘one-size fits all’ Latin America strategy devised earlier on. As a new regional 
integration organisation, Mercosur provided an opportunity to structure the EU’s ties 
with it under the umbrella of an Association Agreement from the outset, including an 
FTA component. While the decision to undertake negotiations was a logical continuation 
of the new Latin America strategy, the outcome of the process was radically different 
from the one envisioned initially as negotiations with Mercosur were halted in 2005. 
Simultaneously, negotiations for an Association Agreement with Chile concluded 
successfully in 2002, setting the country apart from an earlier link with the Mercosur 
negotiations. 
Both negotiations are discussed in parallel in this chapter, as they had been 
treated as such by the EU from the very first moment when negotiations were envisioned. 
Consequently, the progress of EU decision-making on both negotiation mandates 
occurred in parallel until the negotiations phase when both processes were decoupled. 
The initial rationale for this link was that Chile would ultimately enter into Mercosur itself, 
given that it didn’t fit into any of the other regional integration mechanisms in the region. 
The underlying logic to this rationale was that if the EU created a free trade 
area with Mercosur and aided Mercosur to improve its own integration, there 
would be a greater incentive for Chile to fully enter Mercosur. (García 2008, 
123). 
When measured against this yardstick, the ultimate outcome of both 
negotiations reveals an important strategic, horizontal and narrative incoherence in the 
EU’s foreign policy towards both actors. The outcome of negotiations did not square 
with the goal of supporting Chile’s integration into Mercosur while the EU continued to 
uphold its rhetoric of supporting the regional organization. Simultaneously, as will be 
explored below, the output of different EU policies targeted at Mercosur and Chile did 
not match the dynamics of the negotiations. 
While the initiation of the negotiations with Mercosur and Chile can be 
explained through rational decision-making based on a number of external factors, just 
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like the decoupling of the negotiations with Chile, this is not the case when considering 
the developments leading to the negotiations with Mercosur being halted, nor for the 
shape of negotiations themselves. It is here that the analytical lens based on bureaucratic 
politics can once more generate important additional insights. While there is very little 
evidence for policy inertia having played a role, diverging interests between different parts 
of the EU’s bureaucracy and the autonomy of individual actors amidst weak coordination 
mechanisms have an important explanatory value. 
So as to outline these dynamics, the chapter is structured according to the 
administrative processes before the adoption of negotiation mandates, followed by a 
section on the negotiations phase. It is only at this point in time that Chile will be 
discussed separately, as the decoupling only occurred once negotiations were underway. 
Against this backdrop this chapter will put more emphasis on the EU’s 
negotiations with Mercosur, as this was the more difficult process, while mentioning 
developments relating to Chile in the side-lines. Only the last section concerned with the 
negotiations themselves discusses both as separate processes, as it was then that the 
linkage came undone. 
 
5.2 Envisioning Association Agreement negotiations with Mercosur and Chile 
As introduced briefly in the previous chapter, a number of external developments 
prompted the European Commission to begin the process of implementing its Latin 
America strategy by focusing on Association Agreement negotiations with Mercosur and 
Chile. While Manuel Marín was successful in pushing for the signature of Framework 
Cooperation Agreements (FCA) with both Mercosur and Chile in 1995 and 1996 
respectively, these fell short of the ambitions of Association Agreements. While 
preparatory work on the Association Agreements began as early as 1996 (Robles 2008b, 
338), the process that would see the European Commission receive its negotiation 
mandate from the Council would take almost four years to complete (Faust 2004, 46). 
The main external motivating factor for the Commission’s focus on these 
negotiations was the creation of Mercosur itself as the emergence of this new regional 
actor allowed the Commission to devise plans for the implementation of its Latin America 
strategy in absence of existing commitments.36 As one interviewee put it: “Mercosur was 
                                                
36 Former EU official, Brussels, 19.6.2015 (Interview 17). 
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the flavour of the month in the 1990s.”37 While Mercosur’s creation was a strong external 
incentive in itself, once more broader trends in international trade policy need to be 
considered as well, such as problems arising in the negotiations for the Doha 
Development Agenda (DDA) at the World Trade Organization (WTO), and the shift of 
the United States’ trade policy towards the region.  
The Commission’s emphasis on implementing the EU’s Latin America strategy 
can be seen in the trajectory of EU-Mercosur and Chile negotiations since the advent of 
the strategy. While the Framework Cooperation Agreements with Mercosur and Chile 
had to be emptied of any trade component due to member state divisions, the 
Commission’s negotiators were nonetheless successful in injecting language into these 
that would foresee the process of Association Agreement negotiations.   
For instance, the EU’s 1995 FCA with Mercosur states that: 
Parties shall undertake to forge closer relations with the aim of increasing and 
diversifying trade, preparing for subsequent gradual and reciprocal 
liberalization of trade and promoting conditions which are conducive to the 
establishment of the subsequent interregional Association (Council of the 
European Union 1995, Title 2, Article 4). 
A similar provision can be found in the 1996 Framework Agreement with Chile 
(Council of the European Union 1996b, Title 3, Article 4). The parallel negotiations for 
the EU’s Association Agreement with Mercosur provided an additional grounding for the 
Commission’s strategy, as the outcome from such negotiations would certainly serve as a 
blueprint for future agreements of the same type. 
Even before the Commission officially envisioned entering into Association 
Agreement negotiations with these partners, DG1B under Marín’s leadership had thus 
successfully pushed for a rhetorical commitment to such negotiations, aiming to help 
regional integration processes in the region. While it is advisable to question such publicly 
voiced rationales, research has pointed to the fact that this motivation was indeed present 
in the Commission and the wider EU foreign policy community at the time (Doctor 2007, 
291), supported by claims to this end by the EU’s later chief negotiator (Falkenberg in 
Doctor 2007, 291). Sciences Po’s Mercosur working group also agreed with this 
assessment, albeit also mentioning EU attempts to counter-balance US political influence 
in the region (Working Group on European Union-Mercosur negotiations 2005, 15). 
While considerations of support for regionalism have provided for a rhetorical 
leitmotif for the Association Agreement negotiations with Mercosur and Chile, external 
                                                
37 Former Latin American diplomat, Hamburg, 7.5.2015 (Interview 2). 
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developments in the realm of trade policy also coincide with Marín’s attempts for these 
negotiations to get underway. This is a view favoured by Marukh Doctor: 
Once one stripped away the ‘distractions’ offered by the many named or 
explicit objectives, it was patent that the substantive core of any agreement 
would be measured by the potential economic impacts of a bi-regional 
association as well as public perceptions thereof. (Doctor 2007, 297) 
Though somewhat surprising given the rhetorical emphasis on regionalism 
support for its own sake at the time, the argument makes sense in the wider context of 
developments in trade policy. Neither Chile nor Mercosur are major trade partners of the 
EU, with Mercosur only accounting for 2.4% of the EU’s total trade volume in goods in 
2000, and Chile accounting for 0.4%. Nonetheless, as argued in the previous chapter, 
growth on the continent rapidly increased the economic importance of both Mercosur 
and Chile. While the 1997-98 financial crisis in emerging markets and the 2001-2 
Argentinian crisis put a brief dent into this positive track record and made Mercosur 
appear less economically attractive (Doctor 2007, 290), in the 10 years after the 
Framework Cooperation Agreement of 1995 the economies of the five countries 
concerned nevertheless managed to sustain average economic growth levels of 2% 
annually. While this is lower than the growth rates in other emerging regions at the time, 
when the European Commission first proposed the draft negotiation mandates in July of 
1998, it seemed as though the much more rapid economic growth of the previous years 
would continue into the future. 
Aside from these general considerations, it is important to note important 
changes in the EU’s trade balance with the region across the relevant period of time here 
(Graph 2). During the mid to late 1990s the EU’s trade balance with Mercosur was 
positive, while that with Chile was mostly balanced. Hence it was initially Mercosur that 
more actively pursued negotiating a trade treaty with the EU due to its trade deficit at the 
time (Robles 2008a, 191). The picture dramatically reversed after 2000, with the EU 
developing an important trade deficit with the region. 
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Graph 2: EU-15 trade balance in goods with Mercosur and Chile 
 
Source: Own calculation based on Eurostat (2014). 
 
It has been noted by a research group at Sciences Po Paris that around the time 
of the start of negotiations  
the economic actors have been one step ahead of the negotiation process, so 
that this process simply follows the dynamics of the trade and investments it 
is supposed to facilitate and support. (Working Group on European Union-
Mercosur negotiations 2000, 5)  
Furthermore, the same report notes that the economies of both organisations 
are largely complementary despite some difficulties in terms of the sensitive nature of 
agricultural products for the EU (Working Group on European Union-Mercosur 
negotiations 2000, 6). Agriculture is particularly important for the European Union due 
to the extensive system of subsidies set up under the Common Agricultural Policy and 
the large agricultural production capacity of Mercosur—as will be detailed further on. 
Other important sectors to be considered were those of services and public procurement 
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While developments in the region hence provide an important backdrop for the 
Association Agreement negotiations, the wider context of World Trade Organisation 
negotiations are more relevant. After the creation of the World Trade Organisation in 
1995, negotiations were underway under this new framework to liberalise trade in services 
and agriculture. In this context Mercosur countries were extremely vocal in the late 1990s 
that the EU would have to liberalise its market to allow access for Latin American 
products (Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet 2000, 573), and particularly agricultural products. 
This even led to an alliance of Mercosur, Chile and the United States in April 1999 ahead 
of a WTO negotiation round so as to pressure the EU into reforming its Common 
Agricultural Policy (Agence Europe 1999n) and thereby allowing the liberalisation of trade 
in agriculture. In contrast, the European Union was particularly keen on the liberalisation 
of services (covered under the ongoing WTO negotiations) and the public procurement 
sector. 
As the areas discussed under WTO negotiations touched on many sensitive 
issues that would arise in the negotiations with Mercosur, important parallels are drawn 
below in the timeline of both negotiations, with the EU’s Chile and Mercosur negotiations 
particularly influenced by those in the realm of the WTO. Overall, it is important to note 
that one can consider the decision to undertake and continue negotiations with Mercosur 
as a rational reassurance of the EU for the potential failure of the WTO Doha Round 
(Doctor 2007, 291). 
Aside from the factors outlined above, much like in the case of Mexico the trade 
strategy of the United States loomed over the thinking process within the European 
Commission. While discussed since 1994, negotiations for the Free Trade Area of the 
Americas finally started to take shape in the late 1990s (see Nelson 2015, 63–112). The 
possibility of such an agreement coming to fruition put the EU under pressure to ensure 
continued market access in Latin America (Doctor 2007, 291; Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet 
2000, 578). As Mahrukh Doctor has noted:  
Peaks in EU negotiation seriousness [for the EU-Mercosur Association 
Agreement] tended to coincide with peaks in perceived US influence in the 
region (Doctor 2007, 290) 
This view of developing EU-Mercosur relations as a counter-weight to the 
rapprochement of the United States with Latin America under the FTAA project had at 
the time been voiced by the French President Jacques Chirac, who saw the EU’s ties with 
Mercosur as an important component of a multipolar world order  (Barrau 1999, 43; 
Santander 2001, 62). 
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Graph 3: EU and US trade volume with Mercosur over time 
 
In billion international US dollars. Source: Own calculation based on Eurostat (2014); 
United States Census Bureau (2014). 
 
 When looking at the development of trade between Mercosur and the European 
Union, and that of the United States over time (Graph 3), it is important to note that in 
the absence of free trade treaties the trade between the regions has evolved very similarly 
across time—albeit with the EU’s trade volume with Mercosur being marginally larger 
than that of the United States during much of the time period under consideration here. 
The creation of a Free Trade Area of the Americas could have jeopardised the EU’s 
position as a more important trade partner for Mercosur than the United States and was 
therefore an important background consideration for EU trade officials.38 
Such considerations were even more relevant in the case of the negotiation 
between the European Union and Chile.39 It was the aim of both the EU and the United 
States to sign FTAs with the country, with the EU’s negotiations on the Association 
Agreement concluding a few months before the beginning of negotiations between the 
United States and Chile. The EU’s agreement with Chile entered provisionally into force 
in 2003, while negotiations between the United States and Chile concluded in December 
2002 only. The latter then entered into force in 2004. This delayed effect can be seen in 
the development of the trade volume of both the United States and the European Union 
                                                
38 Former EU official, Brussels, 19.6.2016 (Interview 17). 
39 Ibid. 
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with Chile (Graph 4). While the graphs follow very similar curves until 1999, the EU’s 
trade with the country then developed somewhat more rapidly until 2003, the year when 
the EU-Chile agreement came into force. While the EU’s trade with the country grows 
much more quickly over the following years, both curves approach and converge again 
once the US agreement had come into force. The brief gap between both agreements 
shows the potential that a failure to negotiate such an agreement by either the European 
Union or the United States could have had on trade with a specific Latin American 
partner. 
 
Graph 4: EU and US trade volume with Chile over time 
 
In billion international US dollars. Source: Own calculation based on Eurostat (2014); 
United States Census Bureau (2014). 
 
The underlying economic factors for negotiations with Mercosur and Chile and 
the dynamism of regional integration in Mercosur thus provide for important external 
developments that are compatible with the hypothesis based on rational decision-making. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that these views were indeed shared by different actors in 
the EU’s foreign policy decision-making system, and have thus served as the basis for the 
EU wanting to open negotiations with both. While the Commission desired to begin 
Association Agreement negotiations with Mercosur earlier on, as has been explored in 
the previous chapter, by the late 1990s this view had diffused throughout the EU’s foreign 
policy decision-making system. 
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5.3 Commission divisions over the proposal 
Nonetheless, the process leading to the negotiations cannot be understood without a 
consideration of factors of bureaucratic politics, as divisions within the European 
Commission shaped the timeline for the granting of a negotiation mandate and the 
content of the mandate in itself. This was down primarily to the fact that Commissioner 
Marín and Agriculture Commissioner Franz Fischler had diverging interests on the issue 
ahead of asking the Council to grant a negotiation mandate in July 1998. These divisions 
led to the rare event of a contested vote in the College before the process continued in 
the Council. The absence of functioning coordination mechanisms between Commission 
portfolios in the Santer Commission then shaped the EU’s decision-making process once 
the Council discussed the negotiation mandate. 
The autonomy of Commissioner Marín and DGIB in driving the Association 
Agreement process forward was crucial under the geographical division of competencies 
until 1999 (García 2008, 135), as  
Manuel Marín […] was a vehement advocate and driving force of a close 
partnership between EU and MERCOSUR (Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet 
2000, 570–71) 
 Aside from the motivation arising out of Marín’s own Latin America strategy, 
the prospect of the FTAA discussed above contributed to similar dynamics in the 
Commission as had been the case for negotiations with Mexico. Already in February of 
1998, in a brief outlining the EU’s preparations for the 1999 EU-Latin America summit 
Commissioner Marín had promised that the Commission would draft a negotiation 
mandate by June (Agence Europe 1998j). It would eventually take until July 22nd for the 
Commission to submit such a proposal to the Council over disagreements with Franz 
Fischler. 
Under normal circumstances, draft negotiation mandates prepared within the 
Commission’s bureaucracy typically see very little opposition in the College of 
Commissioners due to their general nature. The case of the draft mandate for Mercosur 
and Chile negotiations thus differed, as the disagreements between Commissioners had 
more to do with differences as to the overall orientation of the EU’s foreign policy, rather 
than the specific content of the mandate in itself (García 2008, 139, 143). Franz Fischler’s 
views on the mandate were influenced by powerful agricultural lobby groups, and 
particularly the Committee of Professional Agricultural Organisations (COPA). This 
grouping, as well as national farmer lobbies started to voice opposition against EU 
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negotiations with Mercosur around the time of the negotiations for the Framework 
Cooperation agreements (Faust 2004, 51), fearing that the European agricultural sector 
could be negatively affected by any kind of rapprochement with the region. 
For instance, COPA voiced concerns in 1996 when the Framework Cooperation 
Agreement with Mercosur came into being, arguing that the EU’s agricultural products 
were essentially the same as those of Mercosur (Agence Europe 1996g) and hence fearing 
that this would negatively affect the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy. In the more 
specific context of the EU-Mercosur FTA, organisations from the agricultural sector 
believed that ultimately it would be them who would have to pay for the benefits that 
others —and principally the industrial and services sectors—would gain from any form 
of agreement with Mercosur (Copa-Cogeca in García 2008, 142; Working Group on 
European Union-Mercosur negotiations 2006, 27). 
These groupings then pointed to the difficulties that any agreement with 
Mercosur would create in the ongoing process of CAP reform, while arguing that the 
agricultural issues at stake could only be resolved in the context of WTO negotiations 
(Doctor 2007, 295). COPA additionally mentioned that the European Commission had 
committed itself at the Amsterdam Council meeting in 1998 not to conclude any further 
FTAs (Turner 1998a). Fischler and his DG adopted this position, mentioning that 
agriculture would suffer the most under any Mercosur Association Agreement, while 
complicating the on-going CAP reform even further (García 2008, 141–42). This formed 
the basis for an important divergence of positions between two influential 
Commissioners. 
The Commissioner responsible for relations with most of the developed world 
as well as the EU’s position in the WTO, Leon Brittan, was initially similarly opposed to 
Marín’s attempts, not only for the previously mentioned personal reasons, but because he 
favoured a different approach to EU FTA negotiations (Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet 2000, 
571). Instead of pushing for negotiations with emerging economies Brittan was a strong 
advocate for developing ties with North America, and particularly the United States, 
submitting a proposal to this end in March of 1998. His opposition weakened 
considerably when his project for what could have been a previous iteration of the 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) (European Commission 1998) 
was dropped due to member state insistence, and particularly that of France (Müller-
Brandeck-Bocquet 2000, 570–71). Despite this, Brittan was already vocal in public about 
a date for the proposed mandate on a tour of Mercosur countries in April 1998 and even 
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stressed that negotiations could begin at the 1999 EU-Latin America summit (Agence 
Europe 1998k). 
Despite Fischler’s position extensive preparatory works for FTA negotiations 
were carried out within the Commission due to the autonomy of individual portfolios and 
their supporting DGs, completing an overview of existing trade relations and barriers 
between Mercosur and the EU, a so called ‘photography’ in April 1998 (Turner 1998c) 
and officially by mid-May (Dauster 1998, 447). While dissimilar from today’s scoping 
exercises ahead of EU trade negotiations,40 this was nonetheless a necessary precondition 
included in the previous Framework Cooperation Agreement with Mercosur for putting 
Marín’s proposal for Association Agreement negotiations on the table at a meeting of the 
College of Commissioners. The photography and an analysis by the European 
Commission found that there were no significant issues of trade sensitivity that would 
prevent the negotiation of a beneficial and WTO-compatible agreement with Mercosur 
(Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet 2000, 570). Given that most development and political 
dialogue aspects were already covered by the previous FCA, no apparent difficulties 
would be present in those areas either, rendering it possible for Marín to table his 
proposal. 
Before the initial vote scheduled on the draft mandate in the College on 8 July, 
Fischler sought to build a coalition of fellow Commissioners from France and southern 
Europe to postpone its decision to submit the mandate (Agence Europe 1998l). He 
indeed received some support from Commissioners whose nationality was that of 
important agricultural producers: the two French Commissioners, Yves-Thibault de 
Silguy (Economics and Finance) and Edith Cresson (Research, Science & Technology), 
and the Irish Commissioner Pádraig Flynn (Employment and Social Affairs) were all 
against Marín’s proposal (Santander 2001, 62–63). 
A delay was indeed granted until 22 July (Agence Europe 1999h) so as to study 
some of the reservations voiced by Fischler (Agence Europe 1998i, 1998l). In the end, 
however, these views did not prevail and the proposal was transmitted to the Council for 
approval on that date. Most unusually for the consensus-driven decision-making process 
at this level, this resulted in a contested vote with four Commissioners voting against the 
proposed mandate after an extensive debate (Agence Europe 1998f; García 2008, 142). It 
appears though that four Commissioners, including Fischler, voted against submitting the 
proposed mandate to the Council. One account additionally lists de Silguy, Cresson and 
                                                
40 DG Trade official, Brussels, 18.6.2015 (Interview 12). 
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Flynn  (Agence Europe 1998f); another mentions President Santer himself (García 2008, 
142).  
In the end the proposed mandate was indeed based on past agreements, and 
particularly the EU’s most advanced agreements (García 2008, 136–37) such as the 
Europe Agreements with Eastern Europe and the EU-Mexico Association Agreement 
(see previous chapter). While the proposal remained vague on agriculture, leading to fears 
that Mercosur would reject the offer (Turner 1998b), the negotiations were ultimately 
meant to cover all sectors of the economy (Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet 2000, 573). Overall, 
the Commission had hence attempted to balance the sensitivity of agriculture with WTO 
requirements (Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet 2000, 571), as well as the EU’s trade interests. 
Marín framed the issue of the negotiations within the context of the Framework 
Agreements at the press conference (Agence Europe 1998f), downplaying both his 
personal role in the process and the divisive nature of the vote. 
Ultimately I concur with Maria Garcia that the Commission’s proposal for a 
negotiation mandate was motivated primarily by the market prospects in Mercosur and 
Chile, as well as its possibility to support regional integration in the region (García 2008, 
137), thus supporting the hypothesis based on rational decision-making. Compatible with 
two of the hypotheses from the lens of bureaucratic politics, the autonomy of the different 
Commission portfolios in the Santer years and the lack of functioning coordination 
mechanisms once more allowed Commissioner Marín to develop his preferred alternative 
further. Nonetheless, the presence of opposition within the Commission nonetheless 
demonstrates that not all actors in the EU’s foreign policy system shared the same views 
on the issue, leading to the contested vote on the draft negotiation mandate and a slight 
delay in the process. These differences of opinion, once extended to the realm of the 
Council, would ultimately prove fatal for the negotiations with Mercsour while allowing 
those with Chile to move forward. 
 
5.4 Establishing the negotiation mandates in the Council 
The period during which the Council deliberated on the negotiation mandates for the 
proposed Association Agreements with Mercosur and Chile lasted almost a year and was 
shaped by important disagreements between member states. Replicating the concerns 
elaborated on above in parts of the Commission, these were mainly related to agricultural 
questions and the strategy to pursue in the context of WTO negotiations. 
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The fact that the go-ahead for negotiations was ultimately given to the 
Commission in June 1999 can be explained by a number of factors. On the one hand, 
advocates for the agreement, such as the German Council presidency in the first half of 
1999 and Commissioner Marín, used their positions to influence more sceptical actors. 
On the other, the previous commitments included by Marín in the FCAs, as well as the 
looming June 1999 EU-Latin America summit meant that the EU was already publicly 
committed to the project. In this case, the hypothesis based on policy inertia thus 
contributed to the EU beginning the negotiations in the first place. 
While most member states agreed that it was necessary to support Mercosur 
integration and the democratization process in the region by negotiating agreements with 
both Mercosur and Chile (García 2008, 147), differences in the realm of trade policy and 
related agricultural questions (García 2008, 144) threatened to derail the process 
altogether. This is due to the fact that decisions on opening negotiations for Association 
Agreements require unanimity voting in the Council, hence giving every single member 
state a veto over the matter. 
The agreements’ strongest supporters in the Council were Spain and Germany, 
largely due to their large economic interests in the region (García 2008, 143). While not 
opposed to the negotiations per se, another group of member states, and particularly the 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom, favoured multilateral, rather than regional, trade 
negotiations (Agence Europe 1999b) in the context of the WTO. 
The strongest opponent of the proposed negotiations, however, was France. 
The country became vocal about it at the same time as it was being decided on in the 
College of Commissioners (Turner and Neligan 1998). The French criticism was based 
on their own analysis of the likely impact of agricultural questions, and the country made 
the proposal to focus on the elimination of non-tariff barriers rather than to negotiate a 
full FTA with Mercosur (Agence Europe 1998e). 
At an Agriculture Council meeting on the same day as the College’s meeting, the 
matter was discussed due to French insistence. At that point in time 12 agricultural 
ministers noted concerns about the proposed mandate (Agence Europe 1998a) with 
ministers from France, Germany and Belgium seemingly the most concerned. While the 
Spanish minister showed some concerns as well, he simultaneously pointed to the 
potential positive aspects. At the same time, the Swedish, Danish and British ministers 
appeared on the other side of the fence (Agence Europe 1998a; European Voice 1998a). 
It is important to note here, that the position of certain agricultural ministers did not 
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match the overall structure of countries favouring and opposing an agreement with 
Mercosur, the German minister being the most relevant outlier here. 
The French reaction was not limited to the discussions in the Agriculture 
Council, as the French Foreign Ministry once more voiced its concerns and claimed that 
the Framework Agreements did not provide for FTA negotiations, hence accusing the 
Commission of non-compliance with the earlier agreements (Agence Europe 1998g). In 
September French Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine reiterated the French position 
himself, and set conditions for a French agreement, namely wanting the prior completion 
of the ongoing CAP reform and WTO negotiations, as well as further prior integration 
within Mercosur itself (Agence Europe 1998h). This was a set of conditions that would 
be impossible to fulfil, hence equating to a French veto on the opening of negotiations. 
COPA and its allies continued their opposition by lobbying France and the 
different agricultural ministers to be sceptical of the Commission’s proposal for both 
negotiations (García 2008, 140–43). While other highly competitive sectors would have 
stood to gain from the negotiations (Faust 2004, 51) their lobbying efforts were not as 
organized at the time, and civil society interest41 was almost absent (García 2008, 186–
89). Initially, agricultural interest groups pointed to an incompatibility between the EU’s 
reform agenda and any EU-Mercosur agreement. This view found some support with the 
French, Irish and Dutch agriculture ministers (Santander 2001, 62). When it became clear 
that some kind of agreement would be found in the Council, this strategy was altered, and 
the agricultural lobbies suggested that EU-Mercosur negotiations would have to be linked 
to the progress of WTO negotiations (Doctor 2007, 295).  
Given the difficulties of the Council in reaching an agreement on the proposed 
negotiation mandate, the responsible DG under Marín’s leadership did not remain idle in 
attempting to influence the Council’s decision-making process. It did so by using a variety 
of strategies, such as support for lobbying groups, re-emphasizing the necessity of 
interregional ties with Latin America, and conceding on some of the points raised by the 
critical member states in the Council. Once more, an available policy space, albeit 
constrained by the activity in the Council, was utilized by Marín to ensure the survival of 
his political agenda towards the end of his mandate.  
Marín used his autonomy as a Commissioner to shape the rhetoric of the EU’s 
relations with Latin America ahead of the 1999 Rio summit by publishing an updated 
                                                
41 For an overview over interest group, and particularly civil society involvement in Mercosur 
and Chile, see Cecilia Alemany (2004). 
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Latin America strategy document in March of 1999. This coincided with the 
Commission’s collective resignation and Marín taking over as the caretaker Commission 
president until the arrival of the Prodi Commission later on, further increasing his 
autonomy to shape the Commission’s policy. The document portrays the negotiations 
with both actors as a natural progression from the Framework Cooperation Agreements 
signed earlier: 
Following the successes of the 1995 and 1996 agreements aimed inter alia at 
paving the way for free trade, the EU is examining new initiatives with a view 
to establishing interregional association agreements [with Mercosur and 
Chile] covering three key areas: the strengthening of political dialogue, the 
progressive establishment of a free-trade area and deeper cooperation. 
(European Commission 1999a, 5) 
It also emphasizes that developing these ties in a similar manner as those with 
Mexico was only logical (European Commission 1999a, 5). At the same time, the 
document ensured that a logical distinction was made between entities with whom 
Association Agreement negotiations would be sensible and those with whom they would 
not, thus excluding a similar possibility for the Andean Community and Central America 
(Agence Europe 1999c). As the date of the summit approached Commissioner Marín also 
became increasingly vocal about his antipathy for the French position and mentioned the 
potential loss of face for the EU if it were to go to the EU-Latin America summit without 
a mandate for negotiations (Harding 1999a). 
But DG IB’s actions did not remain limited to attempting to influence the 
Council’s decision-making process through mere rhetoric. Facing the opposition of 
agricultural lobbies and the positions of some Commissioners and member states, Marín’s 
bureaucrats became actively involved in rallying businesses that would benefit from an 
envisioned FTA with Mercosur. It thus helped to create the Mercosur-Europe Business 
Forum (MEBF) (Santander 2005, 295; Torrelli 2003, 9–10), which was meant to act as a 
counterpart to COPA and its allies. While it was dominated by German firms at first 
during the Council’s decision-making phase (García 2008, 146), its membership would 
rise over the course of the actual negotiations. 
The MEBF then launched a campaign to convince the Council to agree to a 
mandate, all while lobbying respective national governments. The forum had privileged 
access to decision-makers at the national and EU level due to the involvement of CEOs 
from large companies across the continent, but particularly in Germany and 
Mediterranean EU countries (for a list of the companies involved in the MEBF see 
Torrelli 2003, 7). The lobbying attempts appear to have had an influence at the very least 
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in the case of Germany, as officials from that country have admitted to trying to forge a 
consensus in the Council largely due to German business interests (García 2008, 146). 
While the companies represented in the MEBF on the European side all had similar 
interests in Chile, no specific organisation was set up for that purpose, nor did the MEBF 
specifically address the Chile negotiations (García 2008, 194). 
Given these differences not only between individual member states, but also 
within the Commission itself, the ultimate go-ahead for negotiations with Mercosur and 
Chile can be attributed to successful bargaining in the Council as mediated by Germany 
and Spain (García 2008, 146–47; Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet 2000, 571), as well as the 
looming deadline of the 1999 EU-Latin America summit (García 2008, 135–36). 
Germany’s position was particularly privileged as it disposed of an important autonomy 
to shape the process given its Council presidency in the first half of 1999. 
While the differences between the EU’s member states remained unresolved 
over the course of 1998, attempts to reconcile the different positions were made by 
Germany once it had taken over the presidency, with the aim of coming to an agreement 
during the General Affairs Council meeting on May 31st (Agence Europe 1999i)—just in 
time for the 1999 EU-Latin America summit. Given the symbolic nature of this first ever 
summit of its kind, it needed to be filled with some relevant content, and the 
announcement of negotiations between the EU and Mercosur and Chile would have been 
ideal for this purpose.42 
Within this framing, important efforts got underway to build coalitions in order 
to reach an agreement ahead of the deadline that the Council had set itself. This also 
helped to sway the French position, as by February 1999 its strategy had shifted to trying 
to delay any actual decision on negotiations with Mercosur until after the summit itself 
(Agence Europe 1999b), all while symbolically launching them during the summit. 
Nonetheless, over time different proposals were floated to overcome the internal 
differences. For instance, France, Ireland and the UK were behind a proposed formula 
that would see the negotiations only aim for an FTA (rather than necessitating one) 
(Agence Europe 1999k), with the Scandinavians and Benelux countries backing similar 
compromise solutions by the German Council presidency (Agence Europe 1999k). On 
the other side of the divide were Spain, Portugal and Italy as strong supporters of spelling 
out the goal of an FTA in itself. Similar coalition patterns could be found on whether the 
mandate should include a proposed timeline for the negotiations. 
                                                
42 Former EU official, Brussels, 19.6.2015 (Interview 17). 
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Nonetheless, no agreement was found by the self-imposed deadline and the 
topic put on the agenda of the June Cologne European Council meeting (Agence Europe 
1999f). To the surprise of different observers (Agence Europe 1999j; Riccardi 1999) the 
European Council’s conclusions then made no mention of the issue. Ultimately, the 
Council only came to a last-minute agreement during a special session of the General 
Affairs Council on 21 June (Agence Europe 1999e), just prior to the start of the EU-Latin 
America summit itself. Nonetheless, it would then take until 15 September for the actual 
negotiation briefs to be decided on in a General Affairs Council meeting (Agence Europe 
1999l), allowing the negotiations to get underway in earnest. 
The ultimate compromise reached was a Franco-Spanish one (Agence Europe 
1999e). It aimed for tariff negotiations with Mercosur by July 2001—and hence implicitly 
linking it to the scheduled conclusion of WTO trade talks, while removing the necessity 
for the creation of a Free Trade Agreement, and thereby potentially easing WTO rules 
that would have required a large opening in the agricultural realm (Agence Europe 1999e). 
This was also possible due to the Commission conceding on the wording with the ultimate 
formulation to “negotiate a commercial liberalisation aiming at the creation of an FTA” 
(García 2008, 147) allowing everyone to read into it what they chose. Lastly, due to French 
insistence, the mandate did not contain a date by which negotiations were supposed to be 
finalised. Unofficially, however, Mercosur’s countries, as well as member states like Italy 
and Spain, wanted to see the conclusion of negotiations by 2005 (Harding 1999b). 
Ultimately, France gave in on many of the issues due to their belief in counter-
balancing the FTAA project, and providing an insurance policy against the failure of 
ongoing WTO negotiations (Agence Europe 1999i). Nonetheless, the country’s ultimate 
change of position has been explained as follows:  
President Chirac himself had launched the idea of an EU-Latin American 
summit […] and France would have been threatened by a serious loss of face 
if it had continued to offer resistance. (Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet 2000, 571) 
While in the end the Commission (and its negotiation partner Mercosur) 
appeared to be relatively happy with the Council compromise on the mandate (Agence 
Europe 1999g), it nevertheless severely restricted the room for manoeuvre of the 
European Commission (Working Group on European Union-Mercosur negotiations 
2005, 15), rendering it difficult for the institution to conduct negotiations as it saw fit (see 
below). This came about despite the Commission’s expertise in the area and its access to 
a large pool of information on trade relations with Mercosur due to its preparatory work. 
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It is hence possible that part of the ultimate failure of the Mercosur negotiations was 
premeditated due to the negotiation compromise found in the Council. 
While the Council ultimately reached a consensus on opening negotiations with 
Mercosur and Chile, this section has shown that the process was shaped more by 
bureaucratic politics rather than rational concerns on the best negotiation strategy for the 
EU. Once more the divergence of positions, primarily along the lines of member states 
supporting free trade with Mercosur and those concerned over the likely impact on the 
EU’s CAP, put the suggested timeline at risk and led to a negotiation mandate that tied 
the Commission negotiators to the timeline of ongoing WTO talks. Furthermore, the 
autonomy of individual actors helped the formulation of the compromise proposal, 
alongside the EU’s policy inertia arising out of previous (rhetorical) commitments towards 
Mercosur and Chile. 
 
5.5 Negotiating despite internal divisions 
The internal divergence of interests that caused the delay in the Council’s approval of the 
negotiation mandates did not disappear over the actual negotiations in the following years, 
and would ultimately contribute to a decoupling of the Mercosur and Chile processes, 
and the failure of negotiations with Mercosur in 2004. Consequently, from this point on 
both negotiations are outlined separately, focusing on the more complex issue of 
Mercosur. 
 
5.5.1 Mercosur 
After the just-in-time agreement by the Council that the EU would indeed undertake 
negotiations with Mercosur, the EU-Latin America Rio de Janeiro summit final 
communiqué included wording that the negotiations would officially begin at an EU-
Mercosur Joint Council—an institution set up under the previous FCA—to be held on 
the fringe of the November 1999 General Affairs Council meeting (Agence Europe 
1999m). 
While a launch date for the negotiations was hence found, the communique 
explicitly did not include a timeframe within which negotiations should be concluded. 
Technical talks on the overall structure and chapters of negotiations were then underway 
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in the second half of 1999, with the Cooperation Council43 setting the agenda for the 
actual negotiation rounds that began in April 2000 (Agence Europe 1999d, 1999m). 
By this time the new Prodi Commission had taken office, fundamentally 
revamping the portfolios of the Commission, as well as the underlying DGs. This meant 
that a new team of Commissioners took over with responsibilities for individual EU 
policies (see chapter 3). Consequently, negotiations on the trade components of the 
proposed agreement were led by the newly created DG Trade under Commissioner Pascal 
Lamy, while DG RELEX under Chris Patten was responsible for the remainder and 
coordination of policies under the agreement, creating further potential for diverging 
interests between both entities in the Commission. The only remaining Commissioner 
from the previous Commission was Franz Fischler, whose portfolio was enlarged to 
include fisheries. Despite their nominal supervisory role, all three Commissioners would 
take an active role in the negotiations. 
What is most fascinating though is that the Commission’s new set-up divided by 
policy areas rather than geographical regions, the shake-up of personnel and the fact that 
its negotiation mandate was relatively clear appears to have put an end to most divisions 
internal to the Commission. While Brazilian officials felt that Fischler’s former scepticism 
negatively affected the launch of negotiations, they argued that as these continued the 
Commission appeared to be united, as opposed to the EU’s member states.44 This is even 
more surprising as the new RELEX Director-General Guy Legras previously held the 
same position in DG Agriculture and had voiced strong concerns over the prospects of 
an EU-Mercosur agreement (Agence Europe 2000e). Despite this all three 
Commissioners appear to have defended the negotiations against criticism from other 
internal EU actors, and acknowledged that the EU would have to make important 
concessions on agriculture early on (Agence Europe 2000f). 
While negotiations on the political dialogue and cooperation elements 
supervised by DG RELEX proceeded quickly (Agence Europe 2000c) given their 
similarity to the previous FCA, the broader trade agenda and agricultural issues were 
initially bracketed from the negotiations in line with the Council-mandated WTO link. 
This meant that early reports over quick progress in the negotiations were necessarily 
exaggerated by the focus on these issues. 
                                                
43 A regular meeting at the ministerial level established through the Framework Cooperation 
Agreement. Similar mechanisms were established with Mexico and Chile. 
44 Latin American diplomats, Brussels, 16.6.2015 (Interview 7). 
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Despite the fact that no progress was made in the Doha Round until July 2001, 
the trade chapter was nonetheless opened after that date in line with the original mandate 
from the Council. It is from this critical phase of the negotiations onwards that difficulties 
between the parties and within the EU itself once more came to the fore. An external 
factor complicating the talks was the fact that Mercosur’s institutions were not as 
integrated as the EU’s, leading to confusion among the EU’s negotiators as to who was 
authorized to speak on Mercosur’s side.45 Furthermore, while the trade chapter was 
opened in 2001, one interviewee cautioned that none of the difficult questions had truly 
been addressed in talks up to the breakdown of negotiations in 2004.46 
Looking at the constellation of actors on the EU’s side, the opening of the trade 
negotiations meant that lobbying organizations came to be increasingly active once more, 
with aggressive lobbying by the industrial and services sectors (Doctor 2007, 294). While 
the creation of the MEBF had helped to ensure that negotiations would go ahead in the 
first place, its lobbying efforts were less prominent at this stage. Its members had 
previously been able to agree on the benefits of launching negotiations with Mercosur, 
however its diverse membership now rendered the formulation of a coherent position 
more and more difficult (Doctor 2007, 295; Faust 2004, 52). This was also related to the 
fact that Spanish firms took a more and more active role in the MEBF as negotiations 
progressed (Torrelli 2003, 8–9), counter-balancing the previous domination of German 
firms in this entity. 
The Commission continued to be a strong supporter of the agreement, for 
instance flanking the negotiations with heavily increased development budgets for 
regionalism support in 2002 (Agence Europe 2002g, 2002h). The Commission’s activities 
led Mercosur officials to state publicly that they believed the Commission was more 
favourable towards the negotiations than the member states (Agence Europe 2002f). Its 
view was further supported by the European Parliament, which repeatedly called on 
member states to remove the restriction on negotiations for trade issues ahead of the July 
2001 deadline, and thus positioning itself against the more sceptical member states 
(Agence Europe 2001a). 
The most relevant actors on the EU’s side at this stage were the member states, 
given that the Commission’s room for manoeuvre in the negotiations had been severely 
limited beforehand by the negotiation mandate. During the negotiation rounds they were 
                                                
45 European Parliament official, 18.6.2015 (Interview 14). 
46 Former EU official, Brussels, 19.6.2015 (Interview 17). 
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continually present in the form of a special committee (see chapter 3) to observe the 
process and so as to provide constant input for the Commission’s negotiators. As this 
process is entirely secret and unrecorded, very little public information is available on it. 
Maria Garcia has argued, however, that the member state presence in the form of the 
committee had a significant impact on the progress of the negotiations (García 2008, 185), 
and their differing views determined the progress and dynamics of the entire process. 
The coalitions of supporters and more sceptical member states did not change 
radically, with Germany continuing to be the strongest proponent for the agreement. 
While Spain and Portugal were keen on supporting Mercosur through this process 
(Agence Europe 2002d), the former’s position was somewhat mixed. On the one hand 
Spain accused the Commission of neglecting Latin America in its development policy, 
while insisting that agricultural concessions to Mercosur would have be carefully balanced 
internally (Agence Europe 2000d). France, on the other hand, retained its scepticism 
across the board. 
Given that the most difficult questions were bracketed from the negotiations at 
first, the largest risks during this part of the negotiation phase occurred with the 
Argentinian crisis in April 2002 (Agence Europe 2002e, 2002i), and the election of Luiz 
Lula da Silva as president of Brazil in 2003, which weakened the country’s attitude towards 
free trade. Commission officials were furthermore increasingly worried that Mercousr’s 
regional integration hadn’t gone far enough to ensure the successful conclusion of 
negotiations.47 
While these external developments could have altered the EU’s reasoning to 
abandon the negotiations in line with the hypothesis based on rational decision-making, 
a number of other external developments, the EU’s policy inertia and the autonomy of 
the Commission negotiators meant that these continued for the time being. Negotiations 
at this stage were helped by a continued lack of progress in the realm of the WTO Doha 
Round, and the continuing talks towards an FTAA. It was the overall absence of a 
multilateral WTO deal on the trade issues to be considered in the Mercosur negotiations 
(García 2008, 150) that enabled the negotiations to get underway in the first place. The 
lack of progress on agricultural issues in the WTO then also took pressure off the EU to 
make important concessions in the talks with Mercosur (Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet 2000, 
577–78). This overall lack of progress in the WTO realm has probably kept the 
negotiations alive for longer than they would have otherwise as “abandoning talks was 
                                                
47 European Parliament official, 18.6.2015 (Interview 14). 
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not on the cards, partly as a hedge against the (increasingly likely) possible failure of the 
Doha Round.” (Doctor 2007, 291). This external factor was aided by the fact that DG 
Trade had already invested heavily in the negotiations by then and that the Commission’s 
negotiators were sufficiently autonomous to keep making offers despite some 
reservations in the Council.48 Commission officials were conscious of the fact 
nonetheless, that they would have to negotiate with the member states internally over 
which concessions they could offer.49 
These developments led high level officials to believe that negotiations could 
indeed conclude successfully, so that at a November 2003 ministerial meeting a timetable 
was set to end negotiations in October 2004 (Agence Europe 2003c, 2003d, 2003e). This 
goal was re-iterated at the May 2004 EU-Latin America summit in Guadalajara (Agence 
Europe 2004g). Nonetheless, negotiations would ultimately break down once more 
difficult aspects were put on the table, and particularly in the realm of agriculture. By 2004 
detailed market access offers were discussed between both sides, with the Commission’s 
negotiators making extensive offers including in the agricultural realm so as to enable a 
successful conclusion of the negotiations (Agence Europe 2004i). 
Internal EU differences were then quick to crop up again as multiple member 
states voiced their criticism as to the willingness of the Commission to open up the EU’s 
agricultural market for imports from Mercosur (Agence Europe 2004j), with 
Commissioner Fischler stepping in to defend the offer made by the Commission, pointing 
in particular to the Commission’s previous impact assessments (Agence Europe 2004f). 
Member state criticism was partly fuelled by COPA’s renewed lobbying against the 
agreement at critical junctures during the negotiation process (Agence Europe 2004a, 
2004c). 
The concerns over agricultural issues did not only come to the fore once more 
at this point in time because they were on the table by then, but also because the perceived 
risk of losing market access with the FTAA had been averted due to the failure of these 
negotiations in 2004 (Nelson 2015, 110). Despite these difficulties and the reduced 
incentives for the EU, the Guadalajara Declaration issued during the EU-LAC summit in 
May 2004 reiterated the rhetorical link between Association Agreements and the support 
of regional integration: 
In view of the progress achieved, we reconfirm the positive signal given by 
the Madrid Declaration in relation to the negotiation of Association 
                                                
48 Latin American diplomats, Brussels, 16.6.2015 (Interview 7). 
49 EU trade official, Brussels, 18.6.2015 (Interview 12). 
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Agreements, including Free Trade Agreements. Such Association 
Agreements are our common strategic objective. The Parties recognise that 
the prospect of Association Agreements should give a new impetus for 
strengthening regional economic integration processes. (Council of the 
European Union 2004, 8). 
The document also officially welcomed the progress in the negotiations and set 
a deadline for October 2004 for these to conclude (Council of the European Union 2004, 
8). Nonetheless, negotiations had come to an effective deadlock at the next negotiation 
round less than a month later in mid-June of 2004 over agricultural and public 
procurement issues (Agence Europe 2004d).  While the EU’s chief negotiator Karl 
Falkenberg initially remained optimistic, stating that negotiations could still conclude 
before the end of the term of the Commission at the end of October that year (Agence 
Europe 2004i), no progress was made at further negotiation rounds (Agence Europe 
2004l) and a final ministerial meeting on 20 October led to a suspension of negotiations 
(Agence Europe 2004k). 
The main differences between both sides occurred over the degree to which 
each other’s markets would have to open up. While the FTA would ultimately have to 
liberalise at least roughly 90% of trade within 10 years under WTO rules (García 2008, 
138–39), both sides disagreed on whether this was actually the case. An EU official has 
put the blame on Mercosur’s market access offer stating that it was non-compliant with 
WTO rules.50 Brazilian officials however have put the blame on the limited agricultural 
concessions offered by the EU.51 
There is some truth in both sides of the argument, as the Council’s Article 133 
Committee on 7 June 2004 made clear to the Commission that the member states would 
not accept any further concessions to Mercosur (Agence Europe 2004e), having been 
critical of the Commission’s negotiation strategy for some time (Agence Europe 2004h). 
While several attempts were made to relaunch the process throughout 2005 and 2006 
(Agence Europe 2005b, 2006d), the EU had essentially frozen the process in 2005.52 Yet 
negotiations were never officially abandoned but left in limbo for a very long period of 
time, and this was compatible with the EU’s continued rhetoric of regionalism support. 
In consequence the negotiations were off the table until an attempted relaunch on the 
occasion of the EU-Latin America summit of 2010 in Madrid (Council of the European 
Union 2010a) that has yet to bear any fruit (see chapter 7). 
                                                
50 EU officials, Brussels, 17.6.2015 (Interview 11). 
51 Latin American diplomats, Brussels, 16.6.2015 (Interview 7). 
52 Member state diplomat, Brussels, 22.6.2015 (Interview 19). 
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While a deepening of the relationship has not occurred in the trade realm over 
the period covered here, the two parties nevertheless made use of the political aspects of 
the existing Framework Agreement. In policy areas where the main responsibility lies with 
the member states this manifested itself in declarations and attempts to foster cooperation 
in the United Nations upon request from Mercosur (Agence Europe 2000g; Harding 
2000) and to push for a comprehensive Security Council reform (Agence Europe 2004b). 
Looking at the EU’s development cooperation targeted at Mercosur and its members, the 
EU’s commitments to the region remained in place and were updated over the years due 
to insistence from the European Commission (Agence Europe 2002g, 2002h). While 
negotiations on the Association Agreement with Mercosur failed over trade issues in the 
end, this did not have any impact on the EU’s other policies towards the region, once 
more leading to an incoherence of the EU’s policy outputs towards Latin America. 
The negotiations phase with Mercosur was thus shaped by a number of parallel 
dynamics. While a number of external developments have indeed altered the EU’s 
rationale at the time when negotiations were first opened, these are not sufficient to 
explain the dynamics of the negotiation process. This was shaped in part through 
dynamics in the realm of bureaucratic politics, such as the limitations of the previous 
negotiation mandate, which made for the most difficult issues being bracketed from the 
initial negotiations, thus supporting the hypothesis based on the complexity of decision-
making within the EU and its policy inertia. On the other hand, the reorganization of the 
European Commission and the change of personnel led to a disappearance of the 
divergence of interests internal to the Commission, and the autonomy of its (trade) 
negotiators meant that the negotiations proceeded despite divisions among the member 
states in the Council. Yet it is this presence of these diverging interests on agricultural 
issues and the failure of the FTAA project that led to the ultimate breakdown of 
negotiations with Mercosur and the ensuing strategic, narrative and horizontal policy 
incoherence. 
 
5.5.2 Chile 
Following from the parallel nature of the decision-making process in the Commission 
and then the Council, the EU Latin America summit of 1999 also marked the official start 
of negotiations with Chile, and these were then still tied to the timeframe for the Mercosur 
negotiations. Nonetheless, the two were later decoupled, marking an important moment 
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for the emergence of the EU’s strategic and narrative policy incoherence towards Latin 
America. Once more, while a number of external developments are compatible with the 
assumption of rational decision-making, the lens of bureaucratic politics nonetheless 
provides a fuller picture. 
In this case it was the relative absence of agricultural issues in this relationship, 
the prospect of a US-Chilean FTA, Chilean lobbying and the EU’s policy inertia that 
meant that once Mercosur negotiations started to become more difficult, the EU 
decoupled the processes to speed up negotiations with Chile itself. This would lead to a 
conclusion of negotiations in April 2002, just in time to be announced at the 2002 EU-
Latin America summit in Madrid.53 
While the parallelism of both processes was initially meant to contribute to 
Chile’s rapprochement with Mercosur, the country made it clear that it was interested 
primarily in bilateral ties with the EU.54 Chilean officials had been critical of the fact that 
the EU desired to couple the processes together from the outset (Agence Europe 1998h), 
arguing that FTA negotiations with Chile would be much simpler than within the complex 
setting of Mercosur and given differences over agricultural questions (Agence Europe 
1998c), a view confirmed by interviewees who mentioned only some difficulties in the 
realm of fisheries due to Spanish demands.55 
Some officials in the European Commission shared this assessment already in 
1998, fearing that the difficulties of the Mercosur progress could derail the Chilean 
negotiations (Agence Europe 1998d). While the Chile negotiations were technically 
subject to the same delay due to WTO negotiations, the Commission’s Chief Negotiator 
Guy Legras first mentioned its desire to decouple the Chile negotiations from the WTO 
process in late June 2001 at an EU-Chile Cooperation Council (Agence Europe 2001b), 
as it became clear that a multilateral consensus at the WTO appeared to be out of sight. 
Additionally, Commissioner Patten—who had taken a personal interest in the EU-Latin 
America summit format (Agence Europe 2001c)—had already stressed in 2000 that, in 
his opinion, negotiations could conclude in time for the 2002 EU-Latin America summit 
(Agence Europe 2000a). 
The main supporter of decoupling at the time was Spain (Agence Europe 
2001b), as it would host the 2002 summit during its Council presidency, and the 
conclusion of negotiations would be a worthwhile announcement. While by early 2002 
                                                
53 For a more detailed overview over the EU-Chile negotiation process see (García 2008, 2011). 
54 Former EU official, Brussels, 19.6.2015 (Interview 17). 
55 Ibid. 
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some difficulties remained in the negotiations for a few member states, a General Affairs 
Council meeting on 28 January officially affirmed that negotiations would be sped up 
(Agence Europe 2002b) and the WTO link removed. Ultimately negotiations concluded 
on 26 April, in time for the agreement to be initialled at the II EU-Latin America summit 
in Madrid (Agence Europe 2002a). The signature followed in November after legal 
revisions and translations (Agence Europe 2002c), with the trade chapter of the 
agreement coming into effect on 1 February 2003 (Agence Europe 2003b). 
 During the actual negotiations the member states were represented similarly to 
the Mercosur negotiations in a special committee to give continuous input to the 
Commission’s negotiators. Their influence through this official body appears to have been 
relatively limited in this instance however (García 2008, 185), as no significant divergences 
of opinion existed, and member states and DG Trade under Pascal Lamy were concerned 
about the progress of FTAA negotiations and the prospect of a separate US-Chile 
agreement from the outset. Interestingly, and contrasting with the case of negotiations 
with Mercosur, it was the EU that ultimately concluded an agreement with the country 
first, with bilateral Chilean-US negotiations only being launched afterwards in August 
2002 (Agence Europe 2002j). 
While the process for EU-Chile negotiations was initially coupled with that for 
EU-Mercosur negotiations, the slow progress in the latter and the looming risk of once 
more losing market access to the United States ultimately contributed to a change of heart 
amongst both the new Commission and the member states, allowing for a bilateral EU-
Chile Association Agreement to be signed. This is compatible with the hypothesis based 
on rational decision-making. Nonetheless, bureaucratic politics, and the lack of a 
divergence of opinions on the Chilean issue, as well as the EU’s policy inertia arising out 
of its previous commitments to the country help to explain this development more fully. 
It is striking, however, that there appears to be no evidence for the decoupling of the 
negotiations being discussed in the context of the EU’s Latin America strategy, which is 
likely once more down to the autonomy of DG Trade during the Prodi years.  
 
5.6 Conclusion 
The first true attempt to turn the EU’s Latin America strategy into practice instead 
contributed to the emergence of its strategic, horizontal and narrative policy incoherence 
towards the region. Instead of concluding an integrated Association Agreement with 
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Mercosur and Chile, so as to support further regional integration, negotiations with 
Mercosur failed while a separate Association Agreement was concluded with Chile 
instead. While a number of external developments are compatible with the hypothesis 
based on rational decision-making, such as the lack of progress in the WTO’s Doha 
Development Agenda, or the United States’ attempts to conclude a Free Trade Area of 
the Americas, the dynamics of the negotiations with both partners can only be fully 
understood when utilizing the lens of bureaucratic politics. 
Initially the shared assessment of all relevant internal EU actors allowed 
discussions on negotiation mandates to proceed within the Commission under the 
leadership of Marín. This was additionally helped by the autonomy that he and his DG 
disposed of within the Santer Commission’s administrative logic. Once details of the 
proposals emerged, however, the positions of various Commissioners diverged in 
important ways, primarily due to agricultural considerations, thus leading to a delay in the 
Commission’s preparatory process and a rare contested vote in the College of 
Commissioners.  
Come the deliberations in the Council, divergent opinions between the member 
states replicated the internal Commission difficulties, leading to a protracted period of 
internal deliberations as unanimous decision-making on the mandates was required. These 
could only be resolved due to the bargaining led by individual member states during their 
Council presidencies, and the looming deadline of the 1st EU-Latin America summit 
which was meant to symbolically announce the start of negotiations. During this period 
considerations of diverging opinions, the EU’s policy inertia and the complexity of the 
EU’s decision-making can thus contribute to our understand of the decision-making 
process. 
Later on, the Commission’s leeway in the negotiations was limited by the 
Council’s mandate through the inclusion of a delay before negotiations on the trade 
chapters could begin. Despite this the change of Commission portfolios and 
Commissioners in the Prodi Commission appear to have eliminated divergences of 
opinion within this actor, leading to it taking up a united position in favour of a Mercosur 
Association Agreement which would include important agricultural concessions.  
Ultimately, it was the divergence of positions in the Council over agricultural 
issues that put an end to the negotiations. Nonetheless, negotiations were only frozen 
officially due to the EU’s policy inertia over its rhetoric of regionalism support. This 
contrasts with the negotiations with Chile, which were accelerated over a number of 
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external developments. This was facilitated by the fact that all internal EU actors shared 
the same assessment of the situation after the Prodi Commission had taken office, and 
due to the lesser importance of agricultural issues in this instance. 
Ultimately, the developments outlined in this chapter demonstrate how the EU’s 
policy incoherence towards Latin America could emerge due to a number of bureaucratic 
factors. While the influence of some of these was weakened with the Prodi Commission, 
this also made for the disappearance of a Commission portfolio with a geographical 
responsibility for Latin America. 
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CHAPTER 6:  
Building regions? The case of the Andean Community and 
Central America 
6.1 Introduction 
The evolution of the relations between the European Union and two further regional 
groupings, this time in Central America and the Andean region, is the most notable 
development in the EU’s interregionalism policies in Latin America since the standstill of 
the EU’s negotiations with Mercosur in 2004. The outcome of these negotiations and the 
incoherence of the EU’s policy outputs related to them has already served to illustrate this 
thesis’ initial puzzle in the introductory chapter. To reiterate, while a common 
understanding had been reached to begin negotiations for Association Agreements with 
both the Andean Community of Nations56 and the Central American Common Market57 
at the EU-Latin America summit of Vienna in May 2006, the EU has since concluded an 
Association Agreement in the latter case only, while the outcome in the former was a joint 
Free Trade Agreement with Colombia and Peru. These developments are illustrative of 
strategic, horizontal and narrative policy incoherence. While the EU did uphold its goal 
of interregionalism in one case, it abandoned it in another, all while maintaining a rhetoric 
of regionalism support in public. Lastly, while negotiations on an interregional basis were 
halted in the case of the Andean Community, the EU’s development cooperation towards 
the region did not take this into account, leading to horizontal policy incoherence. 
As this chapter will show, once more a number of external developments can 
partially explain the EU’s move to abandon negotiations with the Andean Community. 
However, the lack of internal debate and policy adaptation in line with these external 
factors, and the continuation of interregional negotiations with Central America despite 
the presence of similar external factors, means that there is very little evidence in favour 
of the hypothesis based on rational incoherence. 
                                                
56 This organisation’s Spanish name is Comunidad Andina (CAN). When negotiations got 
underway, its membership consisted of Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela. 
Venezuela later withdrew from the organisation. 
57 This organisation is known as the Sistema de Integración Centroamericana (SICA) with a seat in San 
Salvador, while its economic branch Secretaría de Integración Económica Centroamericana (SIECA) is 
based in Guatemala City. The membership of the latter organisation is smaller and consists of 
Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama only. However, the latter 
country initially did not partake directly in the others' attempts to set up a customs union. 
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When considering factors of bureaucratic politics instead, the dynamics of the 
negotiations in both cases can be explored in much more detail. First of all, the EU’s 
policy inertia can explain why negotiations were opened with both regional organisations 
in the first place, and why the EU’s rhetoric of regionalism support in the Andean region 
wasn’t abandoned even after the interregional negotiations had failed. Secondly, the 
importance of diverging interests between different institutional actors on the EU’s policy 
outputs can also be seen at play. While the interests of DG RELEX and DG Trade largely 
aligned for the Central America negotiations, this was not the case for negotiations with 
CAN. Furthermore, the autonomy of individual Commission DGs can help us 
understand why the EU’s development cooperation funding towards the Andean region 
did not cohere with the developments in the EU’s negotiations with the region. Lastly, 
the slow pace of the ratification of the Central America agreement and a previous Political 
Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement with the Andean Community demonstrates the 
influence of the complexity of foreign policy decision-making in the EU.  
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows: after outlining the factors 
contributing to the opening of negotiations for Association Agreements with both 
regional organizations, it then elaborates on a number of different developments in the 
negotiation processes with both regions, which can best be understood through the lens 
of bureaucratic politics. While these will be elaborated on broadly in sequence, the analysis 
is divided into three parts. The first is the process of internal deliberations that led the 
granting of negotiation briefs with both regions in the first place. This is followed by an 
analysis of the factors that led the EU to abandon the Association Agreement framework 
in one case, while successfully concluding negotiations in the other. Lastly, the ratification 
process and the difficulties that arose in this context are further elaborated on. 
 
6.2 An unlikely case for negotiations 
The negotiations of Association Agreements with the two regions mentioned above may 
not appear to be relevant developments in the EU’s foreign policy in and of itself. If one 
considers the existence of a previous EU-Latin America strategy that has aimed to create 
deeper links between both regions with a focus on regional integration organisations it 
would appear hardly surprising that the EU chose to open negotiations for Association 
Agreements in both cases. Yet, the consideration of a number of political and economic 
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factors prior to the beginning of the process shows that only a consideration of 
bureaucratic processes can explain the opening of negotiations in both cases. 
First and foremost, the economic case for negotiations between the EU and 
both regions was very weak. In the early 2000s the focus of the EU’s trade policy was 
clearly limited to the multilateral realm, with the hope of reaping the economic benefits 
of a successful conclusion of the WTO’s Doha Round. This preference was expressed 
during the Prodi Commission under then Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy by imposing 
a de facto moratorium on the launch of new EU FTA negotiations (once those with 
Mercosur had already begun) (Woolcock 2007, 5) a focus that was shared by many of the 
EU’s member states at the time. 
This can be explained for the most part by the fact that the extent of Doha’s 
liberalization measures would have had to be known before being able to realistically 
assess the potential and possible depth of any bilateral trade negotiations.58 Furthermore, 
Spain, the EU’s most prominent advocate for strengthening EU-Latin American ties, had 
desired to undertake negotiations for an FTA with the entirety of Latin America in the 
late 1990s,59 mirroring the approach of the United States under the FTAA project. This 
would have rendered Association Agreement negotiations with subregional negotiations 
in Latin America unnecessary. 
The EU’s trade with the region was also much more limited than that with 
Mercosur discussed in Chapter 5. After all, imports and exports between the EU and 
CAN’s four member states after Venezuela’s withdrawal accounted for less than 1 % of 
the EU totals in each case (see Table 8). Most imports from these regions were also already 
liberalized under the EU’s GSP and GSP+ schemes for the foreseeable future, and neither 
region was a particularly relevant recipient of European exports. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
58 DG Trade official, Brussels, 12.6.2015 (Interview 6). 
59 Former EU official, 19.6.2015 (Interview 17). 
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Table 8: EU-CAN and EU-SIECA trade in goods 
  
2005 
 
2010 
 
2015 
 Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports 
Bolivia 140 
(0.0) 
171 
(0.0) 
335 
(0.0) 
307 
(0.0) 
645 
(0.0) 
738 
(0.0) 
Colombia 3,277 
(0.3) 
2,475 
(0.2) 
4,783 
(0.3) 
3,945 
(0.3) 
6,589 
(0.4) 
6,533 
(0.4) 
Ecuador 1,580 
(0.1) 
883 
(0.1) 
2,035 
(0.1) 
1,403 
(0.1) 
2,585 
(0.2) 
2,009 
(0.1) 
Peru 2,444 
(0.2) 
1,087 
(0.1) 
5,190 
(0.3) 
2,312 
(0.2) 
4,949 
(0.3) 
3,730 
(0.2) 
Venezuela 3,778 
(0.3) 
2,848 
(0.3) 
3,808 
(0.2) 
4,133 
(0.3) 
2,161 
(0.1) 
3,003 
(0.2) 
CAN-460 7,441 
(0.6) 
4,616 
(0.4) 
12,343 
(0.7) 
7,967 
(0.6) 
14,768 
(0.9) 
13,010 
(0.7) 
SIECA 4,835 
(0.4) 
 
3,715 
(0.4) 
5,654 
(0.4) 
4,597 
(0.3) 
5,169 
(0.3) 
5,723 
(0.3) 
In million € (% of total EU trade in goods). Source: (Eurostat 2014) 
 
Furthermore, the European Commission, and DG Trade more specifically, 
faced important human resource constraints on the number of trade negotiations that it 
could undertake at that point in time.61 This is mainly due to the complexity of such 
negotiations, creating a number of barriers before any EU negotiation receives the go-
ahead. Internally the EU was undergoing important changes with the 2004 enlargement 
round, leading to an overall inward-focus that further strained the EU’s capacity to 
undertake significant foreign policy initiatives, especially in a region that did not play an 
important role for any of its 10 new member states.62 
Lastly, the EU’s political focus was not on either of these regions, unlike when 
the EU first started official dialogues with them in the 1980s. While Mercosur had evolved 
rapidly (see Chapter 5), the same could not be said of the Andean Community (though it 
has been in existence for much longer than Mercosur). While its institutions were 
                                                
60 Excluding Venezuela which withdrew from the organization before negotiations began. 
61 Former member of the Barroso cabinet, 8.6.2015 (Interview 3). The problematic nature of 
these resource constraints in general have been acknowledged by a large number of 
interviewees. 
62 Member state diplomat, Brussels, 17.6.2015 (Interview 9); Former EU official (Brussels, 
19.6.2015, Interview 17). 
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relatively developed, it still lacked integrated policies. In the case of SICA and SIECA, 
neither their institutions nor the political and economic integration functioned very well.63 
With SIECA reuniting countries as distinct as Nicaragua, with the second-lowest GDP in 
all of Latin America, and Costa Rica, an upper-middle income economy, the region’s 
countries furthermore diverge significantly. While this is not quite as extreme in the case 
of the Andean Community, there are nevertheless important differences between its 
different member states. 
For these reasons the EU was initially wary of replacing the existing political ties 
to the Central American and Andean region by new and untested mechanisms. This can 
be seen by the fact that already the establishment of formal political relations with both 
regional groupings through the 1996 Declaration of Rome, as well as the EU-Central 
America Framework Cooperation Agreement of 1993, were accompanied by fears on the 
European side that these could break up the then successful Rio Group and San José 
dialogue formats.64 The latter were regarded at the time as having contributed to the peace 
processes and democratisation wave in the region in important ways. Despite this (as 
outlined in chapter 4), the EU nevertheless eventually signed Political Dialogue and 
Cooperation Agreements with both regions in 200365, making renewed negotiations 
within a few years additionally unlikely as it would take a long time before these 
agreements could come into force due to the ratification requirements of both parties, 
and given that renewed negotiations would once more bind scarce resources. 
The EU’s reluctance to enter into negotiations for any kind of agreement that 
would include trade provisions with both regions at the time is demonstrated by its 
reaction to various Latin American calls to do so. As early as 1997 Peru openly 
approached the EU Council presidency troika of the time about a potential EU-Andean 
Community FTA.66 Similarly, with the Doha negotiations having come to be increasingly 
lengthy, Colombia started to join in such calls, while Costa Rica began to advocate for a 
similar agreement for itself.67 
This originally engendered disbelief and negative reactions from the EU’s side68, 
as it was believed that none of the Latin American countries would stand to benefit 
                                                
63 Former Latin American diplomat, Hamburg, 7.5.2015 (Interview 2), and Latin American 
diplomat, Brussels, 3.11.2015 (Interview  27). 
64 Former EU official, Brussels, 19.6.2015 (Interview 17). 
65 Neither of these has come into force up to this date. 
66 Former Latin American diplomat, Hamburg, 7.5.2015 (Interview 2). 
67 Former EU official, Brussels, 19.6.2015 (Interview 17). 
68 Ibid. 
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economically from this. After all, most of these countries’ significant exports to the EU 
were already unilaterally liberalized under GSP and GSP+. Furthermore, EU 
representatives were doubtful as to whether any of the countries concerned had the 
necessary experience and capacity to negotiate what would necessarily be complex FTAs. 
Bilateral negotiations with individual countries would likely strain the EU’s human 
resources too much for only a small economic benefit (in contrast to the potential of an 
FTA with Mercosur discussed previously), with EU officials further doubting the 
institutional capacity of both regional organisations to enter into talks.69 Lastly, by the 
early 2000s the successful negotiation of a Free Trade Area of the Americas had largely 
dissipated (as discussed in Chapter 5). 
The Guadalajara Declaration that came out of the 2004 EU-Latin America 
summit perhaps best illustrates the important barriers facing the potential of negotiations 
with both regions, stating that any  
future Free Trade Agreement shall be built upon the outcome of the Doha 
Development Agenda and the realization of a sufficient level of regional 
economic integration. (Council of the European Union 2004, 8) 
Overall, aside from the EU’s general commitment to interregionalism there are 
thus very few factors that could rationally explain the EU’s opening of Association 
Agreement negotiations with both regions given their lack of economic importance, the 
EU’s moratorium on new Free Trade Agreements, the absence of US FTA negotiations, 
and the fear that both regional integration mechanisms weren’t sufficiently advanced to 
negotiate successfully with the EU. It is thus only a consideration of elements of 
bureaucratic politics that can explain the opening of negotiations in both instances. 
 
6.3 A lengthy pre-negotiation phase: Overcoming diverging internal views 
This section outlines the developments during the period when the idea for negotiations 
with both regions was first seriously considered within parts of the European 
Commission up to the point when the Commission’s negotiation mandates were 
approved by the Council. While only a small part of the overall process of concluding 
such agreements, this section nevertheless spans two and a half years between November 
2004 and the adoption of the negotiation mandates in April 2007. It once more 
                                                
69 Ibid., and Latin American diplomat, Brussels, 3.11.2015 (Interview  27). The latter has stressed 
that the institutions of SICA and SIECA are suffering from a lack of expertise of its 
bureaucrats, which the interviewee accounted to nepotism in the appointment process, the 
geographical location of the institution’s seat, as well as its general lack of funding. 
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demonstrates the role that the autonomy of individual Commissioners and Commission 
Directorates-General can play in the EU’s foreign policy, all while the divergence of views 
on specific issues increases the duration of the EU’s foreign policy process. 
 
6.3.1 Envisioning negotiations 
Given the political context outlined above, the actual opening of negotiations with both 
organisations appeared nowhere on the horizon in the early to mid-2000s. The ultimate 
launch of a process leading to negotiations hence cannot be understood as a rational 
policy choice, but needs to analysed in the context of bureaucratic politics. The initial 
factor that provided for the first consideration of the negotiations within the 
Commission’s Directorate-General for External Relations was the inauguration of the 
Barroso Commission in November 2004. Here, it was a combination of a change of the 
responsible Commissioner combined with the renewed autonomy of Commission DGs 
that provided the initial impetus for a consideration of the negotiations. 
The inauguration of the Barroso Commission meant an important change for 
the composition of the Commission as a whole, with the most important posts being 
staffed with new Commissioners. While, as Portugal’s former prime minister, 
Commission president José Manuel Barroso had an obvious interest in Latin America as 
such, it was ultimately two other Commissioners who played a crucial role in the process 
to begin negotiations with both regions: RELEX Commissioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner 
and Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson. 
Having served as Austria's Foreign Minister under the conservative government 
of prime minister Wolfgang Schüssel until her nomination to the post of Foreign 
Relations Commissioner in the autumn of 2004, Ferrero-Waldner was instrumental for 
the EU’s renewed focus on Latin America, and the relevant subregions in particular.70 
While it is unclear what exactly motivated her to take an active role in shaping the EU’s 
relations with Latin America, she already showed a keen interest in the region as Austria’s 
foreign minister and is married to an expert on Latin American literature.71 
                                                
70 Her continuing interest in the region is evidenced by her having served as the president of the 
European Union-Latin America and the Caribbean Foundation (EULAC Foundation) after 
stepping down as European Commissioner. This is a joint EU-Latin American institution which 
was created during her tenure as RELEX Commissioner. 
71 Former Latin American diplomat, Hamburg, 7.5.2015 (Interview 2). 
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The important role that Ferrero-Waldner Commissioner played for the launch 
of negotiations can also be attributed to an important change of management style within 
the Commission. While Barroso did not return to the old organizational system of 
attributing portfolios by region, he did decide to preside over a special group of 
Commissioners with external relations portfolios himself (Dominguez 2008, 121). This 
could have given him the possibility to weigh significantly into the Commissioners’ 
separate portfolios. However, as a former member of Mr. Barroso’s cabinet pointed out, 
the Commission president “picked his fights” and did not want to micromanage the work 
of any of the important external relations Commission portfolios, thus allowing individual 
Commissioners significant leeway in their specific policy area.72 
It is in this changed institutional context that the reflection process on the future 
of EU-Latin American relations began. Given the failure of the Mercosur negotiations at 
the end of the previous Commission’s tenure, this would no longer be an option to turn 
the EU’s Latin America strategy into practice. The new Commission was then once more 
approached by both the Andean Community and Central America in short succession as 
to their desire to negotiate Free Trade Agreements with the EU, given the slow progress 
of the Doha Development Agenda negotiations.73 For a country like Peru the initial aim 
was to diversify its external markets in the context of the then ongoing FTAA 
negotiations, as well as to overcome the limitations of the EU’s unilateral GSP scheme74—
even if this meant concessions that could have adverse economic effects in the short term. 
Overall, the motivation of the Latin American states can perhaps best be explained 
through their governments’ common belief in the merits of the Washington consensus. 
What helped Colombia and Peru argue their case were the vague previous 
commitments for the EU to consider deeper trade ties with the Andean region, following 
the logic of the hypothesis based on policy inertia. These references could be found in 
the previous agreements with the EU, as well as EU-Latin America summit declarations. 
The Madrid Declaration of the 2002 summit mentions both the successful conclusion of 
the Doha Round and the necessity of reaching Political Dialogue and Cooperation 
Agreements as precursors to trade and association negotiations (Council of the European 
Union 2002, 3). Once the PDCAs were signed in 2003, the formulations on eventual 
Association Agreement negotiations contained in these could then be pointed out by the 
                                                
72 Former member of the Barroso cabinet, London, 8.6.2015 (Interview 3). 
73 EU Trade official, 12.6.2015, Brussels (Interview 6); Former EU official, 19.6.2015, Brussels 
(Interview 17). 
74 Former Latin American diplomat, Hamburg, 7.5.2015 (Interview 2). 
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Latin American parties (Council of the European Communities 2003, 2). The Guadalajara 
Declaration of 2004 was then more precise as to eventual Association Agreement 
negotiations with Central America and the Andean Community, however adding the 
condition for their “sufficient level of regional economic integration” (Council of the 
European Union 2004, 8). Nevertheless, the document included provisions on “a joint 
assessment phase of the respective integration processes of the Central American and 
Andean Community's [sic]” that would lead in “due course” to the beginning of 
negotiations (Council of the European Union 2004, 8). Nonetheless, given overall timing 
of the latter declaration immediately after the EU’s big bang enlargement round, and a 
continued reference to Doha (US Embassy Italy Rome 2004), this was meant as a 
symbolic gesture at the time and negotiations on the European side were only envisioned 
for the distant future. 
Therefore, other bureaucratic factors also need to be considered to explain the 
process leading to the beginning of negotiations with both regional organizations. It is 
here that the influence of the incoming RELEX Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner needs 
to be considered. While it is unclear what exactly motivated her to take initiative on the 
EU’s Latin America policy, she nonetheless asked DG RELEX to begin to study the 
options for Association Agreement negotiations with CAN and Central America within 
three months of her taking office.75 While the DGs’ bureaucrats were initially reserved 
about the idea by making reference to their resource constraints76, work to this end got 
underway due to the new Commissioner’s insistence. 
It has been noted by multiple interviewees that such a policy shift initiated by an 
incoming Commissioner is highly unusual. They stated that Commissioners typically need 
some time to adjust to their new role at the beginning of the mandate, and will often find 
it difficult to overrule or out-manoeuvre the key personnel in the Directorate-General 
who will typically remain in place. Despite this, the central role of Ferrero-Waldner has 
been confirmed by most interviewees, while one used the case as an example to underline 
that the EU’s bureaucracy can occasionally rapidly change tracks if the political situation 
permits, and key bureaucrats are convinced of the merits of such a change in the first 
place.77 
                                                
75 Former Latin American diplomat, Hamburg, 7.5.2015 (Interview 2); EU officials, Brussels, 
17.6.2015 (Interview 11).  
76 Former Commission official, Hamburg, 27.4.2015 (Interview 1). 
77 Former EU official, 19.6.2015, Brussels (Interview 17). 
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In any case, preparatory working groups between the Commission and Central 
America, as well as with the Andean Community, were set up already in January 2005 
(Agence Europe 2005d, 2005a). At a San José dialogue meeting in May 2005 mention was 
furthermore made by Ferrero-Waldner that negotiations could officially be launched in 
2006—in time for the next EU-Latin America summit—while cautioning that this still 
depended on the progress of the Doha Round (Agence Europe 2005c). 
This did not mean, however, that there was no resistance to the negotiations on 
the European side, or to the proposed format on the Latin American end. Alongside the 
preparatory work a case needed to be made for the merits of the negotiations to convince 
the Commission as a whole, as well as the different member states (the strategy to bring 
the two regions on board is outlined in the section dealing with the negotiations 
themselves), in order to overcome the problem of diverging internal views as to the 
necessity for these negotiations. 
The upcoming 2006 EU-Latin America summit provided the incentive for 
Ferrero-Waldner to make her case in a 2005 Commission communication prepared by 
DG RELEX on A stronger partnership between the European Union and Latin America78, which 
would serve as the basis of discussions for the future of EU-Latin American relations in 
the preparations for the summit. The document calls specifically for the establishment of  
an enhanced strategic partnership through a network of association 
agreements (including free trade agreements) involving all the countries of 
the region and liable to contribute to the integration of the region as a whole 
(European Commission 2005, 6) 
 It furthermore makes rhetorical reference to the EU’s previous commitments 
to the region, as well as the responsibility of proving its continued interest in the region 
even after the big bang enlargement round (European Commission 2005, 5). 
The inauguration of the Barroso Commission led to a change in the functioning 
of the Commission; it increased the autonomy of the Commissioners with external 
relations portfolios and gave a Commissioner favourable towards negotiations with both 
regional organizations the RELEX portfolio after the failure of the EU’s negotiations 
with Mercosur. This can explain the initial development of the idea for negotiations with 
CAN and Central America alongside the EU’s rhetorical entrapment arising out of 
previous public declarations. Once this thought-process was initiated the Commission 
                                                
78 This was the first of two Latin America strategy documents prepared during Ferrero-
Waldner’s tenure as Commissioner. 
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nonetheless needed to approve it in the College of Commissioners and the Council 
needed to agree to the negotiation mandates. 
 
6.3.2 Overcoming internal bureaucratic reservations 
With DG RELEX and the responsible Commissioner convinced of the merits of 
negotiating with the Andean Community and Central America, a number of other internal 
EU actors needed to be brought on board for the process to go forward. This ultimately 
succeeded due to an alignment of preferences of other internal EU actors over a lack of 
progress in the Doha Round and further DG RELEX activity. 
Due to the tripartite structure of Association Agreements, DG RELEX—albeit 
the lead actor for Association Agreements—was not the only entity within the 
Commission that needed to give its go-ahead before the demand for a negotiation brief 
could be put to the Council. Given that the political dialogue and cooperation elements 
had already been dealt with to a large extent in the negotiations leading to the PCAs of 
2003, the trade component would be the most significant—if not the only—substantial 
addition in the negotiations for the Association Agreements. Aside from securing member 
state support, gaining that of DG Trade (alongside a number of other relevant DGs, such 
as AGRI) was hence the most important element before negotiations could be envisioned. 
While DG RELEX’s initial internal concerns about the project were limited to timing and 
workload issues over the DG’s small staff footprint,79 DG Trade’s concerns were of a 
more fundamental nature. 
For EU trade officials—as was the case for many member states—a number of 
different elements still stood in the way of the negotiation of Association Agreements 
with either region. At the time of DG RELEX’s Latin America strategy document the 
Doha Round was still ongoing and the EU was still strongly committed to its successful 
conclusion, with the moratorium on new FTA negotiations still in place in late 2005. At 
the same time, DG Trade was busy updating the EU’s existing agreements with the rest 
of the world so as to take into account the effects of the EU’s enlargement rounds. 
Additionally, trade officials argued that the economic case for the agreement was 
relatively weak. While negotiations would occupy an important number of the EU’s trade 
negotiators, neither the markets of CAN nor SIECA were deemed important or integrated 
                                                
79 Former EU official, 19.6.2015, Brussels (Interview 17). 
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enough economically for the EU to warrant such costly processes.80 The difficulty for 
further economic integration at least in CAN was illustrated by the fact that Venezuela 
had increasingly begun to embrace principles of socialist economic planning under 
President Hugo Chavez.81 When four of the five CAN members called for the EU to 
negotiate an FTA with the region in 2003, Venezuela was notably absent (Agence Europe 
2003a), and similarly abstained from negotiations with the United States (see below). 
Similar tendencies could be observed in the Central American region, with Honduras, 
Guatemala and Nicaragua showing sympathy for the ALBA regional integration project 
launched by Venezuela and the Petrocaribe project funded by it (Erisman 2011, 125). The 
latter would allow these countries to receive Venezuelan oil at significantly reduced rates. 
Lastly, the EU was involved in an on-going dispute at the WTO over its banana 
quotas and tariffs which involved some Central American and Andean states under the 
leadership of Ecuador (US Embassy Ecuador Quito 2005). Given that disagreements over 
the EU’s position on one of these countries’ key exports were proving difficult to resolve, 
the prospect of amicable and successful negotiations for Association Agreements between 
both sides appeared relatively slim. 
Some of these difficulties were addressed by purely coincidental developments, 
such as the timetable of the Council’s rotating presidency, or a scheduled biannual EU-
Latin America summit which provides a prominent forum for relations between the two 
regions. With Austria due to take over the presidency in the first half of 2006, and as the 
host of that year’s EU-LAC summit, the country’s support for progress in the relationship 
was virtually assured. On the one hand this was due to the country still being governed 
by the very same government from which Ferrero-Waldner emerged. On the other 
tangible progress in the EU-Latin America relationship would be a sign of prestige for 
the country holding the presidency and hosting the summit. The country then used its 
policy autonomy when holding the presidency to ensure that some progress would be 
made in the EU’s relations with the Latin American region 
The importance that Austria attributed to progress in the EU-Latin America 
relationship can be seen in the document outlining its presidency priorities. It specifically 
mentions the EU-LAC summit as “the largest event during the Austrian presidency in 
                                                
80 Former Latin American diplomat, Hamburg, 7.5.2015 (Interview 2); Latin American diplomat, 
Brussels, 3.11.2015 (Interview  27); EU officials, Brussels, 16.6.2015 (Interview 8). 
81 This is perhaps best illustrated by Venezuela’s project for an Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos 
de Nuestra América (ALBA), an alternative regional integration scheme between socialist-leaning 
countries in the region (Flemes 2009). 
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2006” (Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2005, 28) and acknowledges the presidency’s 
desire for the beginning of negotiations with both regions. This political priority for 
negotiations did not eliminate the prevalent concern over developments in the Doha 
Round, however, as the document states: 
It is hoped that the Sixth Ministerial Conference of the World Trade 
Organisation WTO in Hong Kong in December 2005 will come up with 
decisions that will make it possible to conclude the round by the end of 2006, 
or at the latest by mid-2007. The outcome of this conference will determine 
the trade policy agenda during the Austrian Presidency. (Federal Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs 2005, 35) 
These Austrian concerns were shared by DG Trade. The failure of the 
December 2005 WTO negotiations in Hong Kong then paved the way for a changed 
approach in the EU’s trade policy in general, in turn softening DG Trade’s position 
towards the Association Agreements with Latin America. 
When the Barroso Commission’s new Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson 
took up his position at the same time as Ferrero-Waldner in 2004, the EU’s preferences 
for the Doha Round and the consequential moratorium on FTAs were still manifest 
(Agence Europe 2004b). This was based on Mandelson’s adamant support for economic 
liberalization in the multilateral realm. In consequence, as Commission officials active at 
the time have pointed out to me, this was the primary reason why Mandelson was initially 
opposed to DG RELEX’s proposals for negotiations with both regional organisations.82 
It was only after Doha’s failure became apparent in Hong Kong that a significant shift of 
thinking on the EU’s trade strategy started to emerge within the EU’s trade policy 
apparatus. This, combined with Austria’s presidency, Ferrero-Waldner’s persuasion, as 
well as the promise of certain safeguards related to progress in the integration process of 
the regions concerned, ultimately helped to sway DG Trade’s position in favour of the 
proposed negotiations according to Commission officials.83 
While only published after DG Trade had informally agreed to the negotiations 
with both regions, its Global Europe (DG Trade 2006) communication of October 2006 
best illustrates the change of thinking that occurred after Hong Kong’s failure. The 
document outlined an entirely new vision for the EU’s trade policy based on bilateral 
treaties where necessary, and thereby proposing to end the moratorium on new FTAs 
outside of the Doha context. On the one hand the document states that 
                                                
82 EU Trade official, Brussels, 12.6.2015 (Interview 6). 
83 Ibid.; Former Latin American diplomat, Hamburg, 7.5.2015 (Interview 2). 
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Europe remains committed to the WTO and is working hard to resume 
negotiations as soon as circumstances in other countries allow. (DG Trade 
2006, 10)  
On the other, as a departure from previous policy it mentions that: 
Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), if approached with care, can build on WTO 
and other international rules by going further and faster in promoting 
openness and integration, by tackling issues which are not ready for 
multilateral discussion and by preparing the ground for the next level of 
multilateral liberalisation. (DG Trade 2006, 10) 
The document furthermore makes specific reference to the negotiations with 
both regions, stating that a European focus on FTAs from that time on was by no means 
entirely novel. After all, such a changed approach followed the logic of both proposed 
agreements for which preparations had already begun (DG Trade 2006, 10–11). The 
emergence of this changed approach made negotiations with both regions much more 
logical from the perspective of the EU’s stated trade policy preferences, thus reducing the 
divergence of views between DG Trade and DG RELEX. 
Nonetheless, the language of the document itself reveals that the change of 
thinking cannot be explained by Global Europe alone. Furthermore, given the lack of 
overall importance of both regions’ economies for the EU, DG Trade’s change of 
thinking does not readily square with the priorities of the document. It is instead the free 
trade policy of the United States that served as a further factor in the change of DG 
Trade’s thinking. The failure of the FTAA project initially meant that the EU would not 
have to fear immediate market access issues in the Latin American region, as has been 
explored in the previous chapter. 
However, the abandonment of this grand project did not mean that the United 
States ended its advances towards the region. This time around, the focus was on bilateral 
negotiations with willing Latin American countries, hence rendering EU market access 
fears acute once more.84 US negotiations with a number of countries in both Central 
America and the Andean region had begun in May 2004, ultimately leading to the 
conclusion of agreements with Central America in 2005, and with Panama, Colombia and 
Peru in 2006.85 
For the EU’s trade preferences these agreements had two effects: On the one 
hand, a senior EU trade official pointed out that the EU and the US are economic 
                                                
84 Former EU official, Brussels, 19.6.2016 (Interview 17). 
85 The so called Dominican Republic Central America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR) is an 
agreement with the 5 SIECA states, as well as the Dominican Republic. While negotiations had 
equally begun with Ecuador, these have never led to the conclusion of an actual agreement. 
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competitors in both regions, and that any move by the US would mean that the EU would 
naturally have to follow suit86 despite the region’s relative economic insignificance. 
Furthermore, the capacity of these countries to successfully conclude agreements with the 
United States alleviated some of DG Trade’s concerns over their capacity to negotiate 
such complex agreements bilaterally (US Embassy Peru Lima 2006), potentially rendering 
negotiations less costly for DG Trade and increasing their chance of success. While not 
alleviating all of DG Trade’s concerns, its position had nevertheless become more 
favourable with the effective failure of Doha and the conclusion of the US FTAs, thus 
decreasing the divergence of views within the Commission. 
It is here that the issue of the upcoming EU-Latin America summit became 
relevant again, and meant that the Council could ultimately provide an additional impetus 
to DG RELEX’s (and Austria’s) project. Given that such summits, as well as the summit 
declaration, are technically a matter between governments rather than the supranational 
institutions, the Council (aided by preparatory work within COLAC) had to agree on an 
approach ahead of the May 2006 Vienna summit that would signal a deepening of the ties 
between the EU and Latin America despite the failure of the negotiations with Mercosur. 
The announcement of negotiations with Central America and the Andean Community 
would hence be an ideal signal. 
It is in this context that the General Affairs Council conclusions from 27 
February 2006 on the Commission’s 2005 Latin America strategy document need to be 
seen. In it the Council specifically gave its general support for DG RELEX’s plans, stating 
that: 
The Council […] welcomes the comprehensive Commission Communication 
on ‘A stronger partnership between the European Union and Latin America’ 
which comes at an appropriate juncture in the relationship between the two 
regions. (Council of the European Union 2006b, 12) 
  With regards to the proposed negotiations specifically, the document equally 
affirms the Council’s willingness to support these: 
While reiterating its attachment to ongoing multilateral negotiations in the 
WTO under the DDA, the Council recalls the EU’s strategic objective of 
enhancing the EU-Latin American bi-regional partnership through a network 
of association agreements, involving all the countries of the region and aimed 
at promoting the integration of the region as a whole. […] It also expects that 
appropriate decisions can be taken regarding the opening of negotiations on 
association agreements, including free trade agreements, with the Andean 
Community and Central America. (Council of the European Union 2006b, 
14) 
                                                
86 EU Trade official, Brussels, 12.6.2015 (Interview 6). 
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While a commitment to Doha remained at this time, more than seven months 
ahead of the publication of Global Europe, it nevertheless signalled the Council’s 
willingness to entertain the negotiations with both regions in principle, including in the 
realm of trade. 
 It is necessary to consider at this point that the Council’s approval for the 
process at this stage should not be taken for granted. Rather, it is once more a number of 
parallel developments that contributed to its positive attitude towards DG RELEX’s 
approach. First and foremost, it is surprising that some of the member states would, at 
least in principle, welcome negotiations with a regional organization that contained 
Venezuela, or any of the countries politically influenced by it, as a member state. While 
Venezuela’s increasingly belligerent rhetoric was largely seen as an internal problem of the 
Andean Community, some of the EU’s member states such as Spain and the Czech 
Republic nevertheless voiced important criticisms as to the democratic credentials of 
Venezuela’s government. In 2002, Spain’s conservative government under José María 
Aznar, which held the rotating Council presidency at the time, even went so far as to 
welcome the failed coup against Hugo Chavez (BBC News 2004). Such views were shared 
in some Eastern European countries like the Czech Republic (US Embassy Czech 
Republic Prague 2006), which was equally sensitive to the country’s close alignment with 
Cuba.87 Given the necessary inclusion of democracy and human rights provisions in any 
EU agreement, this issue had the potential to be a significant hurdle for any negotiations. 
By early 2006, however, this Spanish obstacle to negotiations had disappeared. 
When José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero was made prime minister of Spain in 2004 after the 
electoral victory of the PSO, Spain’s social-democratic party, the country slowly moved 
away from its radical opposition to Latin America’s socialist governments. Instead, 
Zapatero opted for a policy of engagement. While the changed political climate dictated 
from above took some time to permeate inside Spain’s bureaucracy,88 the government 
even proposed relaxing the EU’s so called Common Position on Cuba (see the following 
chapter), which had limited European interactions with the island (US Embassy Czech 
Republic Prague 2005). The fact that it was the previous Aznar government which had 
initiated the Common Position makes the reversal of Spain’s policy even clearer. 
                                                
87 This can be seen in a number of American diplomatic cables (US Embassy Czech Republic 
Prague 2006, 2007) and was confirmed in an interview with a former EU official (Brussels, 
19.6.2015, Interview 17) and a member state official (Brussels, 4.11.2015, Interview 31). 
88 MFA officials appear to have been particularly critical of the premier’s position towards 
Venezuela (US Embassy Spain Madrid 2005). 
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Similarly, agricultural concerns such as those that had contributed to the failure 
of negotiations with Mercosur were less prevalent in the case of these regions, if one 
leaves the sensitive issue of bananas aside. This allowed countries like France to take a 
more positive attitude towards the negotiations than was the case for Mercosur.89 This 
was accompanied by what has been described to me as member states’ “permissive 
consensus”90 on the Commission’s proposed Latin America strategy that developed in 
parallel to the support for Global Europe. Furthermore, as explained by an Eastern 
European Trade Policy Committee delegate, the new member states largely lacked clear 
preferences as to the opening of trade negotiations, with political concerns over some of 
the left-wing governments not being allowed to interfere with a general liberalization 
agenda. In any case it was feared that a refusal of such negotiations would play into the 
hands of Venezuela and its anti-liberalization agenda for the region,91 thereby potentially 
creating a perceived urgency for negotiations. Additionally, as someone who is familiar 
with the discussions in the Council’s Latin America working group has explained, while 
the issue of competition with the EU never comes up in formal discussions, “the EU 
always needs to be on par with the United States when it comes to market access in the 
region”.92 Lack of member state support for the negotiations was hence not an inhibiting 
factor at this stage, as their positions aligned themselves largely with that of DG RELEX 
and the now convinced DG Trade. 
Against this backdrop of shared assessments between the relevant actors, the 
preparatory work for negotiations with Central America under the joint assessment 
exercise continued successfully. This eventually contributed to the identification of a 
number of economic integration steps that the region would have to undertake in parallel 
to negotiations with the EU. By the May 2006 EU-LAC summit in Vienna both sides 
were sufficiently satisfied that the EU-Central American side-summit could announce the 
decision that formal negotiations would be launched. Nonetheless, the agreement still 
included safeguards on regional integration, as follows: 
Central America confirmed its commitment to implement as planned the 
decisions taken by CA Heads of States on 9 March 2006 in Panama, as well 
as to seek ratification of the CA Treaty on investment and services and to 
develop a jurisdictional mechanism that could secure enforcement of regional 
                                                
89 EU trade official, Brussels, 18.6.2015 (Interview 12); Member state official, Brussels, 
22.6.2015 (Interview 19). 
90 European Parliament Official, Brussels, 24.6.2015 (Interview 25). 
91 Member state diplomat, Brussels, 17.6.2015 (Interview 9). 
92 EU officials, Brussels, 17.6.2015 (Interview 11) 
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economic legislation throughout the region. (Council of the European Union 
2006c, 2) 
While this did not mean that negotiations could begin straight away, given the 
absence of a mandate from the Council, the commitment to the opening of negotiations 
in this public biregional forum nevertheless sent a strong signal and represented rhetorical 
entrapment from the EU’s side. The remaining internal EU policy process could thus be 
seen as more of a formality than it would have been otherwise. 
Similar progress could not be achieved in the context of negotiations with the 
Andean Community due to a number of developments that destabilized this regional 
actor ahead of the summit. This was mainly due to a more radical shift in Venezuelan 
foreign policy, as well as the election of Evo Morales in Bolivia. Much like the conditions 
imposed on Central America, the EU had already insisted in its preparatory work for the 
joint assessment in 2005 that CAN would have to establish an internal common tariff 
before negotiations could begin (US Embassy Peru Lima 2005). This meant that the 
Andean Community would have to undertake further integration steps before any future 
negotiations. With Venezuela unwilling to deepen regional integration as demanded, a 
fulfilment of these conditions appeared increasingly unlikely. 
In a surprising move Hugo Chavez then decided in April 2006 that Venezuela 
would withdraw from the organization altogether93 and join Mercosur instead. This 
radically changed the dynamics of possible negotiations with the EU: On the one hand it 
eliminated an internal CAN hurdle to negotiations, with the four remaining members of 
the organisation committed at least in theory to negotiations with the EU. On the other 
it temporarily put the organisation into administrative disarray, as Venezuela’s departure 
meant a loss of almost one third of total funding for CAN’s institutions.94 While Chavez’s 
decision was not communicated as a move against free trade in public, it nevertheless 
appears to have aimed at punishing Colombia and Peru for their free trade agenda that 
led them to sign the agreements with the US and pursue negotiations with the EU in the 
first place (US Embassy Venezuela Caracas 2006). 
Aside from a potential blow to the organisation’s administrative capacity to 
negotiate with the EU, one additional problem became apparent: the political landscape 
of Bolivia had been radically changed with its presidential elections of 2005. Evo Morales 
                                                
93 Chavez had made reference to CAN's apparent pro-FTA stance when leaving the organisation 
(Maihold 2008, 23). Instead Venezuela's government has since promoted the Bolivarian Alliance 
for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA), essentially a redistribution scheme towards poorer 
Latin American countries which chose to align with Venezuela's left-wing policies. 
94 Former EU official (Brussels, 19.6.2015, Interview 17). 
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had been elected president of the country with a landslide victory for his political party 
supported by the country’s indigenous movements. With his inauguration in early 2006 
the political view of the country’s government on free trade was about to change. While 
Morales’ positions did not appear to be as radical as that of Venezuela’s president, the 
country nevertheless slowly began to alter its domestic economic policies, while also 
developing ties with Hugo Chavez and ultimately joining ALBA (see Girvan 2011).  
Once more, Spanish and Czech officials, this time joined by the EU’s High 
Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana, voiced fears 
over these political developments in conversations with US counterparts. The main 
concerns at the time were the potential of an ever closer alliance between Bolivia and 
Venezuela (US Embassy Belgium Brussels 2006; US Embassy Czech Republic Prague 
2006; US Embassy Spain Madrid 2006a), which was perceived as a threat to the spread of 
Western values in the region. Lastly, there were concerns about Bolivia’s programme to 
re-nationalise its oil and gas resources by expropriating foreign companies (Agence 
Europe 2006c). 
Ultimately, none of these factors altered the EU’s willingness to launch 
negotiations with the Andean Community. The Spanish Foreign Ministry’s director for 
foreign policy discussed the EU’s attitude to the negotiations with American diplomats, 
saying that 
the EU was clear at the Summit that the door is open to begin negotiations 
on a trade agreement right away, whether with three countries or four. (US 
Embassy Spain Madrid 2006b)  
This meant that multiple dynamics were at play on the European side ahead of 
the summit. On the one hand, the EU was ready to entertain FTA negotiations for 
economic reasons, while attempting to continue supporting the Andean Community’s 
regional integration. Balancing these goals was rendered particularly difficult by the fact 
that the Andean Community’s four members had not been able to agree to a common 
position ahead of the summit, which put the declaration for the entire summit at risk. 
Ultimately the European side suggested a compromise proposal that, while not 
offering a concrete timeframe for negotiations, still made reference to the ultimate scope 
and a future start of negotiations.95 In the summit’s final declaration this compromise 
reads as follows: 
Recalling the common strategic objective established in the Declaration of 
Guadalajara, we welcome the decision adopted by the EU and the Andean 
Community to initiate during 2006, a process leading to the negotiation of an 
                                                
95 Former EU official (Brussels, 19.6.2015, Interview 17). 
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Association Agreement which will include political dialogue, cooperation 
programmes and a trade agreement. (Council of the European Union 2006a, 
12) 
Through this compromise and by its continued insistence on a regional 
approach, the EU upheld its political pressure on the organization to integrate before any 
negotiations could begin.96 In this context the EU demanded that CAN find a common 
position for the negotiations ahead of any further meetings (US Embassy Bolivia La Paz 
2006a). Nonetheless, Ferrero-Waldner cautioned in a meeting of the European 
Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee that the process would most likely be difficult, 
and that convincing Bolivia would prove to be challenging (Agence Europe 2006a). 
At CAN’s June 2006 meeting the remaining members of the organisation indeed 
agreed to strengthen its institutions and policies, and indicated their desire to negotiate an 
Association Agreement with the EU (US Embassy Ecuador Quito 2006), thereby 
facilitating the opening of negotiations. What remained, however, were differing positions 
as to the trade component of the negotiations, with Bolivia arguing that the economies 
of the region were too disparate for a regional approach (US Embassy Bolivia La Paz 
2006a). 
In an attempt to force Bolivia to give up its reservations in the trade realm, the 
EU gave the country a deadline to join the process (US Embassy Colombia Bogotá 2006) 
or be excluded from any trade negotiations with the EU altogether. While Bolivia would 
eventually leave the negotiations, the country’s lack of a clear political position on the 
negotiations and the political pressure was nevertheless sufficient for it to join the process 
at the time (US Embassy Bolivia La Paz 2006b). Both sides then came together at a 
meeting in July, after having finalized the joint assessment exercise. While the meeting 
gave the green light for preparations for the negotiations to go ahead, it still demonstrates 
the EU’s insistence that further Andean integration would have to occur before 
negotiations could get underway properly (EU-CAN High Level Meeting 2006). 
The EU’s willingness to entertain negotiations with the Andean Community and 
Central America was ultimately down to a combination of factors that led to a reduction 
in the divergence of interests between internal EU actors, the fact that DG RELEX and 
Austria made use of their policy autonomy, and the fact that the EU was rhetorically 
entrapped to entertain the negotiations. 
 
                                                
96 Ibid. 
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6.3.2.1. Approving the negotiation briefs 
The last step before negotiations could begin was the granting of negotiation briefs to the 
Commission. Securing an agreement in the Council on these for a number of proposed 
trade agreements was ultimately one of the priorities of the German presidency in the first 
half of 2007. By late April 2007, when the General Affairs Council gave the go-ahead for 
the trade element of the Association Agreements, these had become only two of five new 
mandates for Free Trade agreements being granted to the European Commission (Agence 
Europe 2007) under the new approach announced with Global Europe. Free trade 
negotiations would equally get under way with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN)97, South Korea and India. 
This approach of granting negotiating briefs in parallel formally aligned the two 
negotiations with the EU’s overhauled trade strategy and hence eliminated some of the 
difficulties of prioritisation of trade negotiations that DG Trade was concerned about. At 
the same time, the agreed negotiation briefs addressed some of the remaining concerns 
within this Directorate-General by including important elements of conditionality on the 
remaining issues (European Commission 2007b). The Council thereby demonstrated the 
existence of what was earlier described as a permissive consensus on the negotiations. On 
the one hand it showed its awareness of some of the remaining issues, while on the other 
it entrusted the Commission with a large degree of independence to resolve these. 
The negotiation briefs for talks with Central America are not in the public 
domain. Nonetheless, the conditionality of negotiations can be derived from the 
discussions surrounding the Commission’s mandate to negotiate with CAN. Already the 
draft mandate prepared by DG RELEX that was approved by the College of 
Commissioners took note of DG Trade’s concerns and those likely to be voiced by the 
Trade Policy Committee by tasking the Commission’s negotiators with ensuring that the 
agreement contain 
A clause referring to the effective start of the negotiations and the conclusion 
of the Agreement […]. This clause should refer to the assessment of the 
concrete achievements on the commitments undertaken by the Andean 
Community at the High Level Meeting of July 2006 as regards the 
strengthening of its regional economic integration. (European Commission 
2007b, 6)  
                                                
97 This regional integration organisation is composed of Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, 
Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam. 
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COREPER, a high-level Council preparatory body also made sure to further 
emphasize the importance of this element prior to the Council’s go-ahead. The notes of 
a meeting at which the proposed mandates were discussed contain a declaration that states 
that 
The Commission will, as appropriate, take into account the possible impact 
that the evolution of the Andean Community Integration could have on the 
development of the negotiations, having in mind the importance of 
developing a strong framework of relations with the Andean Community 
(COREPER 2007, 13) 
A similar declaration was made concerning the on-going WTO dispute 
settlement over the EU's banana import regime that Ecuador had filed in November of 
2006 and that was then supported by Colombia. After the countries had taken this step 
Commissioner Mandelson had threatened the Andean Community in December that 
negotiations could only begin once the complaint had been lifted, as ”it is not possible to 
litigate and negotiate at the same time” (as cited in Agence Europe 2006b). This was 
addressed as follows in the context of the upcoming negotiations by COREPER: 
With regard to the CAN negotiating directives, the Commission will take into 
account the possible impact that the evolution of WTO dispute settlement 
on bananas could have on the development of the negotiations, having in 
mind that the Commission is fully aware of the clear limitations and risks to 
engage in meaningful discussions aimed at improving preferential market 
access pending the active pursuit of a WTO panel on that key product. 
(COREPER 2007, 13) 
The declaration meant that it would be at the Commission's discretion to 
adequately take the issue into account in its negotiation strategy, and thereby add an 
important political component to the negotiations. 
While the two Association agreements stand out from the ‘pure’ Free Trade 
negotiations with Asian countries agreed at the very same meeting, a further COREPER 
document that is not fully in the public domain demonstrates how the EU aimed to 
reconcile the difference between the two distinct types of agreements: 
Negotiations on Free-Trade Agreements [...] shall lead to agreements with a 
clear legal and institutional linkage to the existing or future Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreements or updated Framework Agreements. Such legal and 
institutional linkage would entail, inter alia, the [sic] Free-Trade Agreement 
could be totally or partially suspended if the conditions for such suspension 
under the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement or updated Framework 
Agreement apply, and that there would be a coherent institutional framework 
for the administration of the agreements. (COREPER document 8598/07 as 
cited in Okano-Heijmans 2014, 16) 
In essence this meant that while the other proposed free trade agreements would 
not be fully-fledged Association Agreements, similar political elements would necessarily 
 184 
have to accompany the ‘pure’ free trade agreements either within it or in additional treaties 
with such countries, thereby rhetorically limiting the differences between the two kinds 
of agreements that the EU would negotiate in the future. 
While DG RELEX as the initial driver for the negotiations with both regional 
organizations initially faced important internal hurdles to gaining negotiation briefs, these 
could ultimately be overcome. This was related to the EU’s rhetorical entrapment, and an 
alignment of the interests of internal EU actors which led to the relative coherence of 
their positions over time. While DG Trade ultimately still had some concerns as to the 
feasibility of the negotiations with both regions, these could be addressed by the inclusion 
of conditionality in the agreement. The necessity for policy coordination at this point of 
the process has to be considered as strong and working relatively well, as DG RELEX 
could not begin negotiations on its own, having to take existing concerns on board in the 
draft mandate for the negotiations. 
 
6.4 The negotiation experience: Handling difficulties differently 
Actual negotiation rounds with both regions began shortly after the approval of the 
mandates in the Council. While these have encountered a number of difficulties, and a 
radical change of approach has occurred in the case of the Andean Community, it is 
nevertheless important to note that the parallelism of both processes was upheld during 
the entire negotiations phase. 
Given the important difference that arose during both negotiation processes 
these are outlined separately within this section, with a focus first on the Andean 
Community, which is then supplemented by the different perspective of the negotiations 
with Central America. While a number of external factors have contributed to both 
negotiations’ disparate outcomes, ultimately this section argues that the hypothesis based 
on rational decision-making cannot account for these differences. Instead, bureaucratic 
politics once more help us in gaining a fuller picture of the developments underlying this 
emergence of policy incoherence. Here, the lack of diverging positions in the Central 
American case can explain why the EU insisted on an interregional approach despite a 
number of external challenges to it. In contrast, an emerging divergence of views with 
DG Trade combined with its autonomy in the negotiation process can help our 
understanding as to why the EU ultimately negotiated a free trade agreement with 
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Colombia and Peru only, while abandoning the inclusion of political and cooperation 
chapters. 
 
6.4.1 Negotiating with the Andean Community 
The negotiations with the Andean Community need to be considered in two distinct parts: 
a first period of negotiations following the originally envisioned interregional approach, 
and a second one that outlines the EU’s change towards bilateral free trade negotiations 
with Colombia and Peru. Whereas the initial period is illustrative of the EU’s capacity to 
align its different policies when necessary and under the strong incentive set by the 
adoption of the negotiation mandates, the second once more reveals distinct policy goals 
of different internal EU actors. 
 
6.4.1.1. Aligning the EU’s policies during the negotiations 
With the go-ahead for negotiations given by the Council, the Commission could shift its 
focus to a negotiation strategy that would help overcome some of the internal CAN 
difficulties that these were facing. While these attempts would ultimately fail, the initial 
phase of the negotiations nevertheless demonstrated the unity of the EU’s position, 
making use of the different policy tools at its disposal across policy areas to drive forward 
the negotiation process. This phase hence demonstrates a scenario under which the 
negotiation mandates have united the European Commission, much as could be observed 
in the case of the negotiations with Mercosur. The commitment by the member states in 
this case furthermore allowed the Commission a relative degree of autonomy and served 
to overcome any possible internal bureaucratic divisions. 
The factors that had rendered the announcement of a start to negotiations at the 
2006 Lima summit impossible still remained when negotiations were scheduled to go 
ahead in early 2007. While the EU was originally mainly concerned about the problems 
for Andean integration that arose due to Venezuela’s decision to leave the process, it 
became increasingly clear that the position of Bolivia would render the negotiations 
particularly difficult. This was due to ideological as well as economic factors. While the 
country’s membership in ALBA ensured that it was rhetorically opposed to the concept 
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of free trade, the nature of the country’s export structure also meant that the negotiation 
of an FTA with the EU would have provided few benefits for the country.98 
The difficulty of reconciling the aim for a true biregional agreement with its trade 
aspect had already become apparent in the July 2006 EU-CAN meeting which gave the 
green light for the preparation of formal negotiations. In the document Bolivia had 
requested “flexibility in the future negotiations considering the different levels of 
development between the CAN countries” (EU-CAN High Level Meeting 2006, 2). By 
early 2007 the issue of dissenting voices within the Andean Community had come to be 
even more prevalent with the inauguration of President Rafael Correa in Ecuador. Given 
his political views the country then began to develop closer ties with Venezuela and 
Bolivia, ultimately introducing a two-way split within CAN. 
While both countries’ detailed trade policy preferences were not necessarily clear 
from the outset of the negotiations, their position was more and more at odds with those 
of Colombia and Peru, the main proponents of a free trade agreement with the EU. Ahead 
of the official opening of negotiations in June 2007, EU diplomats voiced their concerns 
as to these developments to US counterparts (US Embassy Peru Lima 2007). 
Nonetheless, negotiations began somewhat successfully. This can be attributed 
in large part to the way in which the EU approached the negotiations, emphasizing that 
trade would only be one of its three constituent pillars. This initially led Ecuador to believe 
that the EU’s aims were different from pure free trade negotiations, which stands in 
contrast with the country’s refusal to pursue FTA negotiations with the United States (US 
Embassy Ecuador Quito 2007b). 
From the outset the EU had introduced important elements of conditionality, 
as well as incentives that would accompany the negotiations to boost their success. Much 
as can be seen in the parallel negotiations with Central America (see below), it was the 
EU’s position that negotiations would only occur in a region-to-region context that was 
meant to further incentivise regional integration. When communicating with the Andean 
partners ahead of the first round of negotiations in April 2007, the EU made its conditions 
clear by stating that: 
it is expected that the CAN will continue making further progress in the 
definition of a common tariff reduction point, as well as in the process of 
taking the necessary decisions on the harmonization of the Andean Customs 
Regimes. (EU-Andean Community Ministerial meeting 2007) 
                                                
98 Senior DG Trade official, Brussels, 12.6.2015 (Interview 6). 
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This condition was accompanied by a clear positive incentive in the realm of the 
EU’s development funding. Given DG RELEX’s leadership role on the allocation of the 
EU’s multiannual development cooperation frameworks, it was able to alter the funding 
to the region in support of the negotiations. The 2007-2013 regional strategy document 
thus voices one of the EU’s main development goals for the region as follows: 
to support regional trade and economic integration in the Andean 
Community, notably by encouraging intensification of this process before and 
during negotiations on an Association Agreement, including a free trade area; 
(European Commission 2007a, 15) 
This was meant to be achieved by earmarking more than 40% of the EU’s total 
aid to the region for the regional economic integration envelope (European Commission 
2007a, 30). The EU hence provided significant monetary incentives to help the region 
integrate further economically and therefore to achieve the EU’s negotiation conditions. 
This mix of conditionality and incentives helped initial progress in the 
negotiations. Any of the frequent Colombian and Peruvian attempts to convince the EU 
of the merits of bilateral negotiations, such as by Peruvian president Alan García in 
November 2007 (Noriega 2007), were countered by restating the EU’s insistence for 
region-to-region negotiations, while mentioning the potential for side payments to keep 
Bolivia at the negotiation table (US Embassy Bolivia La Paz 2007). 
EU and member state officials were equally keen to point out to the Colombians 
the advantages of the biregional approach for the ultimate passage of an agreement. While 
there were important concerns about the human rights situation in Colombia amongst 
European politicians, the issue would likely not be scrutinised as closely in European 
parliaments if the agreement were to be regional, rather than bilateral (US Embassy 
Colombia Bogotá 2008b). 
These attempts, alongside the relatively positive attitude of Ecuador during this 
initial phase made for a successful start of negotiations. The country’s commitment at this 
point went so far that when Bolivia threatened to leave before the official start, 
Ecuadorean diplomats successfully intervened and thereby pre-empted a potential 
Colombian and Peruvian exit from the regional organisation (US Embassy Ecuador Quito 
2007b). 
While initial negotiation rounds, which were mainly concerned with issues of a 
general nature, did not make for significant differences of position, difficulties 
nevertheless began to arise in the spring of 2008 (European Commission 2009). 
Nonetheless, there were increasing European political concerns over the situation in 
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Bolivia and Ecuador. The former had undertaken a controversial nationalisation project 
in its natural gas industry, hurting European business interests (US Embassy Bolivia La 
Paz 2008b). In the latter case it became apparent that Ecuador’s foreign policy apparatus 
was suffering from internal divisions, thereby threatening the unity of the country’s 
foreign policy positions (US Embassy Ecuador Quito 2007a, 2008b). 
Looking at the negotiations themselves, these had reached a gridlock ahead of 
the EU-LAC summit of May 2008, mainly over Bolivia’s refusal to negotiate anything but 
the trade of goods, with Ecuador gradually moving to a similar position (US Embassy 
Colombia Bogotá 2008b; US Embassy Ecuador Quito 2008c). Furthermore, Ecuadorean 
negotiators voiced their opposition to the agreement’s proposed sustainability chapter, as 
they believed that political conditionality should not form part of the considerations for 
a trade agreement (US Embassy Ecuador Quito 2008a). These difficulties also meant that 
EU officials started to become more and more impatient with a general lack of progress 
in the process (US Embassy Ecuador Quito 2008b). For the European side this was 
reminiscent of the later negotiation rounds with Mercosur. 
Ultimately, it was a further issue that demonstrated the determining influence of 
external political, rather than economic, factors on the negotiations. Bolivia and Ecuador 
used the EU’s discussion of the Returns Directive to threaten a unilateral withdrawal from 
negotiations. This piece of legislation in the realm of the EU’s immigration and asylum 
policy was meant to facilitate the expulsion of illegal immigrants from the EU’s territory 
and had no direct link to the negotiations, nor did officials on the EU’s side believe that 
Latin American countries should be concerned about this.99 Nevertheless both countries 
voiced their fear that it would discriminate against their nationals in the EU (Phillips 
2008a, 2008c). Whether these were actual political concerns or mere posturing is unclear. 
However, a former Latin American diplomat mentioned that Bolivia’s main aim was to 
delay the negotiation process so as to be able to define its own strategy.100 In any case, the 
unclear link between the position of Bolivia and Ecuador, the content of the Returns 
Directive and the EU’s foreign policy means that this should not be seen as evidence for 
the EU’s horizontal policy incoherence towards the region. 
When these difficulties became apparent, an attempt to save the regional 
approach was made at the May 2008 EU-Andean Community summit held on the fringe 
                                                
99 Former EU official, Brussels, 19.6.2015 (Interview 17). 
100 Former Latin American diplomat, Hamburg, 7.5.2015 (Interview 2). The interviewee cautions 
that this was merely an excuse for the Bolivian side to slow down negotiations as the 
government under Evo Morales was still unsure as to its own preferences in these negotiations. 
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of the overall EU-Latin America summit in Lima. The difficulties at this stage were 
summed up succinctly in an internal EU note for the Council presidency ahead of the 
meeting: 
Bolivia wants a maximum of exceptions, long-term calendars etc ,[sic] for its 
‘asymmetries’ which may become the breaking point in negotiations. Ecuador 
is oscillating, and changed part of its approach during the third round, as well 
as part of its team. Colombia and Peru are visibly frustrated with these 
difficulties and have publicly called on the EU to consider giving up its bi-
regional approach.101 
This further shows that the Returns Directive played no role in the actual 
negotiations at this point in time. In order to defuse the problems outlined in the internal 
note, both sides agreed on a format that would allow for more flexibility in the 
negotiations (Phillips 2008b). The joint communique of the EU-CAN meeting described 
this as follows: 
They [The heads of state and government] agreed that particular attention 
would be paid to the specific development needs of member countries of the 
Andean Community, taking into account the asymmetries between and within 
the regions and the need for flexibility, in the appropriate manner, granting a 
special and differentiated treatment for the member countries of the Andean 
Community, in particular Bolivia and Ecuador, on the part of the EU. (CAN-
EU troika summit 2008) 
The new approach would have enabled the establishment of different levels of 
liberalization in the trade realm, thereby effectively turning the trade component of the 
agreement into a series of bilateral accords, while saving the overall goal of an Association 
Agreement. Ultimately, however, this did not help to overcome the difficulties in the 
process. 
This phase of the negotiations illustrates the EU’s capacity to generate coherent 
foreign policy outputs when the interests of its internal actors converge and when the 
roles of each actor are clear, such as on the definition of long-term priorities and funding 
lines in the EU’s development cooperation funding. Despite important challenges to the 
negotiation format, it was the EU’s insistence on the biregional format, the promise of 
side payments as a concession for trade negotiations, as well as the channelling of 
development funds that helped keep all Andean Community member states aboard. 
 
                                                
101 One interviewee showed this document to me. 
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6.4.1.2. Changing tracks 
It is nonetheless at this point in the negotiations, during the spring of 2008, that a 
significant shift in the EU’s policy occurred. After previous difficulties in the negotiations 
the Commission unilaterally cancelled the next negotiation round scheduled for April. 
This initial move could be interpreted at the time as a further attempt to demonstrate the 
EU’s desire to proceed only in a region-to-region format. However, the developments 
over the ensuing month would lead the EU to revert to bilateral trade negotiations with 
only some of the Andean countries, and thereby a radical change of its negotiation 
position. While the FTA ultimately reached with Colombia and Peru is a single agreement, 
the tariff schedules with both parties nonetheless diverge. 
This change of policy can be explained by increasing economic concerns in DG 
Trade that would see the broader political goal of support for regional integration become 
secondary to trade concerns, as well as to fears of alienating the governments of those 
countries which were more willing to improve ties with the EU. This equally meant a 
decoupling of the political parts of the negotiations from the trade aspect, which 
ultimately contributed to the horizontal incoherence of the EU’s policy towards CAN. 
Interviewees have offered different accounts of the ultimate motivation for the 
EU’s change of approach, with a member state representative calling it a “pragmatic 
response”102 to changing circumstances, while others insisted that the means of 
achievement for the ultimate goal of a biregional Association Agreement had simply been 
altered, but not the goal in itself.103  
Initially the EU’s aim still appears to have been to return to the biregional format 
by providing the concerned countries with additional incentives to do so. In July Ferrero-
Waldner announced a further development cooperation project that would once more 
help the economic integration of the region (Agence Europe 2008c). Ultimately this last-
ditch effort was not successful, however, and other dynamics began to overtake the 
process, thus leading to the EU’s policy incoherence towards the region. 
When the EU initially decided to suspend negotiations, this was seen by 
Columbia and Peru as another opportunity to call for bilateral rather than interregional 
negotiations. The presidents of both countries, Álvaro Uribe and Alan García, sent 
identical letters to Commission President Barroso to that end in September. This was 
accompanied by significant lobbying from the diplomatic representations of both 
                                                
102 Member state diplomat, Brussels, 4.11.2015 (Interview 29). 
103 EU officials, Brussels, 17.6.2015 (Interview 11). 
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countries, arguing that their pursuit of improving ties with the EU should not be held 
hostage by unwilling third parties.104 
While the insistence of these countries appears to ultimately have led DG 
RELEX to accept the concerns of DG Trade (see below), concerns remained over the 
possible impact on Andean regional integration. It was in this context that the letters, as 
well as diplomatic representatives from both countries, pointed to the Andean 
Community’s precedent of allowing bilateral free trade—albeit not political—
negotiations in the context of their agreements with the United States (US Embassy 
Colombia Bogotá 2008c). Reference was made to the 2004 decision 598 of the Andean 
Community Commission, which allowed the organisation’s member states the following: 
If it is not possible to conduct community negotiations for whatever reasons, 
the Member Countries can negotiate bilaterally with third countries. (Andean 
Community Commission 2004, article 2)  
Making use of this precedent would hence—at least in theory—help to 
overcome the problem of a bilateral approach’s legal impact on the regional integration 
process. If we are to believe one of the interviewees, the existence of decision 598 was 
one of the main factors that ultimately convinced Ferrero-Waldner and DG RELEX that 
a change of approach would not mean a loss of face given its previous policy 
preferences105. This suggests that while policy inertia played a role in DG RELEX’s 
deliberations, ultimately these were overcome by the existence of decision 598. 
At the same time, DG Trade officials were anxious to allow for continued trade 
negotiations given their concerns over market access in the Andean Community’s two 
most important economies.106 Nonetheless, a fear was also present that taking a bilateral 
approach would reduce pressure on Ecuador to continue negotiating with the EU. 
The main concern was once more the potential loss of competitiveness 
compared to the United States. Both Colombia and Peru pursued an aggressive FTA 
agenda that also included negotiations with Canada (US Embassy Colombia Bogotá 2007; 
US Embassy Peru Lima 2008), and a Colombian FTA with EFTA (US Embassy 
Colombia Bogotá 2008a). Furthermore, the United States Congress had ratified the 
agreement with Peru in 2007, and it was due to enter into force by 2009. This was not the 
                                                
104 Former Latin American diplomat, Hamburg, 7.5.2015 (Interview 2). 
105 Ibid. 
106 DG Trade official, Brussels, 12.6.2015 (Interview 6). 
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case for the US-Colombia agreement, as ratification only occurred in 2011,107 but the 
continued link between the different negotiations can nevertheless be seen in a US 
diplomatic cable (US Embassy Colombia Bogotá 2010). 
Other evidence for the importance of the US factor in these negotiations could 
be seen by EU chief negotiator Rupert Schlegelmilch’s comments to US counterparts that 
the terms of trade agreed by both countries with the US would be the EU’s lowest aim in 
those negotiations (US Embassy Colombia Bogotá 2009b). Additionally, the Andean 
Community had failed to proceed with the small integration steps towards a customs 
union that were part of the EU’s conditions, and that would have allowed for actual 
region-to-region negotiations. With the envisioned efficiency gains from an integrated 
CAN market less likely, the EU’s trade interests in Colombia and Peru hence played out 
in favour of a bilateral approach. 
This would come at a further price for a possible negotiation success with 
Ecuador, however. Given the structure of the country’s exports to the EU, which are 
largely based on agricultural products such as bananas, and the EU’s sensitivities, any kind 
of WTO-compatible bilateral FTA with the country would prove difficult to reach. Given 
the relatively more diverse economies of both Colombia and Peru, the fulfilment of this 
legal requirement that any FTA liberalise a very significant share of trade between both 
partners would not be a significant issue. A bilateral approach would hence ultimately 
render an agreement with the already reticent Ecuador even less likely. 
Lastly, Commission officials from all camps were worried that any significant 
change of approach would lead to a reopening of the time-consuming and possibly 
conflictual process of reaching a new negotiation mandate with the Council, thereby 
further reducing the EU’s credibility in the face of the more willing negotiation partners 
(US Embassy Colombia Bogotá 2008c). Additionally, if negotiations had failed at this 
point, then this would have meant a repeat of the Mercosur debacle, having wasted 
precious human resources without achieving tangible results. 
Ultimately, amidst these complex preference patterns, the views of DG Trade 
were key given its autonomy in negotiations of the trade aspects of any agreement, and 
due to the fact that DG RELEX was divided over whether to reward Colombia and Peru’s 
desire to negotiate with the EU and the prospect of weakening Andean integration. This 
emergent change of position within the EU was first unofficially communicated to the 
                                                
107 The agreement was originally held up in Congress over human rights concerns, much as 
would be the case in the European Parliament later on (see below). In the end the end of 
negotiations between Colombia and the EU contributed to the ratification in Congress. 
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Andean countries in August (US Embassy Ecuador Quito 2008b), but it would take 
longer to reconcile the different EU priorities with a new negotiation format. 
DG Trade was nonetheless nominally weakened given that Trade Commissioner 
Mandelson surprisingly resigned from his position on 3 October 2008 (Agence Europe 
2008d). He was replaced by Catherine Ashton, an official who was entirely new to the 
European Commission at the time, and hence unlikely to be able to influence important 
policy decisions at the beginning of her tenure. Nonetheless, the Council in the form of 
its Trade Policy Committee (still called Article 133 Committee at the time) had 
demonstrated confidence in DG Trade’s assessment as to the options for the Andean 
region. When discussing the letters that had been sent to President Barroso, the meeting 
concluded by stating that 
the Committee encouraged the Commission to do its utmost to overcome 
the impasse whilst keeping in mind issues of regional integration (Article 133 
Committee 2008b) 
This offered DG Trade large room for manoeuvre. Facing these opposing views, 
Ferrero-Waldner and DG RELEX ultimately fell in line with DG Trade’s preferences by 
arguing that they favoured a position which would not see Colombia and Peru punished 
for their membership in CAN.108 Once this internal change of thinking towards a bilateral 
approach had occurred, it had to be rendered at least rhetorically compatible with the 
EU’s stated policy aims for the region, based on the promotion of regionalism and the 
improvement of human rights.  
The Commission’s preferred strategy to unite these different elements began to 
emerge in Barroso’s response to both presidents on 6 October, which is described in 
detail in a US diplomatic cable (US Embassy Colombia Bogotá 2008c). In essence, the 
EU signalled to its Andean partners that it was willing to negotiate a separate free trade 
agreement with willing Andean countries. Simultaneously, the other two pillars could be 
negotiated with all of CAN, with the FTA simply making reference the biregional Political 
and Cooperation Agreement of 2003, or a new political agreement to be reached. In the 
words of the US diplomat who authored the cable, this would have the following 
advantage: 
This linkage allows the EC to avoid the time-consuming process of having 
EU member-states change the negotiating instructions and gives the 
Commission the political cover it believes it needs against accusations of 
fracturing the CAN. (US Embassy Colombia Bogotá 2008c) 
                                                
108 Former Latin American diplomat, Hamburg, 7.5.2015 (Interview 2). 
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Nonetheless, in a further attempt to demonstrate the EU’s commitment to 
Andean regional integration, the decision as to how to proceed was essentially left to the 
Andean countries who were due to hold a summit later in October (Agence Europe 
2008b). While one former official involved in the process described this as a decision 
aimed at respecting the sovereignty of the Andean countries109, the weight of the evidence 
points to a face-saving measure by DG RELEX to try to ensure coherence between the 
EU’s rhetoric and its policy outputs towards CAN. Nonetheless, the initial idea for a split 
of the trade from the cooperation and political aspects had already been floated once at 
the time of the 2006 EU-Latin America summit over Bolivia’s negative attitude towards 
the negotiations (US Embassy Ecuador Quito 2008c). 
While CAN’s Guayaquil summit attempted to demonstrate unity in the face of 
the EU, with CAN’s member states agreeing that the political and cooperation pillars 
would be approached as a group, the summit nevertheless allowed for bilateral 
negotiations in the trade pillar (Agence Europe 2008a). Importantly, Ecuadorian 
President Correa had taken the decision beforehand that he would not attempt to block 
bilateral negotiations of any of his partners, while leaving the door open for the country 
to join into the trade portion later on (US Embassy Ecuador Quito 2008b). This paved 
the way for the interested parties to move forward with a bilateral approach, with Ecuador 
remaining part of the group, while Bolivia then left the process for good (US Embassy 
Bolivia La Paz 2008a). 
Ultimately, the Commission proposed to the Council that the negotiation briefs 
should be modified in such a way as to split the political and cooperation pillars from the 
trade aspects, thereby asking that the Council 
authorise the Commission to negotiate a multiparty trade agreement between 
the European Community and its Member States, of the one part, and the 
member countries of the Andean Community which share the aim of 
reaching an ambitious, comprehensive, balanced trade agreement, consistent 
with the WTO, of the other part, and to designate the Article 133 Committee 
[Trade Policy Committee] to assist the Commission in that task; (Working 
Party on Latin America 2008, 2) 
In parallel, the Commission asked for the Council to 
authorise the Commission to negotiate a political dialogue and cooperation 
agreement between the European Community and its Member States and the 
Andean Community and its member countries, with a view to strengthening 
and updating the commitments set out in the Political Dialogue and 
Cooperation Agreement between the European Community and its Member 
States, of the one part, and the Andean Community and its member countries, 
of the other part, signed in 2003 and to designate the Working Party on Latin 
                                                
109 Former EU official, Brussels, 19.6.2015 (Interview 17). 
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America to assist the Commission in that task; (Working Party on Latin 
America 2008, 2) 
This meant that the negotiation briefs would only have to be modified 
minimally, since the overall goal of a region-to-region approach was nominally upheld, 
albeit in the context of two separate negotiations. The formulation on the parties to the 
free trade agreement would further allow the EU to keep the door for all of CAN’s 
members open, while allowing for negotiations with those most willing to do so. 
The most important change on the EU’s end, however, was that the decision-
making processes for both were meant to be decoupled internally, with the negotiations 
for the multiparty trade agreement being the responsibility of DG Trade and hence a 
different Council structure (the TPC) than the negotiations for an updated PCA which 
would remain the responsibility of DG RELEX (and COLAC in the Council). 
While the member states appear to have received this proposal favourably 
overall, in line with their previous trust in DG Trade’s judgement, there nevertheless 
appear to have been concerns by some member states as to what this approach would 
mean for the value of political clauses in the trade agreement if the political pillar were to 
be excluded from the FTA (Article 133 Committee 2008a). Ultimately, however, a 
mandate change along those lines was agreed and trade negotiations with the willing 
Andean countries could continue. 
Despite the above concerns for the political aspects of the negotiations the 
attempts to upgrade the political and cooperation pillars in the region-to-region context 
were abandoned relatively quickly, with progress only occurring in the trade realm.110 The 
EU’s shift to bilateral negotiations is hence illustrative of the primacy of DG Trade’s, 
rather than DG RELEX’s concerns in this context. 
When looking at the remaining trade negotiations, initially only Bolivia had 
decided not to join the process, while Ecuador remained a part of the group of the willing 
after further internal divisions were overcome (US Embassy Ecuador Quito 2008a). 
Bolivia then accused the EU of attempting to break the Andean integration project. 
Nevertheless, the country was repeatedly invited to join the negotiations under the new 
format by various EU representatives (US Embassy Bolivia La Paz 2008a; Willis 2009). 
Its government nonetheless upheld its opposition to the agreement, even attempting to 
block the others’ negotiations by claiming that the other CAN member states had violated 
                                                
110 Ibid. 
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CAN’s ministerial decision 667, which stipulated that negotiations with the EU would be 
on a region-to-region basis (Fritz 2010). 
These concerns were not addressed by CAN’s other members, however, and an 
initial round of negotiations with the three countries took place in early 2009. The 
outcome from this round appeared to demonstrate that splitting the negotiations despite 
the overall common framework allowed for some progress to be made (US Embassy 
Colombia Bogotá 2009b). Nonetheless, limitations related to the position of Ecuador 
became apparent already in the second negotiation round that took place in this format. 
While Colombia and Peru were getting closer to reaching an agreement with the EU, the 
continued discord within Ecuador’s government, its poor preparation, as well as the 
outstanding issue of banana prices and quotas, meant that the latter increasingly fell 
behind (US Embassy Colombia Bogotá 2009a). 
Ecuador then withdrew from the process entirely in July 2009, citing the 
unresolved WTO banana dispute (Fritz 2010) and the EU’s difficulties to concede 
sufficiently in the agricultural realm. While this was the official answer, its withdrawal 
nevertheless mainly related to its growing unease about FTAs and the country's 
rapprochement with Venezuela and ALBA. As the negotiations with the two remaining 
partners went on, Bolivia and Ecuador came to be ever more vocal about their opposition 
to the EU’s supposed imposition of a neoliberal model on the region (Agence Europe 
2009b). 
Ultimately this clear-cut divide allowed the negotiations with Colombia and Peru 
to be sped up, eying a closure in time for the EU-Latin America summit in May 2010. 
This schedule was then driven as much by a desire to demonstrate progress in the EU’s 
relations with Latin America in time for the summit, Spain’s upcoming Council 
presidency, as well as Ferrero-Waldner’s brief move to the trade portfolio with the 
Commission’s Treaty of Lisbon reshuffle. 
Much like the decision to open negotiations with Central America and the 
Andean Community in 2006 was driven by the schedule of the EU-Latin America summit, 
the 2010 Madrid summit would be another moment to demonstrate that progress in the 
EU’s relations with the region had been made despite the apparent difficulties in line with 
the hypothesis based on policy inertia.  
Ecuador’s withdrawal from the process created further difficulties for the EU’s 
rhetoric of continued support for regional integration, an issue which was addressed in a 
Commission document outlining its strategy for Latin America ahead of the entry into 
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force of the Treaty of Lisbon. The document entitled The European Union and Latin 
America: Global Players in Partnership (European Commission 2009) would be Ferrero-
Waldner’s final input into the relationship as External Relations Commissioner ahead of 
the 2010 summit. The document aimed to take stock of the progress in the relationship 
between the two regions, while also demonstrating that the EU’s policy remained 
compatible with the broader policy goals of regional integration. Lastly, the document 
offered the possibility of leaving a legacy upon which the new European External Action 
Service’s strategy for the region could be built. In terms of the relations with the Andean 
region, the document provided the following narrative: 
When negotiations came up against difficulties, the EU presented alternative 
approaches to support the countries and regions concerned. In the case of 
the Andean Community (CAN), an attempt to conclude a region-to-region 
Association Agreement was not successful. However, at the request of a 
number of Andean countries, the EU offered them the opportunity to 
conclude a trade agreement with a regional perspective, together with the 
option of expanding the 2003 Political and Cooperation Agreement. 
(European Commission 2009, 4) 
The desire to conclude the agreement was also driven by Spain’s impending 
Council presidency in the first half of 2010, which made the strengthening of the EU’s 
ties with the region a priority (US Embassy Spain Madrid 2009). This once more 
demonstrates the importance of the autonomy of the Council presidency ahead of the 
changes introduced with the Treaty of Lisbon. Given Spain’s particular interest in the 
region, and the prestige of hosting the 2010 summit, Spanish diplomats made significant 
efforts that ultimately allowed for the timely conclusion of negotiations (Trueb 2012, 277–
78). 
This was further aided by the fact that the introduction of the foreign affairs 
provisions from the Treaty of Lisbon was only gradual, meaning that the Spanish Council 
presidency was still able to generate initiatives on the EU’s foreign policy. While it did 
foresee a reduction of the role of rotating presidency in the realm of foreign affairs by 
changing external relations working groups to a permanent chairmanship by EEAS 
officials, this only occurred in late 2010 in the case of the working group dealing with 
Latin America (Trueb 2012, 279). The chairmanship of the relevant Article 133/Trade 
Policy Committee would furthermore remain the responsibility of the rotating presidency.  
This Spanish activism was helped by Ferrero-Waldner’s short-term position as 
the EU’s Trade Commissioner until early February 2010, replacing Catherine Ashton who 
had been selected as the EU’s first HRVP. This meant that only the very last phase of the 
negotiations was overseen by her successor Karel De Gucht. While the agreement could 
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be initialled at the Madrid summit in May,111 the breakthrough and de facto finish had 
already occurred in early March (Agence Europe 2010a). Given that such a summit 
declaration has to be drafted unanimously between all remaining partners, the 
announcement was at least somewhat clouded by the inclusion of a footnote which refers 
to a Bolivian legal challenge to the agreement, filed in the Andean Community’s Court of 
Justice (Council of the European Union 2010b, 7). 
The EU’s change of track in the negotiations, while initiated by external divisions 
within the Andean region, can ultimately be explained by the autonomy of DG Trade due 
to the great importance of trade aspects in the Association Agreement negotiations. 
Ultimately DG RELEX’s concerns for regional integration were thereby relegated to a 
secondary role behind DG Trade’s view that an FTA with Colombia and Peru was 
necessary. While the roles of both were initially bound by the negotiation mandate from 
the Council, the problems that occurred after few negotiation rounds meant that their 
preferences had started to diverge beforehand. While regional integration remained 
important for DG RELEX, DG Trade was ultimately happy about the exclusion of more 
reluctant countries from the free trade negotiations as this increased the likelihood of their 
success. 
 
6.4.2 Negotiating with Central America 
While the negotiations with SIECA ultimately succeeded in the same format as originally 
intended, a number of external developments risked putting this outcome in peril. Despite 
these, the EU insisted on continuing the negotiations in the interregional framework in 
this instance. This ultimately kept the negotiations alive and helped to overcome internal 
divisions amongst the Central American countries. 
This difference in the EU’s negotiation position when compared to those with 
the Andean Community can be attributed primarily to the fact that, this time around, the 
preferences of DG Trade and DG RELEX remained aligned all through the negotiations. 
While Commission policy alignment due to the negotiation mandate played a central role 
for the progress of the negotiations—much like at the beginning of negotiations with 
                                                
111 Earlier drafts of the summit’s Madrid declaration seen by the author show that this appears 
to have occurred on a very tight schedule, given that the announcement of the agreement 
remained bracketed until the very end. 
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CAN—continued vertical policy coherence between the EU’s member states towards the 
region also aided in the success of the process. 
Three external developments had the potential to derail the entire negotiation: 
firstly, Costa Rica’s continued attempts to diverge into a bilateral approach whenever 
difficulties arose in the negotiation process; secondly, Nicaragua’s ideological proximity 
to ALBA; and thirdly, the Honduran coup d’état of 2009. While it was the EU’s threat of 
ending negotiations in the former two cases that helped overcome SIECA’s internal 
difficulties, it was the return to relative stability in Honduras and the EU member states’ 
pragmatic acceptance of positive developments in the country that allowed for 
negotiations to conclude successfully. 
Much like in the case of Ecuador and Bolivia, it was the election of a left-wing 
president in Nicaragua that created a first significant risk for the region-to-region 
negotiations. Daniel Ortega, a member of the former junta that ruled the country during 
the Sandinista Revolution from 1979 to 1990 won the presidential elections of 2006. 
Initially, as confided to American diplomats, his election was not seen as a problem by 
the European Union (US Mission to the European Union 2007), and negotiations in the 
interregional format went ahead as planned. Nevertheless, over time the country aligned 
itself ever more closely with ALBA, coinciding with increasing criticism of the prospects 
of the free trade chapter of the proposed Association Agreement. 
Before any effect could be felt on the negotiations, however, relations between 
the country and the EU began to worsen ahead of the country’s municipal elections of 9 
November 2008, when Nicaragua decided to align itself more closely with Russia. This 
manifested itself in the country’s recognition of the independence of South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia. Thereby, the country directly took sides in the Georgian conflict, triggering 
anger in the EU institutions and member states alike. Furthermore, a number of 
opposition parties were barred from participating in the elections, leading to highly critical 
comments from European officials. As a result, the country upped its rhetoric, accusing 
European ambassadors of a campaign to 
destabilise and topple the legitimately constituted government led by the 
comrade commander Daniel Ortega (Nicaraguan diplomat cited in Caroit 
2008; translation mine). 
The EU took a strong and coherent stance in reaction to these developments, 
with member states and the EU’s institutions freezing development aid to the country 
(US Mission to the European Union 2009). For Nicaragua the consequences of such a 
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decision were important, since European Union aid accounts for 40% of the development 
aid received, the total of which makes up around 10% of the country’s GDP (Caroit 2008). 
While these developments initially did not impact significantly on the negotiation 
process for the Association Agreement, ultimately the country’s political demands did 
lead to a suspension of negotiations ahead of a round scheduled for April 2009. In an 
attempt to block further progress, the country asked for the set-up of a compensation 
fund for economic asymmetries, demanding an astronomical sum of 60 billion euros—
more than six times the country’s annual GDP. When this elicited a negative response 
from Brussels, the country unilaterally withdrew from the negotiation process. While the 
measure was seemingly pointed against the EU, European officials believed nevertheless 
that it was targeted more against the country’s Central American neighbours, who were 
also increasingly worried about the political development within its government (US 
Embassy Nicaragua Managua 2009). 
Despite these difficulties, the EU maintained its position that negotiations would 
only go ahead with the entirety of the Central American region (Gutiérrez Wa-chong 
2009), in line with fears that this would have the potential to weaken the region’s 
integration and further worsen the economic case for an agreement.112 In this instance the 
interests of DG RELEX, pushing for a regionalist agenda, and those of DG Trade 
aligned, allowing the EU to maintain its initial stance. After all, given the size of the 
region’s economy the negotiation of bilateral FTAs would not be warranted, nor would 
the prospect of a United States FTA with some of the countries in the region have any 
discernible impact on the EU’s trade patterns.113 
Negotiations were able to resume later in the month, after other Central 
American countries leaned on Nicaragua.114 At the same time, the EU made a promise 
that it would study the set-up of an additional funding mechanism for Latin America to 
tackle some of the existing issues of disparity in the region (Agence Europe 2009d; 
Guatemala Times 2009), thereby addressing the issue of Nicaragua’s development 
funding demands—albeit at a low level. In the words of Guatemala's Deputy Foreign 
Minister this meant that 
Central American and the European Union have [...] decided to install a bi-
regional working group to study the establishment of a financial mechanism 
for the development of Latin America. (Guatemala Times 2009) 
                                                
112 Former EU official, Brussels, 19.6.2015 (Interview 17). 
113 Ibid. 
114 Latin American diplomat, Brussels, 3.11.2015 (Interview 27). 
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From this proposal would emerge the Latin America Investment Facility (LAIF), 
thereby once more demonstrating the EU’s ability to use development funding as part of 
its negotiation strategy when the views of internal Commission actors cohere. 
Ultimately, it was the political conditionality of linking the EU’s development 
policy to the negotiation process, as well as the insistence on the regional format that 
helped overcome this particular blockage. At the same time, one should not overestimate 
the sometimes hostile rhetoric of the Nicaraguan government. Guisell Morales-
Echeverry, Nicaragua's ambassador to the UK, has mentioned in public115 that for 
Nicaragua ALBA and the negotiations with the EU were always seen as complementary, 
helping to balance out any possible negative side-effects. 
Another important setback for the negotiations occurred only a few months 
later, when the July 2009 negotiation round was suspended in the wake of the Honduran 
coup d’état (Agence Europe 2009c). The country’s president Manuel Zelaya was deposed 
by the country’s military on 28 June 2009, nominally over a row between his office and 
the constitutional court. The action was quickly dismissed by external actors including the 
EU as a de facto military coup d’état. This led the EU to suspend political contacts with the 
country, and all member states withdrew their ambassadors and suspended development 
funding to the country (Agence Europe 2009a; US Embassy Tegucigualpa 2009), once 
more demonstrating the EU’s vertical policy coherence towards Central America.  
While the EU was quick to react to this crisis situation, the urge to return to 
negotiations once the situation had stabilised was equally evident. Bettina Trueb (2012, 
277–78) has pointed out that over the last year of the negotiations Spanish diplomacy 
played an important role to close the deal in time for the EU-Latin America summit to 
be held in Madrid. The impact of Spain’s activity can once more be attributed to the 
autonomy of the country’s rotating presidency in the first half of 2010. 
 When Spain's Deputy Prime Minister María Teresa Fernández de la Vega visited 
Costa Rica in in early August, shortly after the coup, she made it clear that the country 
wished for negotiations to continue, with Honduras returning to the negotiation table 
once the crisis resolved (Murillo 2009). A European Parliament delegation visiting Costa 
Rica in October 2009, was more sceptical as to the possibility for renewed negotiation, 
mentioning that a solution in Honduras would have to be found first (Long 2009). 
In any case when a political settlement based on the upcoming elections in 
November 2009 was found, Ferrero-Waldner was quick to embrace the agreement 
                                                
115 At the 2013 Latin America Adelante conference in London. 
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(Agence Europe 2009e). Despite some on-going concerns, the EU hence slowly returned 
to realpolitik and officially resumed negotiations in early 2010, with an aim to conclude 
these in time for the upcoming summit. 
A further stumbling block was the factor of Costa Rica, the country in the region 
that has been the most vocal supporter of an agreement with the EU. Being more 
politically stable and with a more sophisticated economy, the country continually saw 
itself as a case apart. Whenever negotiations were facing difficulties, it was the EU’s 
categorical opposition to bilateral negotiations that forced the country back into line 
(Gutiérrez Wa-chong 2008, 2009). 
Nevertheless, the agreement in itself does take stock of some of the disparities 
in the region, and thereby addresses some of Costa Rica’s concerns. While the Association 
Agreement in itself was negotiated between all the partners at hand, the trade chapters 
are nevertheless individual parts. This is not just a means to allow for different tariff 
schedules, but equally a safeguard to allow for a gradual entry of force of the agreement, 
even when the ratification is blocked in some of the Central American countries.116 
Ultimately, an alignment of interests on the EU’s side, be it amongst different 
parts of the Commission, or amongst large member states (Trueb 2012), helped the EU 
to maintain its initial position throughout the negotiation process. Despite a number of 
external developments in this instance it was the primacy of political concerns over the 
situation in some of the Central American countries, and the absence of an economic 
incentive for bilateral negotiations that could have swayed DG Trade, that helped the EU 
maintain its position and not change its policy approach, as was the case in the negotiation 
with the Andean Community. With the positions of all relevant internal EU actors 
aligning and the negotiation mandate providing clear instructions for the Commission’s 
negotiators, policy coherence was not threatened in this context. This allowed for the 
conclusion of a full Association Agreement with SIECA and Panama at the 2010 EU-
Latin America summit, which contributed to the latter country’s ultimate accession to the 
grouping. 
At the same time, it is necessary to note that the approach of separating the trade 
chapter into individual country agreements allowed for sufficient flexibility for the 
ratification and implementation phase, thereby alleviating some concerns by DG Trade 
over the region’s capacity to integrate, while also offering important concessions to Costa 
Rica. 
                                                
116 Former EU official, Brussels, 19.6.2015 (Interview 17). 
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6.5 The ratification experience 
The conclusion of the Association Agreement with SIECA and of the FTA with 
Colombia and Peru at the EU-LAC summit in 2010 marked the end of the Commission-
driven process of the negotiations. This started another stage leading to its ratification 
and ultimately its implementation. 
While the latter phase was marked by the Commission leading an external 
negotiation process, aided at critical junctures by member states such as Spain, this section 
is concerned with the ratification stage that would see a return to internal EU bargaining, 
principally over the European Parliament’s new powers gained with the Treaty of Lisbon. 
This section once more demonstrates the difficulty for the generation of coherent EU 
foreign policy outputs in absence of agreement amongst all the institutional actors 
involved in the process and amidst the complexity of the EU’s decision-making system.  
The Treaty of Lisbon’s entry into force in 2009 has to be considered as a factor 
that risked putting the agreements’ ratification at stake. Whereas the dynamics of 
negotiations for international agreements were largely limited to the coordination between 
different DGs of the Commission, as well as the Council, the Treaty of Lisbon renders 
this set-up somewhat more complex. 
The most important bureaucratic change for the EU’s foreign policy overall was 
the creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS), and its formal role in the 
negotiations for international agreements (Woolcock 2010, 25) (see chapter 3). This did 
not prove to be of any importance for the agreements in question, however, given that 
the remaining negotiations were largely limited to the trade realm, which remained under 
the auspices of the Commission’s DG Trade. The focus of this section is hence the 
European Parliament, as well as the influence that individual member states had given 
that the agreements were of a mixed nature, requiring ratification by all of the EU’s 
member states. 
 
6.5.1 Dealing with the European Parliament 
The changes introduced with the Treaty of Lisbon led to an increase of the powers of the 
European Parliament that would radically alter its attitude towards FTA and Association 
Agreements. While not gaining a formal input into the formulation of negotiation briefs, 
the Treaty of Lisbon nevertheless provided it with information rights on the progress of 
negotiations not dissimilar to those of the Council, and even pure free trade agreements 
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without political and cooperation provisions now require the European Parliament’s 
consent  (Woolcock 2010, 23). This has the potential to influence the dynamics of the 
EU’s future Association and trade negotiations in important ways, but ultimately did not 
directly create new hurdles for the negotiations at hand. This can be attributed to the fact 
that the existing briefs for both negotiations did not lose validity with the entry into force 
of the treaty, and that both negotiations were very advanced at the time. 
The most important internal EU disruption for the cases here can ultimately be 
attributed to changes in the ratification process for the EU’s Association and free trade 
agreements. Prior to the Treaty of Lisbon the European Parliament was only consulted 
for pure FTAs, and thus without decision-making power. Furthermore, the EP had no 
input into either the negotiation mandate or the negotiations as such, and even when its 
assent was required for specific international agreements it was only the very last actor to 
be involved, even after ratification by the EU’s member state parliaments (Hillman and 
Kleimann 2010, 5; Woolcock 2010, 23). With the Treaty of Lisbon, the Ordinary 
Legislative Procedure (OLP) now applies to the EU’s trade policy, increasing the power 
of the EP on most trade matters. This is particularly relevant as the EU has to adopt 
bilateral safeguards legislation before the agreement could even enter into force 
provisionally. This legislation sets out to define technical conditions under which the 
application of (trade) agreements can be temporarily suspended in case of a disruptive 
surge of imports. With Lisbon the passage of such legislation gives the EP equal decision-
making powers to those of the Council. 
When it comes to the ratification process for international agreements that 
Parliament already had to assent to previously, the only technical change to the EP’s 
powers is that it can now consent to these with a simple rather than absolute majority 
(Woolcock 2010, 23). However, the increase in the its powers on trade matters has meant 
that the EP’s role became more important even for agreements such as the EU-Central 
America Association Agreement. In any case it decided to test its increased role with 
regards to the ratification of the EU-Colombia-Peru FTA, hoping to set a precedent for 
the future. This put the Parliament at odds with the Commission, which was keen to see 
its successfully negotiated agreement approved. 
Given the ultimately different nature of the agreements, one being for an 
Association and the other for free trade, Parliamentary approval procedures differed. 
Whereas the EP’s Foreign Affairs Committee (AFET) holds primary responsibility for 
Association Agreements, it is the Committee on International Trade (INTA) that is 
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responsible for trade agreements, as well as giving an opinion on the trade parts of the 
Central America deal. This differentiated treatment has been pointed out as somewhat 
inconsequential by a professional working in the EP, given that trade was the primary 
concern for both of the agreements at hand.117 Ultimately it contributed to the fact that 
only the approval of the Colombia and Peru FTA agreements was put in peril by dynamics 
within the EP. 
Awareness of the potential difficulties that an agreement with CAN or any of its 
members could have in the European Parliament was apparent even while the 
negotiations were ongoing. In 2008 a French trade official posted to Colombia mentioned 
that the regional approach would most likely aid the agreement’s ultimate ratification, as 
the European Parliament would not be able to single out Colombia from the other 
countries (US Embassy Colombia Bogotá 2008b). Parliamentary opposition became 
clearer, however, at the point in time when DG Trade had announced that negotiations 
had concluded in March 2010, with a number of Parliamentary groups issuing press 
statements that were very critical of the deal (Agence Europe 2010b). 
The main division lines over this agreement can best be seen in a written 
question that was put to the Commission by INTA. In it, the latter entity shows its 
concern about the human rights situation in Colombia and Peru (Moreira, David, and 
Lange 2012) and INTA ultimately puts the agreement’s contribution to an improvement 
of the situation into question. The question acknowledges the existence of a chapter in 
the FTA on trade and sustainable development which was meant to address these and 
similar issues. The main issue taken, however, is that these provisions do not fall under 
the dispute settlement process that apply to its trade aspect, which would ultimately allow 
for the suspension of the preferences granted under the agreement. 
Parliament’s interpretation of its new role became clear when the question was 
debated in a session on 22 May 2012. Bernd Lange, a German Socialist & Democrats 
(S&D) MEP and current head of INTA, voiced his position on parliament’s duties as to 
the agreements as follows: 
I believe that it is clear that trade is not an end in itself, but a means of 
improving people’s living conditions. […] Parliament is, of course, 
investigating very carefully, on the basis of the rights granted to it under the 
Treaty of Lisbon, whether this trade agreement with Colombia and Peru 
meets these requirements. (European Parliament 2012) 
                                                
117 European Parliament official, Brussels, 18.6.2015 (Interview 14). 
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Ultimately the Parliamentary question and his statement call for an ‘action plan’, 
in the absence of which Parliament’s consent to the agreement would be at risk. In a 
separate statement on the question INTA’s rapporteur on the agreement, Portuguese 
European Peoples’ Party MEP Mário David, voiced best what was meant by this, namely  
a transparent and binding road map, possibly with the support of the 
Commission, regarding human labour rights [sic] and sustainable 
development (European Parliament 2012). 
In his answer, Karel de Gucht, the EU’s then Commissioner for Trade, was at 
pains to point out to what degree the agreement already included human rights safeguards, 
arguing that binding elements like a road map would only prove to be counterproductive. 
This is not to say that such concerns did not exist within the Commission (US Mission to 
the European Union 2007), but the role that a trade agreement should play was simply 
interpreted differently. Despite De Gucht’s aim to demonstrate that Parliament’s 
demands were already satisfied through the text of the agreement, the issue of the 
‘roadmap’ did continue to play an important role before Parliamentary approval was 
reached. 
The issue came about due to heavy lobbying by human rights groups and church 
activists who leaned on MEPs, particularly from the S&D Group, to address the issue of 
the respect for the rights of trade unionists in Colombia, mentioning a number of 
disappearances and killings (Fritz 2010, 7). Given a long-standing network of activists that 
observes Colombia’s human rights track record in the context of the on-going conflict, 
the focus was soon on this country alone. No similar and strong advocacy groups exist in 
the case of Peru or the Central American region. Therefore, despite similar problems in 
some Central American countries, the same hurdles did not occur in the context of the 
ratification of the Central America agreement.118 
There is some evidence that the issue of the roadmap caused concern in the 
Commission over the agreement’s successful and speedy ratification. One NGO 
employee claimed that DG Trade officials were so unnerved that they told an NGO group 
that they had gone too far with their demands.119 While the Commission treated the issue 
as having to be resolved largely by Colombia itself, it did nevertheless intervene when the 
European Parliament threatened to inject non-technical measures into the safeguards 
                                                
118 European Parliament official, Brussels, 22.6.2015 (Interview 20). 
119 NGO official, Brussels, 23.6.2015 (Interview 23). 
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legislation, fearing that this could create a dangerous precedent of politicising technical 
aspects of trade policy.120 
Ultimately, it was the Parliamentary left which called for the implementation of 
the roadmap, with the S&D Group finding a face-saving compromise that would allow 
them to back the agreement while Colombia put in place a non-binding roadmap.121 An 
interview with an EEAS official has confirmed that since the passage of the agreement in 
Parliament the issue of the roadmap has furthermore not been followed up 
systematically122, which would confirm the hypothesis that the institutions themselves 
were not interested in this issue. 
While the issue in question was ultimately resolved and Parliament’s consent 
given with 72% of the votes in favour, the road to reach approval for it was still rocky 
and introduced delays in the ratification process. The introduction of the roadmap 
furthermore created a distinction between different countries in the region, despite a 
problematic human rights track-record in most of them. 
Ultimately the case in question once more demonstrates the difficulty for 
coherent foreign policy outputs by the EU amidst diverging views between its key internal 
actors and the complexity of EU decision-making. With the EP only becoming officially 
involved in the last stage of the process for the EU’s international agreements, its actions 
can threaten the EU’s foreign policy coherence even when the views of all other relevant 
internal EU actors cohere. While the Lisbon Treaty changes should provide for more 
regular talks between MEPs and the EU’s negotiators, the EP’s consent requirement adds 
another stumbling block for EU foreign policy outputs to be coherent across time. 
 
6.5.2 A difficult ratification process 
The European Parliament’s approval of both the EU-Colombia-Peru FTA and the 
Central America Association Agreement allowed the national ratification process to get 
underway, thereby launching another time-intensive phase before either agreement can 
fully come into force. Most importantly, however, it also permitted the provisional 
application of parts of both agreements. Nevertheless, neither agreement has been ratified 
                                                
120 Latin American diplomat, Brussels, 3.11.2015 (Interview 28). 
121 European Parliament official, Brussels, 22.6.2015 (Interview 20); European Parliament 
official, Brussels, 22.6.2015 (Interview 21). 
122 Latin American diplomat, Brussels, 3.11.2015 (Interview 28). 
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or fully implemented at present, once more demonstrating the complexity associated with 
this element of the EU’s foreign policy. 
While pure EU trade agreements do not require ratification domestically in every 
member state of the EU, this is not the case for Association Agreements as these are 
mixed agreements given their political parts, or FTAs which contain some political 
provisions or trade provisions not in the exclusive competence of the EU (as outlined in 
chapter 3). While the Commission argued that the EU-Colombia-Peru FTA is an 
exclusive EU agreement, the Council disagreed with this assessment and domestic 
ratification came to be necessary (Brown 2013, 173). 
Once the ratification process at the EU level is finished, however, the parts 
exclusive to the EU’s competence can provisionally enter into force beforehand. That 
was the case for the FTA with Colombia and Peru, and most of the trade components of 
the Association Agreement with SIECA, all of which entered provisionally into force in 
2013. The promise of provisional application even ahead of the ultimate ratification and 
full implementation of an agreement can be used as an EU means of pressure on its 
partners. Typically, this is only granted when ratification is completed in the partner 
countries concerned, hence putting pressure on both the Central American states, as well 
as Colombia and Peru to speedily ratify the agreement. At the same time, provisional 
application gives the EU’s member states more time to finish their domestic ratification 
process. 
Securing provisional application was crucial for some of the partner countries in 
question, given that the reform of the EU’s GSP scheme put the previous unilateral EU 
preferences under its GSP+ scheme in peril. While initially all of the countries concerned 
would still have benefitted from the EU’s reformed GSP scheme as of 2014 (DG Trade 
2012, 20), its new eligibility criteria based on World Bank development indicators were to 
remove Colombia and Peru from the list altogether within years. EU and member state 
representatives in the region then made a concerted diplomatic effort to push for fast 
domestic ratification. This was the case for instance in Colombia where the EU’s 
ambassador, accompanied by those of Germany, France and Spain held a public press 
conference urging the country to speed up its ratification process (Buckley 2012). 
While for the EU’s trade policy an agreement’s actual ratification and full 
implementation is not crucial for most of its trade benefits to accrue, the same cannot be 
said for some of the other provisions. Without all the EU member states’ ratification of 
the Association Agreement the political and cooperation pillars remain formally inactive. 
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It is at this point of the process that the EU’s institutions are weakest, having no influence 
over the ratification process within the member states. 
Looking at the two agreements in question, a large majority of member states 
have ratified the agreement with Colombia and Peru, while ratification is still pending for 
a larger portion of EU member states in the case of the Central America Association 
Agreement (Council of the European Union 2016). While typically ratification is a 
technical if lengthy process, given the Council’s previous formal approval of an 
agreement, the outcome of the Dutch referendum on the EU’s Association Agreement 
with Ukraine on 6 April 2016 demonstrates that political concerns can at times hinder the 
implementation of the EU’s policy. 
It would be impossible to provide an overview here of the domestic ratification 
processes for both agreements in all member states. Some anecdotal evidence can, 
however, portray additional difficulties for the EU’s foreign policy conduct. A relevant 
example is the case of Germany, in which the ratification of the EU-Central America 
Association Agreement and the FTA with Colombia and Peru was risked over domestic 
political concerns. While the country’s representatives in the Council appear to have been 
somewhat interested in the follow-up of the roadmap in the latter case,123 this has not led 
to a delay in the start of the domestic ratification process of the agreement. In fact, 
Germany’s parliament was the first in the EU to give its approval to the deal with 
Colombia and Peru. 
Throughout the domestic ratification process for both agreements, a large 
number of NGOs have nonetheless lobbied politicians to oppose these over a long list 
of concerns. A majority in Germany’s Bundestag, the country’s chamber of elected 
representatives, for both agreements could only be reached between the governing 
Christian Democratic and Free Democratic parties in the spring of 2013 and they were 
opposed by the three opposition parties represented, thereby leading to its approval by 
only a relatively small margin. Most relevantly the social-democratic SPD, part of the S&D 
Group which had approved both agreements in the European Parliament, voted against 
the agreements at the German level, citing human rights and procedural concerns (Bode 
2013; Neuber 2012). 
Had voting patterns remained the same for both agreements in the Bundesrat, the 
representation of Germany’s federated states, the country would have failed to ratify both 
agreements. The Peru and Colombia FTA was ultimately passed in May 2013 by a majority 
                                                
123 European Parliament official, Brussels, 22.6.2015 (Interview 20). 
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that involved SPD-governed states, leading to a headline that effectively stated that the 
“SPD has outvoted the SPD on free trade” (Neuber 2013, translation mine). The 
successful approval of the Central America Agreement was even more difficult and came 
down to a change of mind of two SPD-governed states at the last minute (Maier 2013), 
revealing a rift in the party over the agreement. 
While the concerns in the German case appear to have been of a general nature, 
individual political aspects equally have the potential to delay the ratification process. For 
instance, the provisional application of the trade chapter of the Central America 
agreement with Costa Rica and El Salvador was delayed by Italian reservations over its 
capacity to sell specific protected cheese products in those countries (KAS 2015).  
The ratification of the agreement has also been held up over a political issue in 
the case of Lithuania, which made its ratification of the agreement dependent on political 
demands towards Nicaragua. Lithuania informed all of the Central American 
representations to the EU of its intent to delay ratification of the agreement domestically 
until Nicaragua ceases to recognize the sovereignty of two disputed and Russian-held 
territories in Georgia, namely South Ossetia and Abkhazia.124 While the document dates 
back to July 2012, just after the Association Agreement was signed in Tegucigalpa, the 
country has indeed not ratified it (Council of the European Union 2016) .125 While the 
seriousness of this issue is unclear, diplomats from both Central America and the Andean 
countries have nevertheless voiced their impatience with the EU’s slow ratification 
progress.126 
Despite these difficulties, the provisional application of the trade part of both 
agreements has been an important step forward in the EU’s relationship with both partner 
regions. The first meetings of the joint bodies meant to administer the agreements have 
nonetheless shown that some difficulties remain before the implementation of the trade 
parts can be considered a full success.127 
                                                
124 A document to this effect and dated July 2012 was seen by the author, and the country’s 
continued position has been confirmed in talks with a Latin American diplomat (Brussels, 
3.11.2015, Interview 28). Given the past of its relationship with Russia, and its geographical 
position the country takes issue with a change in the status quo of territories in the post-Soviet 
space. 
125 Representatives from large EU member states who were asked about this (Brussels, 
4.11.2015, Interview 29 & 30) were unaware of this on-going issue. 
126 Senior EEAS official, Brussels, 16.6.2015 (Interview 8); Latin American diplomat, Brussels, 
3.11.2015 (Interview 27); Latin American diplomat, Brussels, 3.11.2015 (Interview 28). 
127 Latin American diplomat, Brussels, 3.11.2015 (Interview 27); Latin American diplomat, 
Brussels, 3.11.2015 (Interview 28). 
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The nature of the EU’s ratification process for international agreements shows 
some of the difficulties associated with the generation of coherent EU foreign policy 
outputs towards both regions over time due to the complexity of the EU’s decision-
making system. While all actors at the EU level may share a similar assessment as to the 
necessity for free trade or Association Agreements at one point in time, this can be 
challenged during the ratification phase at the domestic level or when new national 
governments are elected in some of the EU’s member states. The fact that a very small 
EU country like Lithuania which has almost no substantial ties with or interests in the 
Latin American region can potentially put a project like the Association Agreement with 
Central America on hold demonstrates the difficulty that the EU faces in ensuring the 
coherence of its foreign policy towards the region. Thus, the necessity for a shared 
assessment between all the relevant actors in the EU’s foreign policy system extends to 
the domestic level for Association Agreements and simultaneously has a temporal 
dimension. Partner countries’ awareness of this issue is exemplified by the impatience 
with the ratification process as voiced by some representatives from the region, and 
further puts into question the EU’s capacity for policy coherence in this realm. 
 
6.6 Conclusions 
This chapter has detailed two developments in the EU’s foreign policy towards Latin 
America, one being the negotiation of an Association Agreement with SIECA, and the 
other the conclusion of an FTA with Colombia and Peru. The developments leading to 
the opening of negotiations and those with SIECA illustrate instances under which the 
EU was capable of producing coherent foreign policy outputs due to the absence of a 
divergence of interests between the relevant actors and the coordination between them. 
While the processes in themselves were highly complex, both negotiation outcomes can 
ultimately be explained through the return of diverging interests between DG RELEX 
and DG Trade, while they remained aligned throughout the process of negotiations with 
Central America.  
Preparations for the Association Agreement negotiations were rendered possible 
by a reorganization of the European Commission with the arrival of the Barroso cabinet 
at the end of 2004. The autonomy of DG RELEX and that of the RELEX Commissioner 
Benita Ferrero-Waldner allowed for the initial thought process that would lead to the 
negotiations in the end. While this was initially blocked by internal Commission 
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divergences of view and the requirement for adoption by the College of Commissioners, 
a gradual alignment of DG Trade’s position with that of DG RELEX meant that the 
Council could be asked for its approval, which was ensured through a ‘permissive 
consensus’ among the EU’s member states. 
The negotiation briefs then ensured that initially DG RELEX and DG Trade 
remained united in negotiations with the Andean Community until Bolivia’s and 
Ecuador’s threat to leave the negotiations led to a split in their assessment as to the future 
of negotiations. Ultimately, DG Trade, supported by the Trade Policy Committee, 
prevailed and negotiations continued for an FTA with only some of CAN’s members. 
The same did not happen in the case of negotiations with SIECA, as the absence of strong 
economic incentives meant that the preferences of both DGs continued to align on the 
matter, thus leading to the successful conclusion of an Association Agreement with the 
organization.  
The ratification phase once more demonstrates the difficulties that can arise for 
coherence in the EU’s foreign policy outputs due to the complexity of the EU’s foreign 
policy system. While the Treaty of Lisbon allowed the European Parliament to threaten 
the ratification of the EU-Colombia-Peru FTA at the EU level, the examples of Germany, 
Italy and Lithuania furthermore illustrate the risks to coherent foreign policy decision-
making due to the necessity for domestic ratification of mixed agreements. 
While ultimately both agreements were signed and are provisionally applied at 
present, the complexity of the EU’s foreign policy decision-making process on 
international agreements is further illustrated by the timeline of the negotiation. With 
preparatory work in the Commission having begun in 2005, both agreements’ ratification 
is still not completed in 2016. 
 213 
CHAPTER 7:  
One region, many policies: Complexity in the making 
7.1 Introduction 
The previous chapters have focused on the evolution of the EU’s ties with specific 
regional organizations and countries in Latin America at different points in time. This 
chapter takes a different approach and offers a broader perspective on the development 
of the EU’s relations with the region in the post-Lisbon context. Whereas the negotiations 
featured previously were representative of the most important developments in the EU’s 
relations with the region, such priorities have been largely absent since the end of 
negotiations with Central America and for the EU-Colombia-Peru FTA, which coincided 
with the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon. 
Instead, since then developments in the EU’s relations with Latin America have 
appeared to lack a guiding framework, with EU foreign policy outputs toward the region 
differing radically with regards to the different partners in the region. This can mainly be 
attributed to changes in the EU’s institutional set-up since Lisbon, which have once more 
disrupted established coordination mechanisms through the set-up of the EEAS, and 
contributed to a divergence of views among different internal EU actors. Whereas the 
Treaty of Lisbon was meant to help overcome coordination problems in the EU’s foreign 
policy apparatus, the effect on the EU’s Latin America policy has, to the contrary, 
rendered the formulation of coherent foreign policy outputs more difficult at least in the 
first half-decade of this newly created institution. 
Substantive developments in the EU’s Latin America policy have been limited 
so far to the negotiation of Ecuador’s accession to the EU’s existing FTA with Colombia 
and Peru, despite a continued rhetoric of regionalism support in the Andean region and 
negotiations for a political agreement with Cuba amidst continued criticism of the 
country’s political system. Instead of a coordinated and coherent foreign policy, however, 
the negotiations with Ecuador represent foreign policy activity that was largely limited to 
the realm of the EU’s trade policy only, while leaving aside political or development policy 
considerations. Ultimately, this development was only rendered possible by processes 
internal to the EU’s trade policy system that enabled DG Trade to act in an autonomous 
manner. Given the continued existence of the previous mandate for negotiations with the 
Andean Community, DG Trade was able to exert pressure on Ecuador to return to the 
negotiation table that it had abandoned in 2008. 
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The EU’s agreement with Cuba, in turn, shirks trade elements for the most part 
while re-establishing political and development ties with the country. This can largely be 
attributed to the autonomy and advocacy of the newly created EEAS. Rather than reacting 
to external developments in Cuba that would have changed the conditions underlying the 
EU’s previous Cuba policy, in line with the hypothesis based on rational decision-making, 
this change of foreign policy was ultimately rendered possible by a disappearance of 
diverging views on the EU’s Cuba policy over time, as member state preferences in the 
Council slowly shifted, thus enabling the EEAS to develop a new Cuba policy. 
Similarly, the EEAS has shown a keen interest in negotiating upgrades of the 
existing Association Agreements with both Mexico and Chile, a process which has for 
now been hampered by the differing position of DG Trade, providing further proof of a 
lack of horizontal policy coherence in the post-Lisbon period. This picture is further 
exacerbated by some smaller changes in the EU’s Latin America policy, most of which 
also lacked in horizontal policy coherence. 
Through an exploration of these developments in the EU’s Latin America 
policy, this chapter provides the strongest evidence for the validity of the hypotheses 
based on the divergence of interests between different actors in the EU’s foreign policy 
system and the influence of their decision-making autonomy on the coherence of the 
EU’s foreign policy outputs. Given that the EU’s over-arching rhetoric of regionalism 
support had largely disappeared after the negotiations with the Andean Community and 
Central America, and due to the fact that the EU’s ties with Ecuador and Cuba were 
limited prior to the negotiations discussed here, there is less evidence in support of the 
hypothesis based on policy inertia. In any case, this chapter provides almost no support 
for the hypothesis based on rational decision-making. While a number of external 
developments provided incentives for the EU to develop its Latin America policy further, 
there was no over-arching internal consideration of these which would allow for it to be 
valid in this context.  
In order to underline the importance of the changes to the EU’s foreign policy 
system introduced with the Treaty of Lisbon, the chapter begins with a brief section 
discussing their relevance for the EU’s Latin America policy since then, thus expanding 
on the considerations from Chapter 3. In the following section, the chapter then explores 
the negotiation process for Ecuador’s accession to the existing EU-Colombia-Peru FTA, 
as well as those with Cuba. The remainder of the chapter is then devoted to exploring 
other developments in EU-Latin American relations since the entry into force of the 
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Treaty of Lisbon, which further underline the lack of horizontal policy coherence in the 
EU’s Latin America policy, and how this has been influenced by bureaucratic politics. 
 
7.2 EU foreign policy decision-making in the post-Lisbon context 
As discussed in Chapter 3 the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon initiated important 
changes to the functioning of the EU’s foreign policy apparatus, exceeding the usual 
portfolio changes within the Commission. Through the creation of the EEAS the 
institutional set-up of the Commission has been radically altered in an attempt to 
streamline the underlying foreign affairs bureaucracy. Nonetheless, when considering the 
EU’s foreign policy towards Latin America, this new system appears to have had the 
opposite effect—at the least in the first half decade of its existence. 
While just prior to the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon Commission 
portfolios dealing with different aspects of the EU’s Latin America policy were already 
divided along policy lines, the creation of the EEAS has seen DG RELEX and the 
responsible Commissioner moved out of the Commission’s bureaucracy entirely. DG 
RELEX staff has now integrated into the new service, thus institutionally separating the 
political aspects of the EU’s relations with the region from the Commission’s trade and 
development policy in particular. While many of the former DG RELEX staff have 
remained in place, the hybrid nature of the new service has meant that many member 
state diplomats have joined the ranks, often taking up positions with important 
responsibilities.128 According to some of the interviews conducted, this hybridization and 
politicization of the Commission’s former foreign policy bureaucracy has contributed to 
a lack of trust between officials based in the EEAS and the Commission (and particularly 
DG Trade), which negatively influences the coordination of policy-making between the 
different institutional actors involved.129 While it has been pointed out that issues of 
distrust and competition are not entirely novel, as similar internal divergences have existed 
within the Commission in the past and continue to persist to this day, the creation of the 
EEAS has created additional hurdles for successful cooperation across the now fully 
independent bureaucracies.130 
                                                
128 Former EU official, Brussels, 19.6.2015 (Interview 17). 
129 EU Trade official, Brussels, 18.6.2015 (Interview 12); EEAS officials, Brussels, 16.6.2015 
(Interview 8). 
130 Member state diplomats, Brussels, 4.11.2015 (Interview 30). 
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Similarly, while the EEAS has been a keen advocate of underscoring the EU’s 
international presence through the negotiation of further EU agreements in the region or 
the upgrade of existing ones—supported by a widespread consensus amongst member 
states on the necessity to continue with free trade negotiations in the region131— DG 
Trade has shown itself to be much more reluctant. This is due to the fact that the latter 
institution is lacking the necessary human resources to undertake a large number of 
parallel FTA negotiations at any given point in time.132 Negotiating further agreements in 
Latin America would thus divert from its own priorities focused on finalizing the EU-
Canada trade negotiations (CETA) and those with the United States (TTIP). 
While interviewees have pointed out that, despite the above problems, regular 
coordination meetings take place between the different institutions and DGs involved in 
policy-making toward individual regions and countries, these have been rendered more 
difficult by the fact that equivalent positions cannot always be found in the parallel 
hierarchies, or that currently geographical responsibilities often overlap, rendering 
coordination even more difficult.133 
 While some officials blamed these problems on the set-up of the EEAS as a 
hybrid between the Commission and Council, they nonetheless believed that over time 
the political nature of the entity would allow the EU to show more policy initiative once 
all coordination problems are resolved.134 It was also pointed out in the same interview 
that the new structure of the EU’s delegations under the leadership of the EEAS have 
already helped to facilitate cooperation amongst the different administrative entities in 
Brussels given the integration of decision-making hierarchies within the delegations 
themselves.135 
Another often-cited problem in the initial period of the EEAS had more to do 
with the personalities involved, rather than the nature of the institution in itself. The 
appointment of Catherine Ashton as the first High Representative in the post-Lisbon 
period has been seen as particularly problematic for the EU’s Latin America policy in 
terms of providing leadership that could enable foreign policy change, as well as for policy 
coordination attempts overall. 
                                                
131 Member state diplomat, Brussels, 17.6.2015 (Interview 9). 
132 Ibid. 
133 EEAS officials, Brussels, 16.6.2015 (Interview 8); EEAS official, 23.6.2015 (Interview 22). 
134 EEAS officials, Brussels, 16.6.2015 (Interview 8). 
135 Ibid. 
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Interviewees have pointed out on a number of occasions that Ashton’s 
interpretation of her role being closely linked to the Council increased distrust of her 
within the Commission bureaucracy.136 This has only started to change under the tenure 
of the new HRVP Federica Mogherini since 2014, who has relocated her offices to the 
Commission building, and revived the institution of the Group of External Relations 
Commissioners which now meets at least on a monthly basis.137 While the change is too 
new for any effect to be seen on the strength of coordination mechanisms in the EU’s 
Latin America policy that could reduce individual actors’ autonomy, the move in itself 
indicates a return to the functioning of policy coordination with the Commission in the 
period prior to Lisbon. 
Similarly, officials have pointed out that Catherine Ashton lacked interest in the 
Latin American region, all while introducing difficult administrative changes in the EEAS 
Latin America unit under the 2013 EEAS review.138 While not explicitly addressed in the 
document (EEAS 2013), the geographical desks for EU-Latin American relations were 
nonetheless redrawn in the wake of the review, creating a new South America division 
(out of two previous ones), as well as merging two other divisions into a single one for 
Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean.139 Considering policy proposals that have 
come out of the EEAS, interviewees have claimed that these were the sole result of 
officials responsible for the region, rather than through top-down political guidance.140 
Once more, officials have only started to see renewed political guidance on policy towards 
the region since Federica Mogherini has entered office.141 
While no interviewee directly pointed to this, the creation of the EEAS has led 
to similar divisions of competencies within the Council’s working parties and committees 
with the rotating presidency losing the chairmanship for a majority of the foreign affairs 
working groups to the EEAS, with some remaining with the Council presidency. The 
Working Party on Latin America and the Caribbean (COLAC) changed chairmanship, 
but this was not the case for the senior level Working Party of Foreign Relations 
Counsellors (RELEX), or the Trade Policy Committee (TPC) (General Secretariat of the 
Council 2016). This could contribute to a lack of coordinated agenda-setting between 
                                                
136 Senior EEAS official, Brussels, 18.6.2015 (Interview 13); Member state diplomat, Brussels, 
4.11.2015 (Interview 29). 
137 EEAS officials, Brussels, 16.6.2015 (Interview 8). 
138 Ibid. 
139 Ibid. 
140 Member state diplomat, Brussels, 4.11.2015 (Interview 29). 
141 Member state diplomat, Brussels, 4.11.2015 (Interview 29); Latin American diplomats, 
Brussels, 16.6.2015 (Interview 7). 
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these different bodies, particularly when cross-cutting issues such as negotiations for 
Association Agreements are concerned, and thus increasing each actor’s autonomy in 
decision-making processes further. 
Lastly, while the powers of the European Parliament on foreign policy issues 
have remained largely untouched, its increased role in the EU’s trade policy has led to a 
reorganization of its International Trade Committee (INTA), which has set up permanent 
country expert groups to deal with the increased workload after Lisbon. Given that the 
small number of MEPs involved in these receive regular updates from DG Trade, one 
interviewee believed that this represented an attempt to render specific trade policy 
discussions less public against the spirit of the Treaty of Lisbon.142 
Overall, Lisbon has created some room for diverging views between the 
European Commission and the newly created EEAS. The disentanglement of the 
Commission’s external relations policy from the remaining trade and development policy 
competencies have weakened coordination mechanisms between these different policy 
perspectives, which could thus negatively impact on the EU’s horizontal policy coherence 
by increasing individual actor’s autonomy in the policy process. The political vision of the 
EEAS also contrasts with the more technical perspective of the Commission, increasing 
the likelihood that both institutions will assess priorities for the EU’s Latin America policy 
differently. How these changes have played out in the evolution of the EU’s Latin 
America policy since the Treaty of Lisbon is elaborated on below. 
 
7.3 The EU-Ecuador FTA 
Negotiations for Ecuador’s accession to the existing FTA with Colombia and Peru 
represent an important development in the EU’s Latin America policy given the previous 
limitation of negotiations to some of the Andean Community countries only (see Chapter 
6). The internal EU decision-making processes underlying this development show that 
this was possible primarily due to the policy autonomy of DG Trade in the post-Lisbon 
context and the continued validity of the previous mandate for negotiations with CAN. 
DG Trade could thus simply take the initiative for renewed negotiations with the country 
without having to take stock of the actions and opinions of other internal Commission 
actors and the EEAS. This precluded the possibility for the EU’s policy output towards 
Ecuador and the remainder of the Andean region to be coherent in its narrative and 
                                                
142 Member of the European Parliament, Brussels, 17.6.2015 (Interview 10). 
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horizontally, as it is the EEAS that is now responsible for political ties with the region 
and the overall rhetoric of the EU’s External Affairs communications. 
While Ecuador had initially left negotiations for the EU-Andean Community 
Association Agreement shortly after Bolivia, EU-Ecuador negotiations were relaunched 
in 2013 on the country’s accession to the now concluded FTA with both Colombia and 
Peru. Ultimately these negotiations were concluded quickly by 17 July 2014 (European 
Commission 2014b), indicating a pace of negotiations that was remarkably faster than 
that of other normally very lengthy FTA negotiations. 
However, Ecuador’s willingness to return to the negotiation table cannot be 
considered an external development in its own right that could have altered the EU’s cost-
benefit analysis for reopening negotiations by the country. To the contrary, Ecuador’s 
willingness to negotiate with the EU was mainly induced by changes made to the EU’s 
trade regime in itself, rather than a change of heart by the country’s government. A reform 
of the EU’s Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) had previously changed the list of 
countries eligible for it, with Ecuador risking to lose its access by January 2015. 
The last major political declaration on the EU’s ties with the Andean region goes 
back to the immediate aftermath of the Lisbon-induced changes, a point in time when 
the EEAS was not yet fully operational. At the last meeting of the European Union-
Andean Community Joint Committee which still operated under the original 1996 
agreement—given that its successor has not been ratified to this date—the EU’s rhetorical 
commitment to the Andean integration process remained strong. The document 
accompanying the meeting stated that: 
The European Union underlined that it did not renounce the reopening of 
negotiations for an Association Agreement when [political] conditions would 
allow for it to occur. It is and will continue to be its political priority in the 
Andean region to aim for a profound relaunch of region-to-region relations 
without exceptions and without a weakening of the Andean integration 
process. (translation mine, Comisión mixta Comunidad Andina - Union 
Europea 2010, 5).  
However, since then public declarations on the EU’s (political) ties with the 
region have been remarkably absent, and no further meetings between the EU and 
Andean Community’s institutions have taken place with the exception of a meeting of a 
structured High Level Dialogue on Drugs matters in 2012 (EU-CAN High Level Meeting 
on Drugs 2012). Similarly, the EEAS has not been active in developing its bilateral ties 
with Ecuador since then, resembling the exclusion of matters of political dialogue from 
the bilateral negotiations with Peru and Colombia. 
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DG Trade on the other hand used its policy autonomy post Lisbon and the 
leverage created through Ecuador’s looming exit from GSP to relaunch negotiations with 
the country. The country had been a constant beneficiary of the GSP over time, and 
originally still stood to benefit under reforms that came into force at the beginning of 
2014 (DG Trade 2012). As one out of only 10 countries it even gained immediate access 
to a specific scheme entitled GSP+, offering even more beneficial unilateral market access 
by the EU given the country's signature of certain human rights-related international 
treaties and conventions (European Commission 2014a). 
For Ecuador this access to the EU’s market is highly relevant economically, as 
in 2014 the EU was the country’s second most important recipient for its goods exports, 
only after the United States. These amounted to a total value of 2.2 billion euros in 2014, 
mainly in the agricultural realm, with the country additionally exporting services to the 
amount of 400 million euros (DG Trade 2015). These exports were facilitated in large 
parts through the country’s access to the European market under GSP conditions. This 
status meant that in 2013 the country’s exports to the EU were taxed at 253 million dollars 
only, as opposed to 606 million in absence of GSP and GSP+ (Enríquez 2014b). 
Despite the lack of a Free Trade Agreement with the EU, Ecuador hence 
benefitted significantly from preferential access to the EU’s market under this scheme, 
without having to reciprocally open up its own. This relative comfort of being able to 
trade with the EU added an important economic element to the country’s reluctance to 
continue to negotiate with the EU in 2008. Ecuador’s comfortable situation was due to 
change, however, as the country had been classified as an upper-middle income country 
by the World Bank in 2011, 2012 and 2013. This meant that under the EU’s technical 
GSP rules it would lose eligibility to both schemes one year later, on 1 January 2015 
(European Commission 2013a). This immediately put a large amount of Ecuador’s 
exports to the EU at threat and risked having a severe impact on the country’s economy. 
The problem was exacerbated by the provisional application of the EU’s FTA 
with Peru and Colombia as of March and August of 2013 respectively. Additionally, the 
trade chapter of the EU’s agreement with Central America provisionally entered into 
force for its member countries throughout 2013. This meant that these countries, which 
share partially similar (agricultural) export patterns to the EU, would not only continue to 
be able to export to the European market at GSP rates, but at even lower tariffs for some 
kinds of exports. 
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As one interviewee noted, Ecuador was facing not one, but two interrelated 
problems at the same time: On the one hand the country was under threat of losing both 
its GSP and GSP+ preferences without any viable alternative in sight, putting a large part 
of the country’s external trade with the EU at risk, hence potentially having a significantly 
negative economic impact on the country as a whole.143 Secondly, the imminent 
provisional entry into force of the EU’s FTA with Colombia and Peru created a risk of 
trade diversion away from Ecuador. This was mainly due to the similar nature of exports 
from those countries to the European market. For Ecuador, the desire to negotiate with 
the EU at this point appears clear. 
DG Trade was aware that from an economic standpoint the country had little 
choice but to entertain negotiations that would allow it to secure its exports to the EU 
were it not to suffer serious economic problems in the short term. When the decision was 
made to negotiate an FTA with willing members of the Andean Community only in 2008, 
the possibility was left for either Bolivia or Ecuador to join the process later on. This was 
further emphasized in the actual FTA between the EU and Colombia and Peru, which 
recognizes the right of the other Andean countries to join it and specifically mentions the 
importance of the Andean Community integration process in its article 10 (see Official 
Journal of the European Union 2012). This meant that DG Trade could rely on a pre-
existing mandate, only now with a significantly improved negotiation position towards 
Ecuador given the GSP cut-off date and due to the fact that the country would join an 
existing FTA, rather than partake in the negotiations for the substance of the latter. 
This is particularly relevant as the size of the Ecuadorean market is insignificant 
for the EU, and given that unlike Colombia and Peru the country had not concluded or 
planned to conclude an FTA with the United States. Fears of losing market access to the 
latter thus could not have provided an external incentive for the EU to change its cost-
benefit analysis and to invest human resources in the conclusion of the agreement. 
The institutional position of DG Trade in the post-Lisbon framework was also 
particularly beneficial. While the EEAS holds the overall authority over Association 
Agreements, this is not the case for pure FTAs as the existing one with Colombia and 
Peru. Furthermore, given that the EEAS lacked clear political priorities towards the 
Andean region, it initially welcomed any renewed EU activity towards Ecuador.144 Given 
that under the new development cooperation funding period starting in 2014 funding 
                                                
143 Member state diplomat, Brussels, 4.11.2015 (Interview 29). 
144 Senior EEAS official, Brussels, 18.6.2015 (Interview 13). 
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allocated to the region would shrink significantly and exclude direct cooperation with the 
Andean Community’s institutions,145 DG Trade’s activity could not directly clash with 
that of DG DEVCO either. Lastly, DG Trade did not have to return to talks with the 
Council for a new mandate given that the old one was still valid and member states, led 
by Spain, favoured the conclusion of new EU FTAs in the region.146 Overall, this political 
vacuum significantly reduced the necessity for DG Trade to resort to internal policy 
coordination, increased its policy autonomy and thus reduced its overall workload 
required for an agreement that was to bring only little economic benefit otherwise. 
The negotiation process in itself would also be relatively straightforward for DG 
Trade. Article 329 of the existing EU-Colombia-Peru FTA outlines a process under which 
the remaining Andean countries can join the existing agreement (see Official Journal of 
the European Union 2012). These provisions foresee that it is the EU’s sole responsibility 
to undertake such negotiations, which are limited by treaty to technical elements such as 
tariff schedules. Only once such negotiations have concluded do these need to be 
approved by representatives from all of the FTA’s members in its dedicated trade 
committee. 
Whereas Ecuador would have been able to shape the trade agreement in itself 
had it remained part of the initial negotiations, the possibilities to alter the existing 
agreement were hence much more constrained once the country decided to negotiate its 
accession to the previous deal. Given that Ecuador’s eventual accession to the FTA with 
Colombia and Peru would only involve relatively minor changes, the workload for the 
EU’s added benefit of gaining market access in Ecuador was similarly reduced, thus 
outweighing staffing concerns that have hindered trade negotiations with other countries 
in Latin America since the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon. 
Due to the above factors it is unsurprising that DG Trade showed leadership on 
the issue, driving the process forward at a remarkable pace and by making use of all the 
trade policy tools at its disposal. The first element to consider is Ecuador’s loss of GSP 
preferences. While the criteria used to determine GSP eligibility under the EU’s reformed 
scheme outlined above are seemingly objective at first glance, a look at the debates that 
took place when the reform was being decided on in 2011 and 2012 reveals that there was 
some controversy related to these. A usual row over offering market access to former 
colonies of some EU member states aside, it was the usage of the World Bank 
                                                
145 DG DEVCO officials, Brussels, 24.6.2015 (Interview 24). 
146 Member state diplomat, Brussels, 17.6.2015 (Interview 9). 
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classification that came under some scrutiny. A working document for the European 
Parliament’s Committee on International Trade acknowledges some of the objectivity 
problems related to the World Bank’s classification, while equally pointing out that for 
cases where the EU is aiming for a Free Trade Agreements with countries about to lose 
access to GSP “this proposal could of course lead to increased leverage for the EU in 
these negotiations” (Fjellner 2011, 3). 
That the GSP reform was used as a means of pressure by the Commission even 
before it was adopted can be seen when looking at a number of leaked diplomatic cables 
from Ecuador’s embassy to the EU from 2011 and 2012. On 22 November 2011 the 
Ecuadorean Vice-Foreign Minister for Commercial Affairs Francisco Rivadeneira was 
informed of the EU’s intent to reform its GSP and GSP+ schemes by DG Trade official 
Peter Thompson, revealing that if the reform went ahead as planned, Ecuador would lose 
its preferential access to the EU’s market. Given the general nature of the proposed 
criteria to determine GSP status, the same official equally pointed out that chances of 
gaining an exception were rather slim and that the country should hence aim for a speedy 
accession to the existing FTA with Colombia and Peru (Yépez Lasso 2011a). This take-
it-or-leave-it offer was immediately accompanied by the potential of a figurative carrot, 
namely the possible extension of GSP preferences once an agreement had been signed so 
that no gap would emerge between the country’s loss of GSP status and its accession to 
the existing FTA. This offer was made despite the fact that member states did not want 
to formally politicize the GSP process by introducing exceptions and thus potentially 
violating WTO provisions.147 
The definitive nature of the EU’s offer could be seen in a number of meetings 
between Ecuador’s ambassador to the EU and a variety of EU officials on the matter. 
While the Commission officials in question showed different levels of understanding for 
Ecuador’s position, they nevertheless all emphasized that Ecuador had only the chance 
of joining the existing FTA, or risk losing preferential access to the European market 
altogether (Yépez Lasso 2011b). Given the previous failure to conclude an agreement 
with the EU, some officials also insisted that a formal relaunch of negotiations would 
have to be preceded by a declaration from Ecuador’s president Correa stating his 
favourable position towards their speedy conclusion (Yépez Lasso 2012c).  
                                                
147 Former EU official, Brussels, 19.6.2015 (Interview 17); Member state diplomat, Brussels, 
22.6.2015 (Interview 19). 
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When asked about the rather strong position of the EU on the matter, several 
DG Trade officials interviewed for this project related to me that the end of Ecuador’s 
GSP status was merely coincidental.148 However, they equally acknowledged that the 
country’s loss of GSP preference proved to be the perfect opportunity to invite the 
country back to the negotiation table.149 
At first Ecuador seems to have used a two-tier strategy in reaction to these 
revelations. While undertaking preliminary talks with the EU that could eventually lead to 
the relaunch of negotiations, Ecuador’s diplomatic representatives seem to have also 
aimed to lobby EU member states and the European Parliament so as to introduce a 
possibility for middle-income economies (such as Ecuador) to continue benefitting from 
GSP+ if they kept fulfilling all political conditions beyond the initial deadline (Yépez 
Lasso 2012b). Given that this proved to be unsuccessful in the end, the country was left 
with little choice but to join the negotiations or lose preferential access to the European 
market. 
In the words of Ecuador’s ambassador to the EU at the time, Fernando Yépez 
Lasso, 
the possibility of our country’s exclusion from GSP+ is an element of 
pressure by the European Commission and certain business interests for 
Ecuador to join the FTA that the EU has concluded with Colombia and Peru 
as our only alternative to avoid a loss of market access and the eventual 
economic, commercial and social repercussions. (translation mine, Yépez 
Lasso 2011a, 4) 
While possibly exaggerating as to the intentionality and the political component 
of DG Trade’s move, his assessment nonetheless accurately described the country’s 
options ahead of its scheduled exclusion from GSP+ at the end of 2014. 
The limited nature of Ecuador’s influence over the agreement it would 
eventually join can be seen in the negotiation phase. As already mentioned, the official 
phase of negotiations was very speedy, which can be explained in part by time playing to 
the Commission’s hand as Ecuador was facing the deadline of losing GSP preferences as 
of the end of December 2014, but also by the limited number of adjustments that the EU 
was willing and able to offer to Ecuador. Ultimately, substantial negotiations were limited 
to tariff schedules and lines (Enríquez 2014a, 2014c) rather than substantial changes to 
the nature of the agreement. 
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This relatively harsh negotiation outcome was nevertheless flanked by the 
prospect of significant benefits that the country would receive in case of agreeing to 
accede to the existing agreement, as already mentioned, when changes to the GSP system 
were first discussed. By continuing to offer a piece of bridging legislation that would 
provide provisional GSP-like market access until the FTA could enter into force, the 
economic shock that the country would have faced on 1 January 2015 would not have to 
occur. 
However, the EU’s conditions to discuss such a bridging measure were clear 
from the outset and dependent on the country’s signature and ratification process of its 
accession to the FTA, as can be seen in some of the leaked diplomatic cables (Yépez 
Lasso 2011a, 2012a) or in public declarations from EU diplomats in Quito, who were 
keen to stress that measures to prevent the country’s loss of GSP status would be studied 
once the negotiations had concluded (Enríquez 2014c). 
The proposal for the bridging legislation, while unique, was not a completely 
novel idea. Its political significance should nevertheless not be underestimated. While the 
European Parliament’s Committee on International Trade floated the idea of an 
automatic extension of GSP preferences in case of a concluded but not yet applied FTA 
at the time the GSP reform was debated (Fjellner 2012, 9), this did not find its way into 
the final piece of legislation. Furthermore, the end of negotiations by July 2014 only meant 
that any possible bridging legislation would have to pass through the EU’s legislative 
process more rapidly than is the norm, so that it could apply from January 2015 onwards. 
Ultimately the legislative act was introduced by the Commission at the beginning of 
October, with the votes taking place in the Council and Parliament on the same day in 
mid-December, leaving less than two and a half months for the proposal to pass through 
the EU’s legislative process. 
It was only at this point in time that DG Trade had to rely on cooperation from 
the other EU institutions on the matter, as it had to receive the approval of both the 
Council and the European Parliament for the agreement to pass. Nonetheless, given its 
negotiation success with Ecuador this had only little influence on the likelihood of the 
EU’s approval for the agreement. 
So as not to ease pressure on ratification by Ecuador, the proposal for the 
bridging legislation ultimately continued to contain a mix of figurative carrots and sticks. 
While offering Ecuador the much-needed GSP+ extension, it made the country’s  
continued eligibility dependent on—amongst other things— “Ecuador conducting 
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continuous efforts to sign and ratify the Protocol of Accession [to the FTA]” (European 
Union 2014), thus introducing conditionality, in addition to a maximum timeframe of 
application of 2 years. 
Despite the fact that it was ultimately passed, the proposal for the bridging 
legislation—rather than the FTA overall—was not without problems. On the one hand, 
some feared that this would create a precedent that would hollow out the technical nature 
of the EU’s GSP scheme, while running counter to the EU’s WTO obligations.150 On the 
other hand, some MEPs feared a loss of influence given that the Commission alone would 
determine whether to suspend the preferences,151 and that the bridging legislation could 
lead to a problem where different Andean countries were treated differently, possibly 
weakening the EU’s human rights conditionality.152 The existence of a tension over the 
problematic nature of the EU’s use of its trade position for its own benefit equally became 
clear in Parliament, where the legislative proposal’s rapporteur, Helmut Scholz from the 
GUE/NGL Group, mentioned the dilemma that Ecuador was finding itself in, even 
anticipating some of the upheaval in Ecuadorean civil society on the agreement that would 
take place over the course of 2015 (European Parliament 2014). In any case, an 
interviewee reported heavy Ecuadorean lobbying ahead of the relevant legislative 
decisions. This was not only limited to Ecuador’s diplomatic representation but also done 
through larger pro-trade networks.153 Ultimately the bridging legislation passed the EU’s 
legislative process in time, and Ecuador’s GSP+ preferences were upheld beyond the 
2015 cut-off date. 
At this point other Commission DGs also became involved in the process. 
Shortly after the conclusion of negotiations, the EU’s Commissioner for Development 
Andris Piebalgs visited the region and announced that Ecuador would continue to benefit 
from further EU development funding between 2014 and 2017 to the amount of 67 
million euros (European Commission 2014d) to prepare the country for its FTA 
accession, and despite the EU’s overall move to end bilateral cooperation along the lines 
that the country received previously. Rather than shifting its development funding 
towards the country in close cooperation with DG Trade’s priorities, however, DG 
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DEVCO officials have pointed out that this occurred independently in line with its own 
analysis of the needs of the country.154 This mirrors similar adjustments of the EU’s 
development cooperation funding in the context of the EU’s FTA negotiations with 
Colombia and Peru. Nonetheless, the interview with DG DEVCO officials revealed the 
autonomy of Commission DGs in the aftermath of the Treaty of Lisbon, as DG Trade 
had not extensively consulted with DG DEVCO officials on the progress of FTA 
negotiations, nor did DG DEVCO officials want to involve DG Trade in the decision to 
alter the allocation of its development cooperation funding.  
Ultimately DG Trade has made significant use of its trade policy instruments to 
influence Ecuador through a strategy of figurative carrots and sticks into its accession to 
the existing FTA with Colombia and Peru. While it would have been unlikely for the EU 
to show any interest in the country’s loss of GSP and GSP+ status after the cut-off in 
absence of previous FTA negotiations with the country, the precedent gave DG Trade 
the necessary opportunity to add one more of the Andean Community countries to an 
existing trade agreement—hence ironically the possibility of getting closer to the initial 
aim of reaching a deal with all of the Andean Community’s countries. 
Nonetheless, that this negotiation process was ultimately steered by DG Trade 
only demonstrates some of the weaknesses of the EU’s foreign policy decision-making 
system in the post-Lisbon period. Given that the negotiations with the country coincided 
with a lack of political priorities for the region in the EEAS alongside the beginning of a 
new development cooperation funding period, this lack of internal policy coordination 
was less visible than it could have otherwise been. In that light DG DEVCO’s adjustment 
of the development cooperation money earmarked for Ecuador only appears to be the 
result of internal policy coordination, but was in reality done independently from DG 
Trade’s negotiations. 
Thus the example of negotiations for Ecuador’s accession to the existing EU-
Colombia-Peru FTA shows that the Treaty of Lisbon has once more disrupted established 
coordination mechanisms in the EU’s foreign policy and increased the autonomy of 
individual actors, while simultaneously increasing the potential for diverging views 
between them. These insights from the perspective of bureaucratic politics are rendered 
even more relevant as in this instance no compelling argument can be made as to the 
validity of the hypothesis based on rational decision-making. After all, external 
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(economic) factors that could have provided an incentive for the reopening of 
negotiations with the country were absent in this instance. 
 
7.4 EU-Cuba negotiations 
The recently concluded negotiations for a Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement 
(PDCA) with Cuba, which began in 2014, are perhaps even a more relevant development 
in the EU’s Latin America policy than the negotiations with Ecuador. Once more, rather 
than representing a rational EU response to specific (external) developments, however, 
this is an example where the EU’s policy has clearly been altered due to bureaucratic 
politics. Rather than the result of changes to the functioning of the EU’s foreign policy 
decision-making system in itself, as could be observed for most of the foreign policy 
changes under consideration in this thesis, the negotiations with the country were 
rendered possible by gradually changing opinions within the Council, thus leading to 
shared assessments as to the best approach towards Cuba among key actors in the EU’s 
foreign policy system. 
While the altered positions of many member states enabled the EU’s foreign 
policy change to get underway, the negotiation process in itself represents an instance 
during which the autonomy of the EEAS, rather than that of DG Trade, has played a key 
role. In this case, given that the negotiations were largely limited to the political realm, the 
EEAS did not need to resort to extensive coordination with the European Commission, 
thus making a possible divergence of views by DG Trade or DG DEVCO largely 
irrelevant. 
Cuba has been a political outlier in Latin America and consequently from the 
EU’s policy towards the region for a long time. While part of the EU’s designation of the 
Africa, Caribbean and Pacific Groups of States (ACP), the Spanish-speaking island is 
neither a signatory of the Cotonou Agreement or an Economic Partnership Agreement 
(EPA) with the EU. Nor has it seen a return of democracy or significant economic growth 
as experienced elsewhere, having been continually ruled by the Castro family ever since 
the Cuban Revolution of 1959. 
As a consequence of the island’s special status the EU decided in 1996 on a 
Common Position with regards to Cuba, on a Spanish initiative. The document makes 
the intensification of the EU’s and member state ties with the island dependent on its 
progress towards democracy and the rule of law (Council of the European Union 1996a). 
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While relations with Cuba evolved slowly based on this consensus between 1996 and 2003 
(Hare 2008, 2–5), including the opening of a Commission delegation in the country, this 
would soon change. In 2003 Fidel Castro set in motion a crackdown against opposition 
leaders, and the EU in a review of its Common Position reacted by limiting political 
contacts with the country (Hare 2008, 5–8). Castro in turn retaliated by unilaterally 
rejecting EU development cooperation funding.155 
The 2003 decision was once more taken upon an initiative from Spain under its 
conservative prime minister José María Aznar, though supported by other countries 
favouring a hard line towards Cuba, and particularly the Central and Eastern European 
states that would accede to the EU in 2004. The position of Spain changed slowly after 
the social democrat José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero became the country’s prime minister 
in 2004. Nonetheless the opposition of some hardliners, such as the Czech Republic 
(being suspicious of any government declaring itself to be Communist) meant that the 
EU could not agree on attenuating its position towards the country having realized that 
the 2003 position was not showing any effects. Instead, “the EU's desire for a common 
position dominated the debate more than events in Cuba itself.” (US Embassy Czech 
Republic Prague 2005) This, taken together with the fact that the Czech Republic regularly 
leaked details of internal discussions to the United States (US Embassy Czech Republic 
Prague 2005, 2008) meant that any coherent EU policy output toward the country would 
be very hard to achieve given this lack of vertical policy coherence. 
This problem of vertical policy coherence increased over time as more and more 
member states unhappy about the impossibility of altering the Common Position at the 
EU level, due to the requirement for unanimity, resorted to altering their national foreign 
policies towards the country independently. By 2013, when negotiations were officially 
suggested by the EEAS, 16 of the EU’s then 27 member states had established structured 
bilateral relations with the country (European Commission 2013b, 3). By 2007 Spain 
became increasingly vocal about its desire to alter or abandon the Common Position—a 
move which was enthusiastically supported by the EU’s Development Policy 
Commissioner Louis Michel later on—thus favouring a policy of engagement, and set up 
its own bilateral ties with the country (Hare 2008, 2–5). Gradually Eastern European states 
also changed their position towards the country, with first timid Czech-Cuban meetings 
                                                
155 Internal Council CFSP document dated June 2008. 
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taking place in 2008.156 Since then the Czech Republic has become a strong supporter of 
a policy of engagement.157 
This slow shift of member states’ positions could also be seen in the evolution 
of the annual review of the Common Position and the actions by the Union’s institutions. 
Already in 2007 first meetings at the ministerial level occurred between EU and Cuban 
officials.158 After the Common Position’s 2008 review and a visit by Louis Michel to the 
island the EU’s resumed its development cooperation.159 By 2009 internal Council 
discussions were largely limited to debates over the language to use in the annual review 
of the Common Position while there was a general agreement that EU engagement with 
the island should continue despite ongoing concerns as to the state of human rights, the 
rule of law, freedom and democracy in the country.160 Paul Hare, a former British 
ambassador to Cuba, sees 2008 as the year in which EU-Cuban relations returned to 
business as usual (Hare 2008, 1). Nonetheless, the prospect of concluding an agreement 
with the country was still not yet on the horizon. 
By 2010 the positions of the member states had converged so far that the HRVP 
was invited to develop proposals as to how to structure EU-Cuban relations going 
forward, with the EEAS recommending the opening of negotiations for the future PDCA 
by 2012 (European Commission 2013b, 3). The 2010 policy change was made possible in 
part by Spain holding the rotating Council presidency in the first half of that year and 
being the host of the 2010 Madrid EU-Latin America and the Caribbean summit.161 Where 
the idea for an EU-Cuba agreement originated is unclear, but an official interviewed 
stressed that, given the underlying shift of member state positions, the idea developed 
within the EEAS bureaucracy despite a lack of political guidance from the HRVP 
herself.162 
In any case by 2013 a recommendation was made to the Council to grant a 
negotiation mandate, outlining the rationale to do so as follows: 
The proposed EU-Republic of Cuba Political Dialogue and Cooperation 
Agreement aims at codifying, in a bilateral framework, the existing political, 
cooperation and trade relations between the two sides. It should create a 
coherent, legally binding overall framework for the EU’s relations with the 
Republic of Cuba. (European Commission 2013b, 3) 
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Rather than proposing a radically novel approach towards the country, the aim 
that was stated internally was to formalize existing relations, and thus prioritize political 
over trade concerns. The negotiation mandate agreed by the Foreign Affairs Council on 
10 February 2014 (Council of the European Union 2014, 2) provides for a central role of 
the HRVP, with the Working Group for Latin American and the Caribbean Affairs 
(COLAC) overseeing the process in the Council, though assisted by the Trade Policy 
Committee for the limited number of trade issues. The preponderance of political 
concerns is also evidenced by the fact that the European Parliament’s Committee for 
International Trade (INTA) has not been kept informed about the progress of 
negotiations163, which would have been necessary otherwise. 
While policy coordination with DG Trade was not necessary in this instance, the 
EEAS’ activity on renewing political dialogue with the country through the agreement 
was accompanied by an increased allocation of development cooperation funding. The 
2014-2020 financial framework sets aside 86 million euros for the country. This linkage 
with the EU’s development policy was possible given the timeline of the current financial 
framework and the EEAS’ role in shaping the overall allocation of the EU’s development 
cooperation funding under it (European Commission 2014c). Nonetheless, how the 
coordination between the EEAS with the activity of DG DEVCO will influence the EU’s 
development assistance towards the country under the complex set-up governing the 
implementation of EU development projects in the aftermath of the Treaty of Lisbon 
(see Chapter 3) still remains to be seen.  
With negotiations having finished in March 2016, the process coincided with a 
period of normalizing Cuban-United States relations. It is important to note though, that 
the European Union began the process well ahead of any change of US policy towards 
the country, and that while the processes have occurred somewhat in parallel, there is 
limited evidence for one influencing the other. If anything, the EU has become more 
vocal about its negotiations since the historic handshake between Barack Obama and Raúl 
Castro.164 Lastly, it should be cautioned that the conclusion of negotiations is not the end 
of the process, as the agreement still awaits ratification, which may prove to be somewhat 
challenging in the European Parliament given that Cuba has still made no significant 
progress towards democracy.165 
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To conclude this section, the requirement for unanimous decision-making in the 
realm of the CFSP meant that the EU could not change its foreign policy at the EU-level, 
thus precluding the risk of a horizontally incoherent Cuba policy for a long time. 
Nonetheless, this led to a considerable vertical incoherence in the EU’s Cuba policy as 
the impossibility to alter the Common Position made it difficult for the EU to shift 
towards a policy of engagement, and incentivised member states to alter their Cuba policy 
bilaterally. Only once member state positions started to align could the EEAS become 
active and launch the initiative for the PDCA. Rather than representing a horizontally 
coherent policy change, however, the political nature of the agreement meant that the 
EEAS was autonomous in its actions and very little coordination had to occur with DG 
Trade. On the other hand, the EEAS’ role in the EU’s development policy meant that it 
could set aside funding for the country in the EU’s 2014-2020 financial framework. The 
promise of these bureaucratic explanations of the EU’s Cuba policy contrast with the 
analytical lens based on rational decision-making, as very little has changed in Cuba and 
given that the developments described here occurred independently of the United States’ 
efforts to normalize its relations with the country. 
 
7.5 Latin America policy amidst institutional divisions 
The pattern of horizontal policy incoherence in the EU’s foreign policy outputs towards 
Latin America explored above can also be seen in the evolution of the EU’s ties with the 
remainder of the region. It is here that the division between the EEAS and the 
Commission, particularly in the guise of DG Trade, has come to be particularly 
pronounced. 
Not only do these institutions diverge considerably in their assessment of how 
the EU’s Latin America policy should evolve, but the lack of functioning coordination 
mechanisms between them has meant that both were autonomous in the generation of 
foreign policy outputs in their respective policy areas. This can be seen, in particular, when 
considering the willingness of Chile and Mexico to upgrade their existing treaties with the 
EU to modernize both the FTA components and the political chapters. 
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7.5.1 Upgrading existing Association Agreements 
While the entire Latin American region is still not covered either through EU Association 
Agreements or free trade agreements, Mexico and Chile, the two countries with whom 
the EU signed the first AAs in 1997 and 2002 respectively, have repeatedly voiced their 
desire to upgrade their existing agreements to further liberalize bilateral trade and 
continue to develop the political components of the agreements. The EU has signalled its 
formal interest in doing so on the occasion of both the 2013 EU-Latin America summit 
in Chile and at the 2015 Brussels summit, but so far no progress has been made in either 
negotiation. While the EEAS has been a keen promoter of these upgrades, DG Trade has 
remained more reluctant with regards to the negotiations, and particularly the suggested 
timeframes, leading to a constellation in which the most relevant institutional actors 
diverge in their assessment of the issue at hand. 
Discussions on upgrading the existing agreement with Mexico date back to 
2008,166 when the country was declared a ‘strategic partner’ of the EU. Nonetheless, it 
would take almost five years before this goal was made official. The Santiago Declaration 
of the EU-Latin America summit of 2013 states that Mexico and the EU have reached an 
agreement to explore the options for a comprehensive update of the 
Economic Partnership, Political Coordination and Cooperation Agreement 
(Council of the European Union 2013, 6) 
This was rendered more precise at the summit two years later: The Joint 
Statement of the EU-Mexico summit that was held in the margins of the 2015 EU-Latin 
America summit in Brussels acknowledges the necessity and willingness of both sides to 
upgrade the existing Global Agreement. Nonetheless, the language chosen is revealing as 
to underlying political difficulties, as both sides only agreed to “a willingness to launch, in 
2015, the process of starting negotiations […] to modernise our Global Agreement and 
to reinforce our Strategic Partnership” (EU-Mexico Summit 2015, 1), rather than deciding 
on an actual timeframe for negotiations. The first round of negotiations for the upgrade 
then took place in June 2016, though no matters of substance were discussed (EEAS 
2016). 
This slow pace is reflective of important internal EU differences as to the speed 
with which this process should go forward. While the EEAS holds the overall control of 
the upgrade process, the most significant changes would occur in the realm of trade 
relations only. Given its current focus on TTIP negotiations and its on-going lack of 
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resources,167 DG Trade officials are reluctant to speed through a process that will require 
detailed technical work.  Given the different priorities of both institutions this can explain 
why EEAS officials have pushed for a swift overhaul to please the Mexican side, while 
DG Trade has been more cautious.168 
Underlying these institutional tensions are continued demands by the Mexican 
side to swiftly upgrade the agreement, which are supported by a coalition of member 
states led by Spain. Others, however, share DG Trade’s specific concerns about the 
necessity for a detailed scoping as to the likely effects of changes to the agreements, and 
more generally the effects on EU trade policy prioritisation amidst limited resources for 
negotiations.169 These differences of opinion have hindered the progression of the 
process, despite interviewees repeatedly mentioning the desire of both Mexico and the 
EEAS to press ahead. A Mexican official interviewed for this thesis voiced concerns that 
from the country’s perspective it was incredibly difficult to identify the correct 
counterpart in the EU’s institutions for different kinds of discussions, citing frustration 
that the EU would not move forward in renegotiating its ties with its “closest partner in 
the region despite repeated assurances by the EEAS”.170 Similarly, a Spanish official was 
concerned that relations with the country would deteriorate if no progress was achieved 
soon.171 
Overall there is thus considerable disagreement between the EEAS, which holds 
the overall responsibility for the modernization of the Association Agreement, and DG 
Trade, despite the fact that EEAS officials have recognized the resource constraints of 
the former institution.172 This is particularly problematic as the changes required to the 
political chapters of the agreement would be minimal while Mexico-EU trade negotiations 
would bind a significant amount of DG Trade’s resources at a time when a number of 
other important trade agreements are under negotiation.173 
The case for an upgrade of the EU’s Association Agreement with Chile is largely 
similar, with the country having lobbied the EU ever since the 2013 EU-Latin America 
summit in the country, which recognized that talks had taken place “to explore the 
options to modernise the Association Agreement after 10 years of Association” (Council 
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of the European Union 2013, 6). While the 2015 EU-Mexico summit was clear in that the 
existing agreement would be upgraded despite the lack of a timeline, the language adopted 
at the Brussels summit for the modernization of the Chile agreement was also more 
cautious, stating that both sides 
agree to move forward in the process towards the modernisation of the 
bilateral Association Agreement through the establishment of a Joint 
Working Group (EU-CELAC Summit 2015, 17) 
While Chile is pro-FTA leaning and is a member of the Pacific Alliance and the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP), which should make the country an obvious 
choice for upgrade, the same DG Trade resource constraints remain,174 while the EEAS 
part of the negotiations (it is once more the lead institution overall) is significantly 
easier.175 Thus, much as could be observed in the case of Mexico, there are significant 
disagreements between both the EEAS and DG Trade as to the timeline of negotiations. 
While the new October 2015 EU trade strategy ‘Trade for all’ published by DG 
Trade specifically acknowledges the necessity to upgrade the Mexico and Chile 
agreements along the lines of CETA and what is being discussed in the context of TTIP, 
and to strive for a conclusion of negotiations with Mercosur (European Commission 
2015, 33), no timeline is offered here either. Rather, the document simply states that a 
scoping exercise would have to be completed before any further steps can be taken by 
DG Trade. 
The case of upgrading the EU’s existing Association Agreements reveals the 
difficulty of the new set-up of the EU’s foreign policy decision-making system in the post-
Lisbon context. While the EEAS was created to eliminate coordination problems and 
provide political leadership on the EU’s foreign policy, which should in theory increase 
its capacity to generate coherent foreign policy outputs towards the region, this has so far 
not proven to be the case. Instead, the division of competencies that formerly used to be 
housed in the Commission have led to distrust between the newly independent 
institutions and considerable divergences of opinion on the matters at hand. Furthermore, 
the disruption of coordination mechanisms caused by the Treaty of Lisbon has meant 
that both could nonetheless act autonomously, with the EEAS making promises towards 
Mexico that DG Trade then did not recognize as its own. This in turn has created 
horizontal incoherence in the EU’s foreign policy outputs towards Mexico and Chile and 
considerable frustration among the EU’s negotiation partners. 
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7.5.2 Incremental changes 
In absence of clear political leadership or advocates within the European Union for the 
evolution of its ties with the Latin American region in the aftermath of the Treaty of 
Lisbon, other developments have appeared more haphazard, and once more driven by 
largely autonomous actors within the EU’s foreign policy decision-making system. Given 
the parallel disruption of policy coordination mechanisms this has led to further instances 
in which EU foreign policy output towards the region has been horizontally incoherent. 
At the level of region-to-region ties, the preparation for the biannual 
interregional summits is now a responsibility of the EEAS and the ultimate agenda-setting 
capacity has moved away from the rotating presidency of the Council,176 thus theoretically 
allowing for long-term guidance on what should be discussed at these high-level fora. The 
Lisbon change has also allowed for the 2014-2020 Multiannual Indicative Regional 
Programme for Latin America to be developed jointly between the EEAS and DG 
DEVCO. Under this new guidance the previous programmes targeted at regional 
organizations have disappeared and were replaced with region-wide ones (DG 
Development and Cooperation 2014). The general nature of the document leaves much 
room for divergences of view between both actors in the implementation phase, as the 
competencies of both in the EU’s development policy overlap in important ways. 
Another important development for the EU’s ties with Latin America as a whole 
is the set-up of the European Union-Latin America and Caribbean Foundation (EULAC), 
a relatively small institution designed to facilitate thinking on the evolution of ties between 
both regions. The process for the setup of the foundation was started in the pre-Lisbon 
period almost as an afterthought at the EU-LAC Lima summit in 2008177 and as the result 
of a thought process between the attending French, German and Spanish heads of state 
and government.178 In consequence the summit’s conclusion stated that: 
We [The heads of state of both the EU and Latin America and the Caribbean] 
have decided to consider the creation of an EU-LAC Foundation conceived 
as a trigger for debate on common strategies and actions aimed at 
strengthening our bi-regional partnership as well as enhancing its visibility. 
(Council of the European Union 2008, 14) 
The language used closely modelled that found for the EU’s ties with the 
Mediterranean region, in itself a project supported by Nicolas Sarkozy, the French 
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president from 2007 to 2012. The decision to establish the foundation was then taken at 
the 2010 EU-LAC Madrid summit (Council of the European Union 2010b, 9), once more 
as a low priority item, as discussions on this did not even feature in documents by Spain’s 
rotating presidency which outlined proposed priorities for the summit’s agenda.179 The 
language in the summit’s declaration was sufficiently vague and specifically made further 
Senior Official Meetings (SOMs) responsible for the details, which were led by the EEAS 
on the EU’s side,180 while the preparatory work prior to the Treaty of Lisbon had been 
the responsibility of the Commission.181 
While the foundation was provisionally set up in Hamburg in November 2011, 
making former RELEX Commissioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner the founding 
president,182, its set-up was marred by funding issues and disagreements as to the 
underlying statute and overall political ownership of the institution.183 This was reflected 
in the status of its relations with the EU’s institutions. While the EEAS was meant to 
provide political guidance for the institution, a large part of its funding was, at one point, 
administered through DG DEVCO, creating important problems of oversight184 and 
further demonstrating the autonomy of individual institutional actors in the EU’s 
decision-making system since Lisbon. 
While the provisional status of the institution as a non-profit foundation under 
German law was meant to be changed to that of an independent international 
organization, jointly owned by the EU, its member states and the Latin American states, 
this process led by the EEAS has proven to be similarly slow. While a treaty that would 
establish the foundation as such was signed at 2015 EU-LAC summit in Brussels,185 little 
progress on this has been made since due to disagreements between the parties involved. 
From the Latin American side the EEAS has been criticised to this end, as its stated goals 
appear to have frequently changed, including after already having come to a formal 
agreement186, pointing to problems of policy coordination within the EEAS. 
Taking stock of developments in the EU’s relations with regional organizations, 
negotiations with Mercosur were officially relaunched in 2010, coinciding with the EU-
Latin America Madrid summit of that year (Council of the European Union 2010b, 7), 
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largely as a result of governmental insistence to provide a new and (largely) symbolic 
impetus to the process. Since then a similar split between the EEAS’ role in negotiating 
the political elements of the agreement and the trade component has occurred. While the 
negotiation rounds since then have largely dealt with the cooperation and political 
dialogue dimensions of the proposed Association Agreement, trade offers were only 
exchanged in May 2016 (DG Trade 2016). While this time around member state 
disagreement on trade offers is much less pronounced, the long duration until the 
beginning of the trade component of the negotiations is probably down to internal 
Mercosur differences which have left DG Trade with little enthusiasm for the process. 187 
The EU under the new system has also so far struggled to react to new political 
developments in the region, such as the Pacific Alliance.188 The informality of links 
between the countries who are members of this institution and the lack of central 
institutions have made it distinct from other integration mechanisms in the region and 
that of the EU itself, rendering it more difficult to develop interregional political links.189 
Membership of the organisation is based on free trade between its members and with 
other important economies such as the EU. Despite this, it was a high level EEAS official 
who represented the EU at its 2015 summit in Paracas, Peru, not a DG Trade official.190  
Lastly, a number of developments have occurred in the realm of the EU’s 
bilateral relations with the region, all of which were limited to a single policy area and 
occurred without the necessity for policy coordination under the current set-up of the 
EU’s foreign policy decision-making system. One example for the developments in this 
realm is that Colombia has recently been added to the list of countries which do not 
require Schengen visas. Against the established procedure under which the Commission 
proposes changes to said list, this change got underway due to Spanish lobbying and 
without the involvement of the EEAS, with DG HOME being responsible for the bulk 
of the talks with Colombia.191 Two Latin American countries, Chile and Colombia have 
also signed Framework Participation Agreements to be able to take part in the EU’s CSDP 
under a process involving exclusively the EEAS and the EU’s member states,192 and thus 
side-lining other issues in the relationship with the countries, such as the upcoming 
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upgrade of the EU-Chile Association Agreement or the initial implementation phase of 
the EU-Colombia-Peru FTA. 
Outside of the above-mentioned negotiations with Cuba, Ecuador, and the 
stalled ones with Chile and Mexico the EU’s ties with the Latin American region since 
the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon have been shaped by foreign policy outputs 
that are limited to individual policy areas, be it in the interregional or bilateral realm. Once 
more this can be attributed to the autonomy of individual actors amidst a lack of 
functioning coordination mechanisms in the post-Lisbon context. While this does not 
necessarily indicate that the institutional actors who have not been involved in individual 
decisions taken would have held a different view, opportunities were nonetheless lost to 
combine elements from different policy areas with broader political goals under the 
guidance of the EEAS. 
 
7.6 Conclusion 
Despite the stated aim of the Treaty of Lisbon to increase foreign policy coordination in 
the European Union, the institutional change to the EU’s foreign policy established with 
it have led to a situation in which the potential for the generation of incoherent foreign 
policy outputs towards Latin America has increased. Considering the most important 
developments in EU-Latin American relations since Lisbon, a lack of horizontal policy 
coherence becomes apparent. 
While previously an incoherence between the EU’s rhetoric of regionalism 
support and the conclusion of international agreements could be observed, this rhetoric 
has largely disappeared in the post-Lisbon period. Thus, despite the fact that the EU’s 
Latin America policy since then has been largely limited to negotiations with individual 
countries, rather than subregional organizations, this has not been a source for the 
incoherence of the EU’s policy outputs at this point in time. 
There was always some compelling evidence for the validity of the hypothesis 
based on rational decision-making in previous chapters. However, the developments 
discussed here cannot be understood without the perspective of bureaucratic politics. It 
is particularly the autonomy of two institutional actors, the EEAS and DG Trade, and the 
divergence of views between them, that can help us understand the developments that 
have led to the accession of Ecuador to the existing FTA between the EU, Colombia and 
Peru, the PDCA with Cuba, and the lack of progress in the upgrade process of the 
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Association Agreements with Chile and Mexico. The possibility for both actors to take 
largely independent decisions in the relations with these countries was made possible 
largely due to the disruption of existing coordination mechanisms through the Treaty of 
Lisbon and given that the system in itself was rendered even more complex than was 
previously the case. 
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CHAPTER 8:  
Conclusion 
8.1 A recapitulation of the research framework 
The initial motivation for this thesis was the fact that the EU’s policy towards Latin 
America, originally based on the pursuit of interregional ties and the conclusion of 
international agreements that would link all of the EU’s policy areas relevant for the region 
in a comprehensive framework, appeared to gradually become more incoherent over time 
and across policy areas. This was despite various reforms to the EU’s foreign policy 
system aimed at increasing the coherence of its foreign policy outputs. The term policy 
coherence was defined in this context as the horizontal, vertical, external, narrative and 
strategic consistency of the EU’s foreign policy outputs towards the region. The main 
research question driving this thesis was thus how one could explain the emergence of 
the EU’s foreign policy incoherence towards the region despite the establishment of 
numerous mechanisms aimed at the contrary. 
To respond to this research question two distinct analytical lenses on the origins 
of the EU’s foreign policy incoherence towards Latin America were developed, based on 
literature from the field of Foreign Policy Analysis. The first one, entitled ‘rational 
incoherence’, considered whether the incoherence of the EU’s foreign policy outputs 
towards the region is in reality based on the EU’s rational decision-making, given a change 
of mainly external conditions that would require it to change its policy towards the region. 
This contrasted with a perspective based on scholarship arguing that one needs to 
consider factors of bureaucratic politics instead (Hypothesis 2), as was initially suggested 
by Graham Allison and Morton Halperin (1972) for the foreign policy of sovereign states. 
 This broad analytical lens was then further specified in distinct sub-hypotheses 
based on more specific literature dealing with bureaucratic politics and decision-making 
mechanisms in the EU. In turn, four distinct yet partially interrelated elements of 
bureaucratic politics were considered: firstly, the EU’s capacity for generating foreign 
policy outputs based on rational decision-making may be hampered by policy inertia, 
which could make it difficult for the EU to adapt its policy towards third actors given 
established policy principles and programmes that are hard to alter in the short term, or 
the change of which would mean that previously spent resources would essentially be lost 
(Hypothesis 2a). 
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A second element considered was the potential for diverging interests between 
the different actors involved in the EU’s foreign policy-making to influence the coherence 
of the EU’s foreign policy outputs negatively. It was hypothesized that the importance of 
this factor is related to elements such as an overlap of competence between different 
institutional actors and the salience of any given issue (Hypothesis 2b). 
A third factor considered was the autonomy of individual actors within the EU’s 
foreign policy system to generate policy outputs without consultation or coordination 
with others. It was hypothesized that the absence of strong formal requirements for 
coordination at given points in time, and the disruption to established informal and ad-
hoc coordination mechanisms caused by the almost continual reform of the EU’s foreign 
policy system since the Treaty of Maastricht, would negatively influence the EU’s capacity 
to generate coherent foreign policy outputs (Hypothesis 2c) and especially where the 
positions of different institutional actors diverge signficicantly. 
The last factor considered was the complexity of the EU’s foreign policy system 
itself, involving a large number of actors with varying roles at different times of the 
decision-making process. It was hypothesized that the continued underlying presence of 
the EU’s former pillar structure, as outlined by Michael Smith (2012), has negatively 
impacted the EU’s capacity to formulate a coherent foreign policy towards Latin America 
across these boundaries. Furthermore, the mere long duration of foreign policy decision-
making processes in the EU, and particularly when it comes to the conclusion of 
international agreements may generate incoherence in and of itself given the possibility 
that internal EU actors change their positions on a given issue across time (Hypothesis 
2d), contributing to a divergence of views between them. 
The two broad hypotheses and the interlinked sub-hypotheses were considered 
in the empirical chapters of this thesis, which were organized chronologically, thus 
following the EU’s different negotiations for international agreements with Latin 
American regional organizations and countries over time. This allowed causal pathways 
to be uncovered, relevant both for commenting on the validity of Hypothesis 1, which 
required a change of (external) conditions to impact on the EU’s cost-benefit analysis of 
its Latin America policy, and that of Hypothesis 2, which considered the impact of 
intervening variables on internal EU foreign policy decision-making processes. 
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8.2 The main findings 
This thesis’ primary empirical findings related to the research framework are two-fold: 
Firstly, the empirical chapters detailed that the EU’s foreign policy incoherence towards 
the region was not limited to the examples that drove the elaboration of the initial research 
puzzle. Secondly, the empirical analysis revealed that neither the first nor the second 
analytical lens can be supported or refuted in its entirety, instead revealing a more complex 
picture of the determinants of EU foreign policy incoherence. 
In addition to the EU’s foreign policy incoherence resulting from the divergence 
of its Latin America policy from the stated aim of promoting interregionalism and 
concluding comprehensive Association Agreements in the region, and the incoherence of 
its policies towards the Andean region outlined in the introduction, each chapter has 
unearthed some incoherent aspects of the EU’s foreign policy towards the region. In the 
first empirical chapter, a lack of horizontal and strategic policy coherence was observed 
in the case of negotiations with Mercosur and Mexico. While the Commissioner 
responsible for relations with Latin America at the time aimed to conclude an Association 
Agreement, including a free trade agreement, with the regional organization already during 
the 1990s, the concerns of some member states meant that the agreement reached in the 
end was much more limited in scope. This contrasted with the EU’s Latin America 
strategies adopted a few years prior. Similarly, while the aim was to reach a comprehensive 
Association Agreement in the case of Mexico from the outset, ultimately its FTA 
provisions were only concluded later on. 
In the chapter detailing the EU’s negotiations with Mercosur and Chile, strategic 
and horizontal policy incoherence could once more be observed in addition to an 
incoherence of the EU’s narrative. While the initial stated aims of the negotiations were 
to foster Mercosur-Chile integration, and to put the EU’s interregionalism strategy into 
practice, the negotiation outcomes did not fit this overall strategy or the continued 
rhetoric of regionalism support. Additionally, different aspects of the EU’s policies 
influencing the region did not match horizontally, as the EU’s agricultural, trade and 
development policy outputs were in contrast to one another. 
The next chapter then discussed the observed policy incoherence of the EU 
towards CAN and Central America that formed the basis for the elaboration of the puzzle 
of this thesis in more detail. Once more, strategic, narrative and horizontal policy 
incoherence could be observed. This is primarily due to the negotiation outcome in the 
Andean case not fitting with the EU’s unaltered Latin America strategy or the rhetoric 
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surrounding its relations with the region. Secondly, the continuation of development 
cooperation projects based on the assumption that the Andean Community would be 
strengthened through the EU’s Association Agreement negotiations even after these had 
failed provides important evidence for the EU’s horizontal policy incoherence. 
The final empirical chapter then provided further evidence for a lack of 
horizontal policy coherence in the aftermath of the Treaty of Lisbon, as the activities of 
the EEAS and those of DG Trade did not always match each other. However, by the 
time period considered in this chapter, an over-arching EU Latin America strategy had 
disappeared and the rhetoric surrounding its policy towards the region no longer 
emphasized regionalism support, thus removing the risk of strategic or narrative 
incoherence in this case. 
Considering evidence supporting the differing hypotheses as to the origin of the 
EU’s policy incoherence towards Latin America, the overall picture that has emerged is 
somewhat complex. While the first hypothesis of rational incoherence cannot be refuted 
entirely and has some promise for explaining specific aspects of the EU’s emerging policy 
incoherence towards Latin America—as is explored below—ultimately bureaucratic 
factors have to be considered as well.  
When looking at the evidence supporting Hypothesis 1, Chapter 4 provides 
strong evidence that the development of the EU’s initial interregional approach towards 
the region in the aftermath of the Treaty of Maastricht was based on rational decision-
making. Looking at external drivers for the EU’s foreign policy, the economic growth 
rates in the region, the return to political stability and democratic governance, and the 
renewed focus on regional integration in Latin America all played directly into the EU’s 
considerations to develop its Latin America policy as outlined in the Basic Document of 
1994, and the Commission’s Latin America strategy of 1995. In addition to those factors 
internal to the region, the United States’ Latin American policy needs to be considered as 
well. Both the project for a Free Trade Area of the Americas and the negotiations for the 
North American Free Trade Area contributed to the EU’s resolution to alter its policy 
towards the region. Economic considerations related to the latter in particular can explain 
why Mexico was the first country to benefit from Association Agreement negotiations 
with the EU. Lastly, the context of the Treaty of Maastricht provided an important 
backdrop for the EU to develop new foreign policy initiatives, such as the one related to 
increasing its ties with Latin America. Nonetheless, the coherent development of this 
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policy cannot be explored entirely without taking additional bureaucratic factors into 
consideration, as is elaborated on below. 
Chapter 5 also offers mixed evidence as to the validity of this hypothesis. While 
negotiating with Mercosur was a rational next choice for putting the EU’s Latin America 
strategy into practice, given the organization’s economic weight in the region, the ultimate 
failure of negotiations appears to have been based primarily on particular sectoral 
interests, rather than those of the EU as a whole. The initial parallel negotiations with 
Chile were a rational choice at the time given the belief that the country would ultimately 
join Mercosur. The decision to continue negotiating with the country despite the 
difficulties in the Mercosur process can then also be explained through a cost-benefit 
analysis based on the external factor of the United States’ efforts to conclude an FTA 
with Chile, and the fact that the latter’s accession to Mercosur had come to be increasingly 
unlikely. In short, while it is true that a consideration of policy inertia, as suggested by 
María García (2011), can contribute to our understanding of the EU-Chile negotiation 
process, this is not incompatible with an assumption of rational decision-making. 
 The developments elaborated on in Chapter 6 offer strong evidence for the 
EU’s increasing foreign policy incoherence towards the region. In consequence, this is 
where the assumption of rational incoherence can be best applied, and in this instance 
there is little evidence supporting its validity. Already the decision to open negotiations 
with the Andean Community and Central America, while compatible with the goal of 
interregional ties, was hampered by bureaucratic processes internal to the EU (see below). 
Most importantly, however, the decision to shift to bilateral negotiations with some of 
CAN’s states while upholding the EU’s rhetoric of regionalism support and an aligned 
development policy cannot be explained through rational decision-making. While the 
increasing political divergence within CAN and the United States’ efforts to negotiate 
bilateral FTAs with Colombia and Peru provided important external factors that could 
alter the EU’s cost-benefit analysis, these factors were also present in the Central 
American case. Additionally, there is little evidence that the decision to shift to bilateral 
trade negotiations considered additional political or development factors, or led to a 
change in the EU’s development funding to the region in the short to medium term. 
The final empirical chapter, detailing the evolution of the EU’s ties with Latin 
America since the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon offers the strongest evidence 
against the validity of the hypothesis based on rational incoherence. Instead of reacting 
coherently to factors that would warrant an alteration in its policy, the negotiations with 
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Ecuador and Cuba show that DG Trade and the EEAS reacted separately to external 
factors in their respective policy areas, and there is very little evidence that the remainder 
of the EU’s policy towards those actors has been reconsidered in light of those 
negotiations. A similar pattern can be observed when considering the renegotiation 
processes with Mexico and Chile, where the differing positions of the EEAS and DG 
Trade have led to policy incoherence towards the countries in question. 
Overall, while the hypothesis that the EU’s Latin America policy is based on 
‘rational incoherence’ cannot be refuted in its entirety, its validity is limited across time 
and negotiation processes concerned, with the last chapters demonstrating that 
bureaucratic politics have come to shape the EU’s Latin America policy more and more 
over time. The influence of the different factors of bureaucratic politics considered here 
has not been consistent over time either, with each contributing a partial explanation for 
parts of the EU’s policy incoherence towards the region at different points in time. 
When it comes to the hypothesis based on the EU’s policy inertia, there is almost 
no evidence for it having played a role in the initial development of the EU’s one-size fits 
all approach after the Treaty of Maastricht. This is due to the fact that the EU’s Latin 
America policy until then had been extremely limited, and the treaty provided an 
opportunity for an important relaunch of the EU’s foreign policy—in line with a relatively 
streamlined decision-making system for the EU’s ties with Latin America (Hypothesis 
2c). This picture changes somewhat when considering the EU’s negotiations with 
Mercosur and Chile. On the one hand, even after Mercosur negotiations had failed in all 
respects, considerations related to sunk costs and the established principle of regionalism 
support led to these being merely suspended (for a very long period of time) and not 
aborted entirely. On the other hand, while the EU’s continued negotiations with Chile fit 
the perspective of a rational reorientation of the EU’s policy towards the country, aspects 
of policy inertia have certainly also played a role, as was suggested by María García (2011). 
The chapter focused on the negotiations with CAN and Central America then 
provides perhaps the strongest evidence for policy inertia. The beginning of negotiations 
with both regions cannot be imagined without the lock-in from the EU’s rhetoric based 
on regionalism support, and specifically language promising such negotiations from 
previous talks with both regional organizations and their member states. The importance 
of this goal then contributes additionally to the exploration as to why the EU’s rhetoric 
and development policy haven’t changed even after switching to bilateral trade 
negotiations in the Andean case. In contrast, only some evidence for the validity of this 
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hypothesis can be found in the last empirical chapter, as by then the EU’s rhetoric of 
regionalism support had largely disappeared and the EU only committed indirectly to the 
renegotiation of the Association Agreements with Mexico and Chile since 2013. 
In contrast to the mixed explanatory value of the EU’s policy inertia, the 
importance of diverging interests could be seen in all empirical chapters to a certain 
extent. While the formulation of the EU’s one-size fits all policy does represent a rational 
decision given a number of external and internal EU factors, this would not have been 
possible without the relatively low salience of the EU’s Latin America policy for most of 
the EU’s member states and a significant number of the Commission’s Directorates-
General at the time. Only when it came to putting the thus-defined EU’s Latin America 
strategy into practice did diverging interests come to negatively influence the coherence 
of the policy process. The concerns of the EU’s Agriculture Commissioner and numerous 
member state agriculture ministers then influenced Manuel Marín’s suggestion for free 
trade negotiations with Mercosur as a first step to putting the EU’s Latin America policy 
into practice, with agricultural considerations ultimately leading to the limited nature of 
the 1995 EU-Mercosur Framework Agreement. Similar internal disagreements also put 
the FTA component of the EU’s Global Agreement with Mexico into jeopardy, leading 
to the conclusion of different components of the agreement in 1997 and 1999 
respectively. When considering the process for Association Agreement negotiations with 
Mercosur later on the presence of diverging interests, and particularly between 
institutional actors representing agricultural, trade, political and development elements of 
the EU’s external relations, becomes even more relevant in explaining the ultimate failure 
of the negotiations. 
Similarly, the chapters focusing on negotiations with the Andean Community 
and Central America provide evidence that diverging interests of different parts of the 
EU’s foreign policy bureaucracy influenced the process. The relative lack of economic 
importance of the Central American region contributed to an alignment of interests 
between DG Trade and DG RELEX in particular, as the former believed that individual 
agreements with the countries in the region would not be viable. A consideration of the 
negotiation process with the Andean Community, however, shows an important 
divergence between DG Trade and the member states on the one hand (due to the United 
States’ free trade strategy), and other internal Commission actors on the other. Without a 
consideration of these diverging interests it would be difficult to explain why the 
negotiations were altered in the one but not the other case. Lastly, the negotiations with 
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Cuba and Ecuador, and the process for the upgrade of negotiations with Mexico and 
Chile, show that interests between important institutional actors continued to diverge 
further in the aftermath of the Treaty of Lisbon, and between DG Trade and the EEAS, 
in particular. This was aided by an increased complexity of the EU’s foreign policy system 
at that point in time (Hypothesis 2d). 
Most of the influence of the diverging interests of different internal EU actors 
on the EU’s policy coherence can be explained by individual actors’ autonomy in the EU’s 
policy process. With functioning coordination requirements and mechanisms, the impact 
of these diverging positions on the EU’s foreign policy coherence would likely have 
remained limited overall. This factor could be seen at play in all of the empirical chapters. 
Beginning with the first chapter, the isolated work of Commissioner Marín and his 
supporting DG allowed for a formulation of the EU’s ‘one-size fits all’ approach in the 
first place, accompanied by work to reallocate parts of the EU’s development cooperation 
funding towards the region. While the initial process leading to negotiations with 
Mercosur and Chile demonstrated that at times the autonomy of specific parts of the 
Commission’s bureaucracy were limited, the ultimate failure of negotiations with 
Mercosur then showed that it was the autonomy of the EU’s trade negotiators, the 
Commission’s Agriculture DG, and the supporting Council bodies that can partially 
explain the failure of the negotiations against the preferences of other parts of the 
Commission and Council. The following chapter then demonstrated the importance of 
this sub-hypothesis, particularly when considering that the EU’s development policy did 
not match the evolution of its negotiations with CAN, given that the goal of regionalism 
support was upheld even after the interregional framework had been abandoned in the 
negotiations. The final and chronologically most recent empirical chapter contains the 
strongest proof of the relevance of this hypothesis. In the post-Lisbon context, the 
autonomy of individual actors in the EU’s foreign policy decision-making system appears 
to have increased, as DG Trade was able to bring Ecuador into the existing FTA with 
Colombia and Peru, and the EEAS negotiated the PDCA with Cuba largely without taking 
trade considerations into account. The same pattern could be observed in the case of the 
upgrade of the agreements with Mexico and Chile, where the EEAS promised and lobbied 
for a speedy start to the process, but DG Trade was able to nonetheless put the effort on 
hold. 
Lastly, there is also some evidence for the complexity of the EU’s foreign policy 
decision-making system having played a role in and of itself. Throughout the thesis the 
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requirement to involve a large number of actors in the decision-making process has 
increased the length of time until the EU could enter into negotiations, and the duration 
of the negotiations themselves as well as the ensuing ratification processes. Taking the 
example of negotiations with Mercosur, the complexity of the decision-making system 
has not only delayed the start of Association Agreement negotiations, but also required 
different parts of an agreement to be negotiated once a deadline had passed. Similarly, the 
requirement for member states to ratify most international agreements of the EU has 
contributed to its foreign policy incoherence towards the region. For instance, while the 
EU’s move to bilateral FTA negotiations in the case of CAN was meant to be flanked by 
the ratification of a previous Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement, the lack of 
national ratification in some of the EU’s member states has held up this process. Similarly, 
the ratification of the Association Agreement with Central America was put in jeopardy 
by the concerns of one of the EU’s smallest member states. Lastly, the increased 
complexity of the EU’s foreign policy after the Treaty of Lisbon enabled diverging 
positions between different actors to play an important role in the trajectory of the EU’s 
Latin America policy since then. 
To summarize the evidence supporting or weakening the differing hypotheses, 
this thesis has shown that while an analytical lens based on rational decision-making has 
some merit in exploring the emergence of the EU’s foreign policy (in)coherence towards 
Latin America, a consideration of bureaucratic politics nonetheless offers a more complex 
and accurate picture. In consequence, it is impossible to consider that the EU’s incoherent 
policy towards the region is based on strategic concerns and a cost-benefit analysis, but 
rather represents the result of an EU foreign policy process that is influenced by the 
structure and functioning of the underlying bureaucracy. 
 
8.3 Relevance of the findings 
This thesis’ findings resonate with the existing literature in a number of ways beyond the 
empirical literature on EU-Latin American relations. The thesis also contributes to the 
literature on interregionalism by providing further evidence for its demise in the context 
of the EU, yet cautioning that the EU’s move away from it was not necessarily strategic 
as has been suggested beforehand. Conceptually speaking, it has demonstrated that 
Foreign Policy Analysis can be applied to the context of EU foreign policy decision-
making by situating the level of analysis in the realm of the EU’s institutions. By doing so 
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it is also able to contribute to the literature on EU foreign policy coherence, and internal 
bureaucratic determinants of foreign policy in particular.  
 
8.3.1 EU-Latin American relations 
Empirically-speaking this thesis has contributed to the limited academic literature on EU-
Latin American relations. While some of the earlier negotiations, such as the ones with 
Chile or Mexico (see for instance García 2011; Szymanski and Smith 2005) have been 
discussed to a certain extent, the elaboration of more recent events in the EU’s relations 
with the region, such as the negotiations with CAN and the Andean Community has been 
much more limited. It is here that the thesis contributes entirely novel empirical insights 
on internal determinants of a number of negotiations processes, such as those with 
Ecuador and Cuba, the relaunch of the Mercosur discussions, and the discussed upgrade 
of the Association Agreements with Mexico and Chile. Even for the cases that have been 
discussed in the literature, this thesis’ focus on processes internal to the EU allows for 
seeing these in a new light. For instance, this thesis has shown that while policy inertia 
has played a role in the EU’s negotiations with Chile, as was argued elsewhere (García 
2011), this argument is nonetheless not complete unless considering factors such as the 
autonomy of individual actors in the EU’s foreign policy decision-making system. 
Additionally, this thesis has generated new empirical insights through interviews 
with decision-makers and stakeholders involved in EU-Latin American relations and the 
consideration of internal documents not used in the literature up to now. United States’ 
diplomatic cables have been used to study the evolution of the EU’s relations with Latin 
America in context. The consideration of these sources has made it possible to outline, 
for instance, that so far Mexico’s initial reluctance for the inclusion of a democracy clause 
in the Global Agreement has been overstated (Szymanski and Smith 2005), that the 
ratification process of the EU’s Association Agreement with Central America has been 
held up due to specific considerations of a very small member state, or that the number 
of EU member states critical of the EU’s common position on Cuba has steadily grown 
over time. 
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8.3.2 The EU’s interregionalism policies are less strategic than argued previously 
While some authors (García 2015; Hardacre and Smith 2009, 2014) have argued that the 
weakening of the EU’s interregionalism policies can be explained through strategic 
considerations based on the weakening of regional integration schemes elsewhere, or 
indeed the importance of development in the realm of international trade policy, this 
thesis has revealed that such considerations only offer a partial answer as to the 
determinants of this policy change, and that the consideration of bureaucratic factors can 
complement these existing perspectives. 
Generally speaking, this thesis’ analysis of the EU’s negotiations for Association 
Agreements in the region—and the failure to conclude them in a number of instances—
helps to further our understanding of interregionalism as an EU foreign policy tool. While 
the initial chapters provide some evidence for the fact that the EU’s pursuit of 
interregionalism was driven by rational as well as normative concerns, as is argued in parts 
of the existing literature (Börzel and Risse 2009, 2015), further developments in EU-Latin 
American relations do not confirm its validity later on. Indeed, the observation of the 
weakening of the EU’s regionalism policies in Latin America matches the analysis by some 
authors who have argued that the EU has increasingly resorted to bilateral ties (Santander 
2010b, 2013).   
While it is true that the EU’s rhetoric has remained similar to that of the 1990s 
until very recently, this was not the case for its foreign policy outputs towards the region. 
For instance, the EU’s move towards bilateral negotiations was described in public as 
being compatible with the aim of deepening the Andean integration process and the EU’s 
ties with it. In practice, however, any attempts to do so were abandoned afterwards. Later 
on, the relaunch of FTA negotiations with Ecuador were portrayed in a similar light. 
While there is some evidence for normative concerns and rhetorical entrapment having 
influenced the opening of negotiations in a number of instances, these goals have been 
overshadowed principally by purely economic aspects later on, leading to an incoherent 
EU policy towards certain actors. Furthermore, the accession of Ecuador to the existing 
FTA with Colombia and Peru shows that normative concerns were entirely absent from 
the policy process at that point in time. 
While the findings in this thesis partially support the idea of the existence of an 
EU policy of ‘complex interregionalism’ that would see the EU making use of different 
venues and levels for the development of ties with third actors (Hardacre and Smith 2009, 
2014), in reality this has often been limited by bureaucratic considerations. 
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8.3.3 Foreign Policy Analysis helps in studying EU foreign policy coherence 
While initially developed for the context of studying the foreign policy of sovereign states, 
this thesis has shown that Foreign Policy Analysis literature can further our understanding 
on the determinants of the (in)coherence of foreign policy outputs in the European 
Union. It thus contributes to an existing literature that considers FPA in the context of 
European integration (Carlsnaes 1993; Dijkstra 2009; Larsen 2009; White 1999b). Rather 
than directly applying insights from FPA, this thesis has adapted some existing ones, and 
argued that the intra-institutional factors and the complexity of decision-making systems 
in and of themselves can be important elements contributing to the relevance of 
bureaucratic politics as a determinant of foreign policy-making. 
 
8.3.3.1. Intra-institutional bureaucracy matters in EU foreign policy-making 
The interaction between the different institutional actors at the EU level in EU legislative 
processes and other decision-making procedures is clearly delineated, allocating a clear 
role to the Commission, the Council and the Parliament, albeit depending on the policy 
area concerned. Consequently, these mandated coordination and control mechanisms can 
be considered as relatively strong when not disrupted by treaty changes. 
This thesis has found, however, that factors hindering coherent EU foreign 
policy decision-making do not necessarily exist in the (formal) relations between these 
institutions only, but more so within them. It is here that the internal organisation of the 
European Commission, with its portfolio structure, the supporting bureaucracy, and 
internal rules of procedure can have a major impact on the coherence of the EU’s foreign 
policy decision-making. While the Commission’s activity in the realm of international 
negotiations is guided by the necessity for a negotiation mandate, its activity before this 
is granted and once negotiations get underway is dependent on the organisation of its 
internal bureaucracy. 
Taking stock of Commission reforms since the Treaty of Maastricht, a number 
of factors have been particularly important for the possibility for coherent foreign policy 
decision-making within the Commission. Firstly, the role of the Commission president 
matters. The more power the Commission president has to set its agenda and act as an 
arbiter between different Commissioners’ positions, the more likely it is that the 
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Commission’s foreign policy activity will be coherent overall. For most of the foreign 
policy activity considered in this thesis the consecutive Commission presidents have 
remained largely absent from the picture, thus not making use of the hierarchical influence 
bestowed on them. 
Secondly, the organizational logic of Commission portfolios has a large influence 
on its capacity to define coherent policies towards third actors. Over time, in the realm 
of the EU’s external relations, these have been guided by providing portfolios according 
to either geographic or functional areas. At times, where a Commissioner was responsible 
for relations with a specific third actor or region, the EU’s foreign policy coherence 
towards said actor was stronger, while intra-policy coherence was weaker. When Manuel 
Marín and his supporting DG were responsible for relations with Latin America, it was 
relatively straightforward for them to define a new Latin America strategy and to alter the 
disbursement of the EU’s development funding towards the region in line with this.  In 
turn, a division of portfolios according to policy lines makes it less likely that all the 
policies targeting a third actor are coherent in themselves, all while individual policy areas 
may benefit from internal policy coherence. This can lead to situations such as the ones 
observed ahead of the renegotiation of the Association Agreements with Mexico and 
Chile, where the EEAS promised quick progress, but DG Trade halted the beginning of 
talks on the upgrade of the FTA component. The influence of Commission 
reorganisations (and the new post-Lisbon set-up) according to these two opposing logics 
could thus clearly be seen in the EU’s negotiations with Latin America.   
Thirdly, the independence of individual Commissioners and their DGs is a 
positive factor for the initiation of EU foreign policy initiatives, but hinders the coherence 
of its foreign policy outputs later on. The initiative for most of the negotiations with Latin 
America considered in this thesis ultimately originated with specific Commissioners, who 
were able to develop these projects given the absence of internal Commission 
coordination mechanisms and requirements which would have allowed other 
Commissioners or DGs to provide (sceptical) inputs into the initial policy process. 
However, once proposals became more concrete, the lack of early consultation has 
hindered both the speed and coherence of the EU’s ensuing foreign policy outputs. This 
could be seen in particular when considering the difficulties in reaching negotiation 
mandates for the Association Agreements with Mercosur, the Andean Community and 
Central America. Once these were reached, however, Commissioners often showed unity 
vis-à-vis the Council, such as when Agriculture Commissioner Franz Fischler defended 
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the Commission’s market liberalization offers in negotiations with Mercosur against the 
Council’s criticism, thus overturning his previous position on the matter. 
While this thesis has focused less on the internal structure of the Council, given 
the preponderance of Commission activity for most of the negotiations under 
consideration, its internal organisation still has an influence on the EU’s foreign policy 
coherence. Much like the European Commission the consideration of the EU’s activity 
towards third actors across policy lines is hindered by the set-up of its preparatory bodies. 
These originated within different pillars of the EU’s former three-pronged structure, and 
have thus operated according to different decision-making logics. While COLAC is the 
Council body most immediately concerned with political relations with the region, the 
role of the Trade Policy Committee, and thus of economic considerations, has been 
preponderant for most of the negotiations under consideration here, supplemented by 
the activity of agricultural bodies in the case of the negotiations with Mercosur in 
particular. The different leadership role of individual bodies depends on what kind of 
agreement is under consideration, such as assigning the main supervisory role to COLAC 
for the EU’s PDCA negotiations with Cuba, but to the TPC where FTAs form part of 
Association Agreements. This renders an across-the-board consideration of Latin 
American issues even more difficult. 
Intra-institutional foreign policy coherence is further hindered through the 
existence of coalitions between officials involved in policy-making in specific policy areas 
across institutional lines. The most relevant coalitions that could be observed for the cases 
under consideration in this thesis are those between DG Trade officials and members of 
the TPC, and those working on agricultural matters in the Commission and the Council. 
Such divisions have ultimately contributed to the failure of the EU’s negotiations with 
Mercosur, and the preponderance of trade concerns in the negotiations with Colombia 
and Peru. 
 
8.3.3.2. The complexity and duration of EU negotiations creates coherence problems 
In addition to intra-institutional constraints to coherent EU foreign policy outputs, the 
complexity and duration of the process leading to the ratification of international 
agreements in the EU needs to be considered as a significant issue. While the EU’s treaties 
are very clear as to the different steps of the process, such as the granting of a negotiation 
mandate, the roles of the different institutions during the negotiations phase and the 
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decision-making procedures leading to the ratification of international agreements, the 
system is nonetheless incredibly complex. 
Depending on the kind of agreement negotiated, a large number of 
Commissioners, Commission Directorates-General, Council preparatory bodies, 
European Parliament committees and national parliaments are involved in the process at 
one point or another and in differing roles. This account does not even consider the 
bureaucratic divisions within the foreign policy apparatuses of the EU’s member states, 
or different parliamentary committees which may have to be involved. All of this makes 
it difficult for all actors to share the same assessment as to the issue at hand, and the 
positions of different actors can change over time. 
While it is true that some actors are more relevant for the progress of EU 
negotiations, and it is unlikely that, for instance, individual member states would make 
use of their possibility to halt the conclusion of an EU agreement unless they have very 
strong reservations, the impact of the sheer multitude of actors involved in the EU’s 
foreign policy-making could nonetheless be seen throughout this thesis. On the one hand, 
the necessity to involve a large number of entities internal to the Commission and Council 
preparatory bodies before a negotiation mandate can be granted prolongs the phase until 
actual negotiations can get underway, and particularly when individual Commissioners or 
member states have reservations. This could be seen, for instance, before the Commission 
was granted the mandate to negotiate with Mercosur, the Andean Community and Central 
America. Furthermore, depending on the underlying decision-making procedure, 
individual actors sometimes do halt EU negotiation processes altogether against the 
preferences of large majorities, as could be seen when the UK withdrew its consent from 
EU negotiations as a retaliatory measure during the so called ‘beef wars’, or in the 
opposition of Lithuania’s parliament to ratify the EU-Central America Association 
Agreement. 
This leads to another problem for EU foreign policy coherence based on the 
long duration of the process leading to the conclusion of an EU international agreement. 
For instance, initial preparatory work for the EU’s negotiations with Central America got 
underway in the Commission towards the end of 2004 and a negotiation mandate was 
only granted in 2007. The negotiations themselves then lasted until 2010 and the 
Association Agreement, while provisionally applied in parts since 2013, has not been 
ratified in 2016. Up to now, the entire process has thus lasted almost 12 years, spans three 
different European Commissions and the changes introduced since the Treaty of Lisbon. 
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This creates important temporal hurdles to the EU’s foreign policy coherence for a 
number of reasons. For instance, the responsible Commissioners have changed numerous 
times, as has the organization of the supporting Directorates-General. Simultaneously, 
national elections have radically altered the composition of the Council. This means that 
many of the actors which initially decided on the opening of negotiations were no longer 
present when these concluded, leading to the possibility that the initial negotiation 
mandate no longer matches the Council’s preferences or new economic realities. 
As a note of caution, however, the particularity of the EU in this context should 
not be overstated. This is also a concern influencing the negotiations for international 
agreements by most sovereign states, as, for instance, the outcome of the United States’ 
elections of November 2016 could have an impact on the ratification of the previously 
signed Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) free trade agreement.  
Lastly, while the Treaty of Lisbon has at least in theory provided for more 
information rights for the European Parliament on EU trade negotiations, the late 
involvement of this actor has meant in the past that either its democratic rights were 
severely constrained (given that its one-off decision to halt an almost decade-long process 
of negotiations would be unlikely due to the severity of the consequences) or the EU’s 
treaty partners had to scramble to address the EP’s concerns. This could, for instance, be 
observed in the ratification phase of the EU’s FTA with Colombia. 
 
8.3.4 The Treaty of Lisbon has rendered EU foreign policy coherence more 
difficult 
Contrary to the stated aims of the Lisbon reforms aimed at increasing the coherence of 
what has come to be known as the EU’s External Action, the positive impact of these 
changes could not be observed in this thesis. In line with the contributions of others 
(Missiroli 2010; Portela and Raube 2012; M. Smith 2012; Tannous 2013), the Treaty of 
Lisbon has in reality not made significant changes that would address the underlying 
problems for foreign policy coherence in the EU’s decision-making system. While the 
creation of the post of the HRVP and the supporting institution of the EEAS has meant 
that institutional EU actors now exist to provide political guidance to the EU’s foreign 
policy activity, the nature of both as new kinds of actors in the EU’s foreign policy system 
has in reality increased conflict potential, thus weakening the similarity of institutional 
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views on foreign policy issues and disrupted established foreign policy coordination 
mechanisms. 
The core problems for the new institutional structure of the EU’s foreign policy 
decision-making system have been the hybrid nature of the new actors created and the 
lack of a clear definition of hierarchies under the Treaty of Lisbon itself. The underlying 
idea of creating the EEAS out of parts of the Commission, and the Council bureaucracy 
and supplementing this with member state diplomats, was to unite as much foreign policy 
expertise as possible. However, the different background of EEAS officials has made it 
difficult for the institution to function efficiently given the different bureaucratic cultures 
that are now combined within it. Secondly, stripping some competencies away from the 
European Commission has upset the careful balance of its internal organization. While 
foreign policy coordination between for instance DG RELEX and DG Trade occurred 
within the Commission’s bureaucracy beforehand, this now involves administrative 
processes between different institutional actors who are suspicious of one another given 
the unclear nature of the roles of both institutions involved. This is largely a result of the 
vagueness of the Treaty of Lisbon’s provisions on the EEAS, having left the 
establishment of practical procedures to inter-institutional bargaining. 
A similar problem can be observed in the stated roles of the HRVP acting 
simultaneously as the head of the EEAS, a member of the Council, and a Vice-President 
of the European Commission. Once more, the Treaty of Lisbon has left the interpretation 
of these different roles and how they interact to the individual holding the office. In terms 
of the EU’s foreign policy coherence, and particularly its foreign policy activity towards 
Latin America, Catherine Ashton’s interpretation of the HRVP role as being primarily a 
member of the Council was problematic. Whether Federica Mogherini’s emphasis on 
being simultaneously a member of the Commission and the Council leads to a 
fundamental change still remains to be seen. 
Lastly, the European Parliament has gained important information rights on the 
EU’s trade policy with the Treaty of Lisbon. The effects of this could not yet directly be 
seen in the negotiations underlying the analysis in this thesis. However, it is likely that 
involving this institutional actor in the EU’s international negotiations earlier on should 
contribute to inter-institutional foreign policy coherence, as this would allow the 
Commission’s negotiators to take the EP’s concerns on board earlier on during 
negotiations for international agreements. 
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8.4 Methodological considerations 
The kind of ‘thick’ description necessary for studying the influence of bureaucratic politics 
on the EU’s relations with Latin America posed some important challenges in the research 
undertaken for this project. Unlike historical work on EU politics for which researchers 
can access numerous archives and official repositories, this is not available for this 
research project given archival moratoria and due to the fact that freedom of information 
requests to the EU’s institutions are extremely resource- and time-intensive. One 
interviewee even cautioned that freedom of information requests may raise suspicions 
among officials involved in relevant policy processes and could reduce the number of 
officials willing to be interviewed.193 Therefore the empirical work in this thesis has relied 
entirely on other kinds of sources and in most instances these were sufficiently varied to 
allow for the necessary triangulation between them. Nonetheless, the degree of certainty 
surrounding particular events and decisions inevitably varies and this needed to be 
pointed out at each occasion. 
 Staggering the use of different sources across the research process has been 
particularly helpful in uncovering the largest number of empirical sources possible. Initial 
research for this thesis was based largely on existing academic literature and press 
coverage on EU-Latin American relations. When it comes to the latter the use of Agence 
Europe, a news ticker service for EU matters has been particularly helpful. While the 
coverage of many events in the database was very limited at best, it nonetheless allowed 
to construct important timelines, uncover references to official meetings and documents, 
and learn the names of key officials involved in policy processes. When combined with 
press coverage aggregated on websites covering international trade negotiations from a 
critical perspective, such as Bilaterals.org, a relatively clear picture of key events emerged 
over time. 
It was at this point that my research turned towards other sources, such as 
official EU documents available in online repositories. Here the previous establishment 
of a timeline including references to key documents and officials sometimes helped to 
uncover the full texts of key declassified internal documents, references to the content of 
classified documents in non-classified ones, or at least corroborating their existence as 
classified files in the database. I have also found it useful to make use of United States 
diplomatic cables made public through the ‘Cablegate’ leak. The extensive nature of the 
                                                
193 Former EU official, Brussels, 19.6.2016 (Interview 17). 
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United States’ diplomatic network across the globe meant that political reporting occurred 
on most EU-Latin American matters from Brussels and Latin American capitals. These 
were furthermore easily searchable in full text online. Sometimes the assessment of US 
diplomats as to the meaning of particular events and decisions also helped to further 
contextualise them. Lastly, reporting on talks between US and key European officials on 
Latin American matters also provided important insights into bureaucratic structures and 
the thinking of officials involved, all while constantly considering the nature of the sources 
in question. Furthermore, any researcher interested in using this database as a source 
needs to be aware of the potential repercussions coming with this, such as potential 
ethical, methodological and legal issues, including a prohibition for the publication of 
work based on it in certain journals (Michal 2015). 
Once large parts of this initial research had occurred I also began to interview 
key officials that had been identified previously. It is important to consider that no matter 
how diligently one prepares for interviews for officials, the dynamics of interactions with 
policy-makers will outweigh such preparations. While always striving to meet officials 
individually to allow them to speak as freely as possible, this has not always been the case, 
and numerous interviews ultimately took place in a grouped setting. 
Nonetheless, it is my belief that this has been beneficial for most of the grouped 
interviews in question. On the one hand, I sometimes gained access to more and more 
senior interviewees than originally asked for as they tended to join interviews on short 
notice. Most interviewees also started debates on some of my questions among each 
other, thus uncovering aspects that I had not been aware of, or which may not have been 
raised otherwise. Furthermore, the dynamics of such interviews meant that often 
interviewees would ask one another whether they believed that their assessment was an 
accurate one, thus immediately refuting or corroborating statements which may have gone 
unchallenged otherwise. They also helped each other to remember details of specific 
accounts that others may have forgotten about. Being able to witness such exchanges 
first-hand thus increased the analytical value that I could attribute to empirical insights 
gathered in such a way. 
The interviews themselves also proved to be an important means of access to 
official documents not available to me otherwise. While this was often associated with 
important restrictions on their direct use in my research (see the discussion on sources in 
chapter 2), these have nonetheless proven to be invaluable sources for background 
insights and to confirm certain pieces of information related to me in interviews. 
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While research into recent developments in the EU’s foreign policy thus comes 
with important limitations in terms of the availability of necessary data, a creative use of 
different kinds of sources, and especially relatively new ones such as leaked official 
documents can help to provide a sufficiently detailed picture of events necessary for the 
application of the analytical framework used in this thesis. 
 
8.5 Policy implications 
This thesis has revealed important stumbling blocks for the generation of coherent EU 
foreign policy outputs towards third actors. Over time many efforts have been undertaken 
to overcome issues related to the lack of EU foreign policy coordination, including 
through the latest iteration of the EU’s treaties. The creation of the HRVP and the EEAS 
are both important institutional innovations that—as per the treaty—are meant to foster 
foreign policy coordination in the EU. 
Nonetheless, in practice, the Treaty of Lisbon—at least for the parts of the EU’s 
foreign policy under consideration in this thesis—appears to have worsened the EU’s 
capacity for foreign policy coordination in the first instance. This is due to the hybrid 
nature of the post of the HRVP and the EEAS as its supporting institution, which 
transferred many concerns that had been resolved within the Commission’s bureaucracy 
to an inter-institutional context, and united officials from different bureaucratic origins in 
a new entity. Past experience from reforms of the EU’s treaties and the Commission’s 
organization shows that it can take some time until administrative innovations truly 
become effective and new and modes of operation have been found for the interaction 
between the different institutions. One policy implication arising out of this thesis is thus 
that it may simply take some more time before observers can truly tell whether the 
innovations of the Treaty of Lisbon have been effective or not. However, one should not 
ignore lessons that can already be learned from this, and the EEAS review (EEAS 2013) 
contains many important ideas for how to alter the set-up of the EU’s foreign policy 
bureaucracy in the medium- to long-term. Unfortunately, it appears that very few of these 
have been taken up by any of the actors involved in the EU’s foreign policy system since 
then. 
While the creation of the EEAS has shaken up the role of the Commission in 
the EU’s foreign policy, its importance under the new set-up should nonetheless not be 
underestimated, and a consideration of internal Commission factors would have to be 
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part of any attempts to increase the EU’s capacity for coherent foreign policy making. 
What stands out from the temporal analysis of the Commission’s organization in this 
thesis is that a major hindering factor for internal Commission policy coherence has been 
the relative independence of individual Commissioners and their Directorates-General. 
Only when it operated in ways that provided for more elements fostering hierarchical and 
coordinated decision-making between different portfolios could policy incoherence in the 
Commission be averted. As a consequence, allowing the Commission to function more 
like the government of sovereign states with more discretionary power residing in the 
Commission president could help address this issue. The administrative changes 
introduced in the Juncker Commission since 2014 are a step in the right direction. Every 
Commissioner now reports to a Vice-President of the Commission along thematic lines. 
Nonetheless, the nature of the Vice-President portfolios has meant that there are still 
some overlaps of competencies between them, and individual Commissioners may have 
to report to multiple Vice-Presidents depending on which topic they are currently working 
on. 
Another conclusion can be drawn from the experience of the EU’s negotiations 
with Latin America. A further key concern as to the EU’s foreign policy coherence has 
been the long duration of negotiations. This has meant that negotiation mandates may 
come to be out of date, or that internal EU majorities and preferences have changed once 
negotiations conclude. While it is impossible to mandate for negotiations to be shortened, 
the EEAS should coordinate more intensely with DG Trade so that the actual negotiation 
process is not drawn out by the fact that no trade negotiators are available when political 
clauses have already been negotiated. 
Additionally, the existence of mixed agreements, which require ratification by 
the European Parliament and national parliaments, renders the ratification process of 
these much more complex, allowing individual countries’ parliamentary majorities to 
block the ratification of agreements to which the Council, the College of Commissioners 
and the European Parliament have agreed. While meant to increase the democratic 
credentials of the EU, the decision-making process for mixed agreements nonetheless 
puts the EU’s capacity to conclude international agreements at all in jeopardy. This has 
been averted in the case of the FTA with Colombia and Peru, but the impact of this 
remains to be seen in the case of the Association Agreement with Central America. 
Relatedly, similar considerations are likely to influence the ratification of CETA, the 
proposed FTA between the EU and Canada, as the Commission has decided that the 
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agreement would be ratified given the provisions for a mixed agreement. This contrasts 
with provisions on the ratification of trade agreements in the United States, where only 
the approval of one of the chambers of parliament at the federal level is required. To 
avoid such problems in the EU in the future, it is likely that coordination mechanisms to 
involve national parliaments early on during negotiations will be necessary. 
 
8.6 Avenues for future research 
This thesis has focussed on the coherence of EU foreign policy making in the context of 
its relations with Latin America, revealing that the EU’s capacity for generating coherent 
foreign policy outputs is influenced by internal factors, such as whether the relevant actors 
in the EU’s foreign policy decision-making system have a similar assessment of an issue, 
or the strength of coordination mechanisms meant to ensure cross-policy coherence. 
These insights were gained through an analysis of the EU’s relations with Latin America 
over time. 
While this allowed for some generalisations as to internal dynamics of EU 
foreign policy decision-making, such as the influence of the division of Commission 
portfolios and Directorates-General on EU foreign policy decisions, additional factors 
may be present when considering the EU’s ties with third actors where other internal EU 
policy areas become relevant. After all, Latin America has been deliberately chosen for 
this thesis’ empirical analysis so as to exclude security concerns or the perspective of 
future EU membership. This allowed for studying EU foreign policy decision-making 
under ordinary conditions, with a strong involvement of the EU-level institutions, and 
the European Commission in particular. While the analytical lenses developed in this 
thesis have been useful for understanding the dynamics of the EU’s foreign policy 
towards Latin America, their validity once ‘high politics’ is more relevant remains to be 
seen. 
In consequence, a first avenue for future research would be to test the model 
developed here in other contexts, such as the evolution of the EU’s relations with its 
neighbourhood (with the added dimension of the European Neighbourhood Policy) or 
partners which are more economically relevant for the EU and its member states. If 
necessary, the model can then be adapted to be applicable in such ‘high politics’ contexts, 
where the role of the EU’s member states is stronger still. This could be done through, 
for instance, incorporating insights from FPA literature as to the centrality of different 
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actors in foreign policy decision-making processes in addition to the factors considered 
here, and thus allow for a further generalisation of this thesis’ findings. 
Secondly, having outlined how internal EU processes shape its foreign policy 
decisions, the literature on the EU’s international actorness should be revisited in line 
with the insights developed here. It would be particularly important to further study 
whether some of the conceptualisations of the EU, such as being described as a trade or 
normative power (Meunier and Nicolaïdis 2006), are an intentional result of EU foreign 
policy decision-making or whether the EU’s actions that form the basis for such 
descriptions have been shaped by bureaucratic factors.  
Thirdly, EU-Latin American relations could be further explored as the empirical 
analysis for this thesis has focused on the evolution of its ties with the region surrounding 
negotiations for interregional Association Agreements. While a bulk of the EU’s foreign 
policy activity towards the region was captured by this approach, other relevant aspects 
could only be discussed in the margins. Nonetheless, a number of important 
developments have occurred in EU-Latin American relations that should be of interest 
for any researcher looking at the EU’s foreign policy toolkit. 
For instance, the EU-Latin America summit format, and its role for the 
relationship between both regions, deserves some more attention. While only 
intergovernmental in nature and lacking the binding commitments of international 
agreements, these summits nonetheless make for regular meetings at the highest political 
level and generate a plethora of activity within the Council of the EU. The same is true 
for the EU-Latin America and Caribbean Foundation (EU-LAC Foundation), a unique 
international organization meant to enhance ties between the regions. While the EU has 
upheld its aim of a ‘strategic partnership’ with the entire Latin America and the Caribbean 
region, it has also entered into two bilateral ‘strategic partnerships’ with Brazil and Mexico 
during the mid-2000s, and their relevance and impact on broader EU-Latin American ties 
should be further explored. Additionally, the advent of further EU-Mexico and EU-Chile 
negotiations deserves close attention, as these will allow for the study of the post-Lisbon 
context of EU-Latin American relations. 
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ANNEX 1: 
List of interviews conducted 
All individual interviews have separate id numbers (#) matching those in the individual 
chapters of this thesis. The descriptors for the interviewees are based on the post held 
most relevant for this thesis. All ids denote interviews with individuals, unless marked as 
a group interview, in which case the information provided has not been separated by the 
individual in the group interviewed. 
  
Table 9: List of interviews conducted 
 
# 
 
Interviewee description 
 
Place 
 
Date 
 
Other 
1 Former Commission official Hamburg 27.4.2015  
2 Former Latin American 
diplomat 
 7.5.2015 Via telephone 
3 Former member of the Barroso 
cabinet 
London 8.6.2015  
4 German official Brussels 12.6.2015  
5 Former Commission official Brussels 12.6.2015 Follow-up 
Interview 1 
6 Senior DG Trade official Brussels 12.6.2015  
7 Senior Latin American diplomat Brussels 16.6.2015 Group interview 
 Latin American diplomat 1   Group interview 
 Latin American diplomat 2   Group interview 
8 Senior EEAS official Brussels 16.6.2015 Group interview 
 EEAS official   Group interview 
9 Member state diplomat Brussels 17.6.2015  
10 Member of the European 
Parliament 
Brussels 17.6.2015  
11 Senior EU official Brussels 17.6.2015 Group interview 
 EU official   Group interview 
12 DG Trade official Brussels 18.6.2015  
13 Senior EEAS official Brussels 18.6.2015  
14 European Parliament official Brussels 18.6.2015  
15 NGO official Brussels 18.6.2015  
16 EEAS official Brussels 19.6.2015 Group interview 
 EEAS official   Group interview 
17 Former EU official Brussels 19.6.2015  
18 Former DG RELEX official Brussels 22.6.2015  
19 Member state diplomat Brussels 22.6.2015  
20 European Parliament official Brussels 22.6.2015  
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21 European Parliament official Brussels 22.6.2015  
22 EEAS official Brussels 23.6.2015  
23 NGO official Brussels 23.6.2015  
24 Senior DG DEVCO official  Brussels 24.6.2015 Group interview 
 DG DEVCO official 1    
 DG DEVCO official 2    
25 European Parliament official Brussels 24.6.2015  
26 Latin American diplomat Brussels 2.11.2015  
27 Latin American diplomat Brussels 3.11.2015  
28 Latin American diplomat Brussels 3.11.2015  
29 Member state diplomat Brussels 4.11.2015  
30 Member state diplomat 1 Brussels 4.11.2015 Group interview 
 Member state diplomat 2   Group interview 
 Member state diplomat 3   Group interview 
31 Former EU official 
 
Brussels 5.11.2015 Follow-up from 
Interview 17 
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